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Abstract
ABSTRACT
This research investigates how resistance to change can trigger organizational 
learning.
In order to structure the elusive concept of organizational learning, a framework is 
proposed that integrates processes of learning and memory at three levels of analysis. 
The framework identifies learning as cognition at the individual level, communication at 
the group level, and formalization at the organizational level.
The concept of resistance is introduced by delineating its development from a 
mere nuisance to the change effort towards a more recent functional understanding. Fo­
cusing on the diagnostic qualities of resistance, a functional analysis is employed that 
concentrates on the effects of resistance, namely its potential function as a source of 
learning. Informed by an analogy to acute pain, the process is then defined as a se­
quence of resistance, awareness, and organizational learning across three levels of 
analysis.
This process is examined in an empirical case study of a software implementation 
at the British subsidiary of a global manufacturing company headquartered in Germany. 
Methods and data used include personal interviews, repertory grids, and project docu­
mentation.
Results indicate limited resistance at the individual level, confined awareness at 
the individual and group level, and no organizational learning from this source. Resis­
tance was suppressed due to a prevalent dysfunctional understanding of the concept 
among project participants and strong contextual factors, such as a success imperative, 
the inflexibility of the new technology, and a general disinterest in learning and bottom- 
up feedback. ®Hs concluded that organizational learning by resistance depends on the 
understanding of resistance and on the culture of learning in the organization^The re­
sults suggest that not heeding resistance will have opportunity costs in the long run. The 
thesis concludes with hypotheses about the relationship between resistance and learning 
and its contextual influences.
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Preface
PREFACE
In this thesis, I investigate how organizations can learn from emergences of resis­
tance to change. The research focus brings together two theoretical streams and com­
bines them in a sequence that describes resistance as a source of learning in an organiza­
tional context. Consequently, the present study contributes to both the literatures on or­
ganizational learning and resistance to change.
A functional, that is resource-oriented, understanding of resistance depicts a fairly 
recent perspective, as the concept has traditionally been understood as an obstacle or 
mere nuisance in change processes. Organizations today have to deal with changes of a 
frequency, speed, and complexity never experienced before. This makes organizational 
change ubiquitous and resistance to change an equally omnipresent phenomenon. A 
common response by people in professional organizations that I have come across when 
introducing the topic of resistance is: “Oh yes, we have a lot of that in our organization. 
Some of my colleagues/bosses/employees just resist any change, no matter what it may 
bring to them. They often have to be forced to overcome their stubbom- 
ness/laziness/inertia.” Such reactions immediately indicate three of the dominant limita­
tions in past research on resistance; that is, the concept is treated as an individual level 
problem, an ‘observing the other’ perspective is adopted, and any informative potential 
is ignored by focusing entirely on overcoming resistance. In contrast, I examine resis­
tance as a resource in change processes and explore how it can be utilized. Resistance is 
treated as an independent variable and is analyzed for its downstream effects.
The effect of interest in this thesis is organizational learning, a concept of increas­
ing popularity in recent years. In the popular domain the term ‘learning’ seems to cur­
rently be used as a panacea for all sorts of maladies. The idea of lifelong learning is 
promoted as a sheer necessity in the coming information age. The label ‘learning’ is at­
tached not only to organizations, but also to even larger entities. For example, the UK 
Department of Education and Skills (2004) endorses ‘learning cities’ with the goal of a 
‘learning society’, while the German Ministry of Education and Research 
(Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 2004) sponsors ‘learning regions’. 
‘Organizational learning’ on the other hand stands for a concept that is largely confined 
to the academic domain. Here, internal processes and influences are the center of atten­
tion in order to answer the question how organizations might learn. As in the case of
11
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individuals, organizations need input to trigger learning, an ideally informative stimulus 
that functions as a source of learning. Combining the two theoretical streams, the pre­
sent study analyzes resistance to change a source of organizational learning. For this 
purpose, the following chapter structure was developed.
The first chapter is dedicated to the topic of organizational learning. An overview 
of the organizational learning literature is provided initially. Different concepts are ex­
plored, which results in the conclusion that there is little convergence on a comprehen­
sive theory of organizational learning. Given this conclusion, the question of what might 
constitute organizational learning is systematically analyzed. Deriving from characteris­
tics of original learning curve research, I emphasize the necessity to treat learning as a 
process (instead of an outcome) and to not equate learning with subsequent perform­
ance. The procedural perspective enables the identification of agents of learning (who 
does the learning?) that operate on three different levels in the organization. In conse­
quence, learning and memory, as crucial constituents, are discussed for the levels of the 
individual, the group, and the organization. It is argued that any procedural conceptuali­
zation of organizational learning will be incomplete without the described elements. On 
the basis of an assessment of the limitations of earlier process models, an integrated 
framework of learning across three levels of analysis is proposed as the point of origin 
for the empirical assessment.
Resistance to change is introduced as the second theoretical stream of this thesis 
in the second chapter. Examining resistance reveals different components, namely ac­
tors, objects, conditions, manifestations, and perspectives, all of which are discussed in 
detail. The treatment of resistance in academic and management discourse over the past 
few decades is recapitulated to depict a research trajectory that stretches from a dogma 
of overcoming towards a recent awareness of the diagnostic qualities of resistance. 
Hence, a shift in analysis from causes to effects is identified that allows for a re- 
conceptualization. Understanding resistance functionally, informed by an analogy to 
acute pain, facilitates an analysis of its role as a potential source of learning. A sequence 
of resistance-awareness-leaming is proposed as the focus of inquiry. The following re­
search question is stated: How can an organization learn from resistance to change?
12
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A methodology for the empirical part of this thesis is presented in the third chap­
ter. The research strategy chosen is an empirical case study of an organizational change 
project, comprising data from interviews, repertory grids, and the project documenta­
tion. Different types of data are matched with the components of the research focus. 
While the case study method is the research strategy, the research design is a non- 
experimental field study with the purpose of theory building in an exploratory approach. 
Various quality criteria concerning the methodological choices are discussed. The or­
ganization under study is a global manufacturing company headquartered in Germany. 
The actual change project that is analyzed is the implementation of SAP software in 
conjunction with the closure of the distribution warehouse at the company’s UK sub­
sidiary. A detailed account of the methods used and of the actual proceedings of data 
collection and analysis is provided.
In the fourth chapter I present the results of the empirical study. First of all, cer­
tain characteristics of the results are shown. A word count on the interview data illus­
trates the dominance as well as the relative absence of certain themes over others. The 
project documentation is examined for production dates and task frequency across the 
duration of the project. The chapter is then divided according to the components of the 
research focus into four parts on resistance, contextual factors, awareness, and learning. 
Whenever possible a distinction is made between the three groups involved in the pro­
ject, German managers, British managers, and British employees. Data from interviews, 
repertory grids, and the project documentation are combined on all variables of the re­
search focus. Resistance in the project is described briefly as the initial stimulus of an 
expected learning sequence. Contextual factors were found to be a strong influence in 
the project, and they are described in detail for various content areas. Finally, results on 
awareness and learning, which are split according to the three levels of analysis, are pre­
sented.
The fifth and final chapter contains a discussion of the obtained empirical results 
in the light of the theoretical assumptions made in the first two chapters. I reappraise the 
research question of how an organization can learn from resistance to change by revisit­
ing the results and by paying specific attention to the proposed sequence of resistance- 
awareness-leaming at three levels of analysis. As a result, limits of the analogy to acute 
pain are identified and some assumptions are made about the opportunity costs of not
13
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heeding resistance. In the second part of the chapter, the findings pertaining to the inte­
grated framework of learning and memory are elucidated and used to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of this model. The remainder of the chapter is then devoted to 
concluding reflections on the research process, limitations, and considerations for fur­
ther research.
14
Organizational learning
1 ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
“Learning is a crucial activity in a human culture. [...] Learning is the mechanism 
by which organisms can adapt to a changing and nonpredictable environment” 
(Anderson, 1995, p. 1). In any given textbook on learning, fundamental statements of 
this kind introduce the reader to the topic and illustrate the basic idea that learning is 
something good and desirable, and that essentially positive qualities and outcomes are 
attributed to it. Learning has been the key issue of psychology ever since its inception as 
a scientific discipline. Originally preoccupied with an interest in individual learning, 
psychologists and organizational researchers paid attention to the question how people 
learn in collectivities only much later. Today the topic of organizational learning re­
ceives increasing attention from many different areas (Bapuji & Crossan, 2003). Some 
authors already criticize the topic for its common appeal, because the popular and aca­
demic discourse might be too all-embracing, thereby glossing over important intricacies 
and connotations (Contu, Grey, & Ortenblad, 2003). Partly due to the widespread use of 
the concept, it is often unclear what organizational learning supposedly stands for and 
what purpose it serves. In addition, the relative clarity about the processes involved in ‘ 
individual learning cannot be found in research on supra-individual learning.
In this chapter I first seek to illustrate the functionality of learning in organiza­
tions. An extended literature review reflects on the terminology and perceptions of or­
ganizational learning as well as on important characteristics of the concept. Following a 
search for comprehensive theory, organizational learning is then examined for its neces­
sary internal processes, which will be identified and consolidated.
1.1 T h e o r e t ic a l  b a c k g r o u n d
A brief overview of the concept of organization will provide a foundation for the 
pursuit of the question how organizations learn. As the field of organization studies has 
seemingly little paradigmatic consensus, definitions of organizations differ on important 
conceptual issues as well as methodological approaches to study them (Pfeffer, 1993). 
However, there are some essential points of agreement that either stem from the basic 
nature of a statement or the dominance of some theoretical framework. Emphasizing the 
latter I will use open systems theory (Katz & Kahn, 1978) as an initial point of entry.
15
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At the most basic level formal organizations can be understood as entities, which 
transform, or support the transformation of, some form of input into some form of out­
put. As such, this coordinated, that is organized, transformation process represents the 
basic purpose of the organization (Duncan & Weiss, 1979). A transformation perspec­
tive implies some form of boundary that segregates the organization from its environ­
ment, while allowing the organization to operate input-throughput-output processes as 
an open system (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Hence, boundaries must be permeable, with the 
permeability to some degree under the control of the organization. Boundaries facilitate 
an internally and externally perceived identity, a logo, a name, a public appearance as a 
unit, and a legal status.
An instrumental perspective proposes that organizations are aimed at achieving 
some goals or purposes (Beehr, 1995; Scott, 1992), they are target-oriented and seek to 
obtain certain objectives that could not be achieved through individual action alone 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 23). The first and foremost goal organizations pursue ap­
pears to be their own survival or self-perpetuation. Given that organizations operate in 
changing and often competitive environments, they require constant adaptation in the 
form of a dynamic homeostasis to maintain their steady state. This need for constant 
adaptation arises not only from a changing environment but also from a natural ten­
dency for organizations to become disorganized, a principle that Katz & Kahn (1978) 
borrow from the natural sciences, namely negative entropy. Underlying the constant ad­
aptation is also a desire to maintain efficiency in the input-throughput-output cycles.
If an organization’s crucial goals are adaptation and efficiency, learning seems to 
be indispensable in accomplishing them (Dodgson, 1993). While other factors such as 
motivation might certainly be influential, learning encompasses the essence of the goals 
depicted above. Nicolini & Meznar (1995, p. 738) rephrase this by asking the question 
whether organizations can ever '‘not learn ’ in the pursuit of their goals? Their answer to 
this is ‘No’, especially when organizations are symbolized as “the product of thought 
and action of their members” (Gioia & Sims, 1986, p. 1) or “the body of thought 
thought by organizational thinkers” (Weick, 1979, p. 2), which adds the notion of mean­
ing systems and deliberate interpretation to the open systems concept (Daft & Weick, 
1984). Thus learning seems to be a continuous process inherent in organizations. 
Adapted to commercial environments, organizations can also be seen as social commu­
nities specializing in speed and efficiency in the creation and transfer of knowledge
16
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(Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996). In sum, the bulk of the psychological and management 
literature sees learning as the highest form of adaptation, raising the probability of sur­
vival in changing environments (Anderson, 1995; Houston, 1991) and increasing effi­
ciency in producing desired outcomes (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Donaldson, 1995; 
Senge, 1990a).
After these initial assumptions about the ‘positivity’ of learning, the next step will 
be to examine specific instances and reasons, that is, to explore the potentially func­
tional values of learning for organizations. Shrivastava (1983, p. 10) presents a schema- 
tization of different perspectives on organizational learning. Following and extending 
his thoughts, the categories introduced in the subsequent paragraphs represent new de­
velopments in the literature and more strongly emphasize the functional values of or­
ganizational learning in order to develop an argument for further analysis of internal 
processes.
1.2 P e r c e p t io n s  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  l e a r n in g
Pfeffer’s (1993) conclusion that there is little consensus in organization studies in 
general seems to hold for the topic of organizational learning specifically. There are 
various viewpoints depending on the theoretical background of the viewer, as will be 
elaborated later. Scholars conceptualize learning, individual and organizational, using 
different perceptions, which correspond to different fields of interest. These perceptions 
describe learning primarily in non-procedural terms (i.e. outcome-focused) and should 
probably be understood as complementary to one another.
1.2.1 Learning as adaptation
Organizations are not isolated entities that perform under stable inner and outer * 
conditions. Instead, they are subject to constant environmental and technological « 
changes which force them to interact in an increasingly adaptive manner in order to sur­
vive. Employing established evolutionary theories, this is not a new idea. Continual ex­
perimentation and adaptation to a changing set of circumstances together resemble the 
mechanism that governs the survival of every organism on the planet, as sketched out
17
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by Charles Darwin. By adding deliberate intention, this Darwinian approach is only a 
short step from describing learning, although learning need not necessarily be inten­
tional (Bower & Hilgard, 1981; Huber, 1991). Yet learning inherently includes and fa­
cilitates potential adaptation. As Hedberg (1981) remarks, this adaptation can be per- . 
formed in two directions, as defensive adjustment to reality and as offensive improve­
ment of the fit between the organization and the environment. Organizations may also 
shape their environments, as in the case of Microsoft Corporation setting de facto indus­
try standards for computer operating systems in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This, 
however, seems to be a somewhat rare exception to the rule (Davis & Powell, 1992).
Mainstream contingency theory focuses on the alignment between the organiza­
tion’s inner structures and outer environment. As such, the organization ideally must be v 
designed to meet the demands of its environment (Duncan & Weiss, 1979). In this view, 
organizational learning becomes the process of identifying environmental changes and 
organizational contexts, and successfully coping with them; a clearly reactive or even 
passive view of organizational nature. Other theorists, however, criticize the contin­
gency approach for its unrealistic dichotomization of organization and environment, and 
emphasize the importance of aligning the internal environment while stressing the inter­
pretive nature of the external environment (Pondy & Mitroff, 1979; Weick, 1979). 
Those authors that consider a middle position face the question which fit is most impor­
tant, as it might be unattainable to simultaneously achieve internal and external fit 
(Miller, 1992). A third approach, population ecology, abandons the concept of organiza- 
tion-environment fit altogether and argues that organizations have a very limited stake 
in assuring their own survival. Instead, success or failure is determined entirely by envi­
ronmental forces in the form of a selection by agents such as the world economy, com­
petition, or customers (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1988).
From a management science perspective, learning is seen as a purposive, adaptive 
endeavor to retain and improve competitiveness, productivity, and innovativeness in 
uncertain technological and market circumstances (Applebaum & Gallagher, 2000; 
Boemer, Macher, & Teece, 2001; Chaston, Badger, & Sadler-Smith, 2000; Cyert & 
March, 1963; de Geus, 1988; Dodgson, 1993; Dumaine, 1994; Hodgson, 1995; Senge, 
1990b; Stata, 1989; von Rosenstiel & Koch, 2001). Strategically, the basic line of 
thought is that competitive battles are won by organizational capability rather than new 
products, resources, or market position (Hedberg & Wolff, 2001). The greater the uncer­
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tainties, the greater the need for learning (Levinthal, 1991). In that sense, learning might 
provide the underlying theme for a Darwinian approach to organizational survival.
1.2.2 Learning as comprehension o f complexity
Organizations encounter increasing complexity within and outside their bounda­
ries. In an age of mega-mergers and continuing diversification, even the main parame­
ters of an organization’s inner and outer environment might become hard to compre­
hend. In this light, organizational learning can fulfill a number of functions: It can pro­
vide a means of orientation and uncertainty avoidance (de Geus, 1988; Galer & van der 
Heijden, 1992; Huber, 1991; Wenzler & Chartier, 1999). It can be an essential tool in 
understanding history or the effect of historical developments on the present (Busby, 
1999; Levitt & March, 1988). It can contribute to the efficacy of information dissemina­
tion (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Isaacs, 1993; Nonaka, 1994; Schein, 1993). And it can 
support the formation and shaping of a common organizational culture (Kofman & 
Senge, 1993; Nicolini & Meznar, 1995; Sonntag, 1996; Weick & Westley, 1996). 
Therefore, over and above the perception of organizational learning as an adaptive 
mechanism, it also appears to provide coping resources in the management of complex 
environments.
1.2.3 Learning as knowledge creation
A paradigm of traditional organizational theory is the view of the organization as  ^
a system that processes information. But, as Nonaka (1994) notes, such a view focuses 7 
almost exclusively on the concept of what is given to the organization without due con­
sideration of what is created by it. Organizations create knowledge, both declarative/ 
(i.e. facts) and procedural (i.e. know-how, scripts), or explicit and tacit - and they do so 
by means of learning (Nonaka, 1994). While the validity of the produced knowledge/ 
might be called into question in many cases, learning and knowledge creation usually 
increase an organization’s capacity to perform (Tsang, 1997). In addition, from an eco­
nomic perspective knowledge as a form of capital, if compared to other forms (i.e. land, 
equipment, labor and money), is theoretically infinite (McElroy, 2000).
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1,2.4Learning as intelligence and innate behavior
Considering its adaptive and productive qualities, organizational learning can also 
be understood as a form of intelligence. Levitt & March (1988) note this aspect in their 
elaboration of learning from experience, yet at the same time the authors caution that 
“learning does not always lead to intelligent behavior” (p. 335). But if learning is com­
pared with other serious alternatives like bargaining or selection, those seem to be much 
more error prone, leading to the conclusion that although intelligence in learning is of­
ten frustrated, it nevertheless occurs rather frequently.
Finally, building on the notion of man as homo sapiens, a wise and knowing spe­
cies, a desire to learn and explore is innate to human beings (Houston, 1991). Even 
though this last argument does not generate a case for a specifically collective or organ­
izational form of learning - after all, the need to explore and experiment could also be 
satiated individually - it sheds light on the predominant orientation of most commercial 
organizations towards controlling rather than cultivating their members’ natural curios­
ity and impulse to learn (Senge, 1990b).
In summary it can be concluded that organizational learning evokes a number of 
different perspectives, and can be attested some important positive outcomes. This is 
reflected in the raised interest the topic has received in the academic community while 
at the same time becoming a ‘buzzword’ in management literature. In a bibliographic 
review Crossan & Guatto (1996) show that as many academic papers on the subject 
were published in 1993 as in the whole decade of the 1980s. The rise from 3 articles in 
the 1960s, 19 in the 1970s, 50 in the 1980s through to 184 in the 1990s (up to only 
1994) significantly outpaces the overall rise in publications during that entire time pe­
riod. In a follow-up study, Babuji & Crossan (2003) report a 25-fold increase in publica­
tions on organizational learning between 1990 and 2002. Moreover, in terms of man­
agement semantics, the subject obtained some rather dramatic emphases such as: “The , 
rate at which organizations learn may become the only sustainable source of competi­
tive advantage in business” (Stata, 1989, p. 64) or “the ability to learn faster than com- * 
petitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage” (de Geus, 1988, p. 71).
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After the introduction of different general perceptions of organizational learning, a 
descent from the meta-level towards the description of specific key characteristics will 
complement the literature review in the following.
1.3 C h a r a c t e r ist ic s  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  l e a r n in g
In addressing defining characteristics of the construct under investigation, an out­
line of the ideas behind key descriptive terms is necessary. The ongoing discussion is 
not a sterile academic debate but involves active participation from scholars represent­
ing a diverse range of disciplines and cultures (Bertoin Antal, Dierkes, Child, & 
Nonaka, 2001b), which will be elaborated later. Although there is disagreement about 
various components, a strong effort towards consensus building could channel research 
into new areas without having to constantly reinvent the wheel. Maier, Prange & Rosen- 
stiel (2001) also remind scholars of inherent ramifications for empirical work, as many 
definitorial approaches seem impossible to operationalize. Given that definitions of or­
ganizational learning are subject to controversy and flux, the following pages comprise 
a collection of defining characteristics rather than depict a concise definition (for earlier 
reviews of definitions of organizational learning see Fiol & Lyles, 1985; or Prange, 
1999). The quest for a definition or theory consensus will then be discussed afterwards 
in section 1.4.
1.3.1 Organizational learning vs. the learning organization
As the notion of organizational learning was taken on by the prophets of practical 
management theory, an interest in the defining elements of the concept, applied to the 
real world, emerged under the label ‘the learning organization’. A decisive introductory 
moment, especially for professionals in the management consulting industry, was cer­
tainly the publication of Peter Senge’s The Fifth Discipline (1990a), spreading the word 
of an alleged new vision in management thinking. Since then the idea of the learning 
organization has led to the creation of numerous guides and practical handbooks, and 
for a number of years there has been a growing dichotomy between two streams of re­
search.
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Although sometimes used interchangeably, the terms ‘organizational learning’ and , 
‘learning organization’ represent distinctly different concepts, illustrated by the underly­
ing questions “How does an organization learn?” versus “How should an organization . 
learn?” (Tsang, 1997). The literature on organizational learning is analytic and concen- / 
trates on understanding learning processes within organizational settings. It employs a . 
descriptive approach and portrays certain types of activities that take place in an organi­
zation, without necessarily trying to change those activities. Moreover, although there is 
a paucity of descriptive studies, the existing studies generally apply agreed-upon meth­
odology and are scientifically rigorous in their designs. In contrast, literature on the 
learning organization is mostly action oriented and attempts to create an ideal type of 
organization, one in which learning is maximized (Easterby-Smith, 1997). Thus, a 
learning organization is one that is good at organizational learning, even though this 
might obfuscate entity with process. With practitioners as targets, writings are prescrip­
tive and provide practical guidelines, often based on the authors’ own consulting ex­
perience (Garratt, 1987). As such, the illustrated examples and more so the ensuing gen­
eralizations seldom follow rigorous research methodologies, but provide ex post facto 
interpretations that are often either vague or of doubtful validity. Moreover, case studies 
based on action research, where consultants systematically study the consequences of 
changes and initiatives that they themselves participated in generating, might not pro­
vide a sufficient degree of objectivity when it comes to reporting strong critique of 
methods and outcomes. As Easterby-Smith (1997) notes, much of the work emitted 
from MIT’s influential Center for Organizational Learning falls into this category. A 
last point worth mentioning is that authors in the realm of the learning organization 
draw heavily from the organizational learning literature while this is not the case vice 
versa, further indicating the difference in targeted audience and message content be­
tween the two streams.
Positioning the present work in respect to the two dominant perspectives of the 
topic, this thesis is placed within the organizational learning approach.
1.3.2 Types o f learning
A number of researchers have identified different kinds of organizational learning 
and attempted to categorize them with varying cluster labels. Since these terminologies 
are often inconsistent and lead to confusion when comparing different concepts, the use
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of Pawlowsky, Forslin & Reinhardt’s (2001) classification terms is proposed here. 
These authors coherently distinguish between learning level, learning type, and learning „ 
mode. The learning level represents what will be described later as level of analysis, that, 
is, individual, group, and organization. The learning mode differentiates between cogni­
tive and behavioral learning (in addition, Pawlowsky et al., 2001, list cultural learning). 
Types of learning are the subject of this paragraph.
Scholars in the field have recognized various types of organizational learning. The 
approaches stem mainly from the realms of management science and organizational de­
velopment, and differentiate between intensities of learning. Some persuasive concepts 
receive both widespread acceptance in the academic literature and unmistakable appeal 
to professional contexts, especially management consulting (Schmolze, 2000).
The latter observation receives ample verification in the work of Argyris & Schon
(1978). These authors elaborate Bateson’s (1972) description of two ‘levels’ of learning/ 
(i.e. types in our terminology), that is learning skills within a context and learning how 
to learn. They develop a three-fold typology of learning that is bound together by a the-^ 
ory of action and integrates the stages single-loop, double-loop and deutero-leaming.
Single-loop learning describes a process that maintains the central features of an ✓ 
organization’s ‘theory-in-use’ (actual rules used to manage an organization’s beliefs) 
and restricts itself to detecting and correcting errors within that given system of rules. 
Single-loop learning stands for an adaptation to present problems, but it does not solve 
the more basic issue of why these problems exist in the first place. A practical analogy 
to this is a thermostat. It detects the temperature of the surrounding air and turns the 
heat on or off when it gets too cold or too warm. It does not, however, address the ques­
tion why the temperature changed beyond the acceptable range.
In contrast, double-loop learning occurs when an error is detected and corrected in /  
ways that involve modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and ob­
jectives. This form of learning challenges and alters the theories-in-use. Fundamental 
values and assumptions, which govern the stated goals, come to the surface and are 
changed. Extending the thermostat example, double-loop learning has taken place when 
the thermostat is, for example, recalibrated as opposed to simply having it limit the am­
plitude size o f temperature changes.
Deutero-leaming differs to some extent from the other two forms as it pertains to , 
the need for organizations to leam how to carry out single and double-loop learning. It
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consists of inquiry into the learning system by which an organization detects and cor- ( 
rects its errors and therefore occupies some meta-level. Swieringa & Wierdsma (1992) 
adopt Argyris & Schon’s first two stages, but replace the idea of learning to learn with 
their concept of triple-loop learning. This happens when the essential principles on 
which the organization is founded come into question, when doubts are raised about the 
role it aims to fulfill and the identity it has.
Similar types of organizational learning, resembling those put forth by Argyris & 
Schon (1978), are postulated by other authors. Hedberg (1981) provides three types of 
learning based on stimulus changes in the organization-environment relationship that he 
labels adjustment learning, turnover learning, and turnaround learning. While the former 
two correspond to single and double-loop learning, the latter is closer to the triple-loop 
concept.
The single versus double-loop dichotomy and its inherent ideas are also found in 
Miles & Randolph’s (1980) differentiation between reactive and proactive learning, Fiol 
& Lyles’ (1985) lower and higher level learning, Dutton & Jackson’s (1987) behavioral 
level and strategy level learning, and Senge’s (1990a; 1990b) suggestion of adaptive 
and generative learning1. Fiol & Lyles (p. 810) list generic characteristics that encapsu­
late the main ideas from the concepts illustrated above (Table 1.1). Again, what Dutton 
& Jackson and Fiol & Lyles originally labeled as ‘levels’ corresponds to ‘types’ in Paw- 
lowsky et al.’s (2001) classification. In utilizing an inherent assumption of different 
stages of increasing sophistication and complexity, the types listed here propose a hier­
archy of learning with evolutionary connotations, an assumption of progressively desir­
able learning stages.
A learning type that has a somewhat unique status is unlearning. It is recognized - 
that knowledge sometimes disappears from an organization’s active memory, it is no 
longer used. Given Hedberg’s (1981, p. 18) definition of unlearning as “a process'' 
through which learners discard knowledge”, emphasizing a functional and perhaps in­
tentional notion, organizational unlearning can be classified as yet another type of or­
ganizational learning (McGill & Slocum, 1993; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).
1 For a list of concepts reflecting the single- versus double-loop dichotomy see Pawlovsky (2001, p. 77)
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Table 1.1: Types of learning
Lower-level* Higher-level*
Characteristics Occurs through repetition Occurs through use of heuristics and in­
sights
Routine Non-routine
Control over immediate task, rule and Development o f differentiated struc­
structures tures, rules, etc. to deal with lack of
Well-understood context control
Occurs at all levels in organization Ambiguous context 
Occurs mostly in upper levels
Consequence Behavioral outcomes Insights, heuristics, and collective con­
sciousness
Examples Institutionalizes formal rules New missions and new definitions of 
direction
Adjustments in management systems Agenda setting
Problem-solving skills Problem-defining skills 
Development of new myths, stories, 
and culture
♦the term ‘level’ corresponds to ‘type’ in the terminology adopted from Pawlowsky et al. (2001)
Advocates of unlearning are concerned that redundant and unsuccessful content of . 
memory might compromise organizational decision processes, especially when faced 
with rapid environmental change. As a result, organizations are advised to treat their 
memories as enemies at times (March & Olsen, 1979), collectively identify and remove 
inherited cultural obstacles to creating a learning organization (Finger & Brand, 1999), 
or abandon outlived conventional environments (McGill & Slocum, 1993). Following 
this advice, it is worth noting that unlearning can lead to a reduction in (potential) be­
haviors or to a reduction of constraints on (potential) behaviors, resulting in either a de­
crease or increase in subsequent behavioral outcomes. In relation to outcomes, Huber 
(1991) differentiates between temporal inactivity, initiation for a focused search for sub­
stitutes of the unlearned content, and new learning as effects of the unlearning process.
As organizational learning is an activity essentially made up of individuals -  an 
assumption that will receive more attention later in sections 1.6 and 1.7 -  a radical form 
of deliberate unlearning is the dismissal of members of the organization. However, ac­
commodating new members also entails individual unlearning as part of the socializa­
tion process, resulting in loss of information the new members possess upon entry 
(Huber, 1991). The hint of organizational learning and unlearning as a function of per­
sonnel selection and socialization receives attention in March (1991), who identifies two 
trajectories within the socialization process: The organizational code of received truth is 
learning from the beliefs and practices of individuals, and individuals are learning the
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organizational code. This mutual adaptation enables individuals to grow into the organi-
i
zation by learning the code, and the code is developed by individuals who initially devi- 
| ate from it. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a system-level, long-term advan-
i  tage in slowing socialization to the code, but an individual-level, short-term advantage
i
in fast socialization.
As much as unlearning might be favored from an adaptive, evolutionary perspec­
tive on organizational learning, the crucial role of intelligent decision formation and im­
plementation based on sound memory content needs to be strongly highlighted. Integrat­
ing both points of view, Hedberg (1981, pp. 19-20)) concludes:
“Balances between organizations’ abilities to learn and to unlearn appear <■ 
necessary for long-term survival. Unlearning abilities are needed in order to 
make room for more adequate interpretative frameworks and responses in or­
ganizational memory. Learning abilities are needed to generate new knowl­
edge and to adjust and update existing knowledge.”
This integrative aspect has been elaborated in later works, and Klein (1989) ar­
gues that the original unlearning model has too strong a focus on discarding knowledge 
altogether instead of adequately transforming it. This idea is reflected in the concept of 
absorptive capacity, the ability of an organization to harness its prior related knowledge, 
to recognize the value of new information, and then to assimilate and apply it (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990).
1.3.3 Organizational learning and organizational design
Organizational design creates, develops and often dictates communication and in­
teraction within an organization and across its boundaries. It is the “allocation of re­
sources and people and the structuring of the organization to carry out its objectives” 
(Duncan & Weiss, 1979, p. 103). Since the structure of an organization is found to have 
decisive effects on the interaction of its members, various scholars have examined the 
topic in order to determine which types of organizational design inhibit or enhance or­
ganizational learning.
Embedded in the basic organization-environment fit paradigm, Duncan & Weiss
(1979) study the relationship between learning, strategy and design (see Figure 1.1). 
Although learning is not required for strategy formulation and design, the ideal process 
sees organizational learning as providing knowledge to devise a strategy that is respon-
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sive to a particular task environment. Knowledge generated through learning, in combi­
nation with strategic objectives, then both affect the design to be implemented. A design 
that emerges out of such a process will sustain organizational effectiveness by enabling 
attainment of goals and objectives, adaptation to the environment, and role clarification 
for individuals.
Learning
Action-outcome knowledge
Action-outcome knowledge
Design
Action-outcome knowledge
Strategy
Figure 1.1: Relationship between learning, strategy, and organizational design
If resulting designs are based in part on knowledge about action-outcome relation­
ships, the causal inference that a particular action leads to a particular outcome can be 
corroborated. But since organizations consist of many individuals, actions of single in­
dividuals are embedded in an ecology of the actions of many others, obscuring the attri­
bution of causes to effects. In order to decrease interaction effects in complex organiza­
tions, departmentalization or sequential attention allows for the examination of local 
consequences (Levinthal & March, 1993). However, such segregation often entails loss 
of awareness of the bigger picture. One way to combat this is tight coupling of the sys­
tem, keeping short linkages with few buffers, redundancies, and possible delays, as in 
just-in-time inventory systems for example. The argument in favor of tightly coupled 
systems is that such structures enhance learning by making problems, arising through 
ongoing operations, more visible and observable.
Bringing the two perspectives together, the function of loose coupling in order to 
examine consequences and confirm action-outcome relationships seems to contradict 
the function of tight coupling to augment problem detection. Levinthal & March (1993) 
suggest that loosely coupled systems make locally confined diagnostics easier while 
tightly coupled systems are better for system-wide error detection. Striking a balance 
between the two strategies apparently depends on the frequency of errors and the diffi­
culty of diagnosis.
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The recognition that certain structures are more conducive to learning than others r 
implies a recommendation to always conduct the design process with the objective of 
maximizing organizational learning potential. On this note, Shrivastava (1983) catego­
rizes six different types of learning systems and examines their characteristics and rami­
fications. He uses the term learning systems to indicate the mechanisms by which learn­
ing is perpetuated and institutionalized in organizations. In differentiating between one 
man institutions, mythological learning systems, information seeking cultures, participa­
tive learning systems, formal management systems, and bureaucratic learning systems, 
he discusses each system’s idiosyncrasies and proposes a typology for further research. 
Shrivastava concludes on the notion that the learning capabilities of an organization can , 
be enhanced by deliberate and knowledgeable design processes.
Elaborating on aspects of design, it should be noted that there are limits to formal­
ized structure. Official organigrams, standard operating procedures, and recognized job 
descriptions often obscure the actual practices of organizational members. Brown & 
Duguid’s (1991) arguments about informal communities-of-practice, which account for 
a substantial amount of the learning and innovating activities in organizations, empha­
size this point. By recognizing the many noncanonical communities in its midst and 
reconceiving of itself as a community-of-communities, especially large organizations 
can, in this view, accommodate leaming-in-working and spur innovation.
The idea that structure is an outcome of learning, however, must be challenged by 
the considerations of macro organizational theory. According to Fiol & Lyles (1985), 
centralized and decentralized decision-making structures have very different impacts on 
the organization’s learning ability. Centralized structures often reinforce past behavior,/ 
while decentralized structures permit the assimilation of deviant behavior. Certain or­
ganizational forms, such as self-designing organizations or adhocracies, are particularly 
good at adapting to changing environments, fostering creativity, and innovating in re­
sponse to environmental demands. Others, such as bureaucracies, excel at managing the  ^
status quo and exploiting the efficiency potential of standardized procedures. Crudely > 
stated, self-designing organizations learn, while bureaucracies organize (Weick & 
Westley, 1996). The latter statement, however, needs to be attenuated, since the exploi­
tation of efficiency potential is also a form of learning, as will be elaborated further be­
low.
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Taking into account all different perspectives, there seems to be a reciprocal rela­
tionship between organizational learning and organizational design. Knowledge ac­
quired though learning influences the design process, and design affects the learning 
process.
1.3.4 Limits and cautions o f learning
Organizations that move beyond the founding stage and mature generally try to 
learn from experience (and they often fail in doing so). They devote considerable energy 
into developing understandings of experience and history. But historical events or criti­
cal incidents tend to be rare and infrequent, which renders as the basis of learning a very 
small sample of experience (March, Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). Learning from fragments 
of history can be improved by attempts to experience history richly. Such approaches 
include experiencing more aspects of events (e.g., intensive focus on critical incidents), 
more interpretations (e.g., by multiple observers), or more preferences (e.g., modifying 
aspiration levels). Simulating experience is another form of supplementing history by 
creating near or hypothetical histories. Such histories draw on a richer, less polarized set 
of interpretations, but they are error-prone due to their imaginary nature. However, in 
both cases of enhancing learning from historical events, issues of reliability and validity 
are under question, and they should be considered in any interpretative effort.
Organizations consist of individuals that balance community and altruistic moti­
vations with personal aspirations. As individuals or groups within organizations com­
pete for scarce resources and positions, a micro political perspective on learning must be 
considered. This mostly sociologically influenced view focuses on the question why in / 
some cases organizations don 7 learn. The essential argument states that an unhindered < 
transfer of knowledge is politically naive because knowledge and information are vital 
resources of power in organizations (Child & Heavens, 2001; Kluge & Schilling, 2000). 
Since the prototypes of the learning organization advocate a decrease of rules and for- I 
malized structures in exchange for free exploration and interaction, political activity is 
likely to increase in such cases (Kanter, 1989).
The micro-political perspective emphasizes relations of hierarchy and power, and 
points to conflicts over interests, beliefs, and resources. In modem organizations, the 
link between power and expertise has been often decoupled. Recognizing that skills and
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imaginations are intertwined with social and institutional structures, scholars have pro­
posed a study of power as both the ongoing product and the medium of collective activ­
ity (Blackler & McDonald, 2000). Taking the power issues as a given, Coopey & Bur- 
goyne (2000) argue that organizational learning can be facilitated by a free and open 
form of politics in the workplace, and call for a framework of legitimate authority that 
regulates interaction.
In addressing the general problem of governance, Coopey (1995) questions the/ 
egalitarian assumption and asks who will determine the overall direction of the learning 
organization, who will ‘call the shots’ in the end, and whose knowledge should be privi­
leged over others’? In addition, Coopey (1995) envisages the danger that organizational ' 
learning can be misused as simply another tool to spread the ideology of commitment 
and motivation, to exert power in the organization through strong ideological pressures 
(see Victor & Stephens, 1994, for a general discussion of the negative aspects of new 
organizational forms). In sum, internal politics must be taken into account as strong in­
fluential factors in devising any strategic learning and change objectives as well as in 
any discussion of procedural aspects of organizational learning.
The adaptive processes that underlie one possible rationale for organizational 
learning sustain two opposing strategies for gaining competitive advantage and ulti­
mately survival. Organizations can explore their environments, develop new ideas, 
search for new markets, and experiment with new alternatives. Conversely, they can 
refine existing technologies, extend proven competences, optimize production effi­
ciency, and improve traditional paradigms.
In the latter case of an exploitation strategy, frequent use of confirmed routines / 
might increase the relating competencies and successful outcomes, which will result in 
an even more frequent use. This course of action, however, can ignore new develop- / 
ments and lead to competency traps, which occur
. .when favorable performance with an inferior procedure leads an organiza­
tion to accumulate more experience with it, thus keeping experience with a 
superior procedure inadequate to make it rewarding to use.” (Levitt & March,
1988, p. 322)
Competency traps are sensitive to learning rates, which leads to the assumption 
that fast learning might not be desirable under all circumstances because it can result in
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maladaptive specialization2. A classic example of the negative long-term consequences / 
of an over-reliance on distinctive competence is provided in Abernathy & Wayne’s 
(1974) account of Ford’s pursuit of efficient production of the Model T. The company 
achieved considerable efficiency and cost reduction concerning this car, but met ex­
traordinary difficulties in the transition to a new model, which required amongst other 
things the closing of a manufacturing plant for several months. On a broader level nu­
merous examples of the competency trap concept, such as the QWERTY typewriter 
keyboard or the internal combustion engine, provide ample support for the transforma­
tion of seemingly suboptimal technologies into industry standards and stable arrange­
ments (Dierkes, Hoffmann, & Marz, 1996; Levitt & March, 1988).
On the other hand, exploration strategies run the risk of uncertain returns, longer, 
time horizons, and more diffuse effects. Exploration is a key determinant of long-term 
intelligence, but reduces the speed at which skills in existing alternatives are improved.
March (1991) discusses the trade-off between exploration and exploitation in de­
tail. He presumes that because of its mostly positive, proximate, and predictable returns 
on allocated resources, exploitation is in most cases the more attractive alternative for 
organizations. But while refining exploitation strategies might produce positive out-/ 
comes in the short run, a sole reliance upon this alternative is likely to be self­
destructive in the long run. In order to attain an optimal mix of exploration and exploita­
tion, Levinthal & March (1993, pp. 107-109) offer strategies for sustaining exploration 
that operate on either incentives, organizational structure, individual beliefs, or selection 
processes. Their ideas include assigning property rights to successful search activities, 
designing new venture subunits, influencing risk preferences, and increasing the sam­
pling of failure performances in internal selection. Employing a group-level perspective, 
Edmondson (2002) suggests that certain types of teams might be predominantly active 
in one of the two domains, often as a function of their role description. Development 
teams, for example, are prone to explore, while production teams are more likely to ex­
ploit.
Two more difficulties of organizational learning are addressed in Levitt & 
March’s (1988, p. 325) paper. The appraisal of any learning process depends on the
2 The detrimental effects of fast socialization of new organizational members, a form o f fast learning, 
have been identified in the discussion of unlearning.
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evaluation of outcomes as successes or failures. Successes are typically defined in terms 
of the relation between performance outcomes and targets. This carries an inherent 
problem because targets change over time in that either the indicators of success are 
modified, or levels of aspiration vary. Looking at the ambiguity of success from a dif­
ferent perspective, a cycle of events is imaginable where success generates confidence, 
which augments over-generalization of experience (i.e. no external validity). This might ' 
result in a subsequent lack of seeking new experience, and thus ultimately in failure. 
Miller (1994) identified inertia as an often unintended consequence of successful per­
formance. Inertia, defined as an “inability for organizations to change as rapidly as the 
environment” (Pfeffer, 1997, p. 163), arises as successful organizations abandon factors 
regarded as peripheral to success. Subsequently, they become more inattentive to 
change indicators, less self-reflexive in their processes, and overly simplified in their 
adaptation.
On the other hand, experiencing failure can also result in inappropriate action, 
leading to more failure (Kieser, Beck, & Tainio, 2001). In times of organizational crises, /  
probable centralization of authority and low levels o f risk taking can lead to an increase 
in organizational rigidity that is likely to result in resistance, conflict, and defensiveness. 
As these dynamics instill fear and paralyze management, the failure becomes high­
lighted and will set off further rounds of failure and unrewarding change. In order to , 
avoid such developments, strong arguments about explicitly analyzing and learning 
from failures are being made (Klein, 1989; Levinthal & March, 1993).
Another misinterpretation problem is superstitious learning. It occurs when the ' 
subjective experience of learning is compelling, but the connections between actions 
and outcomes are misspecified. In such instances, a specific positive or negative out­
come is attributed to the adoption or abandonment o f a particular routine when, in fact, 
there is no causal relationship whatsoever. The subjective feeling of learning might be 
powerful, but it is misleading (Levitt & March, 1988).
In summarizing some of the difficulties above, Levinthal & March (1993) pro­
vocatively spell out three problems of Teaming myopia’: The tendency to overlook dis­
tant times, distant places, and failure. Organizational learning repeatedly seems to favor 
the short run, ignore the larger picture, and privilege only the lessons gained from suc­
cess, as was shown above. Although learning, therefore, is less than a panacea for or­
ganizations, the imperfections of learning should not be misunderstood as reasons to
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abandon attempts to improve the learning capabilities of organizations. After all, de­
signing organizations to learn from experience and to exploit generated knowledge and 
experience is possible. But given the imperfections identified, the authors suggest a cer­
tain conservatism in expectations.
1.4 S e e k in g  t h e o r y
After the introductory considerations, and before a detailed account of inherent 
characteristics, organizational learning needs to be observed again from a meta-level 
standpoint. A discussion of different perspectives on organizational learning can serve 
as an initial indicator for the fact that there is a large degree of fragmentation in this 
field. Tsang (1997, p. 82) acknowledges this by saying that “an overarching framework 
which cohesively pulls together all the theoretical advances into a unified theory is lack­
ing at the moment”. Numerous authors share his view of an irritating absence of a cohe­
sive theory and call for conjoint efforts from various academic disciplines towards de­
veloping one (e.g. Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Hedberg, 1981; Hodgson, 1995; Huber, 1991; 
Kluge & Schilling, 2000).
In contrast, Easterby-Smith (1997) argues that approaches to organizational learn­
ing are based on distinct, and largely incompatible, views of the nature of learning itself. 
He provides an account of six main disciplines, each with its own ontological assump­
tions, contributions, and problem sets (see Table 1.2): Psychology/organizational devel­
opment, management science, organizational theory, strategy, production management 
and cultural anthropology. The disciplines’ inherent ideas have infiltrated and influ­
enced the territory of organizational learning and have spawned different perspectives. 
Easterby-Smith (1997) concludes that development might best be pursued within each 
of these areas, challenging attempts to create a single framework. Thus, organizational 
learning should be considered as a multidisciplinary field containing complementary 
contributions and research agendas.
33
Organizational learning
Table 1.2: Disciplines of organizational learning
Discipline Ontology Contributions/Ideas Problematics
Psychology 
and OD
Human de­
velopment
Hierarchical organization; importance of 
context; cognition; underlying values; 
learning styles; dialogue
Defensive routines; individ­
ual to collective transfer
Management
science
Information
processing
Knowledge; memory; holism; error cor­
rection; informating; single and double 
loop
Nonrational behavior; short 
vs. long term; information 
overload; unlearning
Sociology 
and organiza­
tional theory
Social struc­
tures
Effects of power structure and hierarchy; 
conflict is normal; ideology and rhetoric; 
interests o f actors
Conflict o f interests; organ­
izational politics
Strategy Competi­
tiveness
Organization-environment interface; lev­
els o f learning progressively more desir­
able; networks; importance of direct ex­
perience; population-level learning
Environmental alignment; 
competitive pressures; gen­
eral vs. technical learning
Production
management
Efficiency Importance of productivity; learning 
curves; endogenous and exogenous 
sources of learning; links to production 
design
Limitations of unidimen­
sional measurement; uncer­
tainty about outcomes
Cultural an­
thropology
Meaning
systems
Culture as cause and effect of organiza­
tional learning; beliefs; potential cultural 
superiority
Instability and relativity of 
culture as barrier to transfer 
o f ideas; whose perspective 
dominates?
While it goes beyond the scope of these introductory pages to discuss all the 
points addressed in Table 1.2, many points addressed in the contributions and problem­
atics columns will be covered in later sections. However, for now Table 1.2 should 
demonstrate the degree of fragmentation and the diversity of issues of interest.
The research in organizational learning has also been accused of being non- 
cumulative in a sense that current studies seldom build on past research results (Tsang, 
1997). In relation to this, Mackenzie (1994) even goes so far as to proclaim that after 30 
years of research in the field, no discernible intellectual progress has been produced. 
However, Prange (1999) questions the feasibility of cumulative research in organiza­
tional learning. She argues that both, the non-cumulativeness and the differentiated con­
tributions of organizational learning theories are related to their underlying meta­
theories. The core distinction to be made is between a prescriptive, positivist approach 
that purports an objective generalizability of social science, and a descriptive, subjectiv­
ist approach that assumes reality to be socially constructed (Burell & Morgan, 1979). 
From an anti-positivist viewpoint, it is nothing unusual to have divergent perspectives, 
and non-cumulativeness might also be interpreted as an indicator of theoretical progres­
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sion. Therefore, given the fundamental discrepancies between the two meta-theories, 
Prange (1999) concludes that the search for an integrated theoretical approach to organ­
izational learning is neither adequate nor appropriate. However, a thorough discussion 
of the heterogeneity in the underlying meta-theories, positivism versus social construc­
tivism, goes well beyond the scope of this text.
Given the absence of conclusive theory, Bertoin Antal, Dierkes, Child, & Nonaka 
(2001a) point to some promising developments, which they think might help alleviate 
the difficulties. They notice the emergence of a shared language between disciplines, a 
more global scope and increased cultural differentiation in research, the inclusion of in- 
terorganizational learning, and the recognition of manifold sources of knowledge and 
power needed for organizational learning.
All in all, the call for a coherent theory of organizational learning appears to reso­
nate among the relevant research communities. Setting aside subjectivist criticism, a 
unified point of reference could advance the field in two ways.
First, it can provide a powerful tool for the development of empirical research. 
The notion of organizational learning is intuitively appealing to many real world set­
tings, and intrinsically bears a connotation of the betterment of organizational life. 
Theoretical guidance in empirical work proves to offer not only a strong sense of direc­
tion and structure in attempts to establish causal inferences; it also facilitates the forma­
tion of sound conclusions and recommendations based on obtained data. As a result, the 
findings of scientific research in the field could be more readily cumulated and trans­
lated into further research questions and hypotheses.
Secondly, it could tie together the various disciplinary perspectives that all add 
aspects to the understanding of the focal phenomenon. As much as the notion of multi­
ple disciplines raises awareness of the complexity and multifaceted nature of organiza­
tional learning, it tends to overly fragment the field, and thus researchers might easily 
lose sight of the fact that there are overlapping key elements of importance to any sub­
ject-specific viewpoint. The core idea of learning as a process that supplies the potential 
to change the internal and external environment, extrapolated to the dynamics of the 
collective, pertains to psychology, management science and cultural anthropology alike. 
Different disciplines subscribe to different paradigms of thought and convey different 
targets of insight (Kuhn, 1996). Yet in theorizing, these different targets are mainly
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relevant to the outcomes of organizational learning, not to the inherent processes. As 
such, a procedural clarification of collective learning has the potential to preserve valid­
ity while spanning across disciplinary boundaries. From a procedural point of view, 
multiple disciplines are not an obstacle to unified theory.
A focus on processes will become clearer throughout the following pages and sec­
tions. By taking on a functionalist approach, a comprehensive procedural conceptualiza­
tion of collective learning serves to contribute towards theory building. Defining theory 
as “a statement of relationships between units observed or approximated in the empiri­
cal world” (Bacharach, 1989, p. 498, italics not in original), a wide-ranging schematiza- 
tion of the specific forms and processes of learning at different stages constitutes a cen­
tral building block for our purposes.
1.5 T h e  q u e st io n  o f  l e a r n in g  a t  t h e  c o l l e c t iv e 3 l e v e l
While individual learning has been an established concept of debate since the 
early days of psychological research, the notion of organizational learning remains 
somewhat unclear and depicts not much more than a catchy phrase at first. Since the 
literature on the subject is generally somewhat imprecise about exact mechanisms, some 
fundamental questions arise. Does learning occur beyond the individual level? If so, is 
individual learning then a necessary precondition? In any case, is there sufficient evi­
dence for a construct labeled organizational learning?
At the basic semantic level, Weick & Westley (1996) state that the use of the label ✓ 
‘organizational learning’ constitutes an oxymoron, as organizing and learning are essen­
tially antithetical processes. Learning means disorganizing and increasing variety, while / 
organizing implies forgetting and reducing variety. The authors, however, manage to ' 
affirm this oxymoron by demonstrating that both processes are compatible as a balance 
between exploration and exploitation. In order for organizational learning to occur, r
3 The terms “collective” and “organizational” are initially used interchangeably here, both depicting 
learning beyond the individual level. This is done to map out important conceptual issues first, in order to 
then make a strong case for a more precise separation of levels of learning (see section 1.6 on levels o f 
analysis).
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learning as fostering diversity needs to be ensued by organizing as a means of consensus 
building (Fiol, 1994).
Prange (1999) addresses the questions raised above explicitly by saying “one of 
the greatest myths of organizational learning is probably [...] the way in which learning 
might be considered organizational (p. 27, italics in original). She elaborates further 
that it remains unclear whether the academic discussion is about individual learning in 
organizations (Argyris & Sch6n, 1978; March & Olsen, 1979), organizational learning 
that is like individual learning (Hedberg, 1981), or some kind of aggregate or emergent 
learning (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988). Jones (1995) even suggests that 
the entire concept might qualify as an anthropomorphic fallacy that leads to an inappro­
priate reification of the concept of organization. Popper & Lipshitz (1998) alleviate this 7 
extreme position by distinguishing between learning in organizations and learning by 
organizations. The former describes learning processes that occur in individuals’ heads, /  
albeit in organizational contexts, while the latter depicts learning processes that occur 
outside individuals’ heads. The question remaining for a necessary reconciliation of the '  
two concepts is how individual learning becomes organizational.
Given some strongly dissimilar opinions and even neglect of existence, a search of 
proof that learning does occur at the collective level appears imperative before any fur­
ther exploration of internal mechanisms.
1.5.1 The learning curve
Deriving from their thought that organizations cannot ever ‘not learn’ (i.e., they 
always learn), Nicolini & Meznar (1995, pp. 738-740) argue that
“ ...learning is a continuous process which is inherent in the very being of or­
ganizations. [...] This is not something organizations do as a choice, but 
something that enters the very definition of organizations as systems 
(Bateson, 1972; Varela, 1979). [...] Organizations actively engage in unend­
ing cognitive processes, and organizations, as collective forms of coordinated 
cognition and action, are continuously being transformed. [...] Organizations, 
through the action of those in charge, construe their identity by transforming 
change, past choices, past experiments, inventions, and so on into rational ac­
countable knowledge.”
In conclusion, the authors hold a firm belief that there is an organizational phe­
nomenon occurring in collective learning. However, their argument remains on a theo­
retical level and is not substantiated by empirical data.
37
Organizational learning
A source that provides more concrete evidence that learning does occur at a col- /  
lective level is the research on organizational learning curves. This phenomenon has 
been found in many groups and organizations and dates back to an early investigation of 
the assembly of discrete units in the aircraft industry (Wright, 1936). The discovery is 
that, as groups and organizations produce more of a product, the cost of producing each 
additional unit and the errors made in production typically decrease at a decreasing rate. 
Thus the standard form of the learning curve resulting in a hyperbolic graph is
-by - a x  ,
where y  = the number of direct labor hours required to produce the Xth unit, a = the /  
number of direct labor hours required to produce the first unit, x = the cumulative num­
ber of units produced, and b = the progress rate.
The effect was even shown to be stable enough to use it as a basis for planning 
and pricing strategies (The Boston Consulting Group, 1972). It has been recognized in 
the manufacture of a wide variety of products and has been extended to activities other 
than production tasks. Yelle (1979) originally differentiates between labor learning (i.e., 
learning by individual employees) and machine learning (i.e., efficiency gains in opera­
tions that are machine-paced) as underlying processes. However, learning effects appear 
to depreciate rapidly (Argote, Beckman, & Epple, 1990; Benkard, 1999).
The success of the learning curve approach to assess collective learning hinges 
mainly on the researchers’ ability to control for other factors besides cumulative output 
that might affect productivity. It has been argued that important aspects of the im­
provements in manufacturing costs and the decrease in errors come through feedback 
from customers, but most of the research has emphasized the direct effect of cumulative 
experience on production skills4 (Argote, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988). If cumulative 
experience accounts for the main effect on the observed outcomes, what does this ex­
perience contain, and who or what are its protagonists or vehicles? If knowledge ac­
quired through learning by doing were entirely embodied in an organization’s technol­
ogy, then this particular organization would be independent of any specific members.
Epple, Argote & Devadas (1991) examine this hypothesis by analyzing the 
amount of transfer that occurs across shifts within a truck plant producing a single vehi­
cle. In the case of a complete integration of knowledge in technology, transfer across
4 Further, but somewhat less substantial and readily controllable, effects were ascribed to changes to the 
current scale of production, transformation of technology, or the passage of time.
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shifts should be complete since both shifts use the same technology. These authors test 
this by analyzing data from a plant that began production with one shift and then added 
a second shift several months into the production program. The results indicate that sub­
stantial, but less than complete, transfer of knowledge occurred when the second shift 
was introduced. Thus it can be concluded that knowledge as the product of cumulative 
experience is not incorporated entirely in the realm of technology. Moreover, eliminat­
ing further explanations, Rapping (1965) demonstrates in a study on war ships that pro- / 
ductivity gains associated with cumulative output were neither due to increased inputs 
of labor or capital, nor to increasing exploitation of economies of scale, nor to technical 
progress associated with the passage of time.
After ruling out a number of possible alternative explanations, key reasons for the 
learning curve effect remain to be discussed, namely improvements in individual per­
formance and interaction among individuals themselves and with the environment. Fol­
lowing this notion, Argote (1993) extracts the prime facilitators of cumulative experi- / 
ence. She reasons that the cumulative number of units produced is a proxy variable for 7 
knowledge acquired through production. If unit costs change as a function of this 
knowledge then it can be inferred that learning has occurred. She classifies three factors 
affecting learning (pp. 36-37):
• improvements in the performance of individual employees;
• improvements in the system (i.e., organization and coordination of work and the or­
ganization’s technology); and
• improvements in the performance of actors in the organization’s environment (i.e. 
suppliers or other firms in the industry).
Thus there might be individual, system, and environmental components to organ­
izational learning curves. Since these three components are difficult to isolate experi­
mentally, that is in a single experiment, Argote (1993) reviews the literature on each one 
separately in order to then compare the three components against one another and as­
sesses their relative influence.
With regard to the environmental component, operationalized as the transfer of 
knowledge from external groups or organizations, an undoubted role in productivity 
gains is recognized, but this might contribute more to the starting value of the learning 
curve than to the characteristic decrease in unit costs or errors associated with experi-
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ence (Argote et al., 1990). Organizations seem to only be susceptible to knowledge ac­
quired by other organizations at certain periods, such as early in their development. 
Some components of knowledge are likely to be tacit and not easily transferable. More­
over, much of the knowledge produced is idiosyncratic to particular settings, thus ob­
structing inter-organizational exchange. In addition, using cumulative output aggregated 
across all firms in the industry as a proxy for environmental knowledge, Argote et al. 
(1990)5 showed that little transfer occurs from one organization to another once produc­
tion had begun. Hence, organizational learning curves do not seem to be grounded en­
tirely in knowledge acquired from the environment.
Regarding the individual component, the question is raised whether organiza­
tional learning curves are simply aggregations of learning curves of individual mem­
bers? Some field studies suggest that group experience may be a more important predic­
tor of group performance than individual experience (e.g. Katz, 1982). The training lit­
erature also gives a strong indication that group training leads to better results than sepa­
rated individual training, especially for tasks involving coordination (Goldstein, 1991). 
The role of individual learning is appraised mainly by the study of employee turnover. 
If learning were embedded primarily in individual employees, then turnover should 
have a negative effect on group or organizational learning. The results are somewhat 
inconsistent, as there are a number of confounding variables such as the nature of the 
task, employee quality, and organizational structure. Argote (1993, p. 41) acknowledges 
this by concluding that individual experience becomes less important than system ex­
perience as a predictor of organizational learning as coordination requirements within 
the organization increase, the organization becomes more structured, and the individual 
becomes less skilled. Individual learning is an integral part of the organizational learn­
ing curve, but the accumulated learning of all individuals concerned does not seem to 
add up to explain the whole effect.
Taken separately the individual and environmental components cannot fully ac­
count for the entire observed decrease in production costs and error frequency. Whether 
they can do so if combined remains unanswered by Argote (1993). However, consider-
5 Argote et al. (1990) use the same data set as Rapping (1965) on the meticulously documented construc­
tion of Liberty Ships during World War II. These ships, 2078 in total, were made at 16 newly constructed 
and purpose-built shipyards by a majority o f previously inexperienced workers from homogenous raw 
materials. The features create the unique situation of a tremendously high standardization for a host of 
important factors, such as prior experience of workers, environmental setting, product characteristics, 
input characteristics etc.
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ing that all experience and knowledge must be related to some memory function in or­
der to make the learning curve effect possible (otherwise there could not be any cumula­
tive experience) renders the argument for a system component more compelling. Institu­
tionalized knowledge is stored for example in standard operating procedures or formal­
ized knowledge management systems, and allows for a content accumulation that is 
separate from the individual and environmental component. On this note, Argote con­
cludes that there is truly a system component to organizational learning curves. What 
exactly constitutes and characterizes the system component and where the system 
knowledge might be contained is considered in a rather brief ensuing discussion that 
leaves the answers to these questions ultimately unclear. However, Argote’s (1993; see 
also Argote, 1999) subtractive approach to identifying a collective or organizational 
form of learning does provide some evidence for its existence.
The analysis of the learning curve findings reveals some conceptual features and 
shortcomings that need to be addressed. In order to outline the present study’s perspec­
tive and avoid an erroneous methodology, the treatment of learning as an outcome and 
the measurement of learning as a change in performance will be discussed. The two are 
somewhat intertwined, since the treatment of learning as an outcome augments the ten­
dency to equate learning with performance. However, a case is made here against the 
two assumptions.
1.5,2 Treating learning as a process
Organizational learning is conceptualized in the literature in two different ways; / 
some treat it as an outcome, others as a process (Edmondson, 1999).
Going back to the initial account of perspectives on learning, ideas such as learn­
ing as adaptation or learning as intelligence represent an outcome-focused view. The 
management literature is, naturally, interested in what comes out of learning, what is the 
bottom line. Here, learning is construed in rough and basic terms and is causally related 
to issues of interest, such as improved competitiveness, productivity, or innovativeness. 
This reflects the behavioralist paradigm that dominated (and still influences) psycho­
logical thinking for decades, especially in North America. Learning is explained in 
terms of input and output, stimulus and reinforcement. Much the same as the rat in the 
Skinner Box is being reinforced with food pellets for pressing buttons, the organization
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is reinforced, for example, for a restructuring program by subsequent increases in pro­
ductivity. Both the rat and the organization apparently learn, but just exactly how this 
happens internally remains uncertain. In the case of the rat, we would assume that the 
learning has something to do with the animal’s brain, which is admittedly complex 
enough in itself. In the case of the organization, however, the question of locating learn­
ing internally becomes more complicated and more dispersed. Thus, the outcome view 
perpetuates the image of learning as something that goes on in a black box, and little 
effort is undertaken to see what is inside.
In contrast, a process view of learning facilitates an understanding of behaviors or / 
mechanisms that lead to outcomes. Put in crude behavioralist terms, a procedural per­
ception of learning allows for the examination of the throughput between the input and 
the output. According to Edmondson (1999) the conceptualization of learning as a proc­
ess can be traced back to the work of the educational philosopher John Dewey, who de­
scribed learning as an iterative process of designing, carrying out, reflecting upon, and 
modifying actions (Dewey, 1922). Stressing the notion of learning as a continuous proc- # 
ess grounded in experience, Kolb (1984) elaborates the procedural character of learning.
In the special case of organizational learning, lack of knowledge about processes in­
creases the difficulty of reaching sound empirical conclusions about the causality of 
outcomes, since many influences in field settings cannot be controlled. A predominantly 
outcome-focused view therefore limits the scope and validity of findings. In addition, 
treating learning as an outcome entices researchers to equate learning with performance, 
a problem that will be discussed in the next section.
Inherent in a process perspective is also a certain separation from the types of 
learning concept. While implying some largely undescribed procedural character, the 
ideas of single- and double-loop learning mainly refer to the outcomes of learning, 
which are described as the fine-tuning of an organization’s theory-in-use or the altera­
tion of its underlying assumptions (see section 1.3.2). Hence, the discussion of the proc­
esses of organizational learning will be mostly kept separate from the generic types of 
learning concept.
Yeo (2002) elaborates on the distinction between process and outcome by recog­
nizing a behavioral and a cognitive approach in the organizational learning literature. 
The former declares that learning is directly linked to some action that follows from it, 
while the latter explains learning as a complex process involving skills like mental 
mapping, use of intuition and imagination, and problem solving. Cognitive learning is
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generative in that it is regarded as creating rather than coping, it imbues a systems per­
spective where the whole is larger than the sum of its parts, rather than perceiving actors 
as monolithic entities that produce outcomes. The behavioral approach draws little or no 
conclusions about the thinking process involved, while the cognitive approach gives de­
tails of how learners make sense of issues and situations, develop insight and under­
standing, and see patterns in their environment (Yeo, 2002, p. 114). Table 1.3, modified 
from Yeo (2002, p. 117), summarizes these arguments.
Table 1.3: The behavioral and cognitive approach to organizational learning
Theoretical per- Behavioral approach 
spectives on leam-
ing_________________________________
Cognitive approach
Operationalization 
of learning
Learning as manifesting action and 
behavioral change, linked to a stimu­
lus and a response
Learning as a complex process involv­
ing skills like mental mapping, use of 
intuition and imagination, and prob­
lem solving
Level of analysis Macro studies which look at organiza- Detailed studies of micro practices 
tions as a whole, particularly the stra- within organizational or trans-
tegic outcomes
Draws no conclusions about thinking 
process involved or emotional re­
sponses of learners
organizational settings 
Explicates how learners make sense of 
issues and situations, develop insight 
and understanding, and see patterns in 
their environment
In conclusion, I follow my arguments in treating learning as a process in my fur­
ther theorizing and attempt to articulate the variables and relationships that this process 
consists of. In addition, throughout the remainder of this text, learning is understood as 
a primarily cognitive phenomenon, while it is recognized that cognition and action are 
tightly intertwined (Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999). A generally procedural perspective 
does not, however, obstruct the view on learning as leading to knowledge stored in 
memory. Moreover, adopting these positions should not give rise to neglect for a sus­
pected reciprocal influence between process, outcome, and context. Yet, the question ^  
remains whether there are generic core processes that can be validated across different 
settings and targets.
1.5,3 Learning and performance
Organizational learning is usually associated with improvement in performance. 
Some authors even claim that performance must be enhanced in order to be sure that
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organizational learning has taken place (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p. 323; Fiol & Lyles, 
1985, p. 803). An implicit assumption utilized in the research on learning curves is that / 
learning somehow equals performance; to be more exact, that learning can be measured 
by measuring performance. Since learning, or knowledge for that matter, is a difficult / 
concept to measure, the cumulative number of units produced or the reduction in errors 
is taken as a proxy variable for learning.
In contrast, many recent works have stated clearly that learning does not always J 
improve performance. As a starting point, it can only do so when the knowledge ob- / 
tained is accurate and veridical (Huber, 1991; Tsang, 1997), since organizations can 
also learn things that are incorrect (Miner & Mezias, 1996). Taking into account a nec­
essary prior implementation of new knowledge for performance increases to occur, this 
is further complicated. Moreover, improvements in performance can also happen due to / 
chance or changes in the environment, leading to possibly erroneous causal inferences. 
As a result, linking a definition of organizational learning to an imperative improvement 
in performance, adaptive ability, or target orientation appears to be problematic.
Another notion on learning suggests that learning need not be conscious or inten­
tional (Huber, 1991). Although the widespread use of research and development de­
partments as forms of deliberate and institutionalized learning seems to contradict this, 
concepts such as congenital learning, vicarious learning, or scanning of the environment 
leave ample room for knowledge acquisition by pure chance.
Fundamental definitions of learning at the individual level describe the concept as 
a relatively permanent change in potential behavior (Anderson, 1995; Houston, 1991). 
Prior learning need not necessarily be expressed in overt, measurable behavior. Thus 
any exclusive concentration on outcome variables will fail to capture the very part of 
learning that is not translated into observable action. Maier et al. (2001, p. 17) illustrate 
this by saying that it is “helpful to define organizational learning irrespective of changes 
in performance”, thereby advocating that successful learning and improved performance 
be considered separately. Given their statement, it seems sensible to assume that at the 
organizational level, too, there is discordance between prior learning and subsequent 
performance, and several authors explicitly subscribe to the irrationality of this link 
(Bood, 1998; Crossan, Lane, White, & Djurfeldt, 1995; Duncan & Weiss, 1979; Fiol & 
Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Lipshitz, Popper, & Friedman, 2002).
Learning curve researchers acknowledge this in part by theoretically limiting 
themselves to empirical examinations of behavioral change in the light of organizational
44
Organizational learning
acquisition of experience (Argote, 1999, p. 16). Holding all other factors constant, the 
occurrence of learning is inferred on the basis of an observed increase in performance 
(i.e. cumulative output). But since we have established that learning can have occurred 
irrespective of changes in performance, the learning curve effect will reflect only a frac­
tion of the learning total. Following this rationale, two organizations that show differ- 1 
ences in their cumulative output coefficients cannot be said to have learned ‘less’ or 
‘more’, since the difference might simply lie in their rate of translating learning into be­
havior. As a result, it seems safe to relate the learning curve effect to some prior learn­
ing, but not to all prior learning.
On the basis of the above discussion, it seems obvious that any attempt to meas­
ure, and especially to quantify, learning by measuring performance is likely to not cap­
ture the whole story. In an organizational setting, the expression of learning in subse­
quent behavior is thought to be dependent on such factors as motivation (Maier et al., 
2001), culture (Plaskoff, 2003), power relations (Vince, 2001), trust and safety 
(Edmondson & Moingeon, 1999), or task related features (Dierkes, Marz, & Teele, 
2001). If these factors act as obstacles, learning content will fail to reach the organiza­
tional stage, because individuals that have learned choose not to translate their new 
knowledge into observable behavior. In addition, the availability of experienced indi­
viduals, that is individuals that have learned, must be ensured, a condition that would be 
precluded by layoffs or voluntary turnover (see for example Argote & Epple, 1990; Car- 
ley, 1992; Starke, Dyck, & Mauws, 2003). In all such cases learning, and knowledge, is 
lost to the organization.
This assumption yields important connotations. First, stating that learning can be 
lost to an organization implies that it must have been acquired or enacted first. There 
seems to be a sequence of events, a set of different agencies involved. It must be sus­
pected that there are different stages across which learning and knowledge progress. 
Second, the necessity for learning to be expressed in behavior in order to affect per­
formance allows us to assume that the notion of sharing is crucial to organizational set­
tings.
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1.6 L e v e l s  o f  a n a l y s is
Based on the review that the existence of a collective form of learning is pre­
sumably undisputed, its internal processes strongly lack widespread agreement and 
clarification. I have raised the question of different agencies involved, broadly speaking, 
who does the learning? As a starting point, Fiol & Lyles (1985) spot an implicit confir- '  
mation in the literature that organizational learning is distinct from individual learning. 
Huysman (1999) carries Fiol & Lyles’ distinction further and identifies an individual 
action bias in various theoretical approaches, increasing the possibility to neglect the 
role played by structural conditions. Such structural conditions are integrated to a cer­
tain extend into Levitt & March’s (1988) concept of routines. They see organizations 
learn by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior. These rou­
tines are believed to be independent of the individual actors who experience them and 
are capable of surviving considerable turnover in individual actors (p. 320). Thus, they 
perceive a certain ‘emergent’ component in organizational learning, but fail to explicitly 
describe it.
Argyris & Schon (1978) consider organizational learning more as a metaphor , 
since organizations to them do not literally remember, think or learn; thus they are 
thinking more of individual learning in organizations. Their theory of learning defines / 
levels of individual learning in relation to individuals’ ‘theories of action’ and extends 
this to collective entities. Given numerous conceptualizations of organizations by 
prominent scholars as meaning systems, interpretation systems, thought systems, or 
simply systems of great complexity, the feasibility of such an extension can be called 
into question.
In this light, Duncan & Weiss (1979) conclude that the concept of organizational 
learning offered by Argyris & Schon (and another concept introduced by March & Ol­
sen, 1975, that will be discussed in a later section) is limited to the individual’s knowl­
edge. They criticize those authors for “having done little more than extract basic con­
cepts of learning theory, problem solving, and theory construction at the individual level 
and placed these into an organizational context.” (p.88)
Various authors provide definitions of organizational learning as something “more 
than collective individual learning” (Daft & Weick, 1984; Duncan & Weiss, 1979; Fiol 
& Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1988; Senge, 1990a) and something more complex and
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dynamic than a mere magnification of individual learning. Hedberg (1981, p. 6), for ex­
ample, states:
“Organizations as such do not learn; members of organizations learn.”; [but] '
“Although organizational learning occurs through individuals, it would be a , 
mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative 
result o f their members’ learning. Organizations do not have brains but they / 
have cognitive systems and memories [...] Members come and go and lead- /  
ership changes, but organizations’ memories preserve certain behaviors, men­
tal maps, norms and values over time.”
In another account of the same ilk Dixon (1994, p. 36) claims:
“ ...each organizational member can learn. An organization learns through 
this capability of its members. Organizational learning is not simply the sum 
of all that its organizational members know -  rather it is the collective use of 
this capability of learning.”
There seems to be a convergence on the logic that organizational learning can 
only take place through the learning of individuals or that individuals are the principal 
agents of organizational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Hed­
berg, 1981; Huber, 1991). According to Dodgson (1993, pp.377-378),
“ ... individuals are the primary learning entity in firms, and it is individuals 
which create organizational forms that enable learning in ways which facili­
tate organizational transformation.”
Yet, organizations quite frequently know less than their members, as, for example, 
can be illustrated in the case of universities. If the individual plays a pivotal role in the 
process of organizational learning, and that very process lacks exact description, then 
the link between the individual and the organization occupies a critical position in any 
theory of organizational learning. The discussion in the literature often implicitly ad- / 
dresses either individual or organizational learning, or a hybrid of both, but does not ex­
plicitly address how individual learning actually translates into organizational learning.
Organizations consist o f individuals, and individuals operate together in order to 
achieve tasks that cannot be done by single members alone. In general, organizations 
are social structures formed by individuals and groups. Individuals work in dyads, 
groups, and teams within organizations. Naturally, organizations are multilevel (Klein, 
Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). Hence, the answer to the basic question ‘Who does the learn- / 
mg?’ must be to differentiate between three levels o f analysis, the individual, the group, 
and the organization. To examine organizational learning is thus to recognize levels is­
sues.
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Organizational research has traditionally suffered from a bifurcation concerning 
levels of analysis (House, Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995). As the quotations above 
indicate, the orientation focuses mostly either on a micro or a macro level, that is, either 
on the individual or on the organization, without integrating the two. Such exclusive 
theorizing, however, is quickly rendered inadequate when individual behavior is placed 
in a larger context, or when organizational functioning is predicted irrespective of hu­
man agency. Some of the most prevalent psychological theories, such as goal setting 
theory, do not account for the influence of organizational contextual variables, while 
organization studies frequently omit inherent human processes. What is needed then is 
an integrated approach, since no construct is level free. Organizations affect behavior / 
and behavior affects organizations, which elucidates the existence of multiple, recipro­
cal causalities. In sum, constructs not only apparently span across different levels o f ' 
analysis, but it must be concluded that there are distinct procedural associations between 
levels. House et al. (1995) state that “the distinguishing feature of organizational phe­
nomena is that processes at several levels of analysis are in some way linked” (p. 73). 
For our purposes, this directly relates to the underspecification of the mentioned crucial 
link between the individual and the organization in collective learning. Conceptual clar­
ity can only be attained through specification of integral processes at different levels of 
analysis, and recognition of procedural linkages. The essential entity connecting the mi­
cro and macro levels, the link between individuals and the organization, is the group 
(Pawlowsky, 2001). This tripartite perspective will be elaborated below.
1.7 L e a r n in g  a t  d if f e r e n t  l e v e l s
Realizing the multi-level nature of organizing leads to a set of interesting concep­
tual questions about implications for organizational learning as well as a requirement to 
specify the usage of descriptive terms. The argument is that all three levels of analysis 
need to be considered in a definition and analysis of organizational learning. Since cog­
nitive learning of individuals as principal agents seems crucial, one question would be 
whether groups or organizations can learn without individual learning involved. In the 
context of organizational learning, the reverse question whether individuals could learn 
without affecting groups or organizations is also imaginable. Jost & Bauer (2003) elabo-
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rate on these issues by introducing a formalism that responds to the question: Who does 
the learning?
If we follow Argyris & Schon’s (1978) denial of genuine collective learning, de­
fining organizational learning (OL) would lead to some notion of distribution or thresh­
old of individual learning.
(FI) OL = learning staff / number of staff
Here, the organization learns when most individuals learn something. This leaves 
the problem of defining the meaning of ‘most’ as a threshold, where it is unclear at what 
percentage ratio a case of organizational learning can be postulated.
Taking the notion of an emergent component into consideration, which suggests 
that organizational learning is more than the sum of individual learning results in the 
summative formula below.
(F2) OL = ILL + GLL + OLL
ILL = individual level learning 
GLL = group level learning 
OLL = organizational level learning
The simple summative formula (F2) assumes that learning on different levels can 
be substituted by one another, and an equal degree of organizational learning is 
achieved. This would allow for various combinatorial equivalences, for example no 
learning on the individual level, but group learning and organizational learning. By sim­
ply combining the binary condition of ‘learning/no learning’ on three levels this would 
suggest eight different types of organizational learning. For example:
1) ILL no / GLL yes / OLL yes
2) ILL yes / GLL no / OLL no
3) ILL no / GLL no / OLL yes
4) etc.
Some of these combinations appear highly unlikely and it remains to be clarified 
to what kind of organizational fact these logical learning situations would correspond. 
However, since the individual has been identified as the crucial building block, some
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adjustment to accommodate an individualist bias as a requirement for a collective com­
ponent seems indispensable.
(F3) OL = ILL (GLL + OLL)
In formula 3 learning at the individual level is enhanced by contributions from the 
group and the organizational level in order to constitute organizational learning. How­
ever, it is confirmed that individual learning must be present, because if a factor equals 
zero, the total will equal zero. In addition, trans-individual learning must be present in 
order to detect organizational learning. It should be noted that factoring out in the case 
of formula 3 is not allowed for logical purposes. The combinatorial logic is now re­
duced to a more manageable three:
1) if OLL = 0, then OL = ILL x GLL
2) if GLL = 0, then OL = ILL x OLL
3) if none = 0, then OL = ILL (GLL + OLL)
The formalism developed by Jost & Bauer (2003) remains on a somewhat theo­
retical note and should not be scrutinized for its mathematical implications, but nonethe­
less clearly illustrates a serious deliberation of the multi-level nature of organizational 
learning. Above and beyond its thought-provoking impulse, the outlined formalism also 
facilitates a more precise debate, since most authors use ‘organizational learning’ as 
some type of umbrella term, thereby obfuscating organizational level learning (OLL), or 
completely passing over the question o f different agencies involved. Any further theo­
rizing in this thesis is based on the concept of organizational learning that is represented 
in formula F3, where ideally all three levels of analysis are involved in the learning ef­
forts.
Scholars of organizational learning have overwhelmingly failed to make explicit 
level distinctions. One of the few exceptions are Cangelosi & Dill, who as early as 1965 
discern three levels of analysis (Cangelosi & Dill, 1965). This distinction has, however, 
not found its way into many subsequent works that either overemphasize one level, or 
completely abandon any real differentiation by imposing features of the individual on 
the organization. Based on such shortcomings and the argumentation delineated so far,
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it is felt that the recognition o f three levels of analysis6 -  the individual, the group, and 
the organization -  is an indispensable milestone towards procedural clarification, and 
ultimately towards theory building in the field of organizational learning.
So how does learning then proceed at different levels of analysis? The following 
three subchapters provide an overview of important characteristics and distinguishing 
features. As our focus remains on processes, a comprehensive account of theoretical 
backgrounds and empirical paradigms, especially in the case of individual learning, 
cannot be given here. Instead of attempting to review the learning literature, the interest 
is specific to the question how information is processed at different levels of analysis. In 
addition, a further set of subchapters is then devoted to a discussion of memory con­
cepts at different levels of analysis, since no learning can take place without a joint 
memory function. The intention behind this elaboration is to map concepts against one 
another in order to identify procedural linkages in an organizational context.
1.7.1 Learning at the individual level
Identifying the individual level first accords with the concept of individuals as 
principal agents of learning as elaborated above. When tempted to reify and anthropo­
morphize organizations, it is important to realize that collections of single individuals 
are the building blocks, the essential elements, of larger entities. Organizations do not 
have brains, and it seems not only intuitively convincing that ultimately “all learning 
takes place inside human heads” (Simon, 1991, p. 125). Hence, knowledge of individual 
learning is crucial for understanding learning at higher levels of aggregation.
Individual learning is probably the most constitutive component of psychological 
research, ever since the official inception of the discipline by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879. 
But although learning has intrigued scientists for far more than a century now, little 
consensus has been made and large areas still suffer from a lack of fundamental insight. 
Research on learning can roughly be classified into three broad theoretical approaches, 
which more or less appeared in chronological order. The first approach stems from a
6 Some authors also suggest an inter-organizational fourth level to capture learning at the population level 
(Crossan et al., 1995; Miner & Mezias, 1996; Pawlowsky, 2001). Since research on the population level 
has to take into account environmental parameters such as market characteristics, governmental regula­
tions, or industry- and technology-specific factors, the analysis is limited here to die organizational level 
as the upper maximum of aggregation. It is acknowledged that organizations do not operate in a vacuum 
and respond to external influences, but the main focus here is on processes internal to the organization.
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conceptualization of the learning process as an action sequence leading from a stimulus 
to a response. This somewhat mechanistic idea is concerned with objective and observ­
able components of human behavior, and is thus labeled behaviorism. Influential propo­
nents like Watson, Guthrie, Thorndike, and Skinner defined as the goal of behaviorism 
the development of laws that explain the relationships between antecedent conditions, 
reactions, and consequences of behavior. Methodologically, this is attained, for exam­
ple, in the paradigms of classical and operant conditioning. The main criticism of be- / 
haviorism, that it is overly simplistic and that it doesn’t account for the influence of 
such factors as human consciousness, emotion, or variegated interaction with the envi­
ronment, provided the building block for the second approach, neo-behaviorism. Neo- 
behaviorists are still interested in stimulus and response, but they are also concerned 
with what happens within that sequence. Scholars in this realm like Hull, Spence, Hebb, 
and Osgood, extended behavioralist thoughts by acknowledging that neurological 
mechanisms exist that are responsible for information processing, and by exploring the 
associated neurological units and their influences on behavior. So the traditional se­
quence of stimulus-response was expanded to stimulus-(mediating) processes-response. 
Critics, however, still assume that the neo-behaviorist position is too mechanistic and 
reduces the complexity of human information and decision processing to a crude media­
tion between static behavioral components. This second approach does open the ‘black 
box’ of the human mind to a small extend, but remains within tight paradigmatic 
boundaries for reasons of apparent precision and objectivity. In contrast, the third and 
most recent approach, cognitivism, grants no significance whatsoever to stimulus and 
response. Instead, the main focus is on so-called higher mental processes, such as per­
ception, problem solving through insight, decision and information processing, and un­
derstanding. Human beings are no longer treated as black boxes and consciousness 
plays a central role in an attempt to explicate complex mental events and ‘look inside 
the head’. Encouraged by new experimental techniques and analytical tools, researchers 
like Bruner, Ausubel, and Piaget place emphasis on thought and thinking. Although the  ^
methodology for investigation into the first two approaches might be more precise (after 
all, overt behavior is measured instead of elusive concepts such as thoughts), there 
seems to be some agreement that the cognitive approach more aptly captures the es­
sence of most human learning.
However, it has been acknowledged that learning cannot be reduced to a simple 
acquisition of bits of information or the effective handling of environmental influences.
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How human beings obtain behavioral patterns that enable them to act appropriately in 
social settings is the main concern of the social learning approach, which attempts to 
integrate various streams of learning theory. Interestingly, this approach mostly applies 
conventional learning theories to social situations, and the utilized theories are rather 
behavioralist than cognitive. Advocates like Bandura explain social learning essentially 
as a form of imitation coupled with operant conditioning. While the social learning idea 
reveals shortcomings to the claims of universal validity of especially the first two men­
tioned learning approaches, its integrative capacity is limited as it basically offers the 
social application of a traditional paradigm.
For the context of work-related learning, and learning in organizations, that the 
present text is concerned with, there are two points that deserve emphasis in order to 
arrive at a working concept of individual level learning. First, the understanding of, and - 
interest in, learning as a process points to a vital need to conceptualize what goes on in­
side the black box. The central notion of information processing implies an unmistak­
able proximity to the cognitive paradigm. Second, if the perspective is procedural, and / 
embedded in an action-related context, learning is necessarily grounded in experience. 
Learning does not occur in a vacuum, nor does it usually involve clinical laboratory set- f  
tings. Research methodologies that acknowledge the existence of consciousness and 
thought, but limit inquiry to the acquisition, manipulation, and recall of abstract sym­
bols fail to capture the crucial role of individual knowledge that is constantly tested out 
in the experience of the learner.
Kolb (1984) makes a strong case for learning as a continuous process grounded in 
experience. His concept of experiential learning is somewhat based on cognitive theory, 
but tries to create an integrative perspective on learning that combines experience, per­
ception, cognition, and behavior. Drawing on the ideas of Kurt Lewin, John Dewey, and  ^
Jean Piaget, he describes learning as involving a transaction between the learner and the 
environment, and stresses the integral process of knowledge creation. As learning is a < 
continuous process, all learning is relearning, in which prior knowledge and skill shape 
subsequent understanding and action. Concrete experience then produces reflexive e f-/ 
fects that change the knowledge and skill base. Representative of the experiential learn­
ing concept is the four-stage model shown in Figure 1.2 below (Kolb, 1984, p. 21). 
Immediate experience serves as a source for observations and reflections that are as­
similated into abstract concepts and generalizations, whose implications are tested in
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new situations, thereby creating new experiences. Defining learning as a result of ex­
perience also distinguishes the concept from maturation processes and from perform­
ance limitations due to situational constraints, which might cause behavioral changes as 
well (Maier et al., 2001).
Formation of 
abstract concepts 
and generalizations
Testing implications 
of concepts in new 
situations
Observations and 
reflections
Concrete
experience
Figure 1.2: The Lewinian experiential learning model
Kolb (1984) adopts the cognitive approach, especially given the two phases of re­
flection and abstraction. But he explicitly adds an action component by linking cogni­
tive learning immediately to direct experience. Thus, experiential learning is not a new 
approach, but evolves the crude and often quixotic cognitive paradigm into a more tan­
gible form. Advantages of this are a coherent and clarifying illustration of the learning 
process, from which clear implications for practical settings can be derived. Kolb’s 
(1984, p. 38) own definition of individual learning is as follows.
“Learning is the process whereby knowledge is created through the trans- /  
formation o f experience. This definition emphasizes several critical aspects of 
the learning process as viewed from the experiential perspective. First is the / 
emphasis on the process of adaptation and learning as opposed to content or 
outcomes. Second is that knowledge is a transformation process, being con- / 
tinuously created and recreated, not an independent entity to be acquired and 
transmitted.” (italics in original)
This working definition accounts for the delineated procedural aims and provides 
a sound basis for further theorizing at higher levels of aggregation. The depicted cycle 
of learning somewhat resembles the scientific method of testing hypotheses as the most 
developed form of problem solving. It has appeared in its basic form in many different 
settings using different labels (Kim, 1993a). However, it fails to explicitly address the 
role of memory, which must be assumed to be crucial in any learning. So when we as-
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sert that all learning is relearning, what is not meant is starting from scratch, but remod­
eling on the basis of prior experience stored in memory. Although learning and memory 
are tightly interconnected, the memory component is under-specified in the process 
model above, and therefore will be discussed separately later.
1,7,2 Learning at the group level
Individuals form groups in order to achieve tasks that cannot be done alone, or 
that require transindividual coordination.
Identifying and discussing learning at the group level necessitates a brief inspec­
tion of the structural meaning of the concept of group, and to make a distinction regard­
ing learning between formal and informal groups. Formal groups are described as ca­
nonical, bounded entities situated within organizations. They incorporate recognized 
role descriptions, membership status, goal-orientation, and leadership (Guzzo & Shea, 
1992). Analysis of group level learning for these cases is compatible with the official  ^
organizational structure. In contrast, learning at this level can equally occur through in-, 
formal groups. These are often noncanonical, rather fluid than bounded, and possibly A 
stretching across organizational units. Role descriptions, membership status, or leader-✓ 
ship often remain uncertain or subliminally acknowledged. A conceptualization of in­
formal groups that is especially helpful in the context of group learning is that of com- 
munities-of-practice, which has been proposed by Brown & Duguid (1991). These au­
thors recognize manifold divergence between espoused practice and actual practice. In 
many settings, groups emerge in the process of activity, instead of being created in ad­
vance in order to carry out a task. Thus, learning should be understood in terms o f ' 
communities that emerge, enact learning, socially construct meaning, and that are highly 
interpretive (DeFillippi & Omstein, 2003; Wenger, 1998). In sum, for the present pur­
poses both conceptualizations of groups can serve as a unit of analysis. A point is made 
here, however, not to limit the analysis of group learning to formally recognized enti­
ties.
Groups consist of individuals, and hence individual learning must be the neces­
sary building block for group learning (as it is for organizational learning). However, it 
has been said that the unique nature of the organization constitutes something more than 
the sum of its individual members. The same might be said for groups, since cognitive
55
Organizational learning
processes at the group level can no longer reside exclusively in separate individuals, but 7 
are assumed to be present also in the interrelations between the activities of group 
members (Gibson, 2001). Again, the perspective of interest is a procedural one, focus- /  
ing on cognition and activities through which individuals develop and generate knowl­
edge through experience with one another. As in the individual case, group learning can 
be directly related to action, and Edmondson (2002) conceptualizes it as an iterative ac- 
tion-reflection process. Gibson (2001) even proposes a four-stage cyclical model that is 
strikingly similar to the one put forward by Kolb (1984). But what exactly then consti­
tutes the difference between learning at the individual and at the group level? Indeed,' 
individual learning appears to be an integral part, but given the unique characteristics of 
a group7, the essence of group learning seems to lie in the interaction among its mem­
bers, in communication.
At the group level, social interaction enables group members to generate knowl­
edge and insight that no individual had to begin with (Argote, Gruenfeld, & Naquin, 
2001; Edmondson, 2002). An entire literature on socially shared cognition and knowl­
edge creation has recognized that, much like the pieces of a puzzle put together, col­
laborative thought and action can lead to emergent knowledge (e.g., Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 2001; Gioia & Sims, 1986; Nonaka, Toyama, & Byosiere, 2001). The notion of 
sharing encapsulates the essence of the emergent gain that is alluded to when stating 
that group learning is more than the sum of its parts. In a generally cognitive approach, ^ 
information, knowledge and contents of memory must be ’’shared, evaluated, and inte­
grated with that done by others” (Duncan & Weiss, 1979, p. 89). Interaction and dia-x 
logue among group members are crucial towards developing and enabling shared under­
standing and conceptual schemes (Jelinek & Litterer, 1994). In this view, learning is ' 
regarded as creating rather than coping, and is popularly labeled generative (Senge, 
1990a). Some authors heavily emphasize the social context aspect of group learning and 
assert that virtually all knowledge generation must be understood on the basis of its so­
cial foundations. In this view even individual experiences occurring in a private context 
can be construed as learning from others (Brown & Duguid, 2000). This perspective is 
challenged, however, by a more moderate standpoint highlighting individual agency in 
group interaction. Here, as cognition is ultimately an individual process, a feedback
7 Gibson (2001, p. 122) defines a group as “a social aggregation, recognized as a meaningful unit by its 
members, in which a limited number of people interact on a regular basis to accomplish a set of shared 
objectives for which they have mutual accountability. “
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loop from group processes back to individual cognition is pointed at (Maier et al., 
2001). In summary, the notion of sharing in groups can be illustrated using an analogy^ 
to a watercolor painting. As each new color is added, it merges with the others to pro­
duce the final effect, in which the contributing parts become invisible.
But communication need not solely proceed through verbalization, as intuitively 
salient. Communication can also manifest itself in observed and shared action.
This is vividly illustrated in a study by Weick & Roberts (1993), who do not spe- '  
cifically use the label ‘learning’, nor do they explicitly limit their analysis to the group 
level. But they generate new ideas by systematically observing high-reliability systems 
and thus make a strong point about communication through action, its procedural char­
acter, and the patterns of interrelations. Their object of interest is the social interaction 
on aircraft carriers, systems that require nearly error-free operations. In undertaking re­
search in such an environment, their rationale is presented as follows:
“...organizations concerned with reliability enact aggregate mental processes 
that are more fully developed than those found in organizations concerned 
with efficiency. By fully developed mental processes, we mean that organiza­
tions preoccupied with reliability may spend more time and effort organizing 
for controlled information processing, mindful attention and heedful action.
[...] Reliable systems are smart systems.” (p. 357)
Weick & Roberts (1993) explore collective mental processes presumed to be in­
herent in all groups and organizations, but more easily detectable and likely to be higher 
developed in extreme environments. A starting point to decipher the subliminal dynam­
ics is the idea of group mind, a form of cognitive interdependence focused around 
memory processes. For the concept of group mind this interdependence exists inde­
pendent of any aspect of homogeneity in a particular group. It also seems that connec­
tions between behaviors, rather than people, may be the crucial ‘locus’ for mind and that 
intelligence is to be found in patterns of behavior rather than in individual knowledge 
(pp. 359-360). Moreover, in terms of action coordination in teams, the concept of group / 
mind suggests that individuals should have overlapping rather than mutually exclusive 
task knowledge, allowing for the development of behavioral dependencies that shape 
the behavior pattern o f the group. So mind is actually seen as activity rather than entity, 
with collective mind differing from individual mind (see also Eisenberg's, 1990, exami­
nation of musical jamming experiences as a form of collective mind through shared ac­
tion). As a central part of their argument, Weick & Roberts (1993) then introduce mind 
as a disposition to heed. Heed positions qualities of carefulness, attentiveness, and vigi­
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lance along the target object of failure-free performance, and thus heedless performance 
suggests a failure of intelligence rather than a failure of knowledge. A dissection of in­
terrelated activities of groups, integrated into the theory of group performance by Asch 
(1952), leads to the concluding notion of heedful interrelating as collective mind. There 
is a transindividual quality of collective mind as contributions of any one individual ac­
tualize collective mind to the degree that heedful representation and heedful subordina­
tion define those contributions. Variations in heed as the prime requirement for effica­
cious collective mind can emerge through the influx of newcomers into the system. In 
such cases, the interaction among those who differ in their experience with the system, 
for example through the exchange of vivid stories of heedful interrelating, is important 
for the survival of heedful images. Weick & Roberts (1993) then apply their ideas of 
heedful interrelating to examples of complex systems in the laboratory and on aircraft 
carriers, illustrating one specific case of expensive failure in great detail. The latter ex­
emplifies a limit to heedfulness, an overload of complexity and subsequent incompre­
hensibility described in military jargon as OBE (overcome by events), which elucidates, 
however, that heedful interrelating of activities is better able to comprehend complex 
events than is true for smart but isolated individuals. Thus, a lasting conclusion is the 
presumption that high-reliability organizations have more developed minds than high- 
efficiency organizations. In high-reliability systems, interpersonal skills are a necessity 
because, as people incline towards individualism and fewer interconnections, organiza­
tion mind is simplified and soon becomes indistinguishable from individual mind. In 
contrast to Perrow’s (1984) well-known research on catastrophic accidents, the authors 
suggest in their analysis that one of the reasons for the relatively few accidents on air­
craft carriers is actually the tightly coupled nature of the system. Heedful interrelation 
builds a mutually shared field that is tightly coupled socially and thus meets the de­
mands of a system that is tightly coupled technically.
Although the concepts of collective mind and heed might be perceived as some­
what inchoate and procedurally unclear for our purposes, the aircraft carrier study pro­
vides evidence for the role of shared action in group learning. Thus group communica­
tion as the core of group learning can work in two ways, through verbalization and 
through action.
In their outline of a theory of group action, von Cranach et al. (1986) establish 
communication as the form of information processing on the group level. This is labeled 
secondary information processing, which is based on primary information processing,
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namely individual cognition. Cognition is still exclusively an individual process, but it / 
forms the foundation for group information processing, that is, communication. Extend­
ing von Cranach et al.’s argument by drawing on Weick & Roberts, verbalization and 
action as the two channels of communication can be consolidated.
It is clear that delineating group learning without any attention to memory proc­
esses is incomplete, as learning and memory at this level of analysis, too, are tightly in­
tertwined. Since memory processes on the group level are part of group communication / 
(Bangerter, von Cranach, & Am, 1997), the issue becomes doubly apparent. Again, the 
memory question deserves separate attention and will be dealt with in a later section.
1. 7.3 Learning at the organizational level
Learning at the organizational level necessarily includes both individuals and 
groups, as illustrated in Formula 3 in section 1.7. Pawlowsky (2001, p. 76) points out / 
that there have been rarely any attempts to define precisely what collective learning 
means at this level. In the same way that group level learning requires individual cogni­
tion, organizational level learning incorporates and only functions on the grounds of 
learning at lower levels of aggregation.
The original concept of learning at the organizational level is intergroup ex­
change. Similar to depicting learning as shared interaction between individuals at the 
group level, it can also be a shared interaction between groups at the organizational 
level. Such conceptualizing then begs the question of what exactly constitutes the or­
ganizational level and how learning between groups goes on procedurally. A proponent 
of the intergroup exchange concept, Argote (1999, pp. 190-194) regards this notion as 
self-explanatory, and focuses instead on describing factors that support exchange be­
tween groups, such as stable environments or task interdependence. Although Argote 
fails to specify the concept, she still makes an effort to demarcate some type of exclu­
sively organizational level procedure, while most other theorists in the field simply reify 
organizations using some macro-level perspective, and completely ignore actual proc­
esses. Transcending formal structures, intergroup exchange can be thought of as ex- / 
change between informal communities-of-practice. In fact, Brown & Duguid (1991) ad­
vocate a view of the organization as an overarching community-of-communities, which 
would promote the acknowledgement of the many noncanonical communities in its
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midst. In such an organization, separate community perspectives can be amplified by 
interchanges among communities.
But how do groups exchange ideas? How do they communicate? If a reification of 
the group as a monolithic entity is to be avoided, this question has two likely answers. 
Groups exchange ideas either through single individuals, such as spokespersons or rep- / 
resentatives, or through documents that convey the result of their work.
The first case emerges from the awareness that there is a limit to the number of 
individuals that can interact in a face-to-face setting. There is no organizational forum / 
where countless actors share a direct, communicative relationship. Interaction through 
communication, in the form of verbalization or action, is restricted to small numbers of 
people. Modem technology such as electronic discussion boards or email groups might 
function as an enabler here, but generally does not solve the problem of participation 
limits to direct communication. In addition, information technology easily deprives 
communicative interaction of a location as a point of reference that can facilitate learn­
ing. Edmondson (2002, p. 142) realizes this by saying that
“...the collective learning process in an organization is inherently local. The 
learning process itself necessarily focuses on some bounded task or opportu­
nity, and it occurs through conversations among a limited number of inde­
pendent people.”
Therefore, the group’s diversity of individual cognitions has to be truncated into a 
communicable form that is transported by one or a few individuals, who act as represen­
tatives. When these individuals then meet other individuals, representing other groups, 
they form a new group, in which they formally or informally exchange the distillate of 
their groups’ prior learning. This quintessentially reduces intergroup exchange to an­
other form of group learning. The learning from one group is processed further in an­
other group.
The second way in which intergroup exchange might be described directly hints at 
the form of learning that is usually exclusive to the organizational level. Since direct 
communication as a means of interaction and learning is not an option for collections of 
individuals beyond the group level, the medium of exchange has to take on a different 
format. As organizations mature and grow larger, they outgrow their ability to rely en­
tirely on personal, spontaneous interactions (Maier et al., 2001). In order to overcome ✓ 
the restrictions of direct communication, the results of individual and group learning
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must be preserved in a form that makes them accessible to all members of the organiza­
tion. They must be formalized.
Formalized documentation such as official guidelines, standard operating proce­
dures, mission statements, training manuals, memos, and experience reports are easy to 
multiply and can be dispersed quickly across large organizations. Formalization cap-7 
tures the essence of what needs to be preserved for the organization and allows for 
widespread access and further processing through standardized formats. As a result, 
condensed knowledge can be fed back into individual cognition and group communica- 1 
tion. This then refutes the notion of intergroup exchange as a separate form of learning / 
at the organizational level altogether, because it can either be described as another form 
of group learning, as outlined above, or as formalization. However, formalization can- / 
not capture all the ongoing and consolidated learning at the individual and group level.
It usually involves negotiation processes, process delays, and might often be largely de- / 
termined by influential individuals. Thus, formalization has a reductive element, a nec- / 
essary decrease in the richness of individual representations, to enable subsequent uses 
of generated knowledge by previously uninvolved parties. As written documentation 
generally implies an official status to its contents and has to be produced with more ef­
fort than spoken words, it commonly conveys only the substrate of prior learning activi­
ties, the approved consensus.
Formalization differs from forms of learning at other levels in that it paradoxically 
does not involve most individuals who constitute the organization. While group level 
learning can in principle proceed without some members of the group, the actual for­
malization process only requires very few individuals that extract agreed contents and 
arrange them in a new medium. Moreover, formalization lacks such an active, genera­
tive element as individual cognition and group communication, while it approximates 
knowledge retention and overlaps with memory concepts. As a result, it seems fair to 
assume that the majority of learning as knowledge creation happens at the individual 
and group level.
Particularly in bureaucratic organizations, there are also formalized types of regu­
lar communication (Tschan, 1992), for example meeting minutes, which should not be 
confused with the extraction of knowledge for organizational purposes that is elaborated 
here. Approaches to formalization as an organizational level concept have appeared un­
der such labels as crystallization (Nonaka, 1994) or institutionalization (Crossan et al.,
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1999). Especially Crossan et al.’s work essentially captures the arguments put forth 
here, but fails to recognize written documentation as the key process variable.
Given the inherent element of retention in the formalization process, the concep­
tual border to organizational memory might be hard to define. These issues will be dis­
cussed in the following sections on memory.
In summary, on the basis of a distinct understanding of different levels of analy­
sis, one can proceed in delineating learning processes. Different forms of information , 
processing were established at different levels of analysis: Cognition on the individual 
level, communication on the group level, and formalization on the organizational level.
From the discussions above it appears that the elaboration and conceptual clarity 
of learning processes decrease as the level of aggregation increases. While individual 
learning has been researched ever since the inception of psychology as a scientific dis­
cipline, learning at the group level through interaction, sharing, and dialogue has re­
ceived less attention. This is especially true for the organizational learning literature, 
where the group level is often completely ignored. A preoccupation with individual 
cognition, strongly established in the history of the field, has spawned a certain inade­
quacy amongst organizational theorists in addressing issues of a systemic and collective 
nature for the research on group and organizational level learning. The organizational ' 
level is probably most under-specified, as researchers generally do not delve into inher­
ent processes, but theorize about organizations in somewhat behavioralist terms. A rea­
son for the gradient in conceptual clarity might be that an explicit distinction of different 
levels of analysis has only been introduced to the organizational learning discussion 
fairly recently. In addition, exploration and testing of theoretical concepts faces in­
creased difficulty when empirical settings involve groups or whole organizations in the 
real world, instead of individuals in a laboratory. Finally, it must be emphasized that the 
processes depicted here should be expected to be strongly interrelated. Learning at 
higher levels of aggregation not only incorporates prior ‘lower level’ learning, but also 
feeds back into processes further upstream (von Cranach et al., 1986). Individual cogni­
tion, group communication, and formalization at the organizational level always occur 
on the basis of prior experience.
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1.8 M e m o r y  a t  d if f e r e n t  l e v e l s
A core component of organizational learning must be, by definition, organiza­
tional memory since no learning can take place in an organization unless it possesses an 
adequate memory system (Kihlstrom, 1996). Any basic textbook on learning and mem­
ory concludes that learning requires and only functions with memory (e.g. Houston,
1991). Bluntly speaking, while learning has to do with acquisition, memory has more to / 
do with storage, but new acquisition will be influenced by what is already stored; the 
two parts are interconnected. Following that rationale it becomes clear that any compre- , 
hensive theorizing on organizational learning has to include and will be enhanced by an 
understanding of memory at the collective level (Weick, 1979, p. 206). Huber (1991) 
stresses the point of the effectiveness of organizational memory as a determining factor 
for the demonstrability and usability of learning by noting that information acquisition, 
information distribution, and information interpretation all substantially depend on ref­
erences and frameworks stored in memory. All these notions provide assurance of the 
crucial dependence of learning on a form of memory, and describe memory as a key 
component for theorizing in the focal field (Casey, 1997; Duncan & Weiss, 1979; 
Simon, 1991).
Research on human information processing generally categorizes three subproc- / 
esses inherent to memory operations, namely acquisition, retention, and retrieval. These 
processes often overlap or merge. Information and knowledge is first obtained through 
functions of perception and learning, then stored in memory repositories, and can finally 
be recovered for further use. Taking into account the previous discussion on levels o f ' 
analysis, it is also important to distinguish between memory processes of individuals, 
groups, and organizations (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998). Thus, we arrive at a three by 
three matrix, as illustrated in Table 1.4, where the processes are tightly intertwined, 
while the levels of analysis allow for a clearer distinction. Since organizations consist of 
individuals and groups, it should be noted that processes and components of individu­
als’ memory are understood as part of group memory, as much as the memory of vari­
ous groups is part of the larger concept of organizational memory.
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Table 1.4: Memory issues across levels of analysis
Individual Group Organization
Acquisition Encoding through practice, 
repetition, reinforcement
Encoding through commu­
nication that establishes 
experts and responsibility 
(transactive)
Metaknowledge (directory) 
of group members’ abilities 
and characteristics
Encoding of labels and 
locations of content
Acquisition mainly through 
individuals
Individuals as basic opera­
tors and facilitators
Retention Located in individuals 
(cortical areas of the brain)
Different compartments, 
e.g. short- and long term 
memory
Located in individuals 
Social network
Located in individuals, 
culture, transformations, 
structures, ecology, and 
external archives; also 
documents
Recent emphasis on com­
puter-based knowledge 
databases
Differentiation between 
information and knowledge
Retrieval Enhanced by appropriate 
cues and meaningfulness of 
content
Generally content- 
dependent
Determination of location 
of content
Combination of retrieved 
content from several indi­
viduals (transactive)
Sharing and integration of 
content, and generation of 
new knowledge
Retrieval mainly through 
individuals, often transac­
tive retrieval
Individuals as basic opera­
tors and facilitators
1.8.1 Memory at the individual level
Given the main concerns of the present work, a thorough description of individual 
memory is not intended here. Since many basic textbooks on cognitive psychology pro­
vide detailed accounts on the matter (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Eysenck & Keane, 1995; 
Houston, 1991), a rough overview of major ideas will suffice for the present purpose, 
and specific literature references are not made.
Much of the research on individual memory, especially on acquisition and re­
trieval, is concerned with fact-based or declarative instead of procedural knowledge,
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and has mainly been studied in laboratory settings. Effective acquisition appears to ne­
cessitate practice and repetition, as well as reinforcement. Great improvements in mem­
ory acquisition are also achieved as a function of the elaborateness of processing, as can 
be observed when subjects generate material to be stored in memory themselves. Elabo­
ration can have a powerful effect on acquisition, although it is generally thought that 
forgetting may be due to retrieval factors rather than to acquisition factors.
The question of how material is encoded leads to observations of the structure of 
memory, which is organically represented by the cortex. Extensive studies assert that 
different types of material, such as visual or linguistic memories, are stored in different 
cortical areas, and that memory content is usually stored in chunks of about three ele­
ments. The research on memory structure is heavily influenced by experiments con­
ducted with brain-damaged patients that often suffer from severe memory failure. It has 
been shown, for example, that damage to the temporal lobe and related structures can 
result in both retrograde and anterograde amnesia. On a somewhat more descriptive 
level, multi-compartment models are proposed that distinguish between different levels 
of processing, or between different stores, such as the sensory, short- and long-term 
store. The most widespread differentiation is probably made between working and long­
term memory, which offers a neat analogy to the structure of modem computers.
Research on retention deals mostly with aspects of forgetting. Memories seem to / 
decay as a function of time, or elaborateness and procedure of initial acquisition. Learn­
ing and retention of one set of materials often interferes with the learning and retention 
of another set of materials. Although there is not a well-established relationship between 
valence of memory and its retention, material learned in high arousal states is usually 
retained very thoroughly.
The retrieval of memorized material largely depends on the availability of appro­
priate retrieval cues. To a large extent, retrieval is context-dependent, both in terms of 
external surroundings and internal states. When asked to reconstruct compilations of 
material, such as entire stories, subjects’ ability is typically enhanced by the meaning­
fulness of the content. For other retrieval tasks, differences are also detected between 
recognition and recall in tests with lists of items. Some characteristics of memorized 
material determine the ease of retrieval in many cases; visual material, for example, has 
advantages over verbal material.
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When placed in organizations, people generate a wealth of knowledge that largely 
remains in their heads during the process of doing their work. In sum, people are per- / 
haps the most effective means for storing the organization’s experience (Simon, 1991). 
As a colloquial yet illustrative example, it has been said that if NASA wanted to go to 
the moon again, they would have to start from scratch, since they might still have the 
data, but not the human expertise that goes with it.
People in organizations do not exist as independent actors; they constantly interact 
with others. This leads to alterations in the types and functions of memory when the 
group is the level of analysis.
1.8.2 Memory at the group level
Memory functions at the group level occupy an intermediate position between in­
dividual and organizational memory. Theorizing in this field suffers from a widespread 
conceptual leap that dichotomizes knowledge residing either within individuals or in 
formalized organizational repositories. This has to do in part with the intuitive tangibil­
ity of memory locations, which is clear for individuals (i.e. the brain) and to some de­
gree organizations (e.g. knowledge management databases), but becomes somewhat 
elusive when the focus is on groups. A cognitive perspective and the notions of informal 
interaction and exchange further complicate the issue (Kihlstrom, 1996).
Experimental research on group memory has traditionally focused on ad hoc 
groups and classical memory tasks, such as the learning of nonsense syllables or the re­
call of stories. As the processes mediating group memory, or more fundamentally, the 
very nature of group memory, seem to be crassly reduced and misunderstood in such 
works, the need to account for core elements of collective interaction was recognized 
(Bangerter et al., 1997). Recent approaches to group memory are frequently embedded / 
in broader discussions of team or group mental models (Mohammed & Dumville, 
2001), which refer to an organized understanding of relevant knowledge that is shared 
by team members (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). In this debate, shared cognition is 
an integral part of group existence and activity, and embodies the task-related coordina­
tion of individuals (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). A different approach derives from 
research on group performance, and the finding that the composition of a group plays a 
decisive role in facilitating and enabling good or bad performance (Moreland & Levine,
1992). Since it might not always be practical to change group composition, the focus
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turns towards using given human resources in the best way possible. Hence, abilities of 
group members must be known in order to allocate tasks. This knowledge of people’s / 
characteristics traditionally resides with a manager, but as work groups increasingly be­
come independent and self-managed, such knowledge then has to be dispersed across 
individuals and become somewhat shared. The two approaches merge on the assump­
tion that a mutually compatible, shared understanding of interactive patterns and indi­
vidual capabilities has a distinct potential to improve group performance and efficiency. 
Groups who know each other well or who have experience of working together in the /  
past are likely to solve given tasks better than comparable groups of strangers (Liang, 
Moreland, & Argote, 1995). The metaknowledge members acquire enables them to / 
identify the location of individual expertise among other members, and therefore to ex­
pand their own specialization of knowledge by utilizing the cognitive resources of oth­
ers. As a result, memory in groups becomes a social phenomenon.
A particularly compelling conceptualization that takes into account the described t 
social dimension is transactive memory8. Wegner (1987) first described transactive 1 
memory as the shared division of cognitive labor with respect to the encoding, storage, 
retrieval, and communication of information from different domains. The concept origi­
nally stems from research on intimate relationships and focused on how information that 
enters relationships is encoded (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991; Wegner, Guiliano,
& Hertel, 1985). It could be shown that people extensively make use of external storage 
for everyday memory tasks. External storage in this context signifies not only inanimate 
objects like diaries or notepads, but also other people. Successful retrieval from external 
storage according to Wegner (1987) requires the prior encoding of two pieces of infor­
mation about a given item, namely a retrieval cue or label, and a location. For the ex­
ample of a phone number, the label could be “John’s number” and the location the ob­
ject “my diary” or the person “my mother”. Referring to the latter, the core notion of 
transactive memory is that people can be locations of external storage for the individual. 
As groups gain experience, they generate knowledge of who is good at what, whom to /  
trust, and how to coordinate and communicate with one another. At the group level, it is
8 It is recognized here that there are several literatures, which are clearly relevant to the broader discus­
sion of team or group mental models and shared cognition, such as information sharing, cognitive consen­
sus, team decision making, team situation awareness etc. However, this section focuses on memory re­
search, and transactive memory is to my knowledge the only model that integrates the notions of memory, 
sharing, and interaction at the group level.
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crucial for each member to acquire metaknowledge about others’ abilities and character­
istics (Moreland, 1999). The information held in a group’s memory can therefore be 
separated into two components: The information stored by group members in their indi­
vidual memories, and directories held by group members that recognize the existence, 
location, and means of retrieval of information held by other members.
The link between individuals’ expertise in groups is constituted by communica- / 
tion (Hollingshead, 1998). In transactive encoding, people talk about and evaluate in­
coming information in order to identify the meaning and subsequent storage location. 
Prior communication has established experts and their respective knowledge domains, 
and their future responsibility for information pertaining to that domain has been as­
serted (Hollingshead, 2000). Transactive retrieval entails determining the location of 
information and often comprises the combination of retrieved input from several loca­
tions. Consequently, a group is capable of accomplishing integrative processes in mem­
ory that generate new knowledge. Although the combined pool of expertise expands, the 
systemic structure reduces the cognitive load of each individual, and decreases redun­
dancy of effort. In sum, the described communication between individuals constitutes a 
group information-processing system that stands for more than the sum of its individual 
components.
Wegner et al. (1985) suggest two structural qualities that characterize transactive / 
memories. Differentiation refers to the storage of dissimilar items in different individu-/ 
als. Nevertheless each individual knows labels and locations of items they do not hold 
personally. Integration relates to a memory system where many members hold the same 
items of information and are aware of the overlap. The two characteristics represent op­
posite ends of a continuum, and an optimal management in this respect depends on the 
task at hand.
In conclusion, the concept of transactive memory draws heavily on an analogy to 
computer networks, with each computer containing its own memory as well as a direc­
tory of other computer memories in the system (Wegner, 1995). Empirical evidence of 
this model of group memory has been provided, although much of the research involves 
couples rather than groups, and has been conducted in the laboratory (Moreland, 1999). 
However, an important contribution is that “transactive memory incorporates the system 
of interconnections that exists in individuals’ communications and, hence, places direct 
emphasis on the social organization of diversity...” (Wegner, 1987, p. 206). The con­
cept proves vital for an understanding of internal processes of organizational learning,
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as it persuasively affirms the notions of informal interaction, communication, and shar­
ing to the theoretical discussion.
1.8,3 Memory at the organizational level
A point has been made earlier about elements of information processing being ac­
quisition, retention, and retrieval. Such essentials must be similarly assumed for mem­
ory at the organizational level. However, the increasingly complex and often geographi­
cally dispersed nature of large organizations implies that a memory concept at this level 
will have to fundamentally differ, for example in defining the locus (since organizations 
do not have brains like individuals), from the ones introduced so far.
The location of memory repositories seems to be the dominant theme in the scien­
tific debate. Where an organization stores information, or from where it retains its gen­
erated knowledge, receives a lot more interest than the question how memory content is 
acquired or retrieved. The use of such terms as ‘storage’ and ‘repository’ promotes an 
understanding of memory content as a collection of discrete units that are precisely la­
beled and that can be packed away like books in a library. This obviously defies the idea 
of information processing at a collective level as a social and interpretative activity 
(Daft & Weick, 1984), but such language is apparently very appealing.
Concerning the locus of organizational memory, concepts of varying sophistica­
tion can be found in the literature. Cyert & March (1963) see memory as contained in /  
accepted procedures, Argyris & Schon (1978) identify people and documents as storage 
facilities, and Weick (1979) perceives people, rules and files, and computers as the main 
components (for a detailed account of works that define and measure organizational 
memory in different disciplines see Stein, 1995). Deriving from their definition of or-/ 
ganizational learning, Levitt & March (1988) claim that lessons of experience are main­
tained and accumulated within routines despite the turnover of personnel and the pas­
sage of time. The actual recordings are stored in individual memories, documents, ac-/ 
counts, files, standard operating procedures, rule books, in the social and physical geog­
raphy of organizational structures, in standards of good professional practice, in the cul­
ture of organizational stories, and in shared perceptions of “the way things are done 
here” (p. 327).
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Walsh & Ungson (1991) provide a more systematic structure to their concept of / 
retention facilities and also discuss processes of acquisition and retrieval in their influ­
ential paper. They first define information about past decisions and solved problems as / 
the core of an organization’s memory over time. Organizations process information and 
“exhibit memory that is similar in function to the memory of individuals” (p. 60). In 
consequence, a central role of the individual is affirmed. Hence, it could be stated that, / 
as in the case of organizational learning, the individual is the principal agent of organ­
izational memory. Individuals acquire information about a particular stimulus event that 
triggered a decision-making process as well as the organization’s response to that stimu­
lus. Similarly, individuals retrieve information from memory, on their own or as a col­
lective (as in transactive memory), in either a conscious or an intuitive manner. So far 
then, Walsh & Ungson’s conceptualization of organizational memory is short of a dis­
tinctively ‘organizational’ note. However, they emphasize that the process of sharing 
permits the transcendence of individual cognitive facilities. Moreover, and most nota­
bly, these authors identify a set of uniquely organizational memory repositories. They 
posit the existence of five storage bins within and one storage facility outside the or­
ganization. First, there are individuals who retain their experiences and observations in 
their own memory, their belief structures, assumptions and values. Second, the culture 
of an organization as a way of perceiving, thinking, and feeling about problems contains 
memory contents in language, shared frameworks, stories, sagas, and the grapevine. 
Third, as organizations are constituted of transformation processes (i.e. input- 
throughput-output) those transformations are retrieved in standard operating procedures, 
rules and formalized systems. A key function of administrative systems is the creation 
and recording of formalized procedures. Fourth, formal and informal codifications of / 
‘correct’ behavior as a substrate of individual and collective role behavior are reflected 
in the structure of an organization. Fifth, the actual physical structure or workplace t 
ecology of an organization also functions as a repository of organizational memory, of­
ten reflecting the status hierarchy. The sixth storage bin of organizational memory is 
located outside of an organization and elucidates that an organization itself is not the 
sole repository of its past. Thus, external archives such as former employees (depending / 
on the length of tenure), competitors, the government, governmental regulatory bodies, 
task forces, financial service firms, and business historians can serve as chronicles of an 
organization’s past. Each of the five internal storage locations varies in its capacity to , 
retain information, but all are interconnected, that is, their respective contents might
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overlap to a certain extent. Given all the different locations, an organization can retain 
its memory contents despite personnel turnover, although individuals might be under­
stood as the basic operators of any form of storage facility (after all they largely deter­
mine what information will be acquired and retrieved). Therefore, organizations can 
memorize independent of any specific individual, but not independent of all individuals. 
Accordingly, Walsh & Ungson (1991) point out that the retention of organizational/ 
memory is not just an individual-level phenomenon, but can apply to a supraindividual 
collectivity as well through a process of sharing (p. 68), as already mentioned.
From Walsh & Ungson’s (1991) systematization it should be clear that informa­
tion technology can only serve as an operational vehicle for the preservation of organ­
izational memory and one with obvious input and output limitations, too. While stan­
dard operating procedures, transformation processes, formal job descriptions, and even 
individual experiences can apparently be easily computerized, subtle but important no­
tions of an organization’s culture, codifications of role behavior or implicitly shared as­
sumptions can mostly not (Anand et al., 1998; Brown & Duguid, 2000). Olivera (2000), 
who is theorizing on a somewhat more operational level, tries to alleviate this dilemma 
by proposing a concept of organizational memory systems that are constituted through 
computer-based technology and social networks. Although he raises awareness about 
memory issues of geographically dispersed organizations, he fails to specify how the 
interpretive nature of knowledge can be computerized, which essentially then leaves 
information technology as a simple facilitator for the storage of discrete content units. 
Further downstream from acquisition in the learning and memory process, the heavy 
influence of the emerging works in computer science on psychological research since 
the 1960s can be stressed by an often present ignorance of the (re)constructive nature of 
human and presumably organizational memory. Corbett (2000, pp. 286-287) concludes:
“As a consequence [of the influence of work in computer science] the idea 
that remembering is an active process involving reconstruction, elaboration 
and invention has been displaced by the notion of memory as a relatively 
passive data storage and retrieval facility. [...] Research on social memory 
conducted by sociologists and social anthropologists reveals how reality is 
reconstructed as an outcome of shared memories rather than an input to their 
construction.” (parentheses not in original)
The detailed listing of possible storage facilities generates the thought that not all 
kinds of memory content might be equally applicable to any kind of memory locus and 
leads to a necessary discussion of memory content.
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In the view of the open systems paradigm, organizations engage in transformation 
processes in which they utilize and create information and knowledge. Although the 
terms information and knowledge are often used interchangeably, there is a clear dis­
tinction. While information is a flow of messages or meanings, knowledge is created /  
and organized by the very flow of information, based on the commitment and beliefs of 
its holder (Nonaka, 1994). On a more technical note, knowledge has been described as 
the “individual ability to draw distinctions within a collective domain of action, based 
on an appreciation of context or theory, or both” (Tsoukas & Vladimirou, 2001, p. 979). 
Brown & Duguid (2000) elaborate extensively on the distinction between information 
and knowledge, and provide illustrative arguments against the treatment of knowledge 
as a tangible commodity. They state that knowledge, first of all, usually entails a 
knower. There is a strong personal attachment, which exacerbates effortless detachment 
and transfer, and contrasts ideas of shipping, receiving, and quantification. In addition, 
there is an assimilating connotation to knowledge. It needs to be somewhat digested, 
and entails the knower’s understanding and some degree of commitment (p. 119-120). 
Knowledge can be further differentiated into tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge 
(Polanyi, 1958). Explicit knowledge is descriptive or procedural knowledge that is x 
transferable in formal, systematic language. Tacit knowledge is more problematic to / 
communicate, as it has a personal quality and is rooted in action, commitment, and in­
volvement in a specific context. As such, a lot of knowledge concerning organizational / 
culture, personal values and implicit role behavior can be classified as tacit. In contrast 
to explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge is not likely to be documented and recorded in 
formal memory repositories and is created and retained through processes of personal 
experience and socialization. One would therefore expect individuals to be the prime / 
facilitators of tacit knowledge.
Another parameter in the discussion of organizational memory that is worth men­
tioning are the retention characteristics in terms of their temporal aspects. As in the in­
dividual case, memorizing on an organizational level can also be divided in short- and 
long-term processes. But while a definition of the extent of short-term and long-term 
memory for individuals is quite simple, this might not be the case for organizations. Dif­
ferent organizations operate at different speeds and a time span of a few hours may be 
considered fairly short-term by an organization producing weather forecasts, while the 
same time span will be considered long-term for organizations dealing in financial mar-
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kets. As Stein (1995) notes, duration within an organization therefore relates to the rate 
of organizational and environmental change and to the perception of its members. Tem­
poral aspects of organizational memory content also relate to the different memory stor­
age facilities. Accordingly, an organization’s culture, structures and external archives 
appear to hold more of the long-term memory, while it can be argued that the other re­
positories hold a bit of both, short- and long-term memory. In the case of the individual 
as a repository, this might be a function of the length of service in the organization.
Adopting an individual level memory concept, the content of short-term memory 
might need to be transferred to long-term memory in order to be accessible and retriev­
able over time. Under certain circumstances, however, knowledge disappears from an 
organization’s active memory. Such cases could include the hiring of a large number of 
new organizational members, role conflict or conflict with other normative orders, or 
weaknesses of organizational control (Levitt & March, 1988). And finally, another view 
on the temporal aspects of memory is that some knowledge might need to be discarded 
altogether from time to time in order for the organization to be able to function effec­
tively. This idea is labeled ‘unlearning’ and has been discussed in the previous pages on 
the different types of organizational learning. It might be concluded that whether the 
memory of an organization supports or hinders its ability to learn depends on how well 
its past solutions can be adapted to fit the problems of the present circumstances 
(Hargadon & Sutton, 1997).
1.9 T h e  p r o c e ss  o f  o r g a n iz a t io n a l  l e a r n in g
Throughout the theoretical part of this text, an attempt has been made to identify, 
discuss, and map the different aspects and facets of learning and memory across levels 
of analysis. The adoption of a process view has led to the description of concepts in 
functionalist terms, with a focus on characterizing information processing through cog­
nition, communication, and formalization.
Using Kolb’s experiential learning cycle, it was made clear that action is closely ( 
related to individual learning. The same can be said for learning at the group level, as 
knowledge creating communication generally revolves around action. This accords with j  
the ideas mentioned earlier by Weick & Roberts (1993), who explain their concept of 
collective mind as inherent in the pattern of interrelated activities among many people.
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Based on the tradition of individual action theory, von Cranach et al. (1986) elaborate 
on the group level and firmly establish action alongside group information processing. 
Further development by Swiss scholars in this realm extends to the organizational level 
and corroborates formalization as level-specific, goal-oriented behavior grounded in ac­
tion (von Cranach & Tschan, 1990).
Internal processes as the core of theorizing on organizational learning have re­
ceived comparatively moderate attention. The few attempts to look ‘inside the organiza­
tion’ and specify what is to be found create little consensus in the field. In fact, “the na­
ture of learning processes is probably the issue over which scholars still diverge most.” 
(Bertoin Antal et al., 2001b, p. 929). But extensive discussions of learning and memory 
components ultimately call for integration into a dynamic process model. This allows 
for a clarification of the focal construct as a whole, and comprehensively illustrates 
theoretical assumptions in a graphic format. A number of process models or frameworks 
have been proposed. In Table 1.5 an overview of these models is provided, and they are 
assessed according to key featured established so far. Included were conceptualizations 
that comprise a sufficient degree of detail to be considered actual process models. In the 
following, a selection of those (not in exact chronological order) will be discussed for 
their strengths and weaknesses.
The first conceptualization of collective learning dynamics can be ascribed to / 
March & Olsen (1975), who devise a systemic model of the process of organizational9 
learning. They describe a circular process in which individual action based on individ-/ 
ual beliefs leads to organizational action, which triggers an environmental response that, 
in turn, affects individual beliefs (see Figure 1.3 for a modified version). Although the /  
model does not attempt to explicate processes in great detail, even at a superficial level 
it fails to adequately mediate between the individual and the collective level. The ques­
tion of learning remains conspicuously vague. Roth (1992, as cited in Kim, 1993a, p. 
39) identifies four shortcomings in March & Olsen’s model: inattention to stimuli inter- /  
pretation and sharing of meaning among individuals, lack of consideration for structural 
elements impeding learning, focus on the organization as a learning environment of in­
dividuals, and emphasis on environmental response to organizational actions. As March
9 Most authors who do not distinguish between the group and the organizational level of analysis gener­
ally use the term ‘organizational’ to describe any learning beyond the individual level.
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& Olsen (1975) see learning primarily driven by environmental responses, they do not 
describe what learning occurs within an organization, a priori independent of the outside 
environment.
Table 1.5: Process models of collective learning
General characteristics Levels of analysis Memory components Feedback functions Notions of interaction, 
sharing and dialogue*
M a r c h  &  
Olsen (1975)
C yclical m odel; iterations 
betw een  ind ividual beliefs, 
ind iv idual and organizational 
actions, and environm ental 
responses
Individual
O rganization
N one Feedback  through 
env ironm en ta l response
N one
Huber (1991) N on-dynam ic fram ew ork 
outlin ing  construc ts and 
p rocesses o f  o rganizational 
learning with associated 
subprocesses
Individual
O rganization
Storage (often  com pu ter- 
based) and retrieval o f  
inform ation  is critical to 
learn ing; m em ory  as an 
in tegral co m ponen t
N one Inform ation  d istribu tion  
w ith in  the organization  and 
subsequen t shared 
inform ation  interpretation  are 
key  p rocesses
K im (1993) C yclical m odel; iterations 
betw een  learning, action and 
env ironm en tal response; key 
link betw een  ind iv idual and 
shared  m ental m odels
Individual
O rganization
Indirect (learn ing  is re ta ined  
as m ental m odels  fo r bo th  the 
ind ividual and the 
organ ization )
Feedback  through 
env ironm en ta l response
Shared m ental m odels at the 
co llec tive  level, consisting  o f  
the o rg an iza tion ’s w orldview  
and its routines
Dixon (1994) C yclical m odel; iterations 
betw een  theory  and action , 
applied  to accessible 
m eaning  structures
Indiv idual 
O rganization  
(ex istence  o f  a group  
level is acknow ledged  
bu t no t e labo ra ted )
Indirect (conceptualized  
private  and co llective 
m eaning  structu res)
Feedback  through effec ts  o f  
action
Through organizational 
d ialogue; p rivate  and 
co llec tive  m eaning structures 
are m ade accessib le  to o thers
Nonaka
(1994)
C yclical m odel; iterations 
betw een  tacit and explic it 
know ledge  creation  through 
four m odes (socialization , 
internalization , 
ex tem aliza tion , com bina tion )
Individual
G roup
O rganization
N one (no ex p lic it 
co ncep tua liza tion )
Feedback  th rough 
ju s tifica tio n  o f  created  
know ledge  by  m eans o f  
quality  standards, and 
th rough netw ork ing  o f  
know ledge
C rucial d ialogue betw een  
tacit and exp lic it know ledge; 
know ledge creation through 
sharing  o f  m em b ers’ 
experiences and perspectives
Coghlan
(1997)
Cyclical m odel, dynam ic 
in terlevel p rocess that starts 
at the ind iv idual; essen tia lly  
K o lb ’s learning cycle  on all 
levels
Indiv idual
G roup
(In terdepartm ental 
g roup  o r unit) 
O rganization
N one Feedback  th rough effec ts  o f  
action
D ialoguing  and in teraction  at 
the g roup  and intcrgroup 
levels c rea te  new data
Cross an, 
Lane & 
White (1999)
Linear m odel; dynam ic 
process  o f  intuiting, 
in terpreting , integrating , and 
institu tionaliz ing
Individual
G roup
O rganization
N one (m em ory  is som ew hat 
associated w ith  the 
institu tiona liz ing  phase)
Feedback  th rough 
ex p lo ita tion  o f  
institu tionalized  know ledge; 
feed forw ard  through 
assim ilation  o f  new 
know ledge
D ialogue and jo in t action are  
crucial to the deve lopm en t o f  
shared understand ing  during  
the in terpreting  and 
integrating  phases
Edmondson
(1999)
L inear m odel focusing  on 
team  learning and its 
an tecedents and 
consequences
G roup None F eedback  th rough g roup  
m em ber in teraction
Sharing and in teraction as 
the core  o f  g roup learn ing
Williams
(2001)
M inim alist com ponen t m odel 
w ith reciprocal in fluences; 
cen tered  on  m anagem ent 
decision  m aking
Indiv idual
O rganization
U nspecified  h in ts to 
ind ividual b e lie f  system s and 
organ izational cu ltu re
Feedback  th rough 
con firm ation  or 
d iscon firm ation  o f  
(m an ag e rs’) beliefs
N one (in teraction  is 
necessary  fo r the 
developm en t o f  ind iv idual 
b e lie f sy stem s)
Lahteemaki, 
Toivonen & 
M attila 
(2001)
C yclical m odel, describes 
learning and change as 
in teractive processes tow ards 
the in ternalization  o f  
im plem ented  changes
Indiv idual
O rganization
N one Feedback  through  the 
im p lem en ta tion  o f  change 
and the crea tion  o f  favorab le  
cond itions fo r fu rther 
learn ing
N one (co llabo ra tion  is 
m entioned  but not 
e labo rated )
Yeo (2002) L inear m odel com bin ing  
goal-related  learn ing  across 
levels o f  analysis
Indiv idual
G roup
O rganization
N one Feedback  th rough the 
in fluence o f  organ iza tiona l 
learn ing  goa ls  on stra teg ic  
m anagem en t
N one
Lipshitz, 
Popper & 
Friedman 
(2002)
S em i-dynam ic fram ew ork 
describ ing  contex tual, po licy , 
psycho log ical, cu ltural, and 
structu ral facets o f  
organ izational learning
N o  explic it 
specification  o f  levels
N one  (unspecified  
conclusion  that 
o rgan iza tiona l learn ing  
produces ch anges in norm s, 
doctrines, standard  operating  
procedures, struc tu res, and 
cu ltures
N one (although  actions as 
the  re su lt o f  p roductive 
learn ing  should  lead to new 
behav io ra l stra teg ies)
O rgan izational learning 
m echan ism s w ith in  w hich 
ind iv iduals m ay ( ‘non- 
in teg ra ted ’) o r  m ay not 
( ‘in teg ra ted ’) share  and 
interact. B oth  versions can 
facilita te  o rganizational 
learning
Holmqvist
(2003)
M atrix m odel o f  dynam ics o f  
in tra- and in terorganizational 
exploration  and explo ita tion
O rganization
In ter-O rganization
N one N one ( it rem ains unspecified  
ho w  a feedback -dependen t 
ba lance betw een  explo ita tion  
and ex p lo ra tion  is ach ieved)
Sharing and interaction 
betw een  o rganizations 
enables in tero rgan izational 
learning
*Organizational learning more than collective individual learning
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Individual
action
Organizational
action
Environmental
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Figure 1.3: March & Olsen’s model of organizational learning
Going back to the discussion on different types of learning, such as single- or 
double-loop learning, an inherent assumption of different stages o f increasing sophisti­
cation and complexity is usually made. The learning types propose a hierarchy of learn­
ing with evolutionary connotations, an assumption of constant adaptation and progres­
sively desirable learning stages. Contrasting the hierarchy assumption, cyclical models 
suggest that organizational learning is an iterative process, which involves the combina­
tion of different activities in order to work efficiently (Easterby-Smith, 1997). As an 
example, Dixon (1994) develops an organizational learning cycle which requires itera­
tions between theory and action, and although there is the idea of progress there is no 
particular end point. Similar iterative processes form the core of Nonaka’s (1994) spiral 
of organizational knowledge creation. This model combines four modes in the creation 
of tacit and explicit knowledge: socialization, extemalization, internalization, and com­
bination. Knowledge creation centers on the interchange between the tacit and explicit 
aspects of knowledge through internalization and extemalization. But in order to actu­
ally generate new organizational knowledge, there needs to be a dynamic interaction 
between all four modes of knowledge creation in the form of a continual upward spiral 
moving from the individual level past the group level to the organizational level.
The constructs and processes that Huber (1991) associates with organizational 
learning deviate from the hierarchical ideas and cyclical models in regard to their 
somewhat linear character. Instead of theorizing about qualitatively different hierarchi­
cal stages or iterative steps, he emphasizes a value-free chain of events of organizational 
learning by postulating four inherent phases and their various subprocesses. In the first 
phase of knowledge acquisition, knowledge is obtained through processes of congenital 
learning (e.g. inheriting knowledge), experimental learning, vicarious learning (i.e. 
learning from others), grafting (i.e. acquiring new members) or searching and noticing.
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The second phase of information distribution determines the occurrence and breath of 
organizational learning by incorporating all of the organization’s components and units. 
Once distributed, information needs to be interpreted. The outcome of this interpretation 
process depends on parameters such as the cognitive maps of people involved, the rich­
ness of the transmission media, potential information overloads, or unlearning. Finally, 
in the fourth phase of organizational memory, knowledge is stored for further use.
Kim (1993b) proposes an integrated model of organizational learning, explicitly 
addressing the link from individual to organization level, whose conceptual elaboration 
makes it very appealing, but also conceals key weaknesses. In his article entitled “The 
link between individual and organizational learning”, as Tsang (1997) notes the only 
thorough exploration of this relationship in the literature (although Kim completely 
overlooks the group level), Kim begins his argumentation in line with many other re­
searchers on the notion that organizations ultimately learn via their individual members. 
Based on the Lewinian experiential learning model, Kim presents his own model of in­
dividual learning. This model deploys a learning cycle of observation, assessment, de­
sign, and implementation functions that stands in reciprocal relation with individuals’ 
mental models; that is, internal images of how the world works consisting of frame­
works and routines. Before integrating his suggestion into a larger scheme, the author 
addresses some fundamental issues in devising a model of organizational learning:
”A model of organizational learning has to resolve the dilemma of imparting 
intelligence and learning capabilities to a non-human entity without anthro­
pomorphizing it.” [...] “ ...if  a distinction between organization and individ­
ual is not made explicit, a model o f organizational learning will either ob­
scure the actual learning process by ignoring the role of the individual (and 
anthropomorphizing organizations) or become a simplistic extension of indi­
vidual learning by glossing over organizational complexities”, (p. 40 and pp.
42-43, parentheses in original)
The model of individual learning is then incorporated into a larger model of or­
ganizational learning, as shown in Figure 1.4 (Kim, 1993b), by illustrating a transition 
from individual mental models to shared mental models, comprising organizational rou­
tines and Weltanschauung (worldview). The learning cycle and mental models are com­
plemented by downstream individual and organizational action components that exer­
cise influence on environmental responses. Thus the link between individual and organ­
izational learning is identified as the transfer of learning through the exchange of indi­
vidual and shared mental models. This process allows organizational learning to be in-
77
Organizational learning
dependent of any specific individual (but not of all individuals). The exchange can be 
explicated in the way of Argyris & Schon’s (1978) idea of double-loop learning, provid­
ing that organizational learning is dependent on individuals improving their mental 
models. Single-loop learning occurs when error correction proceeds by changing action 
strategies within a constant framework of norms of performance. Double-loop learning 
involves restructuring of norms and fundamental changes in frames of reference or theo- 
ries-in-use. Individuals, however, have to make their mental models explicit to allow for 
the development of new, shared mental models. This, as Kim notes, can often become 
problematic because it appears difficult to articulate mental models since they are a 
mixture of what is learned explicitly and absorbed implicitly. One method to overcome 
problems of articulation and observation is the learning laboratory as advocated by 
MIT’s former Center for Organizational Learning (Senge, 1990a).
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Figure 1.4: Kim’s integrated model of organizational learning
In summary, Kim’s (1993b) model deserves consideration because it identifies 
and interrelates crucial elements of the learning process in detail. Advantages, apart 
from a persuasive graphical representation, are an emphasis on communication (which 
is not graphically represented, though), and a clear relation to action, which also func­
tions as an indirect feedback loop. Contrasting these advantages are critical aspects that
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Kim leaves underspecified, most prominently the exact nature of the link between indi­
vidual and organizational learning. How are individual mental models communicated 
and exchanged with the collective? Once they are exchanged, negotiated, and amalga­
mated, which ones are dominant enough to contribute to the shared models? Kim under­
stands mental models as a type of active, working memory that is somehow shared and 
remodeled for collective purposes. How this is done procedurally remains vague. In ad­
dition, a group level is omitted entirely, and the completeness of the included memory 
components might be questioned.
A last framework that deserves detailed attention has more recently been proposed 
by Crossan et al. (1999; see also Vera & Crossan, 2004). These authors identify four 
processes that link the three levels of analysis in ascending order, namely intuiting, in­
terpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing. Individuals are believed to recognize pat­
terns in their experiences, which demands interpretation either alone or in a group. A 
shared understanding that evolves out of the interaction with others is then integrated 
into group processes. In the final stage, institutionalization of tasks and mechanisms en­
sures that routinized actions occur. The four dynamic processes shift learning as a feed 
forward sequence from the individual via the group to the organizational level, while 
utilizing already established content as feedback. Crossan et al.’s framework is compel­
ling because it delineates learning as a dynamic process across interrelated levels of 
analysis. In addition, it confirms the importance of such elements as communication 
through verbalization and action, and feedback to lower levels of aggregation. However, 
the crucial memory component is strikingly underdeveloped, as only the phase of insti­
tutionalization provides a vague hint at retention functions. This leaves an otherwise 
promising framework somewhat incomplete.
Given the work by Kim (1993b) and Crossan et al. (1999), the idea of an inte­
grated framework of learning and memory processes across levels of analysis shows 
potential. Throughout the discussion so far, a comprehensive list of integral components 
as well as shortcomings of prior frameworks have been identified and characterized. 
The outlined concepts in the earlier chapters on learning and memory offer substantial 
clarity and precision to alleviate such shortcomings. Hence, on the basis of lessons 
learned about previous inadequacies, and the current theoretical discussion, a new dy­
namic process framework of learning across levels of analysis is proposed in Figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: An integrated framework of learning and memory
The framework illustrates an integrated sequence of processes that are dynami­
cally interrelated. Learning grounded in experience that occurs at the individual level is
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which might also occur when experienced staff leaves the organization. Individuals can / 
also circumvent or ignore the group level and instead influence the formalization proc­
ess directly. This might especially hold for powerful individuals such as board members 
or information gatekeepers (Daft & Weick, 1984; Staw & Sutton, 1992). The frame­
work describes a balance between exploration through feed forward, and exploitation 
through feedback (Crossan et al., 1999).
The integrated framework organizes all of the fundamental elements discussed so / 
far into a cohesive cyclical structure. It addresses learning and memory issues at three /  
levels of analysis and thereby characterizes a transfer of learning that is sustained and 
augmented by feedback. Generated knowledge is assessed by individuals and enters the 
sequence anew. The sequence is continuous, although learning is manifested in different 
processes for individuals, groups, and organizations. Hence, establishing cognition, 
communication, and formalization as fundamentally different yet interrelated forms of 
information processing, the framework systematizes the flow of learning despite a dis­
continuity10 of processes.
In the remainder of this text, the integrated framework is used as the theoretical 
foundation upon which the introduction of resistance to change to the organizational 
learning discussion rests. It functions as a point of origin that structures the methodo­
logical approach of the empirical part of the study. It constitutes as a building block for 
theory development, but will be, however, held susceptible for conceptual challenges or 
structural improvements resulting from empirical findings.
1.10 Su m m a r y
The first chapter contained a comprehensive review of the organizational learning 
literature, culminating in the proposal of a procedural framework that pulls together the 
discussed aspects and components of organizational learning, and that will guide further 
exploration. The building of a revised theoretical conceptualization was felt necessary 
because of the fragmented and often incoherent nature of the organizational learning
10 According to House et al. (1995) discontinuities are different manifestations of similar variables (in our 
case learning) at different levels of analysis.
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literature, inadequacies of earlier frameworks, and a need to provide guidance for an 
empirical inquiry.
The term organizational learning has a history of being used metaphorically to de­
scribe adaptation, comprehension of complexity, knowledge creation, or intelligence. 
The essential distinction in the literature is found between the concepts of the learning 
organization, which pertains to a rather symbolical use employed mainly by action- 
oriented practitioners (as exemplified by Senge, 1990a), and organizational learning, 
which refers to the theoretical and empirical analysis of learning processes in organiza­
tions (an approach starting with the work of Cyert & March, 1963). This thesis concen­
trates on the latter perspective.
In order to develop a substantiated theoretical position, some important concepts 
within the realm of organizational learning were introduced. Different types of learning 
illustrate the quality of learning outcomes. Internal power relations might influence the 
expansion of learning in organizations. Exploration and exploitation are two notable 
learning strategies, describing approaches based on the development of new ideas or the 
optimization of existing ones. In addition to these related concepts, it was also pointed 
out that organizational learning has been investigated from the perspectives of various 
scholarly disciplines, each one with a different set of potential contributions and inher­
ent research interests. Stemming from such found diversity arose the need to consider 
some fundamental questions about organizational learning in order to further position 
this thesis in the academic debate.
First of all, the question of whether learning at the collective level is at all a feasible 
concept is confirmed by research on learning curves. This refers to the finding that pro­
duction costs and errors in industrial settings decrease over time as groups and organiza­
tions become more experienced. The learning curve findings, however, point at two as­
pects that are deemed detrimental to the development of a detailed understanding of or­
ganizational learning, namely the treatment of learning as an outcome and the direct as­
sociation of learning and performance. Hence, in this thesis a procedural perspective on 
learning is employed that recognizes a potential incongruity between prior learning and 
subsequent expression in observable behavior.
Three levels of analysis - the individual, the group, and the organization - were then 
distinguished in order to specify the discussion of learning processes. It was argued that 
true organizational learning needs to involve individual level learning, group level 
learning, and organizational level learning. In addition, a memory function is required at
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each level of analysis, since the possibility to store and retrieve knowledge is a crucial 
condition for learning to occur. Learning processes were identified as cognition at the 
individual level, communication through action or verbalization at the group level, and 
formalization at the organizational level. Memory functions, while somewhat less 
clearly distinguishable, are depicted as individual memory, transactive group memory, 
and organizational memory.
Following a discussion of earlier process models of organizational learning, the in­
troduced components were then finally combined into a procedural framework of organ­
izational learning and memory across levels of analysis. The different learning and 
memory functions were linked along a feed forward stream from individual cognition to 
organizational formalization, and through feedback loops from higher to lower levels of 
aggregation. The proposed framework serves as the theoretical conceptualization of or­
ganizational learning in the present thesis, and thereby guides the choice of methods for 
the empirical inquiry, and structures the data analysis.
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2 RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
The second chapter introduces resistance to change, the second theoretical stream 
of this thesis. The following paragraphs first of all provide a detailed account of the 
study of resistance to change in various literatures. The aim is to first categorize objects, 
influences, agents involved, and forms of expression, in order to create an understand­
ing of the dynamics of the construct. ‘Overcoming resistance to change’ as the dominant 
research paradigm in the past is then investigated, and fundamental shortcomings of this 
approach are identified. An alternative perspective in the form of a functional analysis 
of resistance is introduced that shifts attention to the effects of resistance rather than to 
its antecedents. Employing resistance as an independent variable allows for the merging 
of the two theoretical streams of this thesis, and finally for the formulation of a research 
question.
2.1 C o m p o n e n t s  o f  r e s ist a n c e
As will be illustrated throughout the following sections, the research interests that 
are prevailing in the resistance domain are focused on controlling and managing resis­
tance in organizational change. The concept is predominantly treated as a dependent 
variable. The resistance phenomenon is regarded as some kind of monolithic entity that 
emerges or not, and that is embedded in varying contexts and subject to diverse influ­
ences. Consequently, efforts are concentrated on manipulating the influential factors in 
order to either completely obstruct the emergence of resistance or minimize its suppos­
edly detrimental consequences. The interest lies basically in fixing the issue.
Examining resistance in this form of a causal analysis, conceptual components can ✓ 
be classify into five different categories: Actor, object, conditions, manifestation and 
perspective (Bauer, 1993). The conceptualization involves single or multiple actors who 
interact with certain objects or events. This interaction lays the foundation for opposing 
interests and conflict of power relations and hence spawns resistance. Conditions that 
are internal or external to the focal organization shape the resistance, which itself is 
manifested in various forms or actions. Any examination of resistance implies a theory- 
in-use of resistance that is applied by a given observer. Such a theory creates a perspec-
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tive that assigns certain values and justifications to the actors involved, and defines or­
ganizational events as either conditions or manifestations of resistance.
2.1.1 Actors
The traditional view of resistance is focused on the management/worker dyad and <- 
locates the actors of resistance unanimously in the lower tiers of the organizational hier­
archy (Coch & French, 1948; Johns, 1973; Lawrence, 1954). Those who are supervised 
resist the power and oppression their supervisors inflict upon them. While such a view ^ 
is well justified in the light of McGregor’s Theory X (1960), which assumes that people 
are naturally untrustworthy, have little ability, and need to be kept under patronizing 
rule, modem organizations necessitate a more differentiated picture. Not only are work­
ing relations often less formal, with fewer strata of hierarchy to facilitate more flexible 
communication, but especially the introduction of modem information technology has 
altered power relations within organizations (Streicher, 1984). Recent trends in organ- x 
izational change like Total Quality Management and Lean Production seem to involve 
all layers of the workforce (Wall & Jackson, 1995; Womack & Jones, 1996), with resis­
tant tendencies being equally probable for a wide range of actors. LaNuez & Jermier /  
(1994), for example, provide an illustrative outline of cases where managers have suffi­
cient motive to exercise resistance by sabotaging the production of goods and services. 
Thus, the traditional subject pool of male blue-collar factory workers as the focus of re­
sistance studies is too homogenous and outdated. All organizational members may be 
on the performing or receiving end of resistance to change.
2.1.2 Objects
Individuals resist a wide variety of organizational practices and policies and in 
principle any change intervention can be targeted. However, the image needs differen­
tiation as to whether change per se is resisted, or specific kinds of changes, or dynamics 
accompanying the change process. It will be shown that these three aspects are some­
what intertwined.
As the concept of resistance to change has become a standard part of management 
vocabulary, there seems to be an underlying belief in an ‘innate inertia’ or ‘innate con­
servatism’ of human beings. Dent & Goldberg (1999a) heavily criticize this view in
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their analysis of current management textbooks, pointing out that the phenomenon is 
treated overly as an individual level concept and has no empirical foundation. Interest­
ingly, innate resistance is also not reconcilable with prominent and well-established 
theories of human needs and motives. In their theories of motivation Maslow (1954), 
Alderfer (1972) and McClelland (1985; McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982) understand mo­
tives such as self-actualization, growth, and achievement as basic needs of human be­
ings, indicating that these motives are not based on fixed standards but tend towards 
structural change. The argument against innate resistance will be elaborated in the dis­
cussion of the ‘overcoming resistance to change’ paradigm.
Examining specific kinds of changes, a distinction can be made between techno­
logical and social change. Few changes are purely technological. Based on the assump-  ^
tion that technology per se is neutral (Pinch, 1996), it can be inferred that people do not 
resist any new technology but the social consequences that come with it (Bauer, 1993; 
Dent & Goldberg, 1999a; Lawrence, 1954). The influx of information technology, for 
example, has such diverse ramifications as the empowerment of IT departments, organ­
izational restructuring, or the confinement of workspace. Thus, it is highly likely that ✓ 
not the change per se is resisted, but the dissolution of social groups, changes in the task 
structure, threats to social positions, job losses, changes and devaluation of skills, in­
creased job demands etc.
Dynamics accompanying change interventions might also instill resistance 
amongst actors involved. Change agents such as external consultants can be a source of f 
conflict not only because of their status as ‘know-it-all’ outsiders, but also because of 
the change agenda they are trying to impose or the interaction they are offering (Bertoin 
Antal & Krebsbach-Gnath, 2001; Kieser, 1998; Schmolze, 2000). Resistance may op­
pose process implications (Molinsky, 1999) or certain goals of the change process as 
well as the style of change management, such as the language used or the degree of par­
ticipation (Boenisch, 1979). Accompanying change interventions are also in many cases 
actual or perceived measures of control and restrictions of freedom that trigger resis­
tance. Considering restrictions and control, reactance seems to occur frequently as a mo-. 
tivation to restore or extend degrees of freedom (Gniech & Grabitz, 1978). As reactance 
often includes irrational aversive behavior, this might in turn generate the further tight­
ening of control.
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2.1.3 Conditions
In observing resistance as a dependent variable, conditions internal and external to 
an organization shape resistance in regards to the type of manifestation as well as the 
likelihood and strength of occurrence. Following Bauer’s (1993) classification, three ✓ 
levels of situational conditions can be distinguished: Interactional, organizational and 
cultural conditions.
Interactional conditions pertain to situational factors at the individual level of ac­
tion. Various psychological concepts located at the individual-organization nexus can be 
identified to be a possible source of influence on resistance (see George & Jones, 2001, 
for a suggestion of a process model of individual change in organizations). The idea of /  
an unwritten psychological contract between the individual and the organization pro­
claims an implicit agreement about the costs and benefits of work relations (Levinson, 
Price, Murden, Mandl, & Solley, 1962; Rousseau, 1989). Resistance can arise either as 
a consequence or be amplified as a function of violations to such contracts. Strebel 
(1996) includes this idea in his concept of personal compacts, comprising psychological 
assumptions as well as formal agreements (e.g., contracts and job descriptions) and so­
cial aspects (e.g., perceptions about an organization’s culture). The relationship between 
costs and benefits is also a central part of equity theory (Adams, 1965). According to /  
equity theory, individuals compare their own ratio between personal input and outcome 
to those of other organizational members, and identify congruence or disparity as an in­
dicator of perceived fairness and justice, or lack thereof. Resistance is justified if input- / 
outcome ratios are seen as unequal. The quality of the relationship between individual 
and organization is also conceptualized under such labels and indicators as organiza­
tional citizenship behavior (Organ, 1988), personal commitment (Hulin, 1991; Meyer 
& Allen, 1997) and turnover (Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979; Mueller & 
Price, 1989). If there is little citizenship behavior, a low degree of commitment and a 
high turnover rate, barriers and inhibitions to engage in resistance are likely to be low 
(although this might depend on what the specific change entails).
Psychological traits and demographic variables are additional conditioning vari­
ables at the individual level. However, the application of these factors to the analysis of 
resistance is obscured for several reasons. Since the expression of resistance in an or­
ganization is seldom confined to single individuals, but is most often a more or less col­
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lective act, singling out individual traits is problematic. Moreover, traits that could be 
held responsible (e.g., neuroticism, anxiety) are negatively loaded and associate a cer­
tain pathology with the resisting individual, thereby prematurely evaluating the process 
(Bauer, 1993). In addition, Clegg (1994) relates the individual subjectivity that deter­
mines the process of resistance to specific power relations and location related tradi­
tions, not to intrinsic characteristics of the concerned subjects.
Organizational conditions include power relations of member groups, structural ✓ 
aspects, and strategic choices. Political activity within organizations and across bounda- x 
ries is likely to result in vested interests among actors involved in change processes 
(Drory & Romm, 1990). Dominant groups exercise influence to shape change interven­
tions according to their own agenda. On the one hand, such vested interests are affected 
by individual level conditions as described above. On the other hand, the dominance of 
interest groups is a function of the way they are embedded in organizational structure. 
The more centralized, the more pivotal to core processes, the deeper stratified, the less 
exposed to norms of equality and the smaller the crisis faced, the more successful domi­
nant groups will be in expressing resistance.
Structural aspects pertain to the formal and informal design of organizations. It is ,  
widely believed that bureaucratic organizations have difficulties in adapting to envi­
ronmental changes due to their rigid structure and formalized and inflexible lines of de­
cision making (McKenna & Wright, 1992). Following that rationale, bureaucratic or- / 
ganizations are resistant to change primarily by means of their structure as a whole, not 
because of their members. Thus, just as there might be organizational structures prone 
to learning, there seem to be organizational structures prone to resistance.
Informal structures of communication and behavior transgress formal boundaries. * 
Although they have no official leader and are not formally recognized, it should not be7 
assumed that their actions are uncoordinated or irrelevant (Guzzo & Shea, 1992), and 
they should not be ignored in change efforts (Lawrence, 1954). Internal communities / 
can be a resource for any transition (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Kofman & Senge, 1993), 
but they need to be deliberately utilized in order to take advantage of their decisive ca­
pacities.
A further organizational condition is the strategic goals that are pursued. In the 
production of goods and services, an organization can either exploit existing capabilities 
or explore new terrain. In the relevant discussion of this trade-off in the chapters on or-
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ganizational learning, it was pointed out that exploitation strategies usually generate 
proximate and predictable returns on allocated resources, while exploration efforts de­
mand longer time horizons and more diffuse effects (March, 1991). Therefore, resis- / 
tance to change can be a product of past excesses of exploitation, rendering the organi­
zation unable to engage in novel initiatives.
Employing a macro-level perspective, there are also cultural conditions that shape 
resistance. These conditions relate to the way an organization is embedded in a particu­
lar society, not to internal organizational culture. Applying the connotations of bureauc­
racies to entire societies, it should be expected that in the classic comparison between 
capitalism and communism, capitalistic societies are generally less resistant to change 
because of their exposure to market forces and internal competition (Porter, 1998). De­
mocratic societies traditionally organize their labor force into trade unions that represent 
workers’ interests opposite employers and government agencies. The history of such 
industrial relations will play a role in how change efforts from either side are perceived. 
Moreover, explanations of resistant societies often center on histories of oppression and 
conquest by which a ‘will to resist’ becomes engrained across generations (Hutchinson 
& Smith, 2000). Stronger resistance could also be expected in societies that subscribe to 
such descriptions as traditional, stoic, and immobile (Beals, Hoijer, & Beals, 1977).
2,1.4 Manifestations
Given the multitude of influences arising from a great diversity of possible actors, 
objects, and conditions, it should be clear that expressions of resistance are equally 
manifold and multifaceted. Sticking to the established subject pool of blue-collar shop 
floor workers, traditional notions of resistance focus on overt, clearly visible and inten­
tional, collective actions such as workplace revolts, formal petitions, sabotage, property 
damage, and output restrictions (Edwards & Scullion, 1982). However, this view has 
distinct limitations.
Elaborating on the intricacies of power relations in organizations, Jermier, 
Knights, & Nord’s (1994b) collection of case studies provide the ground for the argu­
ment that the nature of resistance will vary across space and time, and is likely to be ex­
pressed in a multitude of mundane actions and behaviors at the workplace. For example, 
Prasad & Prasad (2000) describe three discursive practices expressed during the com­
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puterization of a health maintenance organization, which they identify as routine resis­
tance. Employees constructed certain actions of theirs in hindsight as being deliberately 
antagonistic or resistant. A flooding event, causing considerable damage to stored elec­
tronic devices, was later communicated among employees as a purposeful act of sabo­
tage. Another form of routine resistance involved managers interpreting certain em­
ployee actions as disruptive, even though the managers simultaneously acknowledged 
that these actions were not necessarily intended to be so by those who engaged in them. 
The authors conclude that their examples confirm the presence of resistance at an in­
formal and discursive level, expanding the image of resistance as a conscious, calcu­
lated act. A further example by Scott (1987), set in a completely different context, de­
scribes the creativity of Malay peasantry in circumventing the payment of a specific 
form of tax sentence; an instance of passive resistance without formalized protest and 
organization.
The consideration of attitudes in manifestations of resistance adds the role of af- , 
fective elements in the change process. Research on attitudes reveals a tripartite struc- / 
ture consisting of an affective, cognitive, and behavioral component (Eagly & Chaiken, / 
1993). Advocating a multidimensional view of attitudes toward change, Piderit (2000)^ 
cautions that responses to change should not be classified using the rigid dichotomy of / 
resistance vs. non-resistance, but should rather be assessed on continua for different atti- 
tudinal components. In sum, resistance can also be assumed to be constituted by cogni- 
tive, affective, and behavioral components, and is manifested in an abundance of forms./
Attempts at classifying manifestations of resistance struggle to make clear distinc- / 
tions between designated categories. The most notable problems arise in differentiating/ 
between formal and informal resistance. Prasad & Prasad (1998) distinguish formal, 
collective, and intentionally disruptive activities from less visible and more indirect 
forms of opposition that can take place within the everyday worlds of organizations. 
Based on an earlier discussion by Scott (1985) they use the term ‘routine resistance’ to /  
describe “mundane and almost ordinary actions of workplace actors, which are nonethe­
less capable of being interpreted as resistant” (p. 227). As a consequence of such broad 
interpretations, depictions of resistance become increasingly inclusive and subjective to 
the perspectives of observers.
“The central point being made here is that one cannot automatically infer that
resistance is taking place on the basis of a specific type of action (e.g., horse-
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play, gossip, aberrant dress style, etc.) occurring in the workplace. [...] Iden­
tifying routine resistance becomes further complicated because it is often dif­
ficult to specify where compliance ends and where resistance begins. [...]
What we are now confronted with is the possibility that seemingly subversive 
or disruptive practices are not necessarily resistant by intent, while ostensibly 
compliant ones may well contain seeds of resistance and opposition.” (Prasad 
& Prasad, 2000, pp. 388-389, parentheses in original)
A first step towards alleviating problems of recognition and categorization should '  
be to note that there is a difference between opposition and resistance, namely that op­
position is institutionalized and resistance is not. Trade unions, for example, are to a 
large extent institutionalized forms of opposition. Resistance therefore will always be 
connected to some sort of initial spontaneity or ad hoc action. While Prasad & Prasad 
(1998; and to a lesser degree 2000) fail to make this distinction, they acknowledge that a 
more formal definition of routine resistance is somehow deliberately evaded in the lit­
erature. Routine resistance is mostly defined as something that is not conventional resis­
tance, in order to keep the notion flexible and open. Utilizing the framework of social 
interactionism, the authors eventually propose a research trajectory that does not reify 
routine resistance as a pre-specified set of actions, but instead looks at how routine re­
sistance is constituted in local workplace situations (Prasad & Prasad, 2000).
If resistance is thought to be influenced and shaped by multiple situational factors 
such as actors, objects, and conditions described above, Prasad & Prasad’s advice not to 
limit the concept to pre-specified features seems convincing. With all due cautions not 
to fall prey to overly inclusive interpretations while doing research on the phenomenon, 
subjects’ creativity in expressing routine resistance should be considered. Nevertheless, 
despite the problem of blurred boundaries, generic forms of resistance can be identified. 
Table 2.1 shows a categorization according to the dichotomies individual-collective and 
active-passive (Bauer, 1993). The categories are complemented by examples from 
Prasad & Prasad (1998, examples too specific to particular settings are omitted).
2,1.5 Perspectives
Finally there is a meta-level in the analysis of resistance, namely the perspective ✓ 
that can be employed to observe the phenomenon. The perspective implies certain attri- /  
butions and connotations for the actors involved. A basic differentiation can be made 
between the form of ‘observing the other’ and the form of ‘self-observation’ (Bauer, 
1993). ‘Observing the other’ pertains mostly to the viewpoint of external actors who are /
91
Resistance to change
involved in a change process as change agents, investigating theorists or innocent by­
standers. This seems to be the dominant perspective, as resistance in an organizational ^  
context has mainly negative connotations and is thus rarely used for self-observation. 
However, the organizational strategic agenda plays a role in interpreting the observa­
tions of others. If change is wanted, inactivity is construed as resistance. If stability is  ^
the objective, inactivity will be understood as commitment.
Table 2.1: Manifestations of resistance
Active Passive
Individual Reduced performance levels Rationalizing refusals
Criticism of management Apparent acceptance, later return to old
Grievances ways
Sabotage Wishful thinking
Aggressions Refusal to use new facilities
Refusal of (additional) work load Laughter, irony, pleasure about system fail­
ures
Humor and jokes about management 
Anger, nervousness 
Critical comparison with other sys­
tems/organizations 
Sticking to old ways of doing 
Indifference and waiting 
Careful carelessness 
Extension of breaks 
Non-participation in company ritu­
als/traditions
Collective Collective protest and/or strike Negative attitudes, low acceptance
High fluctuation of staff Sticking to old ways of doing
Absenteeism Horseplay leading to product damage
Reduced output in quantity and quality 
(output restrictions)
Work to rule
Destruction of means of production 
Occupation of factory 
Forming of groups
Gossip
Resistance as a prominent concept in management thinking is also attractive be­
cause it has news value as bad news about business activities (Lorsch, 1976). In the ob­
servation of others, bad news can be exploited and instrumentalized according to given 
political and managerial agendas.
From a more remote viewpoint, perspective stands for the theoretical world­
views about the nature of work, organizations, and resistance itself. Using the term 
worldview, the dogmatic aspects of some perspectives are indicated, which may reach 
far beyond the focal topic of resistance to unique fundamental understandings of his-
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tory, society, and science. Jermier, Knights, & Nord (1994a) illustrate as examples the 
arguments of three influential labor process analysts, Karl Marx, Harry Braverman, and 
Michel Foucault. Prasad & Prasad (1998) classify the additional perspectives of neo- 
Marxism, critical cultural studies, feminism, interpretive studies, and post-colonialism. 
Since an even remotely adequate description of the underlying arguments of each of 
these viewpoints goes far beyond the scope of this paper, only an account of the various 
‘brand names’ will be provided here. Interested readers are encouraged to explore the 
collections mentioned above.
In sum, it should be noted that any analysis of resistance to change needs to expli­
cate its inherent perspective, both in terms of its standpoint of observation and its theo­
retical background. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the awareness of un­
derlying perspectives and agendas in the study of resistance is a great support in uncov­
ering limited conceptualizations and premature assumptions.
2.2 O v e r c o m in g  r e s is t a n c e  t o  c h a n g e
The influence of the ‘observing the other’ perspective is nowhere more clearly de­
tectable than in the research paradigm that dominated studies on resistance for most of 
the last 50 years: Overcoming resistance to change (see the eponymous study below). 
Suggestions on how to deal with resistance to change have evolved over time, from 
Taylor’s (1911) proposition to steam-roll resistance to more moderate and attentive 
strategies. But the notion of resistance as a nuisance that needs to be overcome, a stub­
born natural tendency of ‘others’ involved in a change process, appears to be conven­
tional wisdom in especially the management literature (Dent & Goldberg, 1999a). A 
brief overview of the advent of this viewpoint and its further development will be pro­
vided.
2.2.1 Coch & French
The most influential text that should probably be understood as the point of origin 
of this mindset carries its title as an programmatic outlook: ‘Overcoming resistance to
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change’ by Lester Coch and John French (1948). This often cited work11 is based on a 
study conducted at the Harwood Manufacturing Company, a pajama factory in Virginia, 
USA. The company employed workers at piece rate and experienced significant and 
persistent declines in group production rates once a new technology was introduced. In 
this exemplary treatment of resistance as a dependent variable, two initial questions are 
asked: (1) “Why do people resist change so strongly?” and (2) “What can be done to 
overcome this resistance?” (p. 512). Applying Lewin’s field theory to local circum­
stances, the basic experiment consists of three experimental groups and one control 
group. All four groups were subject to job changes that would necessitate the acquisi­
tion of new skills and that would entail initial reductions in productivity (and pay). 
While the control group went through a lecture-style non-participatory group meeting to 
introduce the changes, the experimental groups were exposed to varying degrees of par­
ticipation in decision-making. This was either indirect participation with elected repre­
sentatives talking to management or direct participation in the decisions of how to in­
troduce a new technology. The results are indicated by means of differential recovery 
rates of the learning (i.e., productivity) curves after the introduction of the changes. The 
production rates of all groups plummeted immediately after the changes occurred. How­
ever, while the performance of the control group never recovered to the level before the 
changes, performance of the experimental groups soon reached their before-change 
level and went beyond that. Productivity in the experimental groups not only rose faster, 
but the speed of recovery and the average post-change level of productivity were di­
rectly proportional to the amount of participation experienced. Moreover, turnover in 
the experimental groups was lower than in the control groups. In a second experiment, a 
part of the original control group was given a direct participation treatment, which re­
sulted in fast recovery and a final level of production above the level before transfer. In 
sum, the results indicate a direct relationship between participation and resistance: The 
higher the degree of participation, the lower resistance to change. Coch & French con­
clude that participation in decision-making as a management method reduces and modi­
fies the forces of resistance.
The results of the study are compelling and, embedded in Kurt Lewin’s theories 
and backed by the very influential Research Center for Group Dynamics, were dissemi-
11 According to the Social Science Citation Index, Coch & French’s article has been cited 569 times in 
scientific journals alone between 1981 (the inception of the computerized citation index) and June 2004.
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nated to a wide academic and corporate audience. Together with the Hawthorne ex­
periments (Roethlisberger, 1989), Coch & French paved the way for the Human Rela­
tions approach to management and established employee participation as a means to not 
only humanize general working conditions (Follett, 1982), but also to increase eco­
nomic competitiveness (Froehlich & Pekruhl, 1996).
Despite all apparently positive ramifications, Coch & French’s study suffers from 
serious methodological flaws and must be questioned for its relevance to the concept of 
resistance. Gardner (1977) and later Bartlem & Locke (1981) scrutinize the original in­
terpretations and identify doubtless shortcomings that question the study’s internal and 
external validity. Amongst the faults are the selection of only female subjects, no ran­
dom selection and random assignment to experimental groups, unequal job changes, 
unequal group sizes, dramatic presentation of the necessity of changes only to the ex­
perimental group, confounding inter-group competition, motivational effects due to per­
ceived prior punishment, and a general inattentiveness to cognitive effects. As a result, 
both authors find it impossible to infer that the increased productivity in the experimen­
tal groups occurred solely due to participation in decision-making. Attempts to replicate 
Coch & French’s findings with stricter control of confounding variables either failed to 
find performance differences (French, Israel, & As, 1960) or had to restrict the context 
under which the results are valid (Fleishman, 1965).
Dent & Goldberg (1999a) also question the relevance of Coch & French’s study 
to the concept of resistance by saying that the original experiments are really more 
about employee participation than anything else (p. 32). As the term resistance is not 
used in the original study (only in the title) and the focus shifts between individual con­
sequences of change and meta-level systemic field forces, the title choice of the article 
appears surprising. Frames of reference are provided that guide Coch & French’s think­
ing, but the main cause behind embedding their research in the ‘overcoming resistance’ 
frame is probably their close relationship to the theories of Kurt Lewin12. As will be 
elaborated in the next chapter, Lewin’s theorizing coined the term resistance to change 
as a concept pertaining to social systems.
12 Coch and French were both employed at the time of the experiment at the Harwood plant by its owner, 
Alfred J. Marrow, who had met Lewin as a doctoral student and later collaborated with him (Marrow, 
1969; Marrow, Bowers, & Seashore, 1967). Coch, French, and Marrow were all active at the Research 
Center for Group Dynamics, which was founded by Lewin.
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2,2,2 The persistence o f overcoming
Above and beyond the initially persuasive message of its results, basic parameters 
of Coch & French’s study were an influential source of inspiration for management 
thinking for years to come. Treating resistance as a dependent variable, employing an 
‘observing the others’ perspective, exclusively understanding lower levels of hierarchy 
as obstacles to change processes and adopting the principle that management can ‘fix 
the problem’ of resistance all culminate in the basic assumption that people resist 
change (see Zander, 1950, for an early example). Contemporary textbooks in the fields 
of management, organizational behavior, and organizational psychology support this 
view, and more or less perpetuate its connotations (e.g., Frese, 1998, pp. 664-665; Huc- 
zynski & Buchanan, 2001, pp. 599-604; Mullins, 1999, pp. 823-826; Robbins, 2001, pp. 
545-550).
Employee participation is one management answer to resistance. But since the na­
ture of change can be multifaceted, the types of responses to the resistance that is caused 
by change should vary accordingly. The thinking of contingency theorists was intro­
duced to this context by Kotter & Schlesinger (1979). In their prominent article, the au­
thors describe various causes for resistance to change and then outline several ap­
proaches to dealing with it. Their account of common reasons for resistance includes 
parochial self-interest, misunderstanding and lack of trust, different assessments, and 
low tolerance for change. It must be noted that these reasons relate only to the employ­
ees upon which the change is imposed. Kotter & Schlesinger write from a perspective 
that implicitly allocates management the role of directing change, not taking part itself. 
A possible inability of managers themselves to change is mentioned only briefly (p. 
109). The idea of employee participation is integrated into the proposed six strategies of 
alleviating the problem, that is, overcoming resistance: Education and communication, 
participation and involvement, facilitation and support, negotiation and agreement, ma­
nipulation and co-optation, and explicit and implicit coercion. According to certain situ­
ational factors, the organization in question can be located on a strategic continuum and 
the most adequate of the six methods can be applied.
The appeal of reducing a virtually infinite number of influences (as stated on p. 
109) to a convenient set of variables may explain the success of Kotter & Schlesinger. 
Their recommendations for action, however, reach far beyond a mere mitigation of re­
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sistance. As in part indicated above, employee participation aims at humanizing work, 
decreasing hierarchical differences and creating upward communication. It seems to be 
crassly ignorant to misuse this way of managing as a simple tool of persuasion. More­
over, coercing people into unwanted changes might underestimate power relations and 
have consequences far beyond overcoming immediate resistance (Schmolze, 2000).
Upholding Coch & French’s (1948) basic parameters, Kotter & Schlesinger add 
the notion of contingent responses. The influence of their approach spawned numerous 
management cookbooks on how to seduce employees into accepting change efforts 
(e.g., Hultman, 1998). The underlying theme draws a picture of management working 
against employees. As Piderit (2000, p. 784) puts it, “managers are tempted by the lan­
guage of resistance to treat their subordinates as obstacles”. Instead of using a logic of 
attracting people to follow them, most top managers seem to believe that change is 
something that someone with authority does to someone who does not have authority 
(Quinn, 1996; Weick & Quinn, 1999).
2,2,3 Changing perspectives
The treatment of resistance as something essentially pathological, in combination 
with the assumption that resistance is a natural reaction to change, has conflicting con­
sequences. If change is ubiquitous, any transformation adheres to the logic of an intrin­
sic pathology. The emphasis on ‘overcoming’ perpetuates the conceptualization of resis­
tance as a dependent variable and allocates all efforts of alleviation to the change part of 
the change-resistance dyad. If resistance is to be expected anyway, why not pay more 
attention to its nature and outcomes in order to gain a more complete image?
Nord & Jermier (1994) apply Carl Gustav Jung’s metaphor of the Shadow (Jung, 
1976), originally referred to as parts of an individual’s personality that he or she refuses 
to accept, to the ‘overcoming’ paradigm. They state that by overemphasizing the notion 
of overcoming resistance to change, important aspects of the resistance concept might 
be pushed into the Shadow, that is, they are refused further exploration. As a conse­
quence, resistance is undesirable and change is desirable. Employing an analogy to psy­
chotherapy, resistance needs to be overcome not because it helps the resister (as in
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therapeutic sessions), but because it is an obstacle to someone else’s objectives (e.g., 
management). Thus, resistance is something to be resisted (p. 399).
A shift of focus away from allegedly innate characteristics of individuals is under­
taken by Kotter (1995; 1996). Referring to his chosen title, he asks the initial question 
whether change is something one manages or something one leads? Managing some­
thing implies telling people what to do, while leading something involves showing peo­
ple how to be. Therefore, change initiators cannot be excluded from the change itself. 
While acknowledging that resistance might be within the individual, Kotter states that 
such resistance is rare and situates resisting forces somewhat outside the individual, 
within structural and systemic factors. These obstacles include, amongst others, adverse 
performance appraisal systems fueling self-interest, insufficient communication chan­
nels, narrow job categories, and not achieving enough critical mass for the change- 
guiding coalition. If such obstacles in the total system are removed, a large part of the 
expected resistance will not be encountered.
Taking Kotter’s interpretation further, Dent & Goldberg (1999a) make a vigorous 
argument against the apparent conventional wisdom that people resist change. They 
suggest an enhancement to the general discussion by saying that people do not resist 
change per se, but people resist loss. Loss of status, loss of pay, loss of influence, loss of 
freedom, loss of comfort etc. (as discussed in the subchapter on objects of resistance). 
By assuming that resistance is a given irrespective of the consequences of change, most 
transformation efforts are bound to fail because of this fundamentally flawed mental 
model (p. 26-27). Resistance turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy: Change initiators plan 
on its occurrence, undertake any attempt to minimize it in advance, are tempted to dis­
guise or hide the change, and such going to any lengths will give birth to the phenome­
non that was supposed to be avoided in the first place (Winslow, 1992, as cited in Dent 
& Goldberg, 1999). In sum, Dent & Goldberg advocate abandoning a perspective that is 
overly centered on the individual and ultimately call for a retirement of the phrase ‘re­
sistance to change’.
Looking at resistance through the eyes of prevalent change initiators, namely ex­
ternal consultants, Merron (1993) detects the same deficient mental models and frame­
works as described above. In addition to also denouncing the phrase ‘resistance to
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change’, he notes that employees might “not be resistant to change at all, but expressing 
differing views of what is truth and differing views of the kind of organization they 
want to be in” (p. 83).
This indicates that there might be something more to resistance than simple, un­
specified opposition. In combination with Dent & Goldberg’s (1999a) argument that 
people resist for very specific reasons that are contingent on various situational factors, 
a shift in analysis can be pursued. Change is a very broad term and it comes in a pleth­
ora of different shapes and sizes. And so does resistance, as could be seen in the discus­
sion of its manifestations. Any simplistic attempt to remedy employee opposition by 
offering a handful of generic sets of action, regardless of the originally intended change, 
fails to recognize the inherent complexity of the phenomenon. In the paragraphs on ob­
jects of resistance, it was shown that the idea of innate resistance to change is not com­
patible with prominent theories of motivation. One can think of innumerous occasions 
where people actively seek and welcome changes, such as changes to dissatisfying 
situations, interesting learning challenges, or stimulating enrichments to the environ­
ment (Dent & Goldberg, 1999b). But when resistance does occur, an explicit analysis of 
this very occurrence might produce the benefit of a clarification of the overall change 
process. Resistance has a diagnostic function.
“Researchers have largely overlooked the potential positive intentions that 
may motivate negative responses to change. [...] Hence, what some may per­
ceive as disrespectful or unfound opposition might also be motivated by indi­
viduals’ ethical principles or their desire to protect the organization’s best in­
terests.” (Piderit, 2000, p. 783 and p. 785)
Bringing resistance into the light of thorough analysis reveals its diagnostic func­
tions and raises awareness for a productive use of conflict, instead of its avoidance or 
suppression (De Dreu, 1997). For example, a constructive use of controversy is charac­
terized by full exploration of opposing opinions and frank analyses of task-related issues 
(Tjosvold, 1998; Tjosvold, Wedley, & Field, 1986).
A detailed exploration of the described shift of focus, its connotations and conse­
quences is provided in the following chapter.
2.3 T o w a r d  a  f u n c t io n a l  a n a l y s is
In discussing resistance, the implication of conflict holds the danger of assigning 
blame to one of the parties involved. However, a scholarly analysis should neither
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blame management for autocratically forcing people into unwanted changes nor blame 
subordinates for selfishly opposing necessary transitions. As it can be hard to avoid a 
biased-sounding undertone, abandoning the notion of overcoming resistance to change 
greatly improves the objectivity of the analysis. A neutral standpoint will aid in uncov­
ering the ‘full potential’ of resistance.
The move away from the ‘overcoming’ paradigm describes a less direct path. In 
order to formulate a consistent argument, different streams of theorizing about change 
and social systems need to be taken into account. All have their own shortcomings but 
contribute to my eventual attempt to conceptualize a functional understanding of resis­
tance to change.
2,3.1 Kurt Lewin
A discussion of resistance would not be complete without the works of Kurt 
Lewin, probably the single most influential writer in management science on the topic 
of change. His approach is rooted in his field theory of social forces and provides a 
popular framework for the analysis of resistance. While it is by no means attempted to 
comprehensively delineate Lewin’s powerful theorizing here, a few important concepts 
warrant clarification of his influence on the field.
Lewin (1947a; 1947b; also in Marrow, 1969) applies a systems perspective to the 
dynamics of change. Systems of social roles, with their associated patterns of attitudes, 
expectations and behavior norms dynamically maintain steady-state conditions through 
a process of homeostasis. This infers that social fields, representations of the group and 
its setting, are able to sustain stable conditions despite conflicting forces in the form of 
inhibitors or motivators. At any time, a social field will be exposed to the dynamics of 
forces opposite in direction. Understood as vectors, these forces might not originally be 
equal in strength, but will eventually level off at a point where this is the case, so that 
fA)g + fA,s = 0 is given13.
Hence, social parameters like group performance, leadership, discrimination and 
hostility can be conceptualized as quasi-stationary equilibria of a social force field.
13 Lewin’s original notation is used here, where f^g means a force acting on entity A in the direction to­
ward g. | f/v,g | indicates the strength of the force fA,g. A trained physicist, Lewin uses an explicitly 
mathematical language in his description of social and psychological concepts.
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Forces are continuously acting on the field but find a point of equilibrium for the inher­
ent parameters as long as none of the opposing forces increase or decrease in strength. 
The social state at a given point in time can maintain its stability in spite of essentially 
dynamic forces, much like a river that continuously changes its elements although its 
velocity and directions remain the same (Lewin, 1947a, p. 15). Changing the equilib­
rium to a different level necessitates a change in forces, as implied by the above equa­
tion, so that | fX,g | > | fA,s | • This implies two different strategies for social change, ei­
ther to increase motivating forces or to decrease resisting forces.
Relating his theorizing to force fields within groups and organizations, successful 
change requires three phases of action: Unfreezing, moving, and refreezing. First, the 
social state of a given force field needs to be unfrozen in order to disturb the equilibrium 
and increase the fluidity of a given situation. This can be done by identifying channels 
of communication and decision makers (i.e., gate keepers) and involving them in re­
structuring efforts (Lewin, 1947b). Second, in a period of disturbance, the equilibrium is 
moved to a different level by either increasing the forces for change or decreasing resis­
tant forces. Lewin notes that the latter change produces longer lasting effects, as the 
former strategy results in high tension in the system. Third, in order to stabilize the 
change, the system is refrozen in a period of consolidation to a new steady state. Due to 
homeostatic effects, parts of the force field might return to their prior status quo, which 
is avoided by refreezing.
It can be concluded from the conceptualization of social fields that change and 
constancy are relative concepts, and so is resistance to change. Groups and organiza­
tions are constantly exposed to innumerous influences and continuously adapt their 
steady state to the resulting field forces. For example, a work group that achieves a cer­
tain production level might be subject to two different experiences. In one case, man­
agement sets higher production goals, in another a member of the group becomes ill. In 
the first case, resistance can manifest itself in refusal to work more, in the second case, 
resistance might be constituted by refusal to let the production level drop. Field theory 
explains both cases as resistance to change of the productivity equilibrium. Depending 
on the perspective, resistance and constancy are interchangeable, and both pertain to the 
dynamics of a social system.
Lewin’s concepts have been tremendously durable over time and still exert influ­
ence on contemporary theorizing. The striking simplicity of the tripartite change con­
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cept probably accounts for its popularity, and some authors even go so far as to declare 
that the whole theory of change is reducible to this one idea (Hendry, 1996, p. 624). His 
approach has been applied to a number of studies on resistance (Coch & French, 1948; 
Frank, 1944; Lewin, 1943), of which Bauer (1993) provides a detailed overview. Re­
search on resistance in adjacent psychological fields still heavily relies on Lewin’s find­
ings, for example the idea of undermining counterforces in studies on persuasion 
(Knowles, Butler, & Linn, 2001; "The Economist", 2002).
Examining Lewin’s works, it becomes apparent that he understood resistance as a 
systems concept. Although the psychology of individuals in the system is an element of 
the total system, resistance to change is not a psychological phenomenon (Dent & 
Goldberg, 1999a). Due to the system’s homeostatic nature, the predominantly negative 
or compensating feedback loops always drive the system back to equilibrium. Thus, sys­
tems lack an inherent capacity for change, not individuals. This is not compatible with 
the dominant view of management theory, that is, the individual that must overcome 
resistance.
Prescribing external pressures to change a system holds, however, problematic 
connotations. Even the more moderate strategy of undermining counterforces employs a 
battlefield analogy that obviates a true consideration of possibly legitimate reasons for 
resistance. While Lewin himself seems to be technocratic in his theorizing14, interpreta­
tions of field theory in real world settings support an underlying theme of resistance as a 
motivation problem that can be fixed by management. Field theory as a systems concept 
circumvents individual-level concerns, but fuels the managerial ‘overcoming’ paradigm 
by highlighting the susceptibility of social systems to manipulation. Describing social 
forces with mathematical formalizations promotes a view of solutions to conflict as a 
zero-sum game. Only one side can win, no joint benefit is possible (Bauer, 1993). As 
such, the productive potential of resistance is ignored.
2.3.2 The signal function o f resistance
Probably the first management scholar to detect the shortcomings of the ‘over­
coming’ paradigm, at least the first one with a large enough audience to make an im­
14 “The practical task of social management, as well as the scientific task of understanding the dynamics 
of group life, require insight into the desire for and resistance to, specific change.” (Lewin, 1947a, p. 14)
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pact, was Paul Lawrence (1954). His article in the Harvard Business Review asks the 
question of how to deal with resistance, and the basic proposition is that there are two 
kinds of change, technical change and social change. People do not resist technical 
change as such, but they might resist its social ramifications. Lawrence identifies as the 
core of the problem the ignorance of technical specialists to the effects of new technolo­
gies on human relationships in the organization. Moreover, technical specialists often do 
not recognize production employees as being specialists in their own rights. A number 
of management actions are offered to influence attitudes of staff, presumably the most 
important of which is taking a new look at resistance. Drawing on the self-fulfilling 
prophecy problem, supervisors are advocated not to generally expect people to resist 
change. Instead, Lawrence recommends paying careful attention to occurrences of resis­
tance, which culminates in the following seminal quote:
“When resistance does appear, it should not be thought of as something to be 
overcome. Instead, it can best be thought of as a useful red flag -  a signal that 
something is going wrong.” (Lawrence, 1954, p. 56)
Thus, Lawrence acknowledges the potential value of resistance as an informative 
feedback loop for the change agency. Resistance has a signal function, which clearly 
adds a prescriptive, functionalist dimension to the concept. The implication for change 
agents is to reverse their attitude about resistance to change and utilize it rather than 
fight it.
2,3,3 An analogy to acute pain
Lawrence’s quote shown above is followed in his original article by an analogy to 
pain. As a signal that something is going wrong, acute pain to the body may fulfill the 
same useful function as resistance to the organization. The idea that resistance to change 
might be a functional phenomenon has been hinted at again by Klein (1969), but only 
receives full attention and theoretical elaboration in Bauer (1993; 1995b).
The same way an analogy to individual learning is used in the discussion of organ­
izational learning, using an analogy to acute pain in the resistance discussion can pro­
vide significant insights about the mechanisms that produce observable phenomena. 
Knowledge from one domain (the base domain) is transferred to the domain to be ex­
plained (the target domain). Thus, in analogical reasoning an explanatory structure of
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relationships from a source domain can be transferred to a target domain. The system of 
relations among the base objects is essentially the same for the target objects, and an 
analogy is a way of focusing on relational commonalities independent of the objects in 
which those relations are embedded (Gentner, 1983, 1989).
An analogy to pain on the level of individual action will be helpful to examine re­
sistance on the level of collective activity. It is important to note that this analogy does 
not refer to dysfunctional chronic pain, but to acute pain in reaction to internal or exter­
nal strain or injury. An experience of acute pain in the human organism follows a cycle 
of events (Wall, 1999): Attention is focused internally, the body image and reflective 
activity is enhanced, the current state is evaluated and the course of action is altered. As 
a fifth function before any alteration, pain usually puts a delay to ongoing activity. 
Through its function of enhancing internal attention and reflective activity, resistance, 
like pain, has the diagnostic function of indicating the location of a problem. Used 
pragmatically, resistance, like pain, urges the system to change its intended course. The 
system would otherwise endanger its own health (Bauer, 1995b). There is a clear action 
implication. A system that has no capacity to experience pain will cease to exist for fail­
ure of recognizing threats to survival. Resistance can therefore be understood as ‘collec­
tive pain’, contradicting the traditional dysfunctional connotations.
Furthering the notion of resistance as collective pain, resistance has also been 
characterized as a survival mechanism. Goldstein (1989) proposes this idea in the con­
text of describing resistance as a mechanism of autopoiesis. The theory of autopoiesis 
was originally meant for understanding cell reproduction, but has gradually evolved into 
a general theory of systems. The theory proposes that the components of an autopoietic 
system are used to produce new components and their internal relations, while the pro­
duction of components does not depend on an input-output relation with the system’s 
environment (von Krogh, Roos, & Slocum, 1994). This latter aspect indicates the con­
trast between autopoietic theory and Katz & Kahn’s (1978) open system’s theory of or­
ganizations. Autopoietic systems are autonomous and self-maintaining unities that con­
tain component-producing processes. The components, through their interaction, pro­
duce the same network of processes that produced them. Autopoietic systems are opera­
tionally closed, and hence are not seeking to maintain equilibrium of incoming and out­
going forces, but instead preserve their steady state through self-organization
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(Luhmann, 1984). Any kind of change presents a threat to this internal organization and 
is naturally resisted. Goldstein (1989) transfers this concept to organizations and ex­
plores resistance to change as an innate survival mechanism. According to his ideas, the 
organizational system must be moved to a far-from-equilibrium state, through energy 
exchange with the environment, in order to bring about changes. Moving the system 
toward such a state is made easier if efforts are informed by attention to the specific 
types of resistance that are encountered. Concluding on Goldstein’s perception of resis­
tance as a natural tendency, the systems perspective of this approach has to be empha­
sized. Organizations as autopoietic systems resist change, not single individuals within 
these organizations. Moreover, this approach supports the idea of resistance in organiza­
tions as collective pain, which forces a system to follow the sequence of events de­
scribed above, namely internal focus, reflection of ongoing activity, evaluation, and al­
teration of the course of action.
2.3.4Pain awareness
Further attention to the pain phenomenon reveals a crucial aspect that links an ex­
perience of pain to the consequential sequence of events described above: Pain needs to 
be felt. More precisely, there needs to be awareness of pain in order to enable its func­
tionality as a trigger for action.
Wall (1999) describes pain as the awareness of a need state rather than an isolated 
sensation. Pain promotes healing rather than helps in avoiding injury. Hence, pain is 
more of a motivation than a physical sensation, and there is only a loose link between 
injury or damage and pain. The distinction between nociceptive stimulus sensation and 
subsequent awareness, denoting an appropriate action implication, is counterintuitive 
but crucial (Grahek, 2001)15. There is pain without injury and injury without pain. For 
example, individuals with certain pathological conditions, such as pain asymbolia, feel 
pain upon harmful stimulation, but this does not in any way represent for them a sign of 
danger or threat. Conversely, there might be awareness of pain without the presence of 
an actual stimulus, as in phantom limb pain, or without the actual physical capability for
Grahek’s (2001) elaborations illustrate that the complexity of the pain phenomenon far exceeds a sim-
Ele stimulus-response model. For the present purpose, the important, albeit simplified, distinction is made etween pain and awareness, while recognizing mat this glosses over some intricate details. Such details, 
however, are more relevant to a medical context and go beyond the scope of the present study.
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pain sensation, as in specific cases of congenital or acquired analgesia. Pain awareness 
also has a recursive feedback function, through which sensation may be modulated.
In addition to medical conditions, certain sensations or influences are sometimes 
powerful enough to attenuate pain awareness. In endurance sports or in combat, for ex­
ample, the body’s production of hormones such as endorphin or adrenalin helps to sus­
tain performance levels despite continuous pain sensation. Extreme excitement, anger, 
or fear may induce a reduction in pain awareness.
The activation of both pain sensation and awareness requires a certain minimal in­
duction. A minimum threshold needs to be exceeded for a noxious stimulus to result in 
pain sensation, and for pain sensation to result in pain awareness. Such thresholds vary 
according to individual experience and circumstance as well as intensity and duration of 
prior exposure to noxious stimulation or pain sensation. Pain awareness also fulfills a 
feedback function
Returning to the analogy between acute pain in individuals and resistance to 
change in organizations, the recognition of the role of awareness has some connotations. 
According to the pain analogy, in order to trigger the depicted cycle of events, any 
emergence of resistance would first need to be acknowledged as such. More precisely, 
resistance would need to be both noticed and recognized as resistance. Hence, especially 
in large organizations, the signal value of resistant behavior by some organizational 
members would require a minimum strength and clarity in order to be noticed by other 
members, and in order to generate more than locally confined awareness. The magni­
tude of each threshold will depend on the given circumstances. Due to the feedback 
function of awareness, a dynamic relationship between the phenomenon and its aware­
ness are expected.
In sum, the pain analogy suggests that resistance to change must cause organiza­
tion-wide awareness in order to trigger a sequence of internal focus of attention, reflec­
tion and evaluation of current activity, and alteration of action.
2,3,5 A shift from causes to effects
The analogy to acute pain clarifies the concept of resistance as a resource in the 
change process. Lewinian field theory understands resistance as a counterforce to 
change and assigns it a basically dysfunctional status. The focus of attention are the
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forces that influence and shape resistance. Through the pain analogy, a shift of attention 
toward the effects of resistance is prescribed.
The effects of pain on the individual level have been explained. Pain fulfills a 
(negative) feedback role to the ongoing activity. Embedded in individual action theory 
(Frese & Zapf, 1994), feedback follows the action sequence of goal development, orien­
tation, plan generation, decision, and execution-monitoring. Feedback can only be inter­
preted with reference to a goal. While action theory concentrates on the individual, the 
theory of self-active systems provides a framework for both individual and 
group/organizational behavior (von Cranach et al., 1986).
Bauer (1991; 1993) proposes this as an adequate theoretical framework and elabo­
rates on its implications for the analysis of resistance. A view of social organizations as 
self-active systems manifests that organizations are acting entities whose behaviors are 
steered, controlled, and energetized by internal communication. Coordinated group ac­
tions, based on individual behavior, constitute the behavior of organizations. Execution- 
monitoring and feedback is essential for individual action, and organizations similarly 
maintain crucial self-monitoring subsystems as a source of information. While feedback 
for the individual can stem from outside sources, self-monitoring subsystems gather in­
formation primarily internally, as they play a role in adapting actions to the internal re­
quirements of the system. These subsystems include, for example, communication net­
works, accounting systems and resistance to change. Since resistance is communicated 
within the organization and serves diagnostic and pragmatic functions, it can be identi­
fied as a self-monitoring subsystem. Consequently, resistance is a normal occurrence, as 
in the Lewinian framework, but in contrast to Lewin it serves functional purposes. It can 
appear on all levels of the system, because self-monitoring processes span the entire hi­
erarchy.
Resistance as a self-monitoring subsystem shifts the analysis from causes to ef­
fects. The pain analysis in combination with the theory of self-active systems paves the 
way for the study of the effects of resistance, mainly its informative functions. Thus, a 
functional analysis perceives resistance as an independent variable, providing feedback 
to the organization, as shown in Figure 2.1 below (Bauer, 1991, p. 185).
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Resistance as an independent variable 
Functional analysis
Organizational 
conditions
1
recursive
r
Resistancew Effects on organizations
Resistance as a dependent variable 
Figure 2.1: Conditional versus functional analysis of resistance
In addition to feedback provision to ongoing activities, resistance has recursive ef­
fects, that is, it changes its own course. As changes in the ongoing activities are trig­
gered, this results in modulations of resistance. If process alterations meet original de­
mands, resistance will vanish. If alterations are insufficient or non-existent, resistance 
might increase or become chronic.
In sum, resistance serves the function of a reality principle of changes and indi­
cates necessary alterations as adaptive requirements.
2 .4  L in k in g  l e a r n in g  a n d  r e s is t a n c e : A r r iv in g  a t  a  r e s e a r c h
QUESTION
Learning grounded in experience closely relates action or work practice to proc­
esses of knowledge generation. Some authors explicitly highlight the proximity and in­
terrelation of working, learning, and innovating (Brown & Duguid, 1991). However, 
working and learning are often intuitively understood as antithetical, since learning im­
plies change and working might be seen as resistant to change (Weick & Westley, 
1996).
When juxtaposing learning and change, in principle two different sequences with 
either construct as a starting point can be imagined; that is learning leading to changes 
in practice, or changes in practice triggering learning. Organizational change is defined 
as “a set of behavioral-science based theories, values, strategies and techniques aimed at 
the planned change of the organizational work setting for the purpose of enhancing in­
dividual development and improving organizational performance, through the alteration 
of organizational members’ on-the-job behaviors” (Porras & Robertson, 1992, p. 723). 
On a somewhat less technical note, Huber et al. (1993) see change involving a modifica­
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tion of parameters of “how an organization functions, who its members and leaders are, 
what form it takes, or how it allocates its resources” (p. 216). Analyzing the latter defi­
nition, a leaming-change sequence could be interpreted either way again.
Early protagonists in the field have already expressed a certain degree of skepti­
cism about claims that learning is purely good for all involved (Cyert & March, 1963). 
The micro-political implications of learning processes have long been ignored, as learn­
ing was accepted as a panacea to cope with increasingly competitive environments. As 
shown earlier, until the early 1990s critical responses to organizational learning and 
change initiatives were treated as resistance that must be overcome (Bertoin Antal et al., 
2001b), a mindset that had been reinforced in the literature on organizational change for 
decades. Only during the last ten or so years did a reassessment of key variables of col­
lective learning processes emerge that does not, for example, perpetuate learning as a 
politically neutral process, but takes into account dynamics of power and conflict. On a 
more general note, Schein (1996, p. 29) remarks,
“It is my belief that all forms of learning and change start with some form of 
dissatisfaction or frustration generated by data that disconfirm our expecta­
tions or hopes.”
The growing recognition of emotions and conflict and the way resistance is stimu­
lated as a product of manifold power relations and functional objections merges the 
streams of research on organizational learning and resistance to change. Learning is as­
sociated with change, and change itself seldom comes about as a smooth transition, but 
is most often accompanied by conflict or resistance, as contradictory interests are likely 
to be at stake (Kotter, 1995).
In their call for research on the relation between conflict and learning Berthoin 
Antal et al. (2001b, p. 931) stipulate a challenge of the implicit assumption that conflict 
should be avoided or minimized in organizations by stating the following.
“Fortunately, in the past few years there has been growing recognition that 
emotions, power, and conflict could influence learning. Nevertheless, there 
has been almost no empirical research on this point, possibly because each of 
these factors were seen as antithetical to learning.”
Conflict in organizations manifests itself and is constituted through various forms 
of resistance. Resistance, defined as a “reactive process where agents embedded in 
power relations actively oppose initiatives by other agents” (Jermier et al., 1994a, p. 9), 
can be expected to occur within any type of change process. Although resistance need 
not follow change automatically, the apparent causality in this dyad has been the domi­
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nant perspective of organizational psychology and management strategy ever since its 
conception by Kurt Lewin. Given its supposed ubiquity and expected effects on learn­
ing, the concept of resistance to change in organizations warrants a substantial contribu­
tion to the analysis of organizational learning.
As a result of the outlined idea of a functional analysis of resistance, in combina­
tion with the interest in organizational learning, the focus of attention is set on the two 
key variables of resistance to change and organizational learning. Resistance in re­
sponse to projected change has the potential to cause or influence learning. The rela­
tionship is initially believed to be unidirectional, but prior learning might affect poten­
tial subsequent emergences of resistance. The shift from causes to effects within the 
academic debate moves the research focus towards consequences of resistance rather 
than antecedents. The consequence of interest for the present study is learning in an or­
ganizational context. While the feasibility of a functional analysis of resistance per se 
has been examined (Bauer, 1993), I attempt to explore the effects of resistance Qn or­
ganizational learning. If resistance ideally bears diagnostic and pragmatic qualities, or 
simply conveys bad news value, it will not go unnoticed in the context of organizational 
change. Resistance reveals reality, even if it is not understood constructively. Following 
the discussion on the pain analogy, awareness is expected to have a mediating role be­
tween resistance and learning. Resistance needs to be ‘felt’ by the organization to trig­
ger learning. Figure 2.2 below, modified from Figure 2.1, shows the research focus of 
the present study.
Research focus:
Resistance as an independent variable 
Functional analysis
recursive
Organizational
conditions Resistance Awareness
Organizational 
learning_____
Resistance as a dependent variable
Figure 2.2\ Research focus
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In this thesis, a functional analysis of resistance to change as a source of organiza­
tional learning is undertaken. The proposed sequence of resistance-awareness-leaming 
is expected to be influenced at every stage by organizational conditions such as, for ex­
ample, hierarchy, power relations, or culture. Since resistance is the independent vari­
able, the analysis concerning organizational conditions is concentrated on their influ­
ence on awareness and learning. Based on the pain analogy, a recursive effect between 
resistance and awareness is presumed, which might modulate the intensity and extent of 
resistance. Awareness holds a central role as it pertains to the subjective experience of 
change participants. Hence, there are two perspectives on resistance, the perspective of 
the observing change participants as expressed in the awareness variable, and the per­
spective of the observing researcher (observing the observers).
The three variables in the functional analysis allow for a combinatorial specifica­
tion of possible scenarios. Table 2.2 shows six possible outcomes of the depicted se­
quence.
Table 2.2: Potential outcomes of the resistance-awareness-leaming sequence
Resistance
Yes No
Awareness No awareness Awareness No awareness
Yes
Awareness of and 
learning from 
existing resistance 
(ideal case of op­
timal functional­
ity)
/ Awareness of and learning from non­existing resistance (learning from psychotic or phan­
tom resistance)
/
Learning
No
Awareness of, but 
no learning from 
existing resistance 
(learning blocked, 
missed opportu­
nity)
No awareness and 
no learning from 
existing resistance 
(resistance not 
recognized, the 
project did not feel 
the ‘pain’)
Awareness of, but 
no learning from 
non-existing resis­
tance
No awareness and 
no learning from 
non-existing resis­
tance (irrelevant 
case)
This table systematically organizes possible outcomes, and empirical observations 
will have to verify the feasibility of some of the combinations. Especially the cases of 
awareness about non-existing resistance might prove to be unrealistic in organizational 
settings, and thereby show the limits of the pain analogy. It should be noted that while 
the outcomes in Table 2.2 are logically derived, real cases might lie somewhere in be­
tween the cells.
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This table again emphasizes that the immediate input to learning is not resistance 
but awareness of resistance. No learning from resistance is possible without awareness, 
and awareness needs to be understood in detail to fathom its mediating function, which 
facilitates resistance as a source of learning. As the subjective perspective of change 
participants, awareness may vary in intensity and semantic elaboration, the latter aspect 
indicating, for example, a functional or dysfunctional perception. Therefore an analysis 
of awareness, following an emergence of resistance to change, will have to explain 
whether awareness about resistance was present (existence), to what degree it was pre­
sent (intensity), and how the resistance is perceived (semantic representation).
The plausibility of the resistance-awareness-leaming triad, the ubiquity of resis­
tance in the context of change, and the shift towards the effects of resistance, all against 
the background of the debate on organizational learning, lead to the following research 
question:
How can an organization learn from resistance to change?
An additional, albeit largely overlapping, subquestion would be ‘How can resis­
tance to change function as a source of organizational learning?’. Taking into account 
an initial change, the focus of inquiry lies on the ramifications of resistance to change 
for organizational learning, as outlined in the resistance-awareness-leaming sequence. 
The definition of resistance used is the one proposed by Bauer (1993; 1995a, p. 113), 
which extends Jermier et al.’s (1994a) definition provided earlier. Bauer defines resis­
tance to change as
“A temporal, informal and unanticipated network of communication, that in­
cludes contributions from change agents and change recipients who are 
linked together in conflict. The function of this temporary structure, in form 
and content, is to alter the change project.” [Bauer’s definition is slightly 
modified here to fit the current context.j
This definition provides a general target function for this concept of interest in the 
investigation, and can be specified further once a particular organizational setting has 
been chosen.
Asking a ‘how’-question emphasizes the exploratory approach of the investiga­
tion. The study does not follow a confirmatory approach or attempts to test hypotheses. 
Contextual factors as well as procedural considerations are of interest. No learning at
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all from resistance is impossible, since any change will lead to learning of some kind 
(Nicolini & Meznar, 1995). Contextual factors pertain to the nature of the organization, 
its culture, the work it is engaged in, and also to the nature of the change. Indicated in 
Figure 2.2 as organizational conditions, contextual factors are expected to influence all 
three elements of the resistance-awareness-leaming sequence. Procedural factors relate 
to the depicted sequence and especially to the dynamics within awareness and learning. 
This latter aspect will be evaluated against the proposed framework of organizational 
learning and memory. As various contextual and procedural factors may prove influen­
tial, the research process will require adequate flexibility to account for emergent com­
ponents.
The questions raised above require an investigation that evaluates theory in the 
light of new empirical results. This will be undertaken by means of an exploratory case 
study of an organizational change project. In the following chapter, I will discuss in de­
tail the methodological implication of the research question and its connotations for an 
applied setting.
2 .5  S u m m a r y
In this chapter the second theoretical part of this thesis was introduced. The chap­
ter contained a literature review of resistance to change that lead to the delineation of a 
functional analysis of resistance and concluded with the formulation of a research ques­
tion.
The concept of resistance to change was introduced by first systematically ad­
dressing its inherent components. Hence, actors, objects, conditions, and manifestations 
of resistance as well as external perspectives were discussed separately.
Concerning the latter component, it was then shown that the dominant research 
perspective on resistance was one that centered on the idea of ‘overcoming’ resistance, 
and that essentially treated the concept as a ubiquitous nuisance in change processes. 
This perspective was popularized by an influential study, and then persistently remained 
at the heart of the change debate for a number of decades. The traditional view that peo­
ple naturally resist change has only recently been thoroughly criticized for its impre­
ciseness and universality. At the beginning of this development stood the idea of a sig-
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nal function of resistance. Analyzing the concept as a red flag, a signal that bears impor­
tant information about the change process, revealed the informative potential of resis­
tance.
In order to research this idea systematically, it was then suggested that resistance 
fulfils a similarly important function to the organization as acute pain does to the human 
body. According to his proposition, the sequence of internal attention, reflection of cur­
rent activity, and action alteration that is triggered in individuals by an experience of 
acute pain might occur analogously in organizations as a result of experiencing resis­
tance to change. In this perspective, resistance has diagnostic and pragmatic qualities 
that refute the dysfunctionality of the concept assumed in earlier works. However, resis­
tance, like pain, can only serve a functional purpose if it is felt, that is if there is aware­
ness about resistance.
A functional analysis of resistance was depicted as shifting attention from causes 
to effects, and designating resistance as an independent variable. It was stated that this 
thesis employs a functional analysis of resistance to change and concentrates on organ­
izational learning as an effect, as a dependent variable. The research focus was de­
scribed as a tripartite sequence of resistance, awareness, and learning, in which each 
variable is influenced by organizational conditions. Finally, the research focus was 
translated into a broad research question: How can an organization learn from resistance 
to change?
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3 METHODOLOGY
The empirical part of the present study is devoted to a field study of an organiza­
tional change. The purpose is theory building in the realms of organizational learning 
and resistance to change, structurally based on the proposed functional analysis of resis­
tance and the integrated process framework of organizational learning. The concept of 
resistance to change is employed in this undertaking as an activator of subsequent cog­
nitive and behavioral changes. Organizational learning is perceived as an effect of resis­
tance and the awareness thereof among organizational members, while the focus of the 
investigation also lies on illuminating learning processes.
Researching resistance to change naturally implies an empirical investigation pf 
some form of change. Researching organizational learning requires an organizational 
environment. Hence, an organizational change is the focal point of interest. Develpping 
a methodology to investigate organizational change involves the designation of methods 
o f data collection within a well-defined research strategy as well as the allocation of an 
accessible organizational setting. All three selections have to exhibit adequacy to the 
theoretical background and the research question, and feasibility regarding quality stan­
dards and available resources. In the following, I will provide a rationale for the choice 
of the utilized data collection techniques, explain the chosen research strategy and its 
characteristics, and introduce the context of the study of an organizational change pro­
ject.
3.1 M e t h o d o l o g ic a l  c o n s id e r a t io n s  a n d  c h o ic e s
Field research in organizational psychology is characterized by studies that in­
volve collecting original data in real organizations (Sutton & Staw, 1995). As the objec­
tive of this study is theory building, I concentrate mainly on qualitative techniques. 
Edmondson & McManus (2004) advocate such a research strategy if the developmental 
stage of the focal theory is nascent to intermediate16. Methodological fit in field research
16 Qualitative techniques in research on organizations are traditionally seen as more appropriate for the 
purpose of exploration. The more recent debate, however, sees qualitative research equally suitable for 
hypothesis testing (Flick, 2002).
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on early theory is best achieved by employing techniques that allow for pattern identifi­
cation and the evaluation of preliminary propositions rather than hypothesis testing. The 
result of such field research will then be a more suggestive theory or invitation for fur­
ther work in subsequent studies. Rejecting a ‘quantitative’ versus ‘qualitative’ debate 
(see for example Bryman, 1988b; Filstead, 1979), I agree with Bauer, Gaskell & Allum 
(2000), who refute ‘epistemological hypertrophy’ (p. 10) in favor of sound data collec­
tion and standards of good practice for qualitative research.
In the first chapter organizational learning was described as cognition, communi­
cation, and formalization interlinked at different levels of analysis. In addition, a proc­
ess perspective on learning was adopted, which would preclude any attempt to measure 
learning in the classical outcome sense. ‘Measuring’ learning would in principle imply a 
numerical estimation of cognition, communication, and formalization. However, these 
processes are problematic to operationalize and quantify in non-experimental settings 
outside of the laboratory. Moreover, the theoretical basis relating to the research ques­
tion is not sufficiently developed to justify exclusively quantitative measures. Hence, 
the outlined approach of theory building requires exploration and mapping of processes 
rather than measurement.
Having outlined three levels of analysis, different methods of data collection are 
required to account for different learning processes. The methods need to be able to re­
flect awareness and learning of individuals, groups, and the organization, while at the 
same time providing enough flexibility to capture episodes of resistance. For the indi­
vidual level, I choose personal interviews of change agents and recipients to reconstruct 
the organizational change and to explore cognition relating to learning and resistance. 
The same objectives, albeit not relating to cognition but formalization, are pursued at 
the organizational level by an analysis o f  organizational documentation. Documents are 
essential in the formalization of learning and the understanding of resistance ex post; 
they reflect an official endorsement, and make organizational knowledge distributable 
and widely accessible. Both methods have the advantage of enabling retrospective data 
collection about past events (see Figure 3.2, p. 138). This latter point illustrates the 
challenge of collecting data for the group level, if the process of interest is identified as 
communication through verbalization or action. Such communication by definition only 
exists in the present and would require some form of participant observation or re­
cording technique. As this is rarely possible, for the present study a direct observation of
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group level learning was substituted by questions about group experiences during the 
individual interviews, and by a search for group-specific action in documents. Data col­
lection at the group level instead focused on respondents’ perceptions of resistance to 
change, and the frame of reference they use in their cognitive representation of the 
topic. An inquiry into the construction of meaning about resistance is necessary in order 
to be able to assess how different modes of this independent variable might influence its 
function as a source of organizational learning. The technique employed for this is the 
repertory grid.
The choice of techniques is summarized in Table 3.1. All methods have been ap­
plied repeatedly in similar research contexts (see for example Bood, 1998; Bryman, 
1988c; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 2002), and will be explained in detail further 
below in section 3.4 on the data collection.
Table 3.1: Overview of data collection techniques
Level of analysis Method Primary focus Subjects
Organization Document analysis (also covers 
the group and individual level)
Learning and aware­
ness of resistance
n/a
Group Repertory grid analysis (also 
hints at individual and organiza­
tional level)
Awareness of resis­
tance
Change agents and 
recipients
Individual Interview (also covers the group 
and organizational level)
Learning and aware­
ness of resistance
Change agents and 
recipients
Using three different methods allows for triangulation in an attempt to comple­
ment each technique’s strengths and weaknesses (Jick, 1979), prevent common method 
bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), and maximize validity (Flick, 
1992). Striving for methodological fit in the empirical enquiry produces internal coher­
ence between the research question and the data collection. The choice of methods made 
here is based on theoretical considerations, the methods’ specific characteristics and 
feasibility, and the nature of the investigated organizational setting. Once the actual 
field setting has been introduced further below, a clear link between the variables in the 
research focus and the types of data generated by the chosen three methods will be pro­
vided in section 3.4.1 (see Table 3.2, p. 138). The research strategy that facilitates the 
data collection is a single case study o f an organizational change project. An outline of 
this strategy as well as a justification of its use is given below.
117
Methodology
3.2  S in g l e  c a se  st u d ie s
The case study is a research strategy that centers on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings. It is a detailed examination of phenomena which are be­
lieved to exhibit the operation of some identified general theoretical principle (Mitchell, 
1983). Case studies provide a way of organizing social data so as to preserve the unique 
character of the object under study. Yin (1994) describes case studies as a strategy to 
investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. Yin emphasizes 
three more explanatory points, which are of particular relevance to the present study, 
and which anticipate and substantiate the reasons for the choice of this particular re­
search strategy given further below. Case studies enable the researcher to cope with the 
technically distinctive situation in which there are many more variables of interest than 
data points. As one result, they rely on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing 
to converge in a triangulated fashion. As another result, they benefit from the prior de­
velopment of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 1994, 
p. 13).
Case studies can employ a single- or a multiple case design, where the latter fol­
lows a rationale that favors comparative investigation and places emphasis on the ro­
bustness of results. The focus of the case study may appear in different formats. For ex­
ample, single individuals can be the objects of study. Other units of analysis might be a 
singular event or process, an organization, or a whole community. The same case study 
might involve more than one unit of analysis. In such an embedded case study design 
(as opposed to a holistic design), attention is given to subunits within a single case (Yin, 
1994). The investigation typically combines data collection methods such as archives, 
documentation, interviews, questionnaires, observations, or even physical artifacts. 
Through this combination of methods, case studies enable the researcher to create an 
insight into, for example, facets of organizational life which are not well documented, 
and which are not amenable to inquiry through fleeting contact.
Research strategies in the social sciences might consist of experiments, surveys, 
archival analyses, histories, or case studies; all with the purpose of obtaining empirical 
data. Using the case study as the strategy of choice for inquiry requires some explana­
tion, which will be provided in the following.
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3.2.1 The single case study as a research strategy
The first and most important reason for the choice of the case study as a research 
strategy are the characteristics of the prior theoretical developments. Due to the absence 
of comprehensive theory in the focal field, various integral components were combined 
into a process framework of organizational learning across levels of analysis. The or­
ganizational learning framework and the considerations about the role of resistance and 
awareness at different levels function as a guide to data collection and data analysis. Re­
turning to Yin’s (1994, p. 13) definition, this is a theoretical fundament with many vari­
ables of interest, but fewer realistic data points (i.e. certain individuals, certain groups, 
the project documentation). In addition to the practical constraints outlined above, this 
rules out rigorous testing of hypotheses in a single initial study. However, the purpose 
of empirical inquiry in the present study is one of theory building above anything else. 
Following an inductive, exploratory approach, the case study is used here to provide 
description and generate theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Hartley, 1994). The case study al­
lows for the collection of evidence from multiple sources, and the subsequent triangula­
tion of that material, facilitating a rich familiarity with the case. Using the proposed 
framework as a strategic guide, the value of further investigating various propositions 
can be debated and areas of emergent theory can be probed. Thus, evidence from a sin­
gle case can be used to reformulate preliminary propositions into actual hypotheses, 
generate new hypotheses for later studies, and therefore advance the theory building 
process.
A second reason arises from the nature of the research environment. Given the 
theoretical streams of organizational learning and resistance to change, the ‘logical’ fo­
cus of an empirical study is on organizational change. Such a change needs to be inves­
tigated in a real-life setting, as laboratory studies are mostly inadequate to reflect the 
internal dynamics of whole organizations. Contemporary management rhetoric pro­
claims environments and commercial organizations within them as constantly changing 
(Kotter, 1996). However, most, if not all, of such changes do not occur as the result of 
some rigorous experimental treatment, but as the result of market pressures, strategic 
orientation, efficiency considerations, or government regulations. Research in organiza­
tions in general, and on organizational change in particular, suffers from the difficulty 
of applying the scientific method in surroundings that are not conducive to external ma­
nipulation or interference with internal processes (Bryman, 1988a). In the overwhelm­
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ing majority of organizational settings it is neither feasible nor possible to implement an 
experimental design for an organizational change (i.e. experimental and control group 
based on random selection and assignment, pre- and posttest), and control or hold con­
stant all extraneous variables. Hence, the experiment as a research strategy is most often 
not a practicable option.
Anticipating the discussion of access difficulty in section 3.3.1, a third reason for 
the choice of research strategy is a further consideration of practicality. Comparative 
research on organizational change requires access to a number of subunits or whole or­
ganizations, which is at best problematic (Freeman, 1986). Research at multiple sites is 
also likely to lead to a substantial increase in the costs of the study. In addition, due to 
the use of several data sources, the volume of data generated in a single within-case 
analysis alone can reach overwhelming dimensions17. For a single researcher, it is there­
fore imperative to limit the access problem, control expenses, and cautiously manage 
the extent of data collection and analysis. The research strategy of the single case study 
enables the researcher to guard against resource exhaustion while maintaining a high 
standard of inquiry.
3.2,2 Research design
In the language of experimental design, case studies are usually described as be­
longing to the categories of quasi-experimentation or non-experimental field studies, 
depending on their specific type. In contrast to true experiments, where subjects are 
both randomly (and supposedly representatively) selected from a given population, and 
randomly assigned to a treatment or a control group, there is no random assignment in 
quasi-experiments. Here, self-selection or administrative decisions determine who is to 
be exposed to a treatment in a given field setting. Non-experimental field studies share 
the same setting with quasi-experiments, the real world outside the laboratory, but this 
design has neither random selection nor random assignment. The non-experimental 
technique relies on measurement only. There is no manipulation or active control of 
variables, and no assignment of subjects to groups.
The research design category for the present study is a non-experimental field  
study. Although this design category is probably the most popular in organizational re-
17 For example, Mintzberg & McHugh (1985) examined 2,839 films, which was only part of their evi­
dence, in a study on strategy making at the Canadian National Film Board, resulting in a 383-page report.
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search (Beehr, 1995, chapter 2), it is comparably weak regarding generalizability and 
the strength of causal inference. As theory building, however, is the main aim of this 
study, establishing causal inference is not a prime topic of concern. Generalizability is 
of interest, but not in a statistical sense, which will be elaborated in the discussion of 
external validity further below. Thus, the criticism of this particular design category is 
based on research targets that differ from the one in the present study.
The research strategy here is the single case study of an organizational change. An 
embedded design is applied, which involves the use of sub-units of analysis within the 
larger context of the case (Yin, 1994, chapter 2). Deriving from the theoretical discus­
sion, the three units or levels of analysis are the individual, the group, and the organiza­
tion.
The present study combines two specific research designs that will be illustrated 
using Cook et al.’s (1990) notational system. Here, O stands for an observation and X 
stands for a treatment. Please note, however, that the treatment in this case was not ad­
ministered by the researcher, but represents the implementation of the organizational 
change. All levels of analysis undergo the same change. The methods of data collection 
were introduced and will be explained in detail further below. They were selected for 
their respective and complementary potential to unravel aspects of information process­
ing at different levels of analysis, and they refer to different data sources, which can be 
triangulated in the analysis.
N
The first design is an interrupted time series with several measurement points be­
fore and after the organizational change.
Oi O2 O3 O4  X O5 06
The interrupted time series design is used for the analysis of documentation about 
the change and allows for a retrospective investigation into information processing 
mainly at the organizational level. A time dimension is actively used to map the se­
quence of events inherent to the organizational change.
The second design is a multiple posttest design with one observation after the 
treatment. The dotted line indicates that the two groups are separate and unequal.
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These two posttests refer to individual interviews and repertory grid analyses with 
groups. Hence, this taps mainly into information processing at the individual level and 
the construction of meaning about resistance. Both designs are inherently retrospective 
in that they focus on a past event, although the repertory grids are not necessarily lim­
ited to the change itself.
Describing the research design as it is done above implicates a devaluation prob­
lem. The taxonomy of research designs advocated by authors like Donald T. Campbell 
and Thomas D. Cook reflects unreasonably negatively on the case study as a research 
strategy, or on its inherent research designs. In their earlier works, these authors gener­
ally dismiss the approach by referring to it as the one-shot case study (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979) that has nothing to offer but inconsistency con­
cerning generalizability and internal validity. However, the reductionist and clinical 
language of classic experimental design seems inappropriate to capture the potential for 
multimethodology, triangulation, and depth of inquiry behind the case study approach. 
In a more recent publication Cook et al. acknowledge this and rename the original, dep­
recating term into ‘one-group post-test only design’ (1990, pp. 517-518), which, they 
stress, should also not be confused with a fully-fledged true case study. In addition, 
these authors recognize the usefulness of case studies for suggesting new hypotheses 
and for exploratory research in general.
The case study method is often criticized, as mentioned above, for alleged weak­
nesses concerning standard criteria that are used to evaluate the quality of social scien­
tific research. Although the analysis of single cases has produced very influential re­
sults, such as the examinations of Anna O. (Breuer & Freud, 1895) or Little Albert 
(Watson & Rayner, 1920) that helped inaugurate the respective fields of psychoanalysis 
and behaviorism, the criticism centers on the lack of generalizability of findings. In an 
early consideration, Dukes (1965) therefore limits the applicability of single case studies 
to three instances: When the variance of central variables is small (i.e., a single case ap­
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proximates the prototypical case), when opportunities for observing a phenomenon are 
limited (due to situational complexity or subject scarcity), and when the evidence has 
the potential to falsify a universal claim. While these instances certainly prove adequate, 
more recent reflections have refined the generalizability discussion. These have not only 
extended the number of applicable instances, but have more generally justified the use 
of the single case study as a research strategy. The main quality criteria will be dis­
cussed separately below.
3.2.3 External validity
The criterion of external validity refers to conclusions about the extent to which 
results can be generalized across populations, settings, and times. Case study research 
has often been devalued in this respect, since common sense rejects the idea of justifia­
bly extrapolating from a singular case to more general social principles.
One argument against this devaluation targets the underlying assumptions of the 
research process in the field of social sciences. A distinction is made between the nomo­
thetic approach, which “seeks to establish abstract general laws for indefinitely repeat- 
able events and processes” and the idiographic approach, which “aims to understand the 
unique and nonrecurrent” (Nagel, 1961, pp. 547-548). Any discussion about external 
validity is only relevant if the purpose of the research process is to find an invariant and 
universal law. Hence, the criterion of external validity is a concern only when a univer­
sal law over a variety of groups or an invariant law over space exists. Numagami (1998) 
argues, however, that there are no invariant laws in management or organization studies. 
Instead of concentrating on means to increase generalizability, he writes that the basic 
premise of the existence of invariant laws in social phenomena is not sustainable, and 
illustrates his claim with concepts borrowed from game theory. The central proposition 
is that lawlike regularities in social phenomena do not exist per se, like natural laws in 
physics for example, but are created by human conduct. There might still be stable pat­
terns in social phenomena, but those are not supported by inhuman forces, but rather by 
the stability of knowledge and shared beliefs. As a result, a pursuit of external validity 
would be irrelevant for the case study method.
A different argument criticizes the supposed infeasibility of extrapolating from 
single cases from a somewhat more pragmatic perspective. The logic behind the infea­
sibility claim rests upon an erroneous application of statistical notions, and on implicit
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comparisons to survey research. In a survey, generalizing is achieved through sampling 
techniques in an attempt to create a sample that is representative of some population. In 
many cases this is rather difficult, since the exact nature of the population often remains 
obscure, which leaves the question of what the sample is representative of unanswered. 
The logic of inferential statistics ascertains statistical significance as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) precondition for generalizing from samples to populations. However, 
equating statistical significance with theoretical significance is highly misleading since, 
for example, even the most trivial relationships can be statistically significant if a given 
test has enough statistical power. Instead, it is necessary to recognize that the rationale 
of extrapolation from a statistical sample to a parent population involves two different 
inferential processes (Mitchell, 1983, pp. 197-207). Statistical inference represents the 
confidence of stating that the surface relationships observed in a sample hold for the 
parent population. Theoretical, or logical, inference refers to the confidence of assuming 
that the theoretically necessary relations among the variables in the sample also pertain 
to the parent population. The important point here is that for a single case study, the tar­
geted ‘population’ is not the universe of all similar cases (e.g., organizational settings, 
individuals), but an underlying general theoretical principle. Hence, the generalization 
of case study results is essentially about theoretical propositions, not about populations 
(Hartley, 1994). The question about the typicality or ‘representativeness’ of the case is 
therefore irrelevant to the extent that the selected case has revelatory power. If it does, 
analytical generalization allows the researcher to connect particular results to some 
broader theory (Tsoukas, 1989). This process might involve some kind of pattern- 
matching between implications derived from the theory and observations made in the 
local setting (Campbell, 1975). It may also require the systematic challenging of oppos­
ing explanations.
Analytical generalization is analogously used in experiments, when the researcher 
generalizes the results of a laboratory experiment to a theory rather than to some general 
population. Yin (1994) points out that in scientific experimentation one does not attempt 
to select ‘representative’ experiments, but uses a logic of replication to probe theoretical 
propositions. Therefore, the case under study is not a sample, randomization is not a 
conditio sine qua non for external validity, and the objective is not to enumerate fre­
quencies, but to deliberate and infer theory (Tsoukas, 1989).
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3.2.4Internal validity
If the variation in an outcome can be reliably attributed to the controlled treatment 
of an antecedent event, the resulting causal relationship is internally valid. In a con­
trolled experiment, this usually refers to the degree of certainty with which a manipula­
tion of an independent variable caused the modulation of the dependent variable. Estab­
lishing internal validity is the spirit and purpose of any experimentation, and internal 
validity presumably has priority over any other type of validity. Several threats to inter­
nal validity have been identified, such as the interference of statistical regression due to 
erroneous pretest scores, maturation and mortality of subjects, changes of the measuring 
instrument, or ambiguity about the direction of causal inference. Cook et al. (1990) dis­
cuss these threats and ascertain choice of research design, namely choosing the true ex­
periment wherever possible, as the prime strategy for increasing internal validity. In the 
case of lesser designs, where random assignment to experimental groups might not be 
possible, the investigator has to rule out threats one by one, for example through statisti­
cal adjustment.
The definition above illustrates that internal validity is only a concern in explana­
tory studies, where the goal is to establish causal inference. For descriptive or explora­
tory (case) studies, as in the present study, considerations about internal validity are not 
applicable, since it is not attempted to manipulate variables or make strict causal state­
ments.
3.2.5 Construct validity
This term refers to the degree to which inferences can justifiably be made from 
the operationalizations in a study to the theoretical constructs on which those operation­
alizations were based. The problem is one of possible ‘confounding’ that is, the possi­
bility that the operational definition of a cause or effect implies more than one construct. 
When trying to establish construct validity, a theoretical approach is to embed the con­
struct under study in a nomological network of proximal (or also distal) constructs 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Such a network would include a representation of the con­
structs of interest in a study, their observable manifestations, and the interrelations 
among and between them. A classical, practical instrument to undertake a construct 
validation is the factor analysis. Construct validity requires not only that measures of 
some construct covary with other measures of the same construct (convergent valida­
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tion), but also that there should be evidently less covariation between measures of re­
lated but different substantive constructs (discriminant validation). Campbell & Fiske 
(1959) propose a systematic experimental procedure, the multitrait-multimethod matrix, 
for analyzing convergent and discriminant validities. However, these methods rely on 
measures that are readily quantifiable, as is the case in survey studies.
Construct validation is not accomplished exhaustively in a single study. It requires 
an accumulation of evidence derived from many different sources, and is both an em­
pirical and a logical process. For case studies, construct validity is preferably ascer­
tained during data collection and composition. One tactic available to increase this type 
of validity in case studies is the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1994, chapters 
2 and 4), which essentially provide multiple measures o f the same phenomenon, thereby 
enabling convergent validation. Converging lines of inquiry can be developed in an ef­
fort to triangulate on the construct of interest. The present case study employs three 
methods of data collection to account for these requirements. A second strategy is to 
maintain a chain of evidence during data collection, which allows an external observer 
to backtrack the logical argument from the conclusions to the empirical data upon which 
they rest. The chain of evidence for the present study is shown in the analysis sections 
for the three types of collected data. A third tactic suggested by Yin is to have the draft 
case study report reviewed by peers and key informants. This was done here by present­
ing the results of the study to two groups of respondents on separate occasions (see sec­
tion 3.4). Both groups approved the veracity of the findings.
3.2.6 Reliability
Reliability refers to the consistency or stability of any experimental effect. A reli­
able measurement procedure is free from unsystematic errors of measurement. In classi­
cal test theory this quality criterion is quantified as a coefficient calculated as retest reli­
ability, parallel reliability, split-half reliability, or internal consistency (Lienert & Raatz, 
1998). In individual measurement, a reliable test produces the same score every time it 
is administered to the same subject. It can be replicated multiple times leading to the 
same results. As classical test theory defines any test score as a composite of true score 
and error component, a reliability coefficient allows for the calculation of the standard 
error of measurement as an indicator of the amount of inconsistency in an individual 
score.
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In case study research, the case under study is usually a fairly unique individual or 
event, or the case was specifically chosen for its ‘atypicality’ and probing power in the­
ory building. However, the logic of replication does not imply to reproduce the results 
of one case by doing another case study, but instead in arriving at the same results if a 
different researcher analyzed the same case. Hence, establishing reliability in case study 
research means to minimize errors and biases in a study (Yin, 1994, p. 36). This is 
achieved by keeping a precise account of procedures in the form of a case study proto­
col or a case study database. As illustrated in the discussion on construct validity, exact 
documentation and operationalization of all the steps involved in data collection and 
analysis enable external investigators to comprehend the flow of arguments. In this way, 
peers or other informants can undertake an appraisal of reliability through review.
3 .3  Se t t in g  o f  t h e  st u d y
After an initial description of the access problem in applied organizational re­
search, the following section on the setting of the empirical study will intorduce the fo­
cal organization and the actual project examined. In addition, comments on my role as a 
researcher and on learning and resistance in the change project are provided.
3,3.1 Getting access
Getting access to an organization to do research is a learning experience in itself. 
Field work and data collection in the applied organizational psychology are to a great 
extent dependent on access to organizations and participants’ willingness to cooperate. 
That this is often a problem holds true for organizational learning research, which has 
frequently been criticized for producing comparatively few empirical results. In particu­
lar commercial organizations follow their own purpose and schedule. Data collection in 
such organizations may be fundamentally altered or even unilaterally terminated at any 
given point in time. In contrast to laboratory studies, any organizational research design, 
as well as the chronological order of a given study, have to be highly flexible to provide 
an ability to react to such contingencies. Extensive, multiphase research designs with 
various treatment and control groups, for example, are rarely feasible, unless the re­
searcher has direct decision control over organizational procedures. Hence, adequate
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flexibility will permit the realization of a study, which nonetheless still has to adhere to 
quality criteria of scientific research.
Approaching an organization and convincing key stakeholders of the advantages 
of taking part in a research study can be an extremely time consuming process. Aca­
demic work in the social sciences usually produces results that are not readily compati­
ble or exploitable for commercial purposes. Given a perceived uncertainty of potential 
benefits, organizational decision makers are likely to weigh common reservations such 
as time requirements and confidentiality concerns against participation (Buchanan, 
Boddy, & McCalman, 1988). Perceived potential benefit is generally also linked to the 
experience or reputation of the academic research team, and hence will be diminished 
accordingly in case the ‘team’ consists of a single doctoral student. For such reasons, 
seasoned researchers discard ‘cold calling’, for example, as a waste of time, and advise 
to exploit personal contacts. The amount of time and patience required to gain initial 
access should by no means be underestimated (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p. 71). Van 
Maanen and Kolb (1985, p. 11) summarize this by saying that “gaining access to most 
organizational settings is not a matter to be taken lightly but one that involves some 
combination of strategic planning, hard work, and dumb luck”. Barley (1990, p. 228) 
highlights an additional important lesson about gaining entry when he states that “de­
spite an academic’s proclivity to think otherwise, whom one knows is often far more 
practical than what one knows.”
Confirming Barley’s conclusion, access to an industrial organization was eventu­
ally secured through personal contacts and a mutual interest in the research topic. It 
should be noted, however, that the entire process of gaining access, involving many un­
successful attempts at various organizations, took the better part of 10 months.
3.3.2 The organization under study
The organization that provides the environment and focus for my analysis is 
Rousseau & Paul18, a German manufacturing company that specializes in tableware and 
bathroom and sanitary ceramics.
Rousseau & Paul (R&P) was founded in 1748 as a small manufacture for table­
ware products in the northeast of France, and has been run by members of the two
18 The names used from here on for the company, its employees, and the specific locations of its sites are 
all pseudonyms.
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eponymous founding families ever since. The company was moved to southwest Ger­
many in the late 18th century, and has since been headquartered in a small border town 
called Moorsfeld, where a baroque abbey is used as the location of the principal offices. 
Throughout the 19th century, the company grew through innovative production tech­
niques for crockery, tiles, and bone china, and became industry leader following the 
opening of new production facilities in Moorsfeld and in close by Mitterwald. The tur­
bulence of two wars and a resulting restructuring of the company mark the first half of 
the 20th century. A third production site in Luxembourg was opened in 1959 and more 
sites were to follow through acquisitions in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, and Hol­
land. In 1987 R&P went public, being listed on the stock exchange from 1990 onwards, 
but still with the founding families as majority stakeholders.
Today the company is a manufacturer with a global outlook and European and 
world market leadership in various industry segments. About 11,000 employees gener­
ated a turnover of € 977.5 million in 2002, with an operating result before taxes of € 27 
million (Rousseau & Paul AG, 2002). The foreign business share of the company’s ac­
tivities is currently at 70%. Main markets are Germany with 30% of sales, France, 
Spain, the UK, and Benelux with a combined 46%, Scandinavia with 9%, and the US 
with 6% of sales. Production is spread across 21 sites in 12 European countries, and 
products are sold through subsidiaries or independent distributors in 125 countries. The 
organization is divided into four divisions, namely bathroom, kitchen, and tiles (as one), 
tableware, wellness, and project business. Strategic objectives as stated in the 2002 an­
nual report are a long-term reorientation from manufacturer to lifestyle provider, and an 
increase of international market shares, especially in the luxury goods markets of the 
Unites States and Asia. R&P tries to achieve this through innovative products and mar­
keting, strategic acquisitions, and an information technology (IT) based integration of 
all business activities, using SAP R/3 software, that was started in 1996.
3.3.3 Defining the focal project
Rousseau & Paul was approached in February 2002 through a personal contact in 
the management of the tableware division. A short presentation of the objectives, re­
quirements, and benefits of a possible research study were discussed over telephone and 
a visit to headquarters was arranged for early March. This visit included an initial meet­
ing with a member of the global management board, who gave his approval, and subse­
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quent meetings with executives in IT and logistics. Here, various possibilities for a case 
study were evaluated regarding such aspects as feasibility for a single researcher, time 
frame, location, internal access, and results for the company.
At the time R&P had introduced two major changes to its operations, which were 
significantly interlinked, and followed a concept originally devised by a management 
consulting company. Storage and distribution for the European market were consoli­
dated in the form of a giant warehouse facility in Mitterwald that centralized logistics 
and thereby made redundant smaller storage units in other countries. Through this, the 
flow of goods would lead directly from the nearby main production sites into a single 
computerized storage unit. Automated packing in cooperation with truck operating 
haulage contractors now enables R&P to guarantee direct delivery to any country in 
western and central Europe in principle within 72 hours. This major logistical change 
was largely made possible by the integration of the company’s IT infrastructure on the 
basis of SAP’s R/3. The R/3 software19 is a leading tool for enterprise resource planning 
that integrates the computerized management of various aspects of running a business. 
It is installed enterprise-wide and uses a modular structure to support a broad spectrum 
of key operational areas of the organization, such as procurement, financials, sales, hu­
man resources, or facility maintenance. Interlinking the organization as a whole, even 
across sites and national boundaries, the system makes possible to forecast, for example, 
staffing requirements, raw material stocks, capital commitment, and pricing ranges for 
any given order volume. Hence, key advantages of the SAP system are its potential to 
end the fragmentation of current systems, to allow a process of standardization, and to 
give more visibility of data across the entire organization (Sammon & Adam, 2000). At 
R&P, the stepwise, company-wide introduction of SAP, first in Germany and then in 
other countries, facilitated the logistical restructuring towards a centralized distribution 
system.
The software implementation as the core of the company’s major recent change fit 
precisely into the research aims for learning and resistance. Numerous earlier studies on 
the introduction and use of new computer systems have identified learning and change
19 ‘R/3’ as the product name is mostly substituted by ‘SAP’, as it is the company’s main product. The two 
names will be used interchangeably here.
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requirements as central aspects of such projects (e.g., Bauer, 1993; Brown & Duguid, 
2000). During the first day of meetings at headquarters, it was explained that SAP had 
been introduced recently to the company’s UK subsidiary, which was the last one in a 
succession of implementations in all of R&P’s European affiliates. The UK subsidiary 
combined a manageable smaller size with a relative independence within the R&P 
group, which would allow for a comparatively less confounded isolation of effects. In 
addition, the location in the south of London permitted easy and frequent access from 
my base at the London School of Economics. Following my expression of interest for 
the British project, the UK management was contacted the same day and informed about 
the research cooperation. The next four days at headquarters were spend getting to know 
the company, informally talking to people involved in the UK project as well as other 
executives such as the head of personnel, and familiarizing myself with the changes to 
the IT infrastructure and the distribution logistics.
3.3.4 The change project at Rousseau & Paul in the United Kingdom
R&P’s serious entry into the British market officially started in 1987 when they 
took over a tableware company called Perevia, whose main supplier they had been for 
almost two decades prior to that. The British subsidiary from then on operated under the 
name of Rousseau & Paul UK and was relocated to Sullsgate in the south of London. 
Today, R&P UK sells bathroom and tableware, although the latter is its main activity, 
and accounts for about five percent of R&P’s global sales in those segments. Sales 
channels are two own retail shops, about 45 concession shops in larger department 
stores or shopping centers, and a factory outlet store next to the principal offices in 
Sullsgate. In 2003 the UK subsidiary employed 230 people, most of which are situated 
at shops across the country or belong to a smaller group of traveling sales representa­
tives. This reduces the staff that is constantly located at Sullsgate to about 25 people.
Before the change project R&P UK was an independent subsidiary that managed 
its pricing, marketing, and staffing with little specification from Germany. It operated 
its own warehouse adjacent to the main offices in Sullsgate, from which a warehouse 
crew of 13 employees organized storage and distribution. All products went from the 
production sites in Germany into interim storage at Sullsgate before they were delivered 
to retailers across the UK. The company worked on a computer system called MACH-
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X, which was installed in 1990 and became increasingly outdated and inadequate for the
organization’s needs. The system was supported by an IT department of four employ­
ees. Other employees working at Sullsgate mainly included people in the customer ser­
vice and accounting departments. The named departments - warehouse, IT, customer 
service, and accounting - represent almost the entire workforce at the UK headquarters, 
except for a few support staff and a janitor, and these departments were all affected by 
the subsequent changes.
In late May of 2001 a meeting was arranged between the UK management and a 
German team of IT and logistics executives. At the meeting in London the British man­
agers were told that their IT system would be changed to SAP and their warehouse 
would be closed and storage and distribution permanently substituted by the larger fa­
cilities in Germany. These changes would necessitate the dismissal of 11 workers in the 
warehouse, the dismissal of the general operations manager, and a substantial shrinkage 
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Subsequently, the agenda of the monthly meetings dealt entirely with issues re­
lated to the transition of the warehouse to Germany and the data migration and imple­
mentation of the SAP system. An initial training in R/3 for the British management in 
October 2001 was followed by training sessions for customer service and accounting 
employees in January 2002. The change project proceeded according to schedule and by 
May 2002 R&P UK was operating entirely on the SAP system, delivering stock directly 
from the German warehouse to its customers.
3.3,5 My role as researcher
My research at R&P UK was endorsed by a senior manager at headquarters who 
stood in direct contact with the board member responsible for the tableware division. 
This manager provided me with the initial internal contacts and used his authority to 
request cooperation from the management at the subsidiary. Reflecting Van Maanen & 
Kolb’s (1985) emphasis on the importance of ‘sponsors’ in the organization to get past 
‘gatekeepers’ of information, the German senior manager negotiated my first meeting at 
the British site with John McGregor, the UK managing director. While the helpful effort 
was most certainly beneficial to getting immediate access, it somewhat diminished my 
initial chance of being perceived by UK management as an independent agent. The en­
dorsement from headquarters in combination with the intuitively disturbing cause of 
doing research on resistance stirred British managers’ concern and suspicion. In addi­
tion, my initial appearance, dressed with suit and tie, supported an impression at the 
subsidiary o f a business consultant sent from Germany to make an inquiry with poten­
tially unforeseeable consequences. As these negative expectations became apparent dur­
ing the first meeting at the UK site in Sullsgate, gaining trust was of pivotal importance 
for subsequent encounters. Therefore, I spent much of the time in the following meet­
ings with UK managers and employees carefully emphasizing my status as an inde­
pendent academic, who has no loyalty or obligation whatsoever to R&P’s German 
headquarters. This was underlined visually by my dressing down, and illustrated by de­
scriptions o f my personal and university background. It was also crucial for local par­
ticipants to be ensured on numerous occasions that their answers would be treated with 
complete confidence, which was also assured to them in writing (see Appendix D). 
While extending the total field research period, the efforts of gaining participants’ trusts
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were necessary to obtain veridical responses and thereby validate the data. An indicator 
of the cogency of obtained data and the conclusions drawn from them was the approval 
by participants once the analyzed material was presented to them at the end of the re­
search process.
The issue of trust and safety to discuss and evaluate potentially controversial top­
ics became apparent again towards the end of the data collection, when one British 
managers refused to take part in the repertory grid exercise. As will be explained in sec­
tion 3.4.4, the purpose of the repertory grid sessions was to tap into respondents’ per­
ceptions of resistance to change. After an initial outline of the method, the particular 
manager became disgruntled and stated that he felt tired of having the subsidiary associ­
ated with resistance, since, according to him, there was no evidence of resistance during 
the change project. As a result, I had to explain the method as well as the rationale for 
using it in the study, which then necessarily excluded the manager and his colleague in 
the room from being subjects. This episode illustrates how the apparently negatively 
laden topic of resistance influenced respondents’ receptiveness of the research study. 
Although not affecting data quality, the difficulty of the resistance topic did affect the 
quantity of the collected data in this single instance. The episode also further stresses 
the importance of building trust when doing potentially intrusive research in organiza­
tions (Van Maanen, 1988). Implications of this finding relating to the research process 
will be elaborated in the discussion chapter in section 5.3.
3,3.6 Learning and resistance and the change project
My enquiry and data collection at the British subsidiary started after preliminary 
meetings with German and UK managers in April 2003, roughly one year after the 
changes occurred. This time lag ensured employees’ extensive experience with the 
changes and their effects while being close enough temporally to be remembered in de­
tail. My research sought to answer the basic questions of how the changes caused learn­
ing at different levels of analysis, whether the changes led to emergences or expressions 
of resistance, and how such resistance was handled and, ideally, functioned as a source 
of organizational learning. As a consequence, my main focus of interest was the SAP 
implementation, as it required fundamental learning and constituted a profound change 
to work procedures. Moreover, the system is still in use. Since the warehouse operations 
were simply closed at the British subsidiary, all former warehouse employees are not
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part of the company any more20, and are therefore not accessible to participate in the 
inquiry. Employees in the remaining three departments of customer service, accounting, 
and IT are all operating on SAP now, have gone through the change, and are still part of 
the organization. However, as the warehouse closure was conceptually and chronologi­
cally linked to the new computer system, it aggravated and dramatized the change for 
the remaining employees, and was thus expected to be a concurrent theme during the 
data collection.
Given the chosen organizational setting and the specific change, the general defi­
nition of resistance stated in section 2.4 can be narrowed down to a working definition 
that is more practical for the analysis. This working definition identifies resistance as 
non-acceptance of the change measures at R&P UK. Employing non-acceptance as a 
target of the investigation implies a focus on change recipients, and an interest in any 
critical responses to the new computer system and the closure of the local warehouse.
Fine-tuning the depiction of a key concept raises awareness about a potentially 
problematic contingency, namely the case of finding no resistance in the project. While 
intuitively possible, such a scenario is unlikely to jeopardize the goals of the present 
study for two reasons. First, it can be argued, based on the theorizing by Kurt Lewin 
(1951) outlined earlier, that any change generates some sort of resistance. Social sys­
tems will react to changes of their equilibria with certain inertia. The question of interest 
would then only be whether or how resistance is used for learning. Second, on a less 
conceptual level, even if there were a case of zero apparent resistance, this would still 
provide the possibility to draw useful conclusions. Since the proposed research question 
focuses on contextual factors and procedural considerations, a zero resistance scenario 
would offer the opportunity to analyze why resistance did in fact not occur, and whether 
this affected other learning in the project. The phrasing of the research question center­
ing on ‘how can an organization learn from resistance’ instead of ‘how does an organi­
zation learn from resistance’ affords sufficient flexibility in this respect.
20 Out of the 13 employees in the warehouse before the change 11 were dismissed and 2 kept for customer 
returns. The original two have, however, left the company in the mean time and were replaced by new 
ones that had not experienced the change project.
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3.4  D a t a  c o l l e c t io n  a n d  a n a l y s is
The data collection and analysis section is essentially divided into four parts. The 
first part covers general characteristics of the data collection process, and considerations 
about the relations between obtained types of data and variables of interest. The follow­
ing three parts pertain to the three different methods employed. Here I first explain the 
attributes and specific circumstances of each method, in order to then describe the struc­
ture and procedure of the respective analyses. Interviews represent the main data corpus 
both regarding the quantity of obtained data and the comprehensiveness in addressing 
the research question. While primarily targeted at the individual level, the nature of the 
data collection process for the interviews also allowed for direct probing of issues re­
lated to other levels of analysis. The project documentation holds the same potential to 
provide information about not only the organizational level, but also the individual and 
group level. Repertory grid data are aimed at the group level and pertain mainly to per­
ceptions and representations of resistance within the organizational context.
3,4,1 Process characteristics, variables, and types o f data
The entire data collection process took place over a 5-month period from March to 
July 2003. It started with an initial weeklong visit to R&P’s headquarters in Germany, 
where the context of the study was negotiated and informal conversations were held 
with various executives in IT, logistics, and personnel. The German management re­
sponsible for the change project in Great Britain, as shown in Figure 3.1, consisted of 
Heinz Berwanger (managing director logistics), Peter Schmitdbauer (managing director 
central IT), Manfred Becker (manager customer service tableware), and Sabine Fischer 
(regional manager customer service export). After contacting the British subsidiary, an 
initial meeting was held in Sullsgate on 7 April 2003 with the UK managing director 
John McGregor, followed two weeks later by another meeting with the entire UK man­
agement. Here I presented the aims, requirements, and benefits of the research to Robert 
Walsh (manager IT), Paul Samuelson (financial controller), Kevin Franks (operations 
manager), and John McGregor in a formal presentation. After the second visit to 
Sullsgate a series of further visits was arranged with Kevin Franks to conduct interviews 
and repertory grids with UK management and employees throughout May and June. 
The former UK general manager, Hugh Prescott, who had been dismissed as a conse­
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quence of the change, was visited for an interview at his house in a Kent seaside town at 
the beginning of July. A final visit to Germany for six days in mid-July to do repertory 
grids and formal interviews with the German management team completed the data col­
lection. Documents about the change were obtained periodically throughout the five- 
month time span. The analyzed data were presented to the German and British man­
agement in November 2003 and January 2004, respectively. In total, 27 visits were 
made to sites in the UK (Sullsgate and Widechester, Kent) and Germany (Moorsfeld 
and Mitterwald).
The data collection involved 18 participants; four in the German management 
team, four British managers, nine British employees, and one British ex-manager (see 
Appendix A). All 18 participants were interviewed, while only 7 took part in the reper­
tory grid sessions. On the British side, the group of participants represents almost all the 
relevant (i.e. working with SAP) and permanent staff in Sullsgate as shown in the or­
ganigram in Appendix B. Interviews and repertory grids were conducted in English and 
German with the respective participants from Britain and Germany. Most documents 
were in English.
All participants started their career at R&P before the change project, with an av­
erage length o f tenure of 12.2 years, and, with the exception of the former general man­
ager, were still employed with the company at the point of the data collection. An over­
view of the data collection and its chronological order is provided in Figure 3.2 below.
Triangulation is attempted between methods for the same overall phenomenon 
(Denzin, 1989). As the phenomenon of interest involves two theoretical streams (learn­
ing and resistance) and a set of anticipated components and interrelationships, the goal 
is not to achieve convergent validity for a single construct or a single level in the tradi­
tional sense o f triangulating strictly for validation purposes (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 
1991; Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Instead, the theory building effort strives to realize 
plausible convergence and complementation between methods. The developed pathway 
through the data will frequently consist of careful circumspection and reflection of pre­
viously established findings, often requiring the revisiting of certain issues in the light 
of new insights. Hence, the triangulation will be an iterative analytical process of inte­
grating and contrasting obtained findings in an attempt to detect a logical pattern in the 
results.
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Figure 3.2: Data collection
The data collection produced three types of data, which were then utilized in gen­
erating information about the variables o f interest. Figure 2.2 (p. 110) on the research 
focus shows these variables to be resistance, contextual influences, awareness of resis­
tance among project participants, and learning. In Table 3.2 below, the focal variables 
are matched with the relevant types of data. Awareness, as the conceptualization of the 
perspectives of project participants, and as the immediate source of learning, is split into 
three elements. In order to fully understand this crucial variable in the project, it is ana­
lyzed whether there was awareness about resistance, how strong it was, and how it was 
semantically elaborated.
Table 3.2: Types of data and variables of interest
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The data directly cover the context, awareness and learning at the individual and 
organizational level, and the semantic elaboration of awareness at the group level. Indi­
vidual cognition is assessed through interviews and organizational formalization is re­
flected in documents. Group communication, with the exception of the representation of 
resistance, is not assessed directly, and therefore needs to be reconstructed from indi­
vidual and organizational level data. Hence, interviews include questions about the 
group level, and documents are scanned for group level information.
The table above illustrates a conceptual distinction between resistance and the 
other variables, displayed by a demarcating line. In order to avoid a potentially con­
founding influence of respondents’ interpretations, the resistance variable would in 
principle have to be accounted for from an external perspective through participant ob­
servation or some other form of direct, unconfounded assessment. However, as the 
change project was analyzed retrospectively, concurrent data collection was not an op­
tion. Through my immersion in the organization, I was able to engage in participant ob­
servation, albeit not systematically and not about current events. As a result, the ‘exter­
nal’ reconstruction of resistance in the change project is based on my intensive exposure 
to the organization, on casual conversations with project participants, on uncoded inter­
view material, on personal evaluations about the implementation process at R&P UK by 
members of the IT department at headquarters, and on my inferences from the interview 
and document data. Using partially unsystematic and partially non-independent data to 
assess resistance in the project is suboptimal, but in the present case the local circum­
stances and the general controversy and unease surrounding the topic of resistance in 
commercial organizations did not permit a more direct approach. However, the explor­
ative research strategy does not require to systematically measure this independent vari­
able, but rather to illustrate it as a stimulus. The question is not one of an objective ver­
sus a subjective account of resistance in the project, as resistance is always enacted or 
perceived in the eye of an observer. The core focus of the examination therefore does 
not lie on an external assessment of resistance, but on internal observers’ awareness and 
learning, which directly relates to the available data.
3,4.2Interview data collection
Qualitative interviewing is a widely used method for data collection in most types 
of social research. It is essentially a two-person conversation with the intent of obtaining
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information pertinent to the research question under study, while focusing on content 
indicated by objectives of systematic description, prediction, or explanation. The inter­
viewer attempts to achieve an understanding of situations or phenomena through the 
responses of interviewees. Hence, the interview is “a technique or method for establish­
ing or discovering that there are perspectives or viewpoints on events other than those of 
the person initiating the interview” (Farr, 1984, p. 182). In contrast to other methods, for 
example questionnaires, the outcomes of interviews are less constrained by the re­
searcher’s preconceptions. As a result, the range of emerging themes in the respondents’ 
answers might not necessarily correspond completely with the intended focus of in­
quiry. However, a loose structure permits space for negotiations of meanings as well as 
autonomy for the respondent to introduce issues that were not anticipated by the re­
searcher.
The format of the interview can range from the totally structured to the totally un­
structured (Breakwell, 2000). Structured interviews usually consist of a pre-formulated 
set of questions that are asked in a fixed order. They can also involve a fixed series of 
answers, either as statements to choose from or as a rating scale, which makes the re­
sults easily quantifiable or comparable across respondents. The opposite is true for nar­
rative interviews, where the intention is to go beyond the question and answer schema 
and instead to reconstruct social events by having respondents tell a story from their 
point of view, with minimal interference of the interviewer (Jovchelovitch & Bauer, 
2000). Somewhat in between ranges the semi-structured interview. Here, the inter­
viewer uses a topic guide to structure the session, but remains flexible to react to emerg­
ing themes or unanticipated issues. The topic guide is constructed according to prior 
theoretical findings and the relevant facets of the research question, and consist of a list 
of themes to be addressed rather than a set of specific questions (Gaskell, 2000). There­
fore, respondents are free to report from their perspective and in their own language, 
while the researcher ensures adequate progress concerning the focal agenda.
Semi-structured, in depth interviews were conducted with the management and 
employees involved in the change project. The selection21 of employees included the
21 The term selection is used here as opposed to sampling in order to emphasize the qualitative nature of 
this method of data collection. The language of quantitative research is misleading in contexts where no 
random probability samples are drawn. Gaskell (2000) states that “the real purpose of qualitative research 
is not counting opinions or people but rather exploring the range of opinions, the different representations 
of the issue” (p. 41).
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British management (n = 4), a British ex-manager (n=l) the German management team 
(n = 4), and all relevant employees in the British accounting, customer service, and IT 
departments that took part in the change project (n = 9) for a total of 18 interviews. 
Therefore the strategy was more of an exhaustive inclusion rather than a restricted se­
lection as the manageable total number of people involved in the change project in the 
named units allowed for the interviewing of almost everyone. I conducted all interviews 
between May and July 2003 on company premises in London and Germany. One excep­
tion required traveling to Kent as that particular employee, the former general manager, 
was dismissed as a result of the change. All interviews were tape-recorded and later 
transcribed for further analysis. The length of the interviews ranged between 25 and 121 
minutes (m = 54 minutes). Due to unrecorded explanations and small talk before and 
after, encounters were on average 20 minutes longer. Informed consent was received in 
writing from all participants, and an introductory letter was sent out before the interview 
sessions (Appendix C and D).
The sessions started with a brief introduction of myself and the purpose of the en­
counter, followed by an explanation and the signing of the informed consent form. Par­
ticipants were given the general intended structure of the interview as consisting of an 
initial description of personal information and job characteristics and a main part focus­
ing on the change project. I followed a pre-structured topic guide that directed my ques­
tioning (see Appendix E). Before being asked for specific details about the change, par­
ticipants were encouraged to ‘tell their own story’ about the project in a narrative fash­
ion. While most managers reacted to this with extended monologues, most regular em­
ployees initially conceived of the interview as something resembling a television style 
exchange of short questions and answers. In response, they were reminded to take their 
time, recollect their memories, and tell the story in their own words. Deviations from 
the topics of interest were not interrupted, but followed through if there was an identifi­
able connection to the research objectives. The interviews ended after all the main 
themes on the topic guide had been addressed and respondents indicated that they had 
nothing more to add.
3.4.3 Interview analysis
The tape-recorded data sets used for the present analysis stem from formal inter­
views with four British managers (McGregor, Franks, Walsh, Samuelson, Prescott),
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nine British employees (Peters, Farnsworth, Woolfe, Parker, Browning, Winterstein, 
Adams, Gupta, Naidoo), and four German managers (Berwanger, Becker, 
Schmitdbauer, Fischer). All interviews were transcribed verbatim, resulting in a total 
amount of 127,121 words with an average length per interview of 7,062 words (median 
= 6,602; standard deviation = 3,082), or about 320 single-spaced pages of transcriptions. 
The partitioning of respondents in three identified subgroups was retained for most of 
the analysis.
For the interview analysis, the respondents were split into the three subgroups of 
German managers, UK managers, and UK employees. These groups not only constitute 
the main parties in the project, but their job and project roles as well as task areas are 
also fundamentally different. Resistance has been defined as occurring between change 
agents and change recipients. Moreover, in the proposed learning model it is suggested 
that some integral processes are dominated by different organizational groups; for ex­
ample a higher proportion of management is assumed for the formalization stage. A dis­
tinct organizational hierarchy might also have an influence on resistance and learning. 
Therefore, the awareness and, where appropriate, accommodation of a tripartite per­
spective in the analyses is indicated by theoretical considerations.
A content analysis was undertaken in order to achieve the following objectives. 
First, participants’ recollections served as the basis for both the reconstruction of the 
change project and the comparison of interpretations among groups of actors. Second, 
the interview data were matched against the integrated framework of organizational 
learning to assess individual and collective learning in the project and appraise the proc­
ess model. Third, resistance to change was examined in the interviews to analyze its role 
in the project in general and its influence on learning in particular. In addition, interview 
data was also analyzed for information pertaining to the group and organizational levels.
The content analysis involved extensive coding of textual material. The coding 
procedure and underlying rationale is largely similar for the interview and project 
documentation data. Therefore, it will be discussed in greater detail in this section, and 
more briefly in the later section on the documentation analysis (section 3.4.7, p. 157).
In the first stage of content analysis, several rounds of interpretive reading essen­
tially lead to a reorganization of textual data through ‘cutting up’ of quotations and
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‘pasting’ them into a newly arranged order of codes across interviews. The software tool 
used for this purpose was ATLAS/ti (Muhr, 1997), which provides a practicable plat­
form that substantially enhances the formerly manual handling of textual material. The 
program does not, however, automatize the coding process, but greatly increases the 
transparency and replicability of the resulting coding frame. Together with a detailed 
description of coding steps, the ATLAS/ti record progresses the analysis of textual data 
beyond a somewhat obscure ‘art of interpretation’ to a thorough and accountable prac­
tice of qualitative research (Muhr, 1997; Strauss, 1987). The soundness of analytic in­
duction will provide evidence of validity (Mitchell, 1983).
The development of a coding frame facilitates systematic comparison. The data 
material is addressed with the research question before the theoretical background of the 
introduced process model. Codes are created and used as signposts for information con­
tained in the data. The codes are then coherently organized to fit a predetermined objec­
tive of inquiry. Hence, the resulting coding frame reflects a chosen focus and constitutes 
a theoretical selection that embodies the research purpose (Bauer, 2000; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).
The development and production of the coding frame for the interviews in the pre­
sent study has two parts. The complete unabbreviated coding frame can be found in Ap­
pendix F and G. In the first part the texts were searched for theory-relevant themes that 
were then organized into a coherent structure. This iterative procedure involves four dif­
ferent steps and results in a ‘top-down ’ coding frame that organizes codes in a hierarchi­
cal tree structure. Hence, I distinguished and systematized signposts of themes by mark­
ing relevant quotations, but did not yet consider content valence. For example, the basic 
code ‘the new system’ consists of five thematic codes, one of which is labeled ‘quality’, 
subsuming all remarks about the quality of the new computer system. Whether these 
remarks were overwhelmingly positive, negative, neutral, or mixed was not considered 
in the first phase of coding, because the focus lay on building a systematic coding struc­
ture. The procedure and output (reduced version, for the full coding frame see Appendix 
F and G) of the first part are shown in Figure 3.3 below. In the second part of the cod­
ing process, actual values of the content of individual codes were examined in order to 
detect common opinions and prevalent issues. This process involved two different steps 
and produced a ‘bottom-up ’ coding frame that summarizes common content across re­
spondents and assigns it to the previously generated codes. The data reduction here is
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largely based on the frequency of appearance of values, but not exclusively so, as the 
uniqueness or explanatory power of a single remark in some cases made useful its direct 
mentioning. To use the same example as above, remarks about the quality of the new 
computer system, grouped under the basic code ‘quality’, were condensed into a short 
summary, a main common theme, that represents the quintessence of respondents’ ut­
terances in this realm. A main common theme generally represents an average valence 
of respondents’ remarks for a particular code, although some main common themes rep­
resent unique remarks that were included for their explanatory power. The assigning of 
codes as well as the production of main common themes involves, at least to some de­
gree, an act of interpretation by the coder. Therefore the issue of reliability deserves at­
tention and will be discussed in a separate section below. Procedure and output of the 
second part of the coding process can be seen in Figure 3.4 (this is, again, a reduced 
version because of the space constraints of the chapter; for the full interview coding 
frame see Appendix F and G). In the following I will describe the six individual steps of 
the two parts in detail.
The content analysis of the interview material began with an initial open coding 
across all transcribed texts that was informed by my earlier theoretical developments 
(Strauss, 1987, pp. 28-32). Hence, individual codes were pre-specified by the character­
istics of the change project (e.g. a new software system, redundancies), the components 
of the process framework of organizational learning (e.g. formalization, group learning), 
and elements associated with the topic of resistance to change (e.g. change attitude, un­
certainty). The open coding required two close readings of the transcribed material dur­
ing which codes were assigned to individual quotations, and initially generated 33 the­
matic codes. In the second step, these thematic codes were then clustered under higher- 
level headings, called basic codes, which were themselves related to the topic areas in 
the original interview topic guide. This creation of and connection to a superordinate 
formation provided conceptual and structural order (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 62). 
The resulting hierarchical structure included four topic areas, comprising seven basic 
codes, themselves comprising initially 33 thematic codes. The topic area of communica­
tion did not exist in the original interview topic guide, but was added to the coding 
frame because of its frequency in the texts. Through a third reading, the existing coding 
frame was then tested for coherence, resulting in some reshuffling of thematic codes to 
basic codes, re-linking of quotations to thematic codes, and sporadic merging and split-
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ting of thematic codes, the latter producing one more thematic code. In the fourth step, 
the harmonized coding frame was compared to the underlying theory, namely the proc­
ess model of learning and the considerations about resistance. In order to comprehen­
sively reflect theory in the coding frame, three additional thematic codes were intro­
duced to a total of now 37 thematic codes. A fourth reading facilitated the assignment of 
the new codes to relevant quotations. A frequency table showing the occurrences of 
thematic codes across interviews is included in Appendix H. A total of 1830 quotations 
from the interviews were assigned to thematic codes. After the first four steps, the crea­
tion of the ‘top-down’ coding frame, attention was shifted from structural coherence to 
content valence. All quotations related to an individual thematic code were examined to 
extract common themes. This extraction was guided by a search for commonalities 
across subgroups of respondents (UK management, UK employees, German manage­
ment).
The partitioning was done at this point of the analytical process, because it was 
expected that due to the differing job roles, project roles, and task areas as well as dif­
ferent hierarchical levels of respondents, there would be distinctly different results for 
the three subgroups. These results would otherwise remain unnoticed in case all respon­
dents were simply pooled together. The partitioning is theory guided in that it responds 
to central assumptions of the described theoretical constructs, such as the resistance dy­
namics between management and employees, or group learning processes that are the 
result of common tasks of group members.
Data reduction is the purpose behind this bottom-up approach, and it is a central 
part of the analysis. As mentioned above, analytic choices were based largely on fre­
quency of appearance, but also based on explanatory power, salience, uniqueness, and 
general relevance to the research question (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10; Tesch, 
1990, p. 139). Hence, the fifth reading, which is also the fifth step of the process, 
educed main common themes across all interviews. Main common themes are extracted 
for all thematic codes, and hence correspond to all main issues of concern in the re­
search study, although there is not necessarily a one-to-one match between main com­
mon themes and thematic codes. In a sixth and final step, these main common themes 
were summarized into succinct categories to guide the presentation of results.
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Coding Process Coding Frame
(see Appendix F and G for full coding frame)
Open coding informed by 
theoretical background, re­
sulting in 33 thematic codes 
(first and second reading).
Grouping of thematic codes 
into 6 clusters o f basic codes 
emerging from topic areas 
in the interview topic guide, 
plus 1 communication cluster 
(not in original interview 
topic guide, but added be­
cause of freauencvL
Test of coherence of basic 
codes by content compari­
sons, resulting in regrouping 
o f thematic codes, re-linking 
o f  quotations, and splitting 
or merging of thematic 
codes. 1 more thematic code 
(third reading).
Comparison of codes to the­
ory, resulting in introduction 
o f  3 additional thematic 
codes and assignment of 
related quotations; now total 
o f  37 thematic codes (fourth 
reading).
T o pic  a r e a s B a s ic  c o d e s T h e m a t ic  c o d e s
(n=4) (n=7) (n=37)
Personal informa­ Demographics and Job description
tion job description Demographics
Commitment
Description of the Organizational System integration
change relations Germany vs. UK
Decision making
The project Concern
Prior implementations
Planning
Efficiency
Managing the transi­
tion
Redundancies
IT in the UK
Evaluation of change
Outlook
The new system Quality
Using the new system
MACH
Everyday procedures
Flexibility
Resistance and Resistance Shock
learning Uncertainty
Anxiousness
Expectations
Change attitude
Resistance
Learning Learning from resis­
tance
Training
Experts
Formalization of 
knowledge
Feedback
Individual learning
Group learning
Learning lost
Lessons learned
Communication Communication Communication within 
UK
Communication with
headquarters
Figure 3.3: Top-down interview coding frame
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Coding Process
Partitioning into 3 subgroups 
o f respondents (UK manag­
ers, UK employees, German 
managers). Analysis o f con­
tent o f thematic codes for 
each subgroup and extraction 
o f main common themes 
.{fifth reading).
Summarizing of main com­
mon themes into categories 
to guide the presentation of 
results.
Coding Frame
(see Appendix F and G for full coding frame)
Thematic codes 
(n=37)
Main common 
themes
(separate for 3 groups; 
example shows only 
UK managers)
Categories
Job description 
Demographics 
Commitment
■ We’re doing a good 
job in the UK
■ UK is doing 
fine
System integration 
Germany vs. UK
■ This diminishes what 
we’ve had independ­
ently in the UK 
1 ((
■ Decreased in­
dependence
■ Centralized 
organization
Concerns 
Prior implementa­
tions 
Planning
■ Has this change been 
catered to our needs 
at all?
■
■ A change pre­
scribed from 
headquarters
■ A difficult pro­
ject
■ Success im­
perative
■ Further layoffs?
Quality
Using the new sys­
tem
■ The new system is an 
improvement, but it is 
monumental and 
complex
■
■ Progress
■ One size fits all
Shock
Uncertainty
Anxiousness
■ When the news broke 
about the changes, 
that was a shock to 
everyone
■
■ Insecurity
■ Resistance is 
futile
Learning from re­
sistance 
Training 
Experts
■ We sold SAP particu­
larly well to our peo­
ple
1
■ Selling SAP
■ Insufficient 
training
■ Random for­
malization
■ Responsiveness 
to feedback
■ Learning by 
doing
■ Honesty, cohe­
siveness, and 
lost learning
Communication 
within UK
■ We tried to be open 
with people and kept 
our staff informed
•
■ Changing 
through com­
munication
Figure 3.4: Bottom-up interview coding frame
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The devised coding frame needs to a have adequate reliability in order generate 
consistent results across coders. Reliability in the context of experimental science is de­
fined as the consistency of measurement. The concept has been discussed earlier in this 
chapter. In the context of qualitative data and the coding thereof this quality criterion 
has some specific connotations that differ from its descriptions in classical test theory. 
Here, reliability is essentially the agreement among interpreters (Bauer, 2000), which 
then requires some duplication of effort to obtain an indicator of consistency for the 
same coding procedure across individual coders. Hence, the reliability of a coding sys­
tem is a question of coder training, clear definition of individual codes, the complexity 
of the entire coding frame, and of the given material.
Considering the latter, Krippendorff (1980, p. 130) notes that reliability often gets 
into the way of validity, because researchers have a tendency to improve that quality of 
data that is most easily measurable, given the difficulties of systematically analyzing 
complex symbolic forms. Instead of striving for valid analyses that truly capture the la­
tency and proper meaning in multifarious material, the analytic process is often reduced 
to easily accountable strategies, such as frequency counting, to serve the reliability crite­
rion. If, for example, a research study sought to deconstruct the motifs of a certain class 
of modem poems by counting words, the results might be reliable, but the validity of 
such counts must be deemed dubious.
Since coder training seems to be the key to increasing reliability, where a given 
coefficient represents the state of the training process, it can be argued that reliability is 
a process to be optimized rather than maximized (Bauer, 1993, p. 300). The complexity 
of a coding frame has to match the complexity of the data to produce valid results. But 
more complex coding frames require increasing amounts of coder training to be utilized 
with high reliability. Natural limits are set by the imperative for underlying theory to be 
parsimonious and for generated results to be a succinct summary of the original data. 
Optimizing reliability through an adequately complex coding system that is comprehen­
sible within a reasonable amount of time and effort may therefore be the best strategy. 
In addition, procedural transparency is the key to any assessment of quality and consis­
tency.
In the present case, the assessment of reliability differed for the top-down and the 
bottom-up coding frames, because the former centers on assigning codes to quotations 
and the latter consists of extracting common meaning from quotations with the same 
code. Standard inter-coder reliability was calculated for the top-down coding frame. Af-
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ter the entire textual material was coded (steps 1-4 in Figure 3.3), a second coder who 
was blind to the research question and underlying theory was thoroughly familiarized 
with the coding procedure and the 37 thematic codes, and encouraged to use the top- 
down interview coding frame in Appendix F as a source of information. The second 
coder then coded two randomly selected interviews. Each answer by a respondent in the 
text was treated as a separate unit for which assignments of codes were compared. As in 
the original coding, it was possible to assign multiple codes to the same textual units. 
Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960) was calculated to indicate inter-coder reliability, to a 
value of k  = .77, which is acceptable for exploratory research (Krippendorff, 1980).
For the bottom-up coding frame, an intra-coder reliability check was chosen. 
Since extraction and summary of meaning are central to this part of the analysis, famili­
arity with the research question and setting takes precedent over neutral abridgement of 
coded material (LeCompte & Goetz, 2001). Moreover, some quotes were retained as 
main common themes because of their uniqueness and explanatory power, not because 
of the frequency of their appearance across respondents. Hence, reproducibility across 
coders was substituted by within-coder stability. Two months after the first extraction of 
main common themes, the coded interviews were examined again code-by-code for 
each subgroup of respondents (this is essentially a sixth reading of the interview mate­
rial; see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 with the coding procedures). The thus produced main 
common themes were compared with those generated during the first extraction. In 
cases where incongruencies consisted of more than simple wording differences, the par­
ticular code for the particular subgroup was revisited to ensure consistency of meaning 
and adequate summary by the relevant main common theme. With this the reliability 
testing of the coding frame was completed.
The presentations of results from the interviews data will essentially be split into 
two parts. In the first part, the results of the top-down coding are assessed for their size, 
that is, the average word counts per code for three subgroups of respondents (UK man­
agers, German managers, UK employees) are compared. This allows for an initial scan­
ning about the significance of particular topics, and creates an understanding about the 
salience and importance of certain issues for the respective subgroups. In the second and 
main part, which will be spread across different sections, the content of respondents’ 
answers is analyzed by means of a comparison of main common themes between sub­
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groups. Figure 3.5 shows the two parts of the result presentation along the coding 
frames in a graphic format.
Top-down coding frame
Topic Topic
area 1 area 4
I  f
I l f
Basic Basic Basic
code 1 code 2 code 7
I
Them. Them. Them. Them.
code code code code
*s
Cate­
gory 1
Cate­
gory 1
Cate­
gory 1
. . . . . . . . .
Cate­
gory n
Cate­
gory n
Cate­
gory n
z > t r - a
Main 
common 
theme 1
Main 
common 
theme 1
Mam 
common 
theme 1
Main 
common 
theme 2
Main 
common 
theme 2
Main 
common 
theme 2
Main 
common 
theme n
Main 
common 
theme n
Main 
common 
theme n
Result pre- n:
&........ -  J i­
ll German | | ..........UK
based on 
content
(different 
common 
themes/cate­
gories for] 
subgroups?)'.
UK
’Result pre­
sentation:
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resistance has mainly negative connotations and has a strong association with deficit 
concepts. He used free associations and semantic differentials to generate his results. 
While free associations might simply elicit respondents’ espoused theories, the semantic 
differential method provides predetermined adjectives along which a given concept can 
be rated. In this way, however, the researcher might impose his/her own dimensionality 
of understanding of the given concept on the respondent. In the present study, the reper­
tory grid method was consciously chosen to overcome these potential shortcomings, as 
explained in the following.
The repertory grid method was developed by Kelly (1955) to appraise the process 
of construing, and constitutes the core empirical instrument of his personal construct 
theory. While rejecting the stimulus-response model, personal construct theory attempts 
to elucidate the structure of assumptions people use to ascribe meaning to their experi­
ence (Bannister & Mair, 1968; Ginsberg, 1990; Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 1982). Experi­
ence in this context is not simply seen as a sequence of stimuli, but as “the cycle of 
framing personal interpretations of the world and reassessing them in light of ensuing 
events” (Neimeyer & Neimeyer, 1982, p. 190). Kelly (1955) describes the themes peo­
ple deduct from their experiences as constructs, which are construed through a process 
of contrast and similarity. He retains the fundamental notion that constructs are bipolar. 
In this view, people make sense of their world by simultaneously noting likeness and 
difference. For example, if a respondent describes ‘discussions with management’ as a 
‘constructive’ form of resistance, she indicates at the same time that such discussions 
are not destructive. The construal is understood as a discrimination process that 
stretches across many levels of awareness, from intuitive thought to verbal reasoning, 
from physiological impulse to emotional sensation (Marsden & Littler, 2000). Hence, 
construing resistance to change as a potential source of learning or as a deficit concept 
may represent more than change participants’ cognitive recognition; it may reflect an 
impassioned premonition that has profound implications for the emotional and behav­
ioural aspects of the treatment of resistance.
Originally developed in clinical settings, the repertory grid has gained popularity 
in the last two decades in studies of managerial and organizational phenomena, such as 
strategic decision-making, information requirements analysis, performance appraisal, 
recruitment, consumer relations, training evaluation, and risk analysis (Cassell, Close, 
Duberley, & Johnson, 2000; Gammack & Stephens, 1994; Wacker, 1981; Walton, 
1986). The technique was developed in order to overcome the shortcoming of imposing
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the researcher’s frame of reference and worldview on subjects, as is the case in struc­
tured surveys. Open-ended surveys would to some extent remedy this shortcoming, but 
cannot resolve the problem of the subconscious nature of people’s cognitive organizing, 
which impedes valid and reliable answers to direct, open-ended questions (Reger, 
1990). The repertory grid provides a set of subjective coordinates that locate respon­
dents’ discriminations among a set of environmental phenomena, in our case manifesta­
tions of resistance to change. In investigating cognition, the repertory grid offers three 
important advantages (Brown, 1992; Ginsberg, 1989): Firstly, it is designed to elicit 
meanings to the respondents. The researcher’s inherent preconceptions are not imposed 
upon the subject. Secondly, due to the absence of direct, unstructured questions to par­
ticipants, the technique has great potential to uncover theories-in-use that actually gov­
ern behavior rather than espoused theories. Thirdly, resulting data illustrates not only 
the qualitative nature of subjects’ belief systems, but the data can also be analyzed 
through statistical methods, allowing for reproduction and validation.
The four basic steps in administering a repertory grid are element selection, ele­
ment comparison, element evaluation, and the grid analysis. The combined duration per 
individual is approximately 45 minutes, for a group around 60 minutes, depending on 
the size of the group. As indicated in earlier sections, in this study the repertory grid was 
administered to groups of managers and employees.
In the first step, elements are selected to which participants respond. The selection 
can be undertaken either by the researcher or by the respondent. In our case, respon­
dents were asked to name different manifestations of resistance to change that they 
could think of (e.g. discussions with managers, threats to leave).
In the second step, elements are randomly divided into sets of three (other meth­
ods than the triadic one are also possible) and respondents are asked to name a con­
struct, that is a dimension, along which two of these elements are similar and different 
from the third. In this way, a likeness pole and a contrast pole are found. Examples of 
elicited constructs concerning different manifestations of resistance were ‘irrational vs. 
rational’ or ‘destructive vs. constructive’. This process is repeated until a substantive yet 
manageable pool of constructs is generated. The result of the first two steps is a blank 
matrix with elements as columns and constructs as rows.
In the third step, respondents are then asked to rate on a scale every element in re­
lation to the elicited constructs. In our case, respondents would rate elements on a 7-
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point scale, with 1 and 7 indicating the two antipodes (e.g., destructive = 1, constructive 
= 7). The same rating could be given to more than one element.
Finally, the resulting data matrix of m x n elements and constructs can be ana­
lyzed to create a geometric, quantitative, or qualitative representation of respondents’ 
frames of reference. Content and structure of a grid may be discussed qualitatively or 
analyzed quantitatively by calculating various indicators such as cognitive complexity, 
construct significance, or element distance (Fransella & Bannister, 1977; Ginsberg, 
1989). In principle, any multivariate method grounded in matrix algebra can be em­
ployed for further analysis, but the most useful types are cluster analysis, factor analy­
sis, and multidimensional scaling (Bood, 1998; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Holman, 
1996; Reger, 1990). For the present study, principal components factor analysis was 
chosen. Results can be compared between individuals or groups, and within individuals 
or groups over time.
Following the semi-structured interviews, the repertory grid addressed and elicited 
respondents’ group level cognitive construction systems specific to resistance to change. 
The interview provided a flexible method to raise awareness about the dynamics of the 
focal topic. Once made salient, the structure of assumptions about resistance to change 
was systematically assessed by the repertory grid technique22. The technique was ad­
ministered at the UK site to two groups of British employees with three and two partici­
pants, respectively, and at the Mitterwald headquarters offices to a group of German 
managers with two participants for a total of three repertory grids. It was planned to also 
have a group of three British managers take part, but they declined cooperation in the 
initial stages of the procedure (see section 3.3.5). All participants had been interviewed 
a few days prior to the repertory grid sessions. A paper-based version was used involv­
ing a large flipchart sheet and yellow Postlt notes to write down and arrange elements 
and constructs. The sessions started with a brief general introduction of the method fol­
lowed by an explanation that the topic of interest would be resistance to change. As re­
sistance was mostly negated during the previous interviews, respondents were asked to 
relate their answers not exclusively to the change project, but to their general experience 
in the workplace or their imagination (e.g. “how could resistance to change manifest
22 A similar approach of raising respondents' awareness for, and familiarity with, focal topics prior to the 
application of die repertory grid was employed and recommended by Kristof-Brown (2000).
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itself in a work situation?”). Given the delicate nature and negative connotations that 
surround the topic of resistance, in the introduction I chose not to explicitly relate the 
topic to employees’ personal experience during the change project. The number of elic­
ited elements and constructs had to be limited for reasons of available time and people’s 
attention, since the sessions were not to exceed one hour and since the method can eas­
ily become lengthy and cumbersome for larger matrices. Hence, the number of elements 
or constructs for any group was restricted by the researcher to range between eight and 
ten. Participants were actively encouraged to discuss and negotiate elements, constructs, 
and ratings. The experience revealed that the method would be impractical for groups of 
more than three to four participants, because of the increasing length of discussions, the 
difficulty of reaching consensus, and the required close proximity in the seating ar­
rangement. All verbal interaction was tape recorded and transcribed for further analysis.
3.4.5 Repertory grid analysis
The repertory grids analyzed in this section were conducted with two groups of 
British employees and a group of German managers. The objective behind the admini­
stration of this method was to reveal respondents’ perceptions of resistance to change 
and the frames of reference they use to make sense of the concept. A detailed analysis 
of the referential frameworks obtained has the potential to characterize resistance as 
change agents and change recipients understand it, and thereby to extrapolate about the 
role of resistance within the organizational culture. This will complement the findings 
on awareness of resistance obtained in the interviews and project documentation. The 
distinction between groups of respondents as used in the interview analysis was also 
used for the application of repertory grids.
Repertory grids are somewhat deceptive sets of information because their format 
is very compact. However, in a grid with n elements and m constructs there are [w + m * 
2 + n * m] pieces of information to consider (Bell, 1988). For example, for a grid with 
nine elements and nine constructs, this results in 108 pieces of information.
The analysis of the obtained grids will be done as follows in three somewhat over­
lapping steps. All three steps will involve comparisons between groups. First, respon­
dents’ choice of elements and constructs will be assessed. An analysis of the produced 
element and construct labels will serve as an indicator of the valence of resistance to
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change at R&P, for example in comparison to the whole range of possible manifesta­
tions of resistance to change. So far this is a purely semantic task. The second step will 
be to examine how elements relate to one another and constructs relate to one another 
separately. By considering respondents’ ratings, descriptive statistics such as means, 
skewness coefficients, and correlations are evaluated. In the third step, principal com­
ponents analysis (PCA) is employed to jointly explore how elements and constructs re­
late to one another.
The literature on repertory grids discusses many indices and analytical techniques 
to illustrate and determine the internal structure of a grid (Bell, 1988, 1990, 2000; 
Fransella & Bannister, 1977; Ginsberg, 1989). Such measures summarize the informa­
tion found in the raw data or correlation matrices based on different algorithms, or pro­
vide different forms of graphical outputs. However, these alternative measures mostly 
reflect a researcher’s personal preference and add little value above and beyond the ba­
sic semantic, descriptive, and correlational analyses proposed here. For example, multi­
dimensional scaling might be used as a substitute for factor analysis, although this es­
sentially does not increase the explanatory power of the produced output. Jankowicz 
provides a constructive and detailed discussion of the practicality and usefulness of dif­
ferent analytical techniques (Jankowicz, 2003).
3.4.6 Project documentation collection
As a third method of data collection, an examination of formal documents about 
the change project was undertaken. The analysis of written organizational documenta­
tion provides insight into dynamics of learning and resistance above and beyond the 
findings generated by the other two methods. Formal documents are the product of in­
formation processing at the organizational level, and thereby reflect a process of formal­
ization and legitimization that makes knowledge potentially accessible throughout the 
organization. Through formalization, documentation is made official and obtains an en­
dorsement o f status and value. This usually requires formal markers that distinguish or­
ganizational documentation from mere individual notes (Tschan, 1992). Such markers 
also identify sender and receiver within or outside organizational boundaries or along 
the organizational hierarchy.
The production of documentation involves simplification, compression, accentua­
tion, and selection by an individual author. Hence, the production is naturally biased by
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subjectivity and has to be judged by the motives of the author in a particular context 
(Bauer, 1993). Documentation is often centralized with a few information gate-keepers 
in control. Due to their potentially subjective and political contents, documents should 
never be taken at ‘face-value’, but instead be evaluated with a strong emphasis on con- 
textualization and triangulation with other research data (Forster, 1994).
In addition to their role in the collective learning process, documents record the 
formal communication of organizational action, and therefore constitute a rich source of 
insight especially into project-related action where roles, tasks, and objectives need to 
be defined for a certain time period. Frequency counts can indicate the intensity of such 
communication over the course of a project, but should be used with caution, since rich 
documentation might either be an indicator of intense project activity, or bureaucratic 
structures, or both. In the opposite case, the relationship between little documentation 
and organizational performance should also be carefully assessed, as the production of 
documents might interfere with actual project tasks. From an analytical perspective, 
project documentation can easily provide more comprehensive coverage of the chrono­
logical order of events than interviews, for example. As a result, project documentation 
has great value in the reconstruction of organizational action as well as in the examina­
tion of respondents’ interpretations.
Organizational documentation can include such forms as accounts of standard op­
erating procedures, annual reports, PR material, mission statements, press releases, for­
mal charters and legal documents, project outlines, project reports, memos, meeting 
minutes, internal correspondence etc. In principle, any of these forms is suitable for 
analysis, access and consent of the hosting organization provided. This points at one of 
the key advantages of the analysis of documentation, because the information is already 
collected and mostly independent of timing requirements of other techniques. However, 
for purposes of uncomplicated further inquiry and clarification with concerned indi­
viduals, a prompt analysis is recommended. In sum, the method is unobtrusive, largely 
non-reactive, and therefore inherently maintains ecological validity (March, Schulz, & 
Zhou, 2000).
Since the change project at R&P UK had a clearly defined time frame, set of ob­
jectives, and list of participants, the strategy for this data collection technique was an 
exhaustive inclusion o f all project-related documentation. Two ‘gate-keepers’ were 
identified (Schmitdbauer and Franks), who provided access to formal, official project
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documentation in either electronic or paper format. Informal written communication, 
such as emails or personal notes, was not obtained, because it was no longer available 
given the time passed. In addition, the focus of the inquiry lay on official documenta­
tion. Trying to assess the exhaustiveness of my set of documents, German management 
assured me on two occasions that they had given me everything that had been retained 
in the company archives. Documentation from the German project management was 
complemented by training documents from the British side. For obvious reasons it is 
hard to say whether the obtained set of documents reflects the full range and quantity of 
documentation about the change project. However, judging from the confined dimen­
sion of the project, the centralized storage of written project material, and participants’ 
unfettered willingness to grant access, it seems safe to conclude that at least the vast ma­
jority of official project documentation was made available for analysis.
In addition to directly project-related material (meeting minutes, presentations of 
project structure and objectives, technical specifications), I also collected 12 issues of an 
employee information letter reflecting a time span from July 2001 to April 2003, R&P’s 
2002 annual report, an external auditor’s report, and various documents related to the 
SAP trainings.
All documents were initially pooled and a selection was made on the basis of 
relevance for the research question and the topics of interest in order to exclude docu­
ments of a purely technology-related nature. The resulting subset was then subjected to 
a content analysis.
3.4.7Project documentation analysis
The project documentation was analyzed with the purpose of assessing the formal­
ization at the organizational level within the change project at R&P UK. While the or­
ganizational level is the main target of analysis, information pertaining to the individual 
and group level is also taken into account. The prior theoretical discussion established 
the project documentation as the formalized product of information processing at the 
organizational level. Of interest to the present document analysis is the general focus of 
the documentation as well as indicators and the treatment of learning and resistance. 
Findings obtained from the interviews and repertory grids provide comparative valida­
tion and serve as guideposts for the analysis.
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Project documentation was collected in the form of electronic files and hardcopy. 
The obtained electronic files contained 117 documents. They were retrieved from the 
company’s database server. This initial dataset included a majority of documents with 
purely technical content, such as system specifications, customer and price lists due to 
be changed during the project, and further details of customer accounts. Scanning for 
documentation irrelevant to the analysis, the original electronic dataset was purged of 
91 technical files, arriving at a total of 26 documents retained for further analysis. For 
consistency purposes, the selection process was repeated a second time a few days later, 
resulting in the same number of relevant documents. As indicated in the previous sec­
tion, in addition to the electronic project documentation I also collected 12 issues of an 
employee newsletter reflecting a time span from July 2001 to April 2003, R&P’s 2002 
annual report, an external auditor’s report, and a large document related to the SAP 
trainings. Table 3.3 below shows the sources of project documentation data, the inclu­
sion ratio for further examination, and the total of analyzed material. All in all, 28 
documents were subjected to systematic analysis.
As indicated in section 3.4.3 on the interview coding procedure, the following sec­
tion on the analysis of the project documentation to a large degree relies on the sys- 
tematicity and logic developed for the examination of interview data. Hence, the proce­
dural discussion here will be rather brief in comparison.
The project documentation data are textual material and require a content analyti­
cal approach involving a rigorous coding procedure. The initial strategy for the docu­
mentation analysis was to use the coding frame developed for the interviews, because of 
its comprehensive coverage of issues related to the research question, such as group 
learning and resistance. The interview coding frame was first built through open coding, 
and subsequently expanded and modified to systematize issues emerging from the data 
and issues specified by the prior theoretical discussion. Since the interview coding 
frame covered at least all theoretically relevant topics, it seemed appropriate to utilize 
the same instrument for the documentation analysis.
However, initial coding trials produced largely blank frequency tables, indicating 
that many interview codes were not applicable to the document data. It became apparent 
that topics related to learning and resistance were hardly considered in the formalization 
effort. As a result, for many relevant topics a modified analytical strategy would require 
coding for absences. Yet such a strategy might easily produce a flawed argument, since
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theoretically, out of the universe of possible topics, almost everything is absent from 
any given text, except the few specific topics it is written on. Content analysis tends to 
center on frequency, and thus potentially neglects the rare and the absent (Bauer, 2000). 
A true reason for an observed absence of certain topics in the data might also be simply 
an inadequate extraction tool, that is a suboptimal coding frame. Therefore, in order to 
build a cogent argument, I have to reliably verify any suspected absence of content rele­
vant to the research question. This will be done by comprehensively and exhaustively 
accounting for the purpose and content of the obtained documents. On the basis of dem­
onstrating what information is in the documents a strong case can be made about what is 
not in them.
Table 3.3: Project documentation data
Total
Source Project documenta­
tion in electronic 
format
External
auditor’s
report
UK em­
ployee 
newsletter
Share­
holder
report
Training
document
n/a
Date of pro­
duction
Known Known* Known* Known* Unknown n/a
Amount 117 1 12 1 1 132
Amount rele- 26 1 1 0 0 28
vant and coded
Nature of 
coded docu­
ments
Size of coded 
documents
Complete project List of ob­ Article on
documentation (all servations introduc­
meeting minutes, and recom­ tion of SAP
timeline charts, task mendations in the Brit­
responsibility charts, concerning ish subsidi­
to do lists, specific the SAP ary
training documenta­ implemen­
tion, flow charts of tation and
document trails, warehouse
project structuring, closure
evaluation of project
alternatives etc.)
7186 words +112 198 words 307 words
pages**
n/a n/a n/a
n/a n/a 7691 
words + 
112 
pages**
* not included in the timeline analysis of frequency of document production (the newsletter appears 
every month, the auditor’s report was retrospective a year after the project, and the shareholder report 
appears every year)
** words were counted for text-based documents in MS Word format, pages were counted for slide or 
spreadsheet based documents in MS Power Point or MS Excel format
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The coding was conducted as follows. Essentially, interview codes applicable to 
the documents were retained, and new codes were generated that are exclusive to the 
project documentation. The partitioning into subgroups of respondents, as done in the 
interviews, was irrelevant for the documentation, because the vast majority of docu­
ments originated from headquarters. Both the application of existing codes and the de­
velopment of new ones were undertaken according to the procedure described in Figure 
3.3 and Figure 3.4 in the section on interviews (pp. 146 and 147), involving a top-down 
and a bottom-up coding process.
For existing codes, the first step was replaced by a test of adequacy for every in­
terview code to the document data. After a second reading, a list of 13 retained codes 
was generated. Step 2 was omitted, because of the already existing allocation of the­
matic codes to basic codes. A test of coherence followed as step 3. Step 4 does not need 
to be repeated for existing codes. Step 5, the extraction of main common themes, was 
done without the partitioning of the entire document set into subgroups. Summarizing 
the common themes into thematic categories, step 6, completed the coding with existing 
codes.
For new codes, the first three steps were undertaken to arrive at a coherent set of 
thematic and basic codes. Step 4 was omitted, since the previously existing codes al­
ready account for the theoretical background. The extraction of main common themes, 
step 5, was again done for the entire collection of documents, and the aggregation into 
thematic categories, step 6, finalized the coding.
The complete top-down document coding frame can be found in Appendix J, 
while the coding frame showing main common themes and thematic categories as well 
is shown in Appendix K. For better illustration, Figure 3.6 below shows the codes ap­
plied to both interview and documentation data, and the codes exclusive to the respec­
tive data sets. The document coding frame contains 30 thematic codes. A frequency ta­
ble showing occurrences of thematic codes across documents is included in Appendix 
L. A total of 1143 quotations from the documents were assigned to thematic codes.
The reliability of the document coding frame was assessed according to the same 
procedure as for the interview coding frame (see section 3.4.3). Again, the focus of the 
reliability assessment lay on the top-down coding frame only (steps 1-4 in Figure 5.3, p. 
146). A second coder, blind to the research question and underlying theory, was famil­
iarized with the 30 thematic codes and asked to code two randomly selected documents. 
Cohen’s Kappa was calculated to a value of k  = .79 for inter-coder reliability, indicating
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adequate reliability (Cohen, 1960; KrippendorfF, 1980). Intra-coder reliability was as­
certained for the bottom-up coding frame (steps 4-5 in Figure 3.4, p. 147) by means of a 
second extraction of main common themes two months after the first one. A comparison 
of the results of the two extractions and minor modifications to ensure consistency 
completed the reliability testing.
Interviews
37 (24 + 13) thematic codes
Job description 
Demographics 
Commitment 
Concerns 
Managing the transition 
Redundancies 
Outlook 
Prior implementations 
Everyday procedures 
Flexibility 
Using the new system 
Uncertainty 
Shock 
Anxiousness 
Resistance 
Expectations 
Change attitude 
Experts 
Feedback 
Individual learning 
Group learning 
Learning lost 
Lessons learned 
Communication within UK
Documents
30 (13 + 17) thematic codes
Warehouse closure
SAP implementation process 
SAP specifications 
Title/purpose
System integration 
UK vs. Germany 
Decision making
P la n n in g  
Efficiency 
IT in the UK 
Evaluation of change 
Quality 
MACH 
Learning from resistance 
Training 
Formalization of knowledge 
Communication with headquarters
Date of production 
Date of delivery 
Sender 
Recipient 
Product issues 
Task responsibility 
Product returns 
Pricing issues 
Accounting issues 
Shipment and delivery 
Hotel customers 
Concession shop/wholes, cust j 
Household customers
Figure 3.6: Thematic codes for interview and documentation data
3 .5  S u m m a r y
The third chapter contained a detailed description and discussion of the methodol­
ogy employed for the empirical part of this thesis. The research strategy, the setting of 
the study, and the methods of data collection and analysis were explained.
Following the formulation of a research question at the end of the second chapter, 
the purpose of the present empirical study was outlined as theory building on the topics 
of organizational learning and resistance to change. Specifically, the potential of resis­
tance to change to function as a source of organizational learning was defined as the fo­
cus of empirical enquiry. It was decided to assess this potential by means of an analysis 
of an organizational change in a field setting.
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The choice of methods was subject to two considerations. On the one hand, ade­
quate methodological fit was required in respect to the elements of the research question 
and the processes depicted in the proposed model of organizational learning. Hence, any 
chosen methods needed to be appropriate for the detection of individual cognition, 
group communication, and organizational formalization as well as for the examination 
of emergences of resistance. On the other hand, the methods had to be adaptable to the 
specifics of a particular field setting, which required a degree of flexibility in the appli­
cation of the data collection. As a result, I chose personal interviews, repertory grids, 
and the collection of organizational documentation. Interviews and document collection 
focus on the reconstruction of the change project, and the exploration of individual cog­
nition and organizational formalization related to learning and resistance in the project. 
Repertory grids specifically target the group level perceptions of resistance to change 
among project participants. Each method has the potential to gather information about 
more than one level of analysis, while the tripartite approach allows for triangulation of 
results.
The research strategy used here in a theory building, exploratory approach is a 
single case study of an organizational change project. This is a non-experimental field 
study, which employs an embedded design with three levels of analysis. Quality criteria 
such as validity and reliability were discussed, and the measures taken to ensure an ap­
propriate standard were outlined.
Rousseau & Paul, a global ceramics manufacturer headquartered in Germany was 
the organization under study. The specific focus lay on an implementation of SAP soft­
ware in conjunction with a warehouse closure at R&P’s British subsidiary. In order to 
cater for the particular context, a general definition of resistance provided earlier was 
refined to a working definition of resistance as non-acceptance of the change measures. 
For this retrospective project analysis, I conducted interviews and repertory grids with 
German and British managers and employees and collected the complete project docu­
mentation.
In the remaining part of the third chapter, the employed methods were introduced 
in detail and the specifics of data collection and analysis were discussed. Three methods 
of data collection required three different types of analytical techniques. For large parts 
of the analysis, especially on the interviews, the data pool was also split into three parts 
according to group membership of study participants. This enabled the comparison be­
tween responses from German managers, UK managers, and UK employees.
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For the interview analysis, a systematic coding procedure was devised. The result­
ing coding frame, which was applied to all interview transcripts, accounted for emergent 
topics as well as topics previously determined by the theoretical discussion and the re­
search question. The generated codes were then utilized for the extraction of main 
common themes and categories across respondents, which will facilitate the presenta­
tion of results.
Repertory grid analyses comprised first of all a group level semantic assessment 
of respondents’ choices of elements and constructs. In a second step, the relationships 
among elements and among constructs were considered separately. In a third step, prin­
cipal components analyses were used to explore how the combined elements and con­
structs relate to one another.
The analysis of project documentation largely followed the procedure outlined for 
the interview analysis. A separate coding frame was developed that contained codes 
shared with the interview data and codes exclusive to the document material. This new 
coding frame was then applied to all relevant project documentation. Finally, as in the 
case of the interview analysis, main common themes and categories were extracted.
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4 RESULTS
The presentation of results consists of five main sections. First of all, result char­
acteristics pertaining to the interview and document data are presented. The following 
four sections then correspond to the variables identified in Figure 2.2 (p. 110) on the 
research focus. These variables are resistance, contextual influences, awareness, and 
learning. Accordingly, an outline of the independent variable of resistance in the change 
project is provided in the second part. Third, the context of the change project is de­
scribed, including the nature of the project itself, organizational relations, information 
about participants, and the characteristics of the new system. Finally, in the fourth and 
fifth part, data on awareness and learning are shown. These last two sections distinguish 
between individual, group, and organizational level results. Findings on awareness of 
resistance are related to the factors existence, intensity, and semantic elaboration (see 
Table 3.2, p. 138). Findings on learning reveal to what extent resistance and awareness 
were used as a source of learning, and to what extent the found learning processes cor­
respond to those described in the integrated framework of organizational learning.
4.1 R e s u l t  c h a r a c t e r is t ic s
As an entry into the result presentation, in this first section characteristics of the 
interview and documentation findings are shown. Due to the complexity of the devel­
oped analytical procedure for those two sources, it is necessary to illustrate several fur­
ther aspects of the resulting data in addition to the actual coded content presented later. 
As the repertory grid method is a fairly standardized procedure, the results on that 
method do not need specific further characterization here.
For the interview material a word count per code was undertaken to give an idea 
of the comparative dominance or absence of topics from the perspective of the respon­
dents. Interview transcripts constitute the majority of the combined data corpus and con­
tain information on all facets of the research focus. The logic of the interview results 
presentation was illustrated in Figure 3.5. The word counts will be shown in the next 
section, while the coded content is spread across several subchapters specific to the fo­
cal variables. For the documentation, the frequency of production for the time span of 
the project was examined. In addition, the direction of formalized communication was
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inspected as well as the general nature of the document content. The coded document 
content will also be split into several parts and presented in the relevant sections further 
below.
4.1.1 Interview response distribution
The comparative word count provides information about the weight of identified 
topics23 for the three subgroups of UK managers, German managers, and UK employ­
ees. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the word counts24 across thematic codes for the 
three subgroups, first as stacked columns displaying the cumulative totals for every 
thematic code (Figure 4.1\ and second as lines with markers better illustrating differ­
ences between subgroups {Figure 4.2). In both diagrams gaps between codes demarcate 
basic codes, that is clusters of thematic codes (see Appendix F). The two basic codes on 
learning and communication are paired here because they will be presented as a single 
content unit in the following sections.
It is clear that the word count results are confounded by the demarcation of codes 
and by code specificity. In addition, because semi-structured interviews were used for 
the data collection, the lengthiness or brevity of responses is also confounded by the in­
terview topic guide and the questioning of the interviewer. In the case of, for example, 
narrative interviews, the elaborateness about a topic could be a stronger indicator of sig­
nificance, but at the same time it would be unlikely that all issues of interest to the re­
search question are covered. A second confounding aspect is the fact that certain topics 
are only relevant to certain subgroups because of differing job roles and responsibilities. 
The thematic code ‘planning’ (of the change project), for example, will have seemingly 
little relevance to UK employees, since planning is an essentially managerial task. 
However, discovered brevity on a topic that should be germane to a given subgroup 
might have profound revelatory value. In sum, the word count should simply be under­
stood as a first indicator of the nature of results that provides an idea about the structure 
of findings and about emphases in respondents’ reconstructions.
23 The terms code, thematic code, and topic are used interchangeably, because they stand for the same 
level of meaning unit in the top-down interview coding frame (Appendix F)
24 In all cases of displayed word counts, the data are adjusted for different group sizes, that is, total 
amounts were divided by the number of respective group members (German management = 4; UK man­
agement = 5; UK employees = 9).
165
Results
In the following, I first undertake an initial examination of positive outliers, that 
is, dominant topics. In a second step, intergroup differences on codes are assessed. 
Lastly, attention is focused on found absences, that is, very small word counts on certain 
codes for a given subgroup.
□  UK managers ■  German managers □  UK subordinates
2000
m w  sCodes
Figure 4.1: Cumulative word counts across codes
UK managers —■—German managers —* — UK subordinates
jr  s  <w wCodes
Figure 4.2: Word counts across codes for three subgroups
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The comparative dominance of topics is best illustrated in Figure 4.1, where cu­
mulative word counts across codes can be found. The mean word count per subgroup 
and code is m = 454 with a standard deviation of s = 370. Applying the rule that any 
thematic code with a word count of more than one standard deviation above the mean is 
an outlier, ‘job description’, ‘system integration’, ‘UK vs. Germany’, ‘planning’, ‘train­
ing’, and ‘communication with headquarters’ are identified as dominant topics, account­
ing for 42 percent of the combined total word count for all codes. There are no down­
ward outliers.
As a function of the complexity of a large organization, it can be assumed that job 
descriptions are somewhat extensive, even at the level of a customer service operator. 
The description involves an account of all the daily tasks and explanation on standard 
and non-standard operating procedures for the specific job environment. In addition, the 
question “What is your job description?” or “What do you do in your job on an average 
day?” was always asked to start the interview, to encourage narration and to make re­
spondents feel comfortable as a subject of study. The ‘system integration’ as the core of 
the change project received much attention seemingly because it is the key issue of the 
entire change endeavor. The rationale behind introducing a company-wide computer 
system in the UK was just this system integration between the British subsidiary and 
headquarters in Germany. The weight of the two codes ‘UK versus Germany’ and 
‘communication with headquarters’ indicates the importance of the relationship between 
organizational units in this project. Spanning the geographic divide is apparently not 
only a salient topic in terms of the actual communicative act, but also includes an 
evaluative aspect about the differences in location and culture. This emphasis on organ­
izational relations between countries far exceeds the size of remarks about internal rela­
tions or communication within the subsidiary. ‘Planning’ the change is also a topic that 
respondents elaborate on, and it is interesting to note that planning apparently takes up 
much more space than the evaluation of the change. From a learning perspective, a re­
flective assessment of the change with hindsight was potentially neglected, while pre­
paratory considerations were taken seriously. This could be an indicator of an incom­
plete learning cycle or of a tendency to be inattentive to possible sources of learning and 
insight. The most obvious outlier, exceeding the mean by more than three standard de­
viations, is the code ‘training’. None of the topics under the basic code ‘the new system’ 
receive that much attention. ‘Using the new system’ generates only fleeting interest in 
comparison. Therefore it can be assumed that the training appears to be the key entry
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point into the change, as it introduces recipients to the new system and provides a kind 
of test run for new operational procedures. Becoming acquainted with SAP and thereby 
having the chance to assess the system for its efficiency and quality from a user per­
spective probably makes the training a decisive phase during the change. Independent of 
system characteristics, it can also be assumed that the acceptance of the change would 
be strongly influenced by the way the training was conducted. Whether this was done as 
a pro forma exercise or with genuine concern for the end user and local circumstances 
might have important consequences for potential emergences of resistance.
The combined word counts presented so far convey a more informative message if 
the differences between subgroups are considered, which can be assessed more easily in 
Figure 4.2. Percentages are not calculated, as they are not meaningful in cases of small 
combined word counts. In general, the largest differences are found for those codes that 
also combine the largest word counts.
While the degree of elaboration rises along the hierarchical levels for the code 
‘job description’, an expression of ‘commitment’ to the job appears most important to 
UK managers. This might reflect their intermediate position in the hierarchical chain, 
although it is unclear why UK employees were apparently not motivated to express 
commitment. Since expressions of commitment are rather peripheral to the issues raised 
during the interviews, their exact content nature will have to be explored in a later sec­
tion. The topics in the organizational relations cluster25 seem to hold more relevance to 
the management level. It might be suspected that employees are not involved in the de­
cision making process. German managers spent more time on differences between or­
ganizational units, while British managers highlight the system integration aspect. The 
cluster for the basic code ‘the project’ immediately reveals a striking difference for the 
code ‘planning’. Again confined to the managerial level, the great majority of remarks 
on this topic stems from management in Germany. This finding could either reflect the 
simple nature of a project that was initiated at headquarters, or describes a pronounced 
hierarchical structure for the company’s operations. German managers obviously hold 
more knowledge about ‘prior implementations’, since they were directly involved in 
managing those, and they express this familiarity in the interviews. ‘Redundancies’
25 The term cluster refers to basic codes that each contain a number of thematic codes in the hierarchical 
top-down interview coding frame (Appendix F).
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seem to matter most to UK management, and surprisingly much less to UK employees, 
although the difference in absolute terms is rather slight. The same comparatively small 
differences in absolute terms can be found in the ‘new system’ cluster. Both manage­
ment groups appear rather reticent concerning evaluations of the change project, which 
contrasts their observed emphasis on the planning of the change. Comments about the 
old ‘MACH’ system and changes to ‘everyday procedures’ under the new system are 
dominated by the two British groups, by nature of their direct exposure to these issues. 
Differences in the ‘resistance’ cluster are quite small, as is the overall weight given to 
the topic. One assumption based on the word count would be that resistance was not a 
major factor in the reconstruction of the project, or alternatively that it was not openly 
discussed. ‘Uncertainty’ and ‘anxiousness’ pertain clearly more to the British subsidi­
ary. ‘Resistance’ itself receives more attention from the German side, while resistance 
as a source of learning prevails in the UK managers’ responses. Again, the marginal dif­
ferences in absolute terms make a meaningful comparison difficult here. The next clus­
ter ‘learning’ starts with a sharp increase for the code ‘training’, a topic that was highly 
salient for all three groups, but mostly so for UK managers. Without knowledge about 
the content of remarks, however, possible reasons for the intergroup differences remain 
uncertain or at least speculative. ‘Formalization’ and ‘group learning’ seem to occur 
more in the realm of employees. Finally, UK managers made the comparatively largest 
contribution to the word count on the code ‘communication with headquarters’
The third step of the word count analysis concentrates on those cases in which a 
particular subgroup had very little to say about given topics. UK employees are found to 
have generated a number of such absences. The low word counts on the codes ‘prior 
implementations’, ‘planning’, and ‘efficiency’ might clearly be attributable to employ­
ees’ job roles, task responsibilities or level in the hierarchy. The low count on ‘learning 
lost’ and Teaming from resistance’ might simply reflect the generally low word count 
on those two codes. Hence, the only meaningful absence appears to be for the code 
‘commitment’, where the obtained difference between managers and employees in the 
UK is surprising. For UK managers, no substantive absences can be found. There are 
low word counts on the codes ‘evaluation of change’, ‘using the new system’, ‘experts’, 
‘individual learning’, and ‘group learning’, but they are either attributable to job roles or 
are shared with one of the two other groups. For no single code do UK managers have a 
substantially lower word count than both other groups. The third group, German man­
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agers, equally shows most of its low word counts on codes that are rather irrelevant to 
respective job or project roles. ‘MACH’, ‘shock’, ‘expectations’, and ‘communication 
within UK’ can be disregarded because of this. ‘Learning lost’ and ‘individual learning’ 
have very low combined word counts. Therefore, as for UK employees, only the low 
count on ‘commitment’ remains substantial.
Recapitulating the word count findings, the main observations for the three sub­
groups can be summarized.
First, commitment to the job appears to be of importance exclusively to the UK 
management. Due to the nature of the project, which was initiated at headquarters in 
Germany and required only the UK subsidiary to change, it is intuitively plausible that 
the German management did not feel any motivation to express its level of commitment. 
Operations in Germany were not an object of inquiry, and it must be assumed that Ger­
man managers did not understand the research study as including an assessment of their 
own project performance and behavior. The research study was endorsed by a German 
managing director, who instructed his lower level colleagues in Britain to participate. 
Combined with the fact that the researcher was possibly perceived to have been sent 
from headquarters, UK managers might have felt a much more direct exigency to articu­
late their motives, as their own past activities were put in the spotlight. This rationale, 
however, would require UK employees to be vocal about their degree of commitment as 
well; something that they were not. Another potential explanation might be found in UK 
managers’ middle role in the project, mediating between the two other groups. Such an 
intermediate role, in the project as well as in the hierarchy, may have caused higher 
pressure levels, because UK managers were obliged to both endorse decisions from 
headquarters and at the same time empathize with possible concerns from their employ­
ees. Clarification on the commitment finding will have to be sought in the analysis of 
interview content.
Second, the relationship between German headquarters and British subsidiary re­
ceives much attention, with the codes ‘UK versus Germany’ and ‘communication with 
headquarters’ accounting for 12,5 percent of the combined total word count. The promi­
nence of intra-organizational relations is almost exclusive to the managerial level. Since 
managers on both sides were the main interacting groups, this topic is apparently more 
salient to them, while UK employees’ interactions are largely confined to the environ­
ment of the subsidiary. It can be assumed that the nature of the transnational relation­
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ship, presumably including such issues as cultural differences, language barriers, and 
different operating standards, might have been a critical factor in the project. The qual­
ity of the transnational relationship must be expected to exert a strong, if even causal, 
influence on dynamics of resistance and learning.
Third, respondents were much more vocal about the planning of the project than 
about its evaluation. While the code ‘planning’ is exclusively dominated by managerial 
remarks, as expected because of their job roles, the code ‘evaluation of change’ consists 
largely of employees’ responses. The managerial contribution to the evaluation topic is 
seven times smaller than their discussion of the project planning. It can be suspected 
that the planning of a project is deemed more important than the evaluation thereof, or 
that retrospective evaluation is simply not understood as an integral part of an imple­
mentation project. The latter assumption, however, would be surprising, since the SAP 
implementation project in the UK was one in a series of similar efforts, and was going 
to be followed by SAP implementations in other national subsidiaries. Retrospective 
assessment of performance is an essential part of learning at any level of analysis, and a 
disregard for such an important source of information might seriously impede the poten­
tial for organizational learning to occur. In addition, a found possible inattentiveness for 
a comparably uncontroversial source of information, such as prior performance, will 
cause doubts to emerge about the ability to use resistance as a learning stimulus within 
the same setting. If project evaluation as the most obvious source of learning at the 
managerial level was not taken seriously, it can be assumed that learning did not rank 
high among the project’s priorities.
Fourth, in line with the assumptions about learning, resistance to change does not 
seem to have been an issue of great concern in the reconstruction of the project. There 
are no positive outliers for the six codes of the resistance cluster, and 19 out of the 21 
word count averages for the three subgroups lie below the total average, with the re­
maining two barely above. Given such figures, the question arises whether resistance 
did not surface in the interviews, that is, whether there was no awareness, or whether 
there was simply no resistance. In the first case, the inquiry will have to concentrate on 
potential obstacles to the emergence of awareness and to voicing accounts of resistance 
retrospectively. In the second case, the focus will have to lie on obstacles to expressing 
resistance during the project. Resistance being the stimulus variable, the initial low 
word count observation will have to be explored further.
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4.1.2 Document production frequency and content issues
This initial examination of the frequency of document production over the time 
span of the project provides an indicator of the intensity of the formalization efforts up 
to and beyond the ‘going live’ date in February 2001. Figure 4.3 shows the frequency of 
documentation production over time for all documents. Only material specific to the 
change project was included. A distinction is made between documents relevant for 
closer analysis and nonessential pieces of documentation (see Table 3.3, p. 159). Please 
note that frequencies are only indicated for the set of documents retrieved from the 
company server, one employee newsletter and the auditor’s report, for a total of 119 
documents. The reason for this is that only those documents were produced exclusively 
for the change project at R&P UK, or hold specific relevance.
The document production is compared to the task execution by project partici­
pants. In almost every single document tasks are assigned to individuals and required to 
be completed by a certain due date. These 131 task delivery dates reflect project activity 
over time. According to the integrated framework of learning and memory described in 
section 1.9, such task related activity by individuals or groups precedes formalization in 
a given context. Therefore, the task frequency was added as a comparative factor to as­
sess the proposed learning model.
I Relevant documents Other documents — A —  Task delivery
r* 50
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Time scale
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution of the document production and task delivery
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The diagram shows a peak of documentation activity right before the closure of 
the warehouse at the end of January and the SAP start at the beginning of February. The 
document production starts in May 2001 with the first presentation of the project plan to 
the British managers by the executive team from headquarters. It then reaches a peak 
right before the ‘going live’ date, and significantly decreases afterwards. Interestingly, 
only technical specifications are formalized after February 2002. The only exception is 
an outlier in January 2003, the auditor’s report that mentions the SAP implementation. 
The reason for this time gap is that the auditor company conducts its assessment at the 
very beginning of each year and then immediately produces a report. As the system im­
plementation was still in progress in January 2002, it was not included in the particular 
report for that year.
The two key findings for the document production are the peak of formalization 
activity right before the closure of the warehouse and the official implementation date, 
and the lack of non-technical, internal formalization after the implementation date. It 
must be suspected, as indicated in the interviews, that there was no formal project 
evaluation. This assumption will be revisited in the content discussion.
In a second step, the formalization effort was compared to the tasks undertaken by 
the members of the project management teams. It can be seen that the overall task dis­
tribution lies to the left on the time scale compared to the document distribution. There­
fore, in general the task executions seem to precede the production of documents, 
thereby corroborating the stage sequence of the learning model. However, this conclu­
sion needs to be treated with caution. From a project management perspective it might 
be sensible to produce few documents with many task assignments at the beginning of a 
project, and many documents with more evaluative contents towards the end of a pro­
ject. On the other hand, there was seemingly little evaluation found for the end phase of 
the present project. In any case, the stability of a sequence of task execution and subse­
quent documentation will be moderated by the nature of a given project. Nevertheless, 
in this particular case a trend in the data can be detected that would confirm the assump­
tions made in the learning model. Bauer (1993) used a frequency assessment to track 
emergences o f resistance in a project over time. A similar analysis would have been in­
teresting in the present context, but the coding procedure revealed an absence of formal­
ized content about resistance. A closer look at the document contents will confirm the 
validity of this finding.
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In contrast to the interviews, there is virtually no retrospective perspective in any 
of the documents. All content, even the few evaluative statements, are basically antici­
patory in nature. An examination of the location of documents within the organization’s 
hierarchy in terms of sender and receiver reveals stark lopsidedness. Wherever a sender 
can be clearly identified, it is an individual situated at German headquarters; the sole 
exceptions being the auditor’s report and the employee newsletter. The documentation 
seems to exclusively originate in Germany, and is passed on to the British subsidiary, 
while German colleagues receive copies as well. For example, all meeting minutes are 
drawn by members of the German management team. Change recipients seem to be ex­
cluded from the formalization effort.
A great number of interview codes were not applicable to the document data. 
Most interestingly, there was no mentioning in the documents about ‘redundancies’, 
‘uncertainty’, ‘shock’, ‘anxiousness’, ‘feedback’, ‘resistance’, or learning in any form. 
All these topics must be deemed important for the success of any change, but did not 
reach the formalization stage in the present project.
The thematic category ‘operational project management’, which stands for techni­
cal and logistical information about the change project at R&P UK, accounts for the 
overwhelming majority of document content. Since this type of information is periph­
eral to the research focus, the thematic category is repeated for several clusters of codes 
(see Appendix K). The category is labeled ‘operational project management’, as op­
posed to a non-technical, staff-centered perspective on project management that is of 
interest in the present study. The content of this thematic category will not be discussed 
specifically.
The 13 codes from the interview coding frame that were retained for the document 
analysis account for only 185 quotations out of a total of 1143 (see Appendix L), that is 
43% of the codes combine only 16% of the quotations. In the context of the document 
analysis, code frequencies have more of a meaning than in the case of semi-structured 
interviews, because the frequencies are not confounded by the researcher’s questioning. 
Of the 185 non-technical quotations 113 pertain to the codes ‘formalization’ and ‘plan­
ning the implementation’. The latter code consists entirely of information about the or­
ganization of planning logistics. The code ‘formalization’ is a somewhat tricky relict 
from the interview coding, since in principle any document will be formalized informa-
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tion. In the present case, the code was assigned exclusively to the documentation of pro­
ject steps and decisions taken, in essence the creation of a paper trail. Any formalization 
of new knowledge by users working with the new system was not found, because the 
formalization effort practically ended shortly after the system implementation.
In sum, it should be stated in advance that there is a paucity of non-technical data 
in the project documentation. Even in the 28 content analyzed documents originally se­
lected for their non-technicality, issues of a directly task related, performance oriented 
nature hold the vast majority. Given the complexity of the project, this might not be 
surprising. But an overwhelming dominance of content related to operational project 
management seemingly comes at the expense of attention to feedback, consideration of 
learning, and a general interest in how the change is accommodated by its recipients. In 
this way formalization is not a consolidation of prior learning, but a process of amalga­
mating instructions, decisions, and responsibilities. The formalization then assures ac­
countability and uniform technical specifications, but ignores the human factor in the 
midst of the change.
After this initial outline of the characteristics of the interview and document data, 
the following sections contain the results corresponding to the variables of interest of 
the functional analysis of resistance, as shown in Figure 2.2. The findings on resistance, 
contextual factors, awareness, and learning will each be described separately.
4.2  R e s is t a n c e  in  t h e  p r o je c t
As outlined in the methodology chapter (section 3.4.1), the occurrence of resis­
tance in the project is reconstructed from several data sources and reflects a synthetic 
judgment, as no independent data could be systematically collected for this variable. 
However, the combined observations contain sufficient evidence to outline a resistance 
stimulus in the project.
The change project at R&P UK experienced some minor resistance. The resis­
tance in the project was essentially confined to a single individual, Robert Walsh, the IT 
manager at the British subsidiary. Mr. Walsh’s resistance can be depicted as reluctant 
cooperation or distinct problem orientation. Described by one German manager in a
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passing comment as a “catastrophe to work with”, the British IT manager was character­
ized as seemingly concentrating more on pointing out the shortcomings and flaws of the 
new system during the preparation of the implementation than on the proactive finding 
of results. Robert Walsh himself was very cautious in his commentary on the project, 
since he was aware of especially the German side’s dissatisfaction with his cooperation, 
but did express his disappointment with SAP as a software tool and then generally with 
the way the implementation was undertaken. The word ‘frustration’ was used 24 times 
in his descriptions.
“I keep saying we, because I didn’t get this feedback from other people, I’m 
perfectly happy to say that was my view at that particular time. [...] I'll be 
quite frank, I'm not a great fan of SAP from what I've seen of it. I'm really not 
a great fan.” (Robert Walsh)
On several occasions during the study, Walsh made negative comments about the 
new system and its implications for the subsidiary, and he also expressed his discontent 
to his colleagues. When compared to the manifestations of resistance that are listed in 
Table 2.1 (p. 92), elements of his resistance included reduced performance levels, criti­
cism of management, and irony, as described by co-workers and the German manage­
ment. There was a unanimous agreement among the German managers that Walsh was 
more of a hindrance than a supporting factor during the change.
Robert Walsh’s behavior illustrates that the proposed working definition of resis­
tance as non-acceptance of the change should be understood broadly, as the IT man­
ager’s reluctance and problem orientation only somewhat delayed the implementation 
process, but did not bring it to a halt. The reasons and circumstances for Walsh’s behav­
ior as well as the reactions to it will be explained in the sections on contextual factors 
and on the awareness of resistance itself (specifically the sections ‘A difficult project’, 
p. 189, and ‘Resistance is futile’, p. 208). These sections also illustrate reasons for the 
generally low level of resistance in the project. It will then be assessed how the found 
resistance was influenced by contextual factors and whether it constituted enough of a 
stimulus to raise awareness and trigger learning.
In the following three sections on contextual factors, awareness, and learning, the 
coded interview and documentation content as well as the repertory grid results will be 
presented. The interview and document content is split up according to basic codes and 
thematic categories that correspond to the focal variable for each section (basic codes
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and thematic categories for interviews and documents can be found in Appendix F and 
J). For example, the following section on contextual factors contains the content related 
to the basic interview and document codes ‘demographics and job description’, ‘organ­
izational relations’, the project’, and ‘the new system’. Within those basic codes, the 
generated thematic categories are used to structure the presentation. In addition, for each 
thematic category of the interview material, the content is compared between the sub­
groups of UK managers, German managers, and UK employees. This comparison was 
not possible for the document material, as documents were produced almost exclusively 
by German managers. For the variables awareness and learning, the presentation is di­
vided into three levels of analysis, as shown in Table 3.2 (p. 138). In general, the inter­
view material is richer in content, while the documentation in some cases fails to pro­
vide information relevant to the interests of this study.
4.3  C o n t e x t u a l  f a c t o r s
As mentioned in the paragraph above, the result presentation on contextual factors 
is divided into four sections. The first section below contains the findings on the basic 
code ‘demographics and job description’ from the interviews and documents.
4.3.1 Demographics and job descriptions
The first cluster of codes contains mostly basic information about project partici­
pants’ job descriptions, project roles, and some demographic data. This will be pre­
sented before relating attention to the content of the first thematic category ‘UK is doing 
fine’.
The core groups permanently located at the UK subsidiary’s headquarters and 
relevant to the SAP implementation are accounting, customer service, and IT (see Ap­
pendix B). Accounting consists of two employees (and an external controller) taking 
care of the all the regular accounting duties, such as payroll and purchase ledger super­
vision and reporting debtor days and customers’ cash situations. The unit is headed by 
Paul Samuelson, the financial controller, who reports directly to John McGregor, the 
managing director. The customer service unit comprises six employees (plus two that
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joined on a part-time basis after the change). Each employee, or customer service repre­
sentative, is responsible for a certain sales segment or product returns, and acts as a con­
tact for customer queries, which are mostly done by telephone. The customer service 
group is headed by Kevin Franks, the operations manager, who reports to John 
McGregor. This side of the business in combination with the operation of the warehouse 
used to be led by a superordinate general manager, Hugh Prescott, whose function was 
removed as a consequence of the change project (this will be elaborated later). At the 
time of the research study, information technology at R&P UK is represented only by 
Robert Walsh, who reports to John McGregor. The unit previously consisted of four 
employees and Mr. Walsh as manager, but was reduced to one employee as a result of 
the change. In the ensuing months this single employee, Alice Farnsworth, was trans­
ferred to the retail section, leaving Robert Walsh to represent the IT department on his 
own. IT in the UK today deals mainly with hardware maintenance, network connec­
tions, and problems with office applications. All SAP control and maintenance is done 
from German headquarters.
The British subsidiary has several divisional and functional contacts at headquar­
ters in Germany. It is essentially allocated to the logistics section of the company’s ta­
bleware division. Headed by Heinz Berwanger, who is organizationally located directly 
underneath the company board, the logistics section comprises all storage, distribution, 
and customer service functions worldwide. Subordinate to Heinz Berwanger, Manfred 
Becker leads the worldwide customer service function and employs Sabine Fischer as 
his regional customer service manager for the subsidiaries in the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and South America. Regarding the IT component 
of the project, Peter Schmitdbauer is the manager in charge at headquarters. IT in Ger­
many is organized in a matrix structure, where Mr. Schmitdbauer is the head of retail 
applications functionally and head of IT for the tableware division sectionally. The four 
German managers initiated the change project and supervised its execution.
Rousseau & Paul as a company experiences relatively low personnel turnover. 
This is indicated by the average length of tenure for the project participants being 14.6 
years. Project participants’ age range spans from 33 to 59, with a mean of 47 years. 
Managerial roles in England and Germany are exclusively male dominated, and hierar­
chical levels are emphasized in organigrams, job descriptions, and perpetuated in pro­
ject roles.
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UK is doing fine
The UK subsidiary accounts for about 5 percent of company-wide sales and was 
very profitable at the time of the research study. Britain is the third-biggest European 
market of the company, behind the core markets in Germany and France. Despite a gen­
eral economic slowdown in Europe following the burst of the internet stock market 
bubble in late 2000 and the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the British subsidiary 
has maintained its profitability and slowly expands its market share. This growth stands 
in stark contrast to Rousseau & Paul’s other national markets, namely France and Ger­
many, where the recent record of economic indicators was not quite as favorable.
“We made money. When R&P first bought us we lost money, and as the 
years went on under John McGregor's guidance, we made profits, we re­
turned money to Germany, and that was quite important. And we did that be­
cause we liked what we did, we pushed forward, we challenged.” (Hugh 
Prescott)
“Profitability, uh, we make the highest profitability at the local level o f any 
of the subsidiaries, in consolidated profitability I'm not quite sure where our 
ranking is, but we're one of the major markets in terms of consolidated con­
tribution.” (John McGregor)
“We've grown the business virtually every year since R&P bought it out, we 
feel we're doing a good job.” (Kevin Franks)
The profits contribution of the British subsidiary to R&P’s balance sheet was em­
phasised on numerous occasions by UK managers. Profitability as the main measure of 
successful operations is not only a source of pride, but is displayed as an indicator of 
commitment to one’s job and to the company as a whole. It is interesting to note that 
expressions of commitment were usually not confined to one’s own performance, but 
related to all the staff in the subsidiary. Taking the job seriously and serving the com­
pany to one’s best ability is a pervading theme in the juxtaposition of British operations 
and German headquarters. As the research study in the eyes of UK managers was initi­
ated in Germany and in part re-evaluated past project performance at the subsidiary, 
highlighting the quality of the British effort might be understood as a protection reflex. 
The quoted facts and figures were used to indicate to the researcher that the project was 
indeed a success, and that this success is linked directly to managerial performance and 
commitment.
The absence of comments by UK employees and German managers in this the­
matic realm reflects on the power positions in the organizational hierarchy, and the role 
behavior of respondents. To the German management as the authorizing change agent,
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this project is one in a series of similar implementations that is prescribed and executed 
according to a previously tested itinerary. Since prior implementations have been ac­
complished satisfactorily, it can be anticipated, even at this early stage of the result 
presentation, that success for the present project from the headquarters’ perspective is 
defined almost entirely as acceptance or non-acceptance on behalf of the change recipi­
ents. UK employees, at the bottom end of the hierarchy, might not have understood their 
position in the project as critically appraised or challenged, because they perceive them­
selves as passive recipients who cannot be held accountable for a change they hold no 
responsibility for. Their job role might not encourage proactive appraisal of organiza­
tion-wide issues, and confines them to compliantly accept predetermined measures. As 
a result, the reconstruction of the change project does not induce employees to highlight 
their commitment. In contrast, UK managers are change agents and recipients at the 
same time, and are held directly accountable for project outcomes. They are responsible 
for executing directives from headquarters and adapting them to local requirements, 
while catering for their employees’ needs and abilities. Safeguarding their accomplish­
ments and legitimacy in the light of retrospective enquiry and evaluation by highlighting 
commitment is understandable given the outlined rationale.
At this early stage in the presentation of data contents, the deduced explanations 
for the motives behind responses must appear speculative. Yet, meaning-laden re­
sponses are hard to discuss out of context, and as a result some produced conclusions 
might anticipate findings presented in later sections. Such concluding in advance is kept 
to a minimum and will naturally decrease as the entire results structure becomes more 
complete.
4.3.2 Organizational relations
Decreased independence
The British subsidiary traditionally held a very independent position within Rous­
seau & Paul before the change. Due to a mix of geographic distance, a different lan­
guage, and different business customs R&P UK was always perceived as a more or less 
autonomously operating unit within the organization. The reasons for this lie mainly in 
the history of R&P UK as a formerly separate company (named Perevia, acquired by
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R&P in 1987). Moreover, it is despite the facts that, as one German executive pointed 
out, Berlin is further away from headquarters than London, and many other European 
units speak languages other than German as well, but are much more integrated.
“England has, I believe, a very special role in our company, one which I 
never really understand 100 percent, but that’s how it is.“ (Peter 
Schmitdbauer)26
“I think there is definitely a viewpoint in Germany that we like to do things 
our own way and that this can cause problems, but I thinks that's always been 
the case, [...]. I’d been used to working for an independent company, and I 
think there is a bit o f a hangover, even though it’s 16, 17 years ago, there is 
still a bit of a hangover with that.” (Kevin Franks)
As the UK subsidiary operated in accordance with the same company-wide prin­
ciples of management and operation, which were recognized on both sides of the British 
Channel, the named independence seems to have existed more in respondents’ percep­
tions than as an actual fact. However, several respondents highlighted the differences 
between headquarters and subsidiary. Such differences were mostly confined to issues 
within R&P and only sporadically attributed to differing national cultures. Despite one 
respondent’s belief that the way business is done in the UK has a stronger resemblance 
to customs in the United States, the vast majority of British respondents understood 
Europe as their point of orientation in terms of business culture. Yet, especially on the 
British side an impression that headquarters did not sufficiently appreciate local idio­
syncrasies was voiced.
“It is probably a preconception which is unjustified but nonetheless existed 
that our experience with the head office of the company tended to indicate 
that they took less notice than we believe they should have of the local condi­
tions which existed in a foreign subsidiary, which is of course what we are.”
(Robert Walsh)
“We feel we know the business better than they know it in Germany, the UK 
business I'm talking about. So that does cause conflict at times, but don't 
think it's got any worse, I think it's always been, and it probably will always 
be there.” (Kevin Franks)
In contrast, the German side did not perceive cultural or operational differences a
major factor. It was rather pointed out that the UK subsidiary’s perceived independence
created some friction, albeit nothing insurmountable. German managers stressed that
they operate in an international environment on a daily basis, which instills awareness
about regional individuality, but at the same time fosters a boundary spanning company
26 All quotes by German respondents appearing in this and other sections have been translated by the re­
searcher.
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culture. As a lesson from similar earlier projects, the importance of personal exchanges 
and visits was highlighted, especially since a stronger hierarchical structure was felt at 
R&P UK by the German management.
“[Differences exist] on questions of, how decisions are set up, how is the hi­
erarchical integration, or how does the organization live the hierarchy. This 
can be very different. Uh, you have to think about these things in advance 
and say, how do these people function, and after that you can design certain 
processes, and that is, die English work very hierarchy-driven and very hier­
archy-prone. [...] We work considerably more in a team here.” (Heinz Ber­
wanger)
This hierarchical rigidity at the subsidiary led to some irritation on the German 
side, because even miniscule issues often required the presence of the entire project 
management for any decision to be legitimized. To illustrate the hierarchy issue, one 
German manager provided an anecdote about his first visit to the UK site, where he was 
not invited to walk up to the first floor of the premises because this was allegedly re­
served for executives only.
In sum, there was an underlying theme shared among all respondents that the Brit­
ish subsidiary was somewhat more unique and autonomous than other European units, 
and that cultural and operational differences have to be taken into account during the 
project planning and implementation.
Given the above discussion about the standing of the British subsidiary within the 
company, the system integration during the change project fundamentally reduced any 
amount of factual or perceived autonomy in the UK, because it tied the British opera­
tions closely to those of the German headquarters in two ways. The implementation of 
the enterprise resource planning software SAP R/3 integrated the subsidiary into the IT 
architecture of the rest of the European operations. SAP is administered and maintained 
at headquarters and connects the company’s units in real time. Above and beyond a 
harmonization of software applications, this implies a significant control function, be­
cause the system allows for a greater transparency of task executions. Any operation on 
the system, such as order placement, product returns, and money transfers, can be di­
rectly monitored, recorded, and traced back to a specific employee within the entire 
company network. In addition, changes or amendments to the system require adminis­
trator privileges and are restricted to be done exclusively at headquarters. The second 
reduction of independence stems from the closure of the local warehouse facilities and 
the introduction of a centralized distribution of goods. Customer orders are now entered
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into the system, which sends them to the main European warehouse in Germany, from 
which ordered goods are shipped directly to the ordering customer site. Instead of hold­
ing a large amount of products in stock, the UK subsidiary essentially turned into a sales 
office with an attached accounting unit as a result of the project. The two changes com­
bined brought about not only an alteration of operational procedures, but also a trim­
ming of local decision authority. This was felt sorely by UK management.
“The shift o f control has moved into Germany. The freedom of decision, the 
freedom of innovation has been taken from R&P UK. If you ask me what the 
biggest problem, the biggest downside of what they did to the UK business 
was, it was they removed from us our own individuality. They removed from 
us the innovation we liked, and we became more of a copying machine [...]
Did Germany want someone to be so individually in control? They wanted 
individuality out.” (Hugh Prescott)
British managers critically commented on the undermining of their authority due 
to the system integration. Figuratively speaking, the UK operations were put on a 
shorter leash, and the instantaneous transparency of internal everyday actions caused 
performance to be externally observable. The decline of autonomy was naturally felt 
strongest in the IT department, which will be discussed later. In summary, the UK man­
agement expressed concern about a development that reduced their self-determination 
and changed the nature of the UK operations from a fairly independent business to a 
monitored agency.
The perception of decreased independence is actually shared by German man­
agement. Respondents in this group are well aware of the transparency function of the 
new system and the connotations of the now centralized distribution.
“[There was] reservation about the transparency of data as such, yes, which 
took certain liberties, mainly of course certain independences, where you can 
do something yourself, away from them.” (Manfred Becker)
“I mean, it is clear that up to the point of the warehouse closure, they were 
their own masters, they had their warehouse and could operate that, distribute 
quantities, however they liked. Now they are bound to a central system, and 
could no longer decide about stock in the warehouse, but had to subordinate 
themselves to a degree.” (Sabine Fischer)
Acknowledging the consequences of the change to their British colleagues did not 
lead to a dispute of the introduced measures, however, but to the assumption that this is 
something the UK subsidiary would have to arrange itself with, as it is in the interest of 
the entire company.
Interestingly, UK employees to a large extent did not share their local manage­
ment’s concerns, but instead highlighted some advantages of the system integration for
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their daily procedures. It was noted especially in the customer service that employees 
now felt more as being a part of a big operation than an isolated unit. If mistakes are 
made, the new system provides an additional layer of control to fall back upon. More­
over, SAP appears to make more information, such as stock holdings and production 
planning, available for the order process. The new system also takes the control of the 
order process away from the immediate environment to a more distant supervision. This 
latter point, however, was often connected to the same kind of concerns about the possi­
bility of being closely monitored and the lack of control over the system’s administra­
tion and maintenance that were expressed by UK managers. Overall, UK employees 
seemed to hold a somewhat more balanced view about the consequences of the system 
integration.
Centralized organization
The two parts of the change project, the new computer system and the introduced 
distribution logistics, resulted in a significant shift of control to headquarters in Ger­
many. Not only is the implemented SAP software as the central nervous system of the 
company authorized and maintained by the central IT department, but the physical sup­
ply of goods to customers is now also executed by the central logistics department. This 
latter aspect detaches the UK subsidiary from any contact with the products of the com­
pany, except for a few product returns that pass through the local premises, and the ad­
jacent factory outlet store. The customer service department is still the point of contact 
between R&P and its customers in the UK, but ordering, shipment and delivery, and 
production are either electronically integrated or are carried out by the main organiza­
tion. Therefore, as a result of the change, R&P UK was rendered with significantly less 
decision authority over core processes, which were now centralized at headquarters.
The decrease in decision authority is reflected in the decision making process that 
led to the change project itself. Both decisions, to implement SAP and to switch distri­
bution to the centralized warehouse, were made at headquarters, before consultation 
with the British management team. Since the change in Britain was the fourth project in 
a series of similar efforts with other national subsidiaries, German management did not 
see an urgent reason to integrate their local counterparts in the decision making process.
Interviewer: “But the decision for the project was basically made here?”
Heinz Berwanger: “Yes.”
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Interviewer: „It wasn’t asked somehow in a meeting ‘Do you want this?’ or 
‘Should we discuss this again?’? That was done here [at headquarters] al­
ready?”
Heinz Berwanger: “That was done here already.”
“It was a done deal, well, I mean as far as, well, the SAP part was a done 
deal, the distribution change was a discussion initially rather than, you know, 
this is going to happen and you've got to sign onto it. There was quite a lot of 
discussion about, would it be feasible, would it make sense from our point of 
view, and we worked through that and we did come to the conclusion that it 
was the right thing to do. SAP was a done deal, and there is no question about 
that.” (John McGregor)
“We consciously chose a harmonization approach there, o f course, and har­
monization with England, we know this from many areas, is not so easy. In­
deed. [...] Had we done this any other way, had we said we’d put this as a 
separate company into the retail system and they’d have their own ware­
house, then I’m sure that all our English proficiency, our diplomacy, and 
whatever else would certainly not have been enough to truly find the best 
way of harmonization. I’m sure about that.” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
There is obviously a synergy effect in the combination of the two parts of the 
change, which will be discussed later. It is interesting to note above that the British re­
spondent recalls a negotiation process for the warehouse issue, while both German re­
spondents do not. In retrospect it is difficult to reconstruct the sincerity of the German 
side in the negotiation process about the warehouse closure. Overtly putting the ware­
house closure under consideration, without any real intent to change a foregone conclu­
sion, might also have been a tactic to ease anticipated resistance in the negotiation proc­
ess. Another interesting observation in this topic area is the fact that UK employees 
were not involved in any consultation process either. While UK managers resented the 
disregard from headquarters for their opinion or expertise in deciding about the change, 
they themselves seem to have neglected their employees’ proficiencies and insights in 
just the same manner.
“This was a fait accompli.[...] The one thing they missed out was discussing 
what their future plans were in an earlier stage with John McGregor, [...]
And that they didn't do, they took an autocratic decision, in Germany, what 
we're going to do, and consulted no one outside. They thought they knew bet­
ter.” (Hugh Prescott)
“We were just told that, there was no discussion at all, and not at my level 
anyway, they [UK management] just said this is what R&P decided to do.”
(Alice Farnsworth)
It could be argued that since UK management itself was essentially ordered to 
comply with prescribed measures, there was no scope for employees’ opinions, and the 
fait accompli was simply passed on to the British employees. But even if there was no
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possibility of changing a directive from headquarters, the style of presenting the deci­
sion to UK employees was just as autocratic. Moreover, daily activities at the subsidiary 
are still overseen by the local management, and rely on the proactive involvement of 
local employees. In sum, centralized, non-participative decision-making seems to be a 
characteristic of R&P’s organizational culture that spans across national units.
The normative power of the factual
This thematic category was extracted from the project documentation and corre­
sponds to the three codes retained from the organizational relations cluster in the inter­
view analysis. Apart from conceptual aspects of the system integration and the provi­
sion of support from headquarters, the recommendation is elaborated to implement SAP 
and centralize distribution. Relating to the decision making process, the recommenda­
tion stems from the first presentation of the change plans to the British managers by a 
team from headquarters.
This presentation holds a central role not only within the document data, but also 
for the shaping of project dynamics and perceptions of the change recipients. Some 
German managers in the interviews emphasized that the decision to go ahead with the 
change was put up for discussion in the first meeting. In contrast to their assurances and 
the careful use of the term ‘recommendation’, the document reveals more than just an 
optimistic intention to alter the British subsidiary. The normative power of the factual is 
engineered by the inclusion of an organigram of the project management and a detailed 
time plan for the execution of the project. Once such facts had been created the direction 
of the discussion must have been predetermined, leading change recipients to perceive 
the decision as a fait accompli. In conclusion, this document corroborates the cautious 
statement by the most senior manager from headquarters in the project that the decision 
was made before the first meeting, and it invalidates other German managers’ assertion 
that this was not so.
4.3.3 The project
A change prescribed from headquarters
The announcement o f the upcoming change project caused concerns to emerge 
among the British participants, whether the prescribed measures would work out under 
the particular circumstances of the British subsidiary. Such concerns were related to the
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two aspects of the change, specifically whether the SAP system would be configured to 
serve local needs and whether a distribution process from a central warehouse far away 
from the British market would be sustainable and could be performed reliably. Espe­
cially the shipment process was liable to a definite objective, as British customers are 
guaranteed to receive a delivery within 11 working days from the time of the order in­
put. Used to a large local warehouse operation and being the point of contact for cus­
tomer complaints, UK employees were very skeptical about the feasibility of the new 
delivery procedures.
“And there was a point of concern, when, I guess just about two years ago, I 
had felt we hadn't yet received enough information about SAP and how it 
would actually implement, and I was being provoked by our auditors who 
were saying, we hear that you're going on SAP, have you had manuals, have 
you had information, have you had an input into this, because it's a very un­
forgiving system, it's a very good system, but once it's set up it's very unfor­
giving.” (John McGregor)
“I was obviously concerned as to how it would work because we couldn't get 
china from here to our customer in one piece, so the thing was how it was go­
ing to get from Germany to our customers in one piece.” (Rose Browning)
Concerns on the German side did not involve information policy or communica­
tion efforts, but centered on the smooth management of the project planning itself and 
on procedural aspects of the change. After all, the simple fact that, with the centralized 
distribution, goods need to be transported across or under a stretch of ocean to reach the 
British market posed some logistical problems. Issues such as recipients’ acceptance or 
other somewhat more behavioral factors were not part of the agenda at headquarters.
The British unease with the announced change measures was also fueled by recol­
lections of similar earlier changes at continental European subsidiaries, namely Austria, 
Switzerland, and France. This unease was substantiated by the fact that headquarters 
explicitly structured the UK project based on those earlier implementation experiences. 
Especially the efforts at the French subsidiary were used as a guiding principle for how 
to proceed in the UK.
“We had said these are the experiences with Austria, Switzerland, and 
France, it will be somewhat similar, and our time horizon is largely deter­
mined. If we then say the situation in England is somewhat comparable, let’s 
say specifically with France, yes, because you have to fiddle with other de­
livery contractors, that is somehow a totally different mentality, and so on.
Austria and Switzerland were mentality-wise much closer. We realized that 
during the France project. Now, if you’re dealing with the English, you’ll 
have certain difficulties to use France as a role model, but we managed to do 
this.” (Manfred Becker)
187
Results
The French project, however, was reconstructed by British management as a par­
ticularly negative example of autocratic decision making, unexpected consequences, 
and lack of local participation. Whether this impression is fact-based was not verifiable 
and goes beyond the scope of the present case study, but it sufficed to further raise con­
cerns about the feasibility of the change and the adequacy of its planning strategy.
“I believe, it wasn't quite as smooth in France, is what I heard, the transition, 
and both things happened there, closure of the warehouse, movement onto 
SAP, and I was told it wasn't so smooth.” (John McGregor)
“And the closure of France was not the most harmonious closure, it was not 
greeted well by the French people because it wasn't embraced well by the 
French management, and the method of distribution and the control of the fi­
nances were taken away from the French office and it was having some really 
bad effects on the customer relations, on the credit control side.” (Hugh Pres­
cott)
Hence, the prior implementations did not instill the British side with confidence 
that the proposed measures were pre-tested and well functioning. Instead, they rather 
strengthened the perception that what was to come would be a generic change concept 
uniformly rolled out across national units.
Once the decision to go ahead with the change was introduced, the German man­
agement provided an itinerary for the project, which was based on the plans of the ear­
lier projects in other subsidiaries. Monthly meetings between both management teams 
were arranged and conducted mostly on the British premises. These meetings followed 
a precise project management agenda and participants matter-of-factly processed a set 
catalogue of issues. Given topics were discussed and finalized by assigning tasks to par­
ticipants and setting dates for the delivery of those tasks. The economical recycling of 
tested project plans, however, led to complaints on the British side. The argument was 
that a generic solution would be imposed on a unique environment. This relates back to 
the discussion on the British subsidiary’s apparent independence, or the decrease thereof 
as a result of the initiated changes. In addition, the used planning approach, regardless 
of how many times it had been previously applied, was actually interpreted by some as a 
lack of planning for the local circumstances.
“The problem that we really encountered was, the lack of planning and 
thought that Germany exercised during the whole operation, [...]. Something 
as complex as closing a warehouse and installing a totally global computer 
system would have needed to have unfortunately a lot o f time and energy 
spent in meeting stages to discuss information and detail down to, and stop 
at, the individual tick boxes. It didn't seem that it was enough to get to that
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point, it kind of got to here, and the rest o f it became detail, and it wasn't de­
tail, some of it was very relevant. And they weren't prepared for it.” (Hugh 
Prescott)
In their reconstruction of the project, the German management revealed that in the 
original European strategic plan on centralization and integration that was devised by a 
management consultancy the UK market and subsidiary was not included. Reasons for 
this were the geographic distance, the added complexity of having to cross the British 
Channel, and the comparative autonomy of the local organization. But after three suc­
cessful integration and centralization projects on the European mainland, German man­
agement felt adequately confident to tackle the British market. The time frame after the 
initial decision to go ahead was set for a 9-month duration, from June 2001 to the be­
ginning of February 2002. In retrospect, one German manager concludes that such a
long time frame was not entirely necessary, since a substantial amount of synergy could 
be created by relying on prior experiences. Answers regarding the required time frame 
were, however, somewhat contradictory amongst German managers, because some also 
argued that, given the friction and discontent experienced by their British colleagues, 
more time, especially personal meetings, would have been better. Others remarked that 
the entire process was very much concentrated on eight weeks in the summer of 2001 
and six weeks prior to actual system change.
“This shows me essentially that we, uh, for these talks should have invested 
substantially more in the preparation, and that we’d rather do a meeting too 
many than too few, especially on site. That’s certainly, well, I believe we 
were there six times, six days in total by the actual key project team, not 
more, that’s certainly not much. [...] So, being more at the actual site would 
have probably fostered the harmonization process in people’s heads stronger.
Indeed.” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
A difficult project
In their reconstruction of the project, respondents treat the two parts of the change 
largely as separate events. The chronological co-occurrence was endorsed, however, by 
a stringent rationale of the two parts of the change being notably interdependent. To be 
more precise, SAP could have been implemented without a closure of the local ware­
house, but the closure and subsequent centralized distribution could not have happened 
without SAP. Only an integrated, real-time IT architecture enabled the complex logis­
tics behind a centralized distribution system.
“If SAP hadn't come in and hadn't enabled the sort o f mega-warehouse opera­
tion, which exists in Mitterwald at the moment, then almost certainly we 
would have continued to have a warehouse here.” (Robert Walsh)
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“We didn’t o f course just hop onto an SAP conversion in a slapdash manner, 
but there was this Logistics-IT roadmap for the general worldwide harmoni­
zation of all IT solutions. [...] This went hand-in-hand between logistics and 
IT measures” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
The British warehouse could have been kept open, but since the SAP implementa­
tion required a complete new setup of an extensive software package, this setup would 
essentially have to be repeated should the organization later decide to switch to a cen­
tralized distribution. Hence, the combination of the two parts of the change created po­
tential for synergy effects. This rationalization was also very persuasive for people at 
the UK subsidiary, who could in principle have objected to a double change effort at the 
same time. Nevertheless, despite the anticipated synergies, the rationale still dictated 
two changes at once.
The decisions to implement a new computer system and at the same time close the 
local warehouse and switch to a centralized distribution required extensive adaptive ca­
pabilities from participants. Not only was the change substantial to business processes 
and operations, but also it essentially altered the identity and purpose of the subsidiary, 
which is now entirely a sales unit.
“So therefore there was a big change in the operation of the whole unit here 
because suddenly from having a warehouse with how many people in a work 
unit and deliveries coming in from Germany and going out to shops and our 
different customers, we moved to the very much clearing up, clearing, storing 
type of operation which is going on there now. That was a pretty dramatic 
change to be going on in the background while all this [the software imple­
mentation] was happening.” (Robert Walsh)
“We dismantled the warehouse, we introduced a completely new software for 
all areas, except the retail, and went live on one day with a big bang, except 
for accounting. So this indeed was a larger project.” (Heinz Berwanger)
Preceding the ‘big bang’ day of conversion, an interim phase was launched during 
which the stock intake for the local warehouse was gradually faded out. More and more 
orders were sent directly to the central warehouse, which at the time was a cumbersome 
process, since the SAP order system had not yet been installed, therefore requiring de­
tailed handwritten orders to be sent via land mail to Germany. At the same time, a com­
prehensive data migration operation was undertaken to move electronic information 
onto the SAP system. An initial focus on customer information, such as delivery ad­
dresses, balance fees, and orders, revealed inconsistencies in the customer data file, 
which in turn necessitated a considerable overhaul of the specific data material. A simi­
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lar update became necessary for product information. The interim phase carried on, al­
beit unofficially, until two to three months after the conversion day, because the data 
migration was partially incomplete and employees had to utilize the old computer sys­
tem for reference. Juggling the system implementation and at the same time continuing 
daily operations at no reduced pace proved difficult for employees and demanded sub­
stantial extra effort.
“We weren't given an advance, we weren't given like 2 to 3 months training 
in advance, we were literally flowing right into the new system, live.”
(Dheepa Naidoo)
“It was a strain I would say for everybody for the first month, because, it 
would have been different if they had shut the office for 2 hours a day, 3 
hours a day so, but it wasn't, the office was open from 9 to 5:30 as usual.”
(Jane Adams)
To assists the switch and respond to any upcoming problems, a member of the 
German IT department was on site for four days immediately after the conversion on 1 
February. In contrast to their British counterparts, the German management emphasized 
the importance of thorough preparation as the key to a successful transition. The details 
of the transitional process were perceived as being the responsibility of the local crew. 
Any critical issues were discussed in the planning meetings and support was provided 
for the conversion period, as mentioned above, but other than that there was no interfer­
ence, or further assistance, from headquarters.
An integral part of managing the transition was the handling of necessary redun­
dancies. As soon as the decision for the change was announced, it became clear that at 
least most employees in the UK warehouse would have to be laid off. This posed an 
immediate problem to continuous operations at the subsidiary, since R&P UK would be 
dependent on warehouse workers throughout the pre-change period up until the actual 
official date of conversion. Hence, an early disclosure of bad news would be expected to 
tremendously damage morale and loyalty. On the other hand, labor law and fair treat­
ment dictated the informing of employees as soon as possible. The pivotal figure regard­
ing this aspect of the change was Hugh Prescott, who was in charge of the warehouse 
operations as general manager, but who, at the same time, would also lose his job as a 
consequence of the closure. Before the change, Prescott was directly superior to Kevin 
Franks, the former being responsible for all operations of the subsidiary, including the 
warehouse, the latter being more immediately in charge of customer service and sales
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forecasting. With the warehouse gone and R&P UK transformed into mainly a sales op­
eration, it became apparent that the higher paid storage and operations supervision posi­
tion would become largely obsolete, while the forecasting and customer service position 
became more central to the business. Kevin Franks, in consequence, received a promo­
tion through the change, and an expanded job description. Hugh Prescott was forced to 
retire.
“Most people before the news was announced would have said that R&P 
never worked without Hugh. Every nut and bolt in the place had my name on 
it. I was part of, I was almost, in my opinion, I was almost the heart o f the 
machine, everything passed through me, whether it was my responsibility or 
not. [...]. [After the announcement of my dismissal], emotionally afterwards 
when I went home, no, it was quite dramatic.” (Hugh Prescott)
From a planning and management perspective, it was crucial to have Hugh Pres­
cott oversee the closure of the warehouse with a sufficient degree of loyalty to the com­
pany, given the effects the change would have on his own position. The warehouse op­
erations were to be faded out in a controlled and gradual process, requiring the particu­
lar workforce to be adequately committed to fulfilling their assigned tasks.
“He [Hugh Prescott] was instrumental actually in the success with which we 
made this transition without damaging the morale too much of the employees 
in the company, because there was a big danger that we would damage mo­
rale.” (John McGregor)
“Can I say that we're talking about May, beginning of June [when the change 
was announced]. I didn't go until the end of April, that's nine months of a 
death sentence. At the end of nine months the strongest people break. I don't 
think I broke but I did my job, and for the latter part I am honest enough to 
say that for the latter part all I did in the end was my job. I no longer opened 
myself up to say 'What is the greater picture?'. No, I said this is my job and if 
I saw something happening I thought Not my problem', and I had to take that 
attitude because I couldn't take the problems to my grave, I had enough.”
(Hugh Prescott)
As indicated, a successful transition towards a centralized distribution system not 
only depended on the dedication of the general manager, but also on the cooperation of 
the warehouse staff. After a few days’ deliberation on the extent of the change plan laid 
out by the German management team in the initial meeting in May 2001, UK managers 
called in their warehouse employees one by one to describe to them future develop­
ments and the termination of their contract due to the upcoming closure. Severance 
packages were arranged that would include a bonus payment if an employee stayed 
with the company the entire time of the transition. This form of bribery, as one manager 
called it, was crucial to ensure smooth operations throughout the important and de­
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manding Christmas period towards the end of the year, and for packing up the remain­
ing stock to go back to Germany by the end of January 2002. UK managers unani­
mously highlighted their successful transformation management through being open to 
employees’ questions, telling people early on about upcoming developments, and pro­
viding incentives for loyalty and commitment. Having managed to retain the majority 
of the warehouse employees until the final closure appears to be a proof of success of 
their efforts.
“But we could demonstrate to the whole company that there wasn't a single 
person in the warehouse who felt that they were being treated badly in their 
severance, so we had to have an agreement with them privately, which was 
extremely confidential, whereas we had to let it be known that the principles 
involved were ones that were extremely favorable to those people, so we 
were actually looking after our staff and fighting for their rights as well as 
accepting what the company needs to achieve. And that was an extremely 
delicate balancing act; we were very good at that.” (Hugh Prescott)
In addition to the warehouse layoffs, UK managers also anticipated a detrimental 
effect for the customer service and accounting functions in terms of staffing numbers. 
The change would not only shrink the size of the UK offices in total, but also integrate 
local operations with those at headquarters. This might function as an initiator for fur­
ther centralization and, in turn, enable further reduction of local functions and staff.
“We realized at that time that most o f the people who were currently working 
at the warehouse would be losing their jobs. Uh, there was also a bit of a 
knock-on effect that there would be people within the offices who would 
probably lose their jobs because as certain parts of the work were taken over 
in Germany, you would not need as many people in the offices as here.”
(Kevin Franks)
The effects on the customer service and accounting departments were, however, 
not clear at the onset of the change. Any potential for certain service or accounting func­
tions to be performed in Germany would be dependent largely on knowledge and regu­
lations involved and not so much on the capabilities of the integrated computer system. 
Nevertheless, the dismissal of the warehouse personnel did affect the remaining em­
ployees’ morale and emotional solidarity, issues that will be discussed in more detail in 
later sections and relate to such codes as ‘anxiety’, ‘uncertainty’, and ‘resistance’.
“Obviously, when the warehouse closed down, all the guys in there we'd been 
working with for many years, they had to go, they were made redundant.
Some of them were quite old, particularly if  you're in your late fifties, early 
sixties; it's not that easy to get another job. I think they were well looked af­
ter, I'm not saying that, but it was pretty sad, and some of them were devas­
tated actually. [...] You know, it's not a very big operation here, so you did 
know everybody, and you did know their wives and their children or the
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names of the children at least, you know, all the things, and you did become 
emotionally involved.” (Christine Peters)
“The only thing it seems obviously, I don't think it did much for the morale 
downstairs, because they had a lot of friends outside [in the warehouse] 
who'd worked here for years and years and years, it was a big chunk of staff 
to lose.” (Alice Farnsworth)
A much clearer and more immediate effect did the change have on the IT depart­
ment of the subsidiary, which will be discussed below. In sum, the redundancies as the 
most tangible and for many quite painful aspect of the change had a prominent effect on 
the UK subsidiary. They were a highly salient indicator not only for a substantial de­
crease in size of the subsidiary’s main offices, but also of the alteration of its operational 
purpose towards becoming a sales office. Moreover, the redundancies distinctly affected 
the confidence of the remaining workforce, which will be shown to be pessimistic as a 
result.
Although not removed completely, the information technology department at the 
UK subsidiary was most severely affected by the ramifications of the change project, 
namely the system integration with German headquarters. At one point employing 14 
people, the unit still consisted of three employees and a manager at the time of the an­
nouncement of the change. Today the manager, Robert Walsh, is the sole remaining IT 
representative. Mainly with the assistance of Alice Farnsworth, Walsh used to be re­
sponsible for the maintenance of the former MACH computer system, of the online 
connection with headquarters, and of any software or hardware issues related to local 
operations. With most of modem office work being computer-based, the IT department 
had therefore been central to the performance of the UK subsidiary. As a result of the 
SAP implementation, however, the old MACH system was abandoned, local servers 
were removed to Germany, and essentially all maintenance and software related func­
tions migrated to headquarters. Alice Farnsworth, although at times helping out on IT 
tasks, was transferred to a new position in the retail unit. Robert Walsh’s job role sub­
stantially decreased, and his altered job description now centers on hardware issues and 
communication with the central IT administration in Germany.
“My department has probably gone through most, I was going to say the most 
radical change, [...] a lot of that administration, much to our surprise, moved 
over to Germany. Uh, we still find that strange and a little frustrating.”
(Robert Walsh)
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“My job's gone totally basically. [...] At least we terminated the work down 
there. There is none.” (Alice Farnsworth)
Robert Walsh himself expresses general frustration, but is careful to not be too 
specific. His colleagues more directly criticize the lack of local authority over an IT ar­
chitecture that now constitutes the central nervous system of all their operations, and the 
diminishment of Walsh’s role.
“And that's the one criticism I would have of SAP, well not SAP but the way 
that we've structured it. I have an IT manager here, Robert Walsh, who used 
to have a department, which we've now basically got rid of because there isn't 
the same need, nevertheless Robert is a competent person, and from time to 
time we need to make changes to things, [...] and we don't have access, we 
don't have local access, which I think is wrong basically, so we have to apply 
to Germany. And then somebody there puts our request on the end of their 
list and several days or weeks later this small change is done. And I have 
never understood why we can't have one qualified person with local access.”
(John McGregor)
“He was merely going to be a pawn to put it in, and resolve any issues that 
came out at the hardware front. As far as being an IT manager is concerned, 
you have the great frustration of saying 'I'm no longer a manager, because 
there is nothing for me to manage, all I do is fix keyboards, make a machine 
work. And every time I get a query in SAP I'm the one that sends the email to 
Germany and makes sure they send the answers back’. So yes, he probably 
had extreme frustrations.” (Hugh Prescott)
While German management acknowledges the fact that the British IT department 
has shrunk substantially as an effect of the SAP implementation, they critically assess 
Robert Walsh’s role during the transition and emphasize his alleged lack of cooperation.
“The problem especially in the realm of IT with Robert Walsh was, he totally 
blocked himself to this project, he didn’t accept any arguments that were in 
favor of it. And so was his behavior, and that certainly came up again and 
again in the project teams.” (Heinz Berwanger)
“Of course, he has certainly lost status, and if you ask me, he still hasn’t 
really come to terms with his role.” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
Adding to the detrimental effect of the change on IT in the UK is an expectation 
that the capabilities of the system might easily allow a further concentration of functions 
at headquarters. These developments bear great uncertainty on Robert Walsh’s position 
since they might create further disparity between the original purpose and salary level of 
his job and the now scaled down job description.
“Certainly from Robert's point of view, if  I were him, I would be, I would've 
been worried about my job, because IT is something that they could possibly 
take over completely from Germany. I know he recognized that fact.” (Kevin 
Franks)
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“For Robert Walsh [it was] very, very difficult to lose the good solution that 
the English had made for themselves, and get a relatively general solution 
that wasn’t aligned so much with the specific requirements of the English IT 
landscape, of the English customers, of the English organization. Insofar he 
certainly had some emotional reservations, and certainly some worries that in 
perspective an independent IT landscape with himself as manager is at least 
not vitally required.” (Manfred Becker)
As can be seen, there seems to be a great amount of uncertainty about the future 
role of the IT department at the UK subsidiary and the sole ‘survivor’ who remains to 
embody it at the time of this enquiry. Identified in section 4.2 as the sole change recipi­
ent exhibiting moderate resistance, his actions become more understandable as they are 
embedded in the context of the outlined developments. Together with the warehouse 
closure, the reduction of local IT functions most negatively characterized the change to 
British participants, and signalized a possible future scenario of greater integration, di­
minished local operations and further dependence for the subsidiary. How the project is 
evaluated in hindsight and what expectations respondents have about the future of R&P 
UK will be shown in the next two sections.
Success imperative
The change project at R&P UK was the fourth in a series of similar efforts to syn­
chronize the distribution logistics and IT architecture of the entire company. Two fur­
ther projects are scheduled for the subsidiaries in the United States and Australia. The 
focal project was set up as an adaptation and alignment of local operations with the cen­
tral units of the company, not as an opportunity for ingenuity or the creation of a best- 
case scenario. Hence, there was little room for experimenting or failure. As the objec­
tive was a quick and frictionless change, there was no margin for error and little leeway 
to explore and evaluate. Profound learning and knowledge generation was clearly not a 
priority. As a consequence, participants highlight a relatively smooth transition and the 
seamless continuation of business operations as key indicators of a successful project. 
Anything but reaching the transformation target would have constituted a failure.
German management recognized the success of the project and cited controlling 
figures to prove it. The different language and mentality are listed as the main proce­
dural obstacles. Better relations with the subsidiary through increased personal contact, 
and, of course, a greater proficiency in English are described as side effects.
“I think one indicator that expresses quite directly how it went, we made 
twice as much revenue in February 2002 in the UK market than in February 
2001, [...]. I think this is for me the biggest project success, that we went full 
speed ahead from day one.” (Heinz Berwanger)
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“It was essentially transfer of communication, indeed, uh, we did this from 
here, yes, how do you say, almost in fabric softener mode. For us the chal­
lenge with England was to reasonably understand the language, the mentality, 
the communication, that was the biggest problem. If we had done this in 
Germany, we would have pushed through die project in two months.” (Peter 
Schmitdbauer)
Hence, for the German side this was a confidence-instilling endeavor. No major 
obstacles to cooperation are perceived in retrospect, except for teething problems inher­
ent to any change. The degree of self-assurance might be illustrated by the fact that a 
final project evaluation was neglected on the basis of the justification that everything 
turned out according to plan. It must then be concluded that there was a limited interest 
in feedback from the change recipients, a point that will be discussed in more detail in a 
later section. The project and the change had to turn out successful according to a preset 
agenda.
The judgment that the project was successful is essentially shared by all partici­
pants in Britain. UK managers emphasize their own cooperation with headquarters and 
the collective effort of the subsidiary, which they believe satisfied their superiors. Em­
ployees spend more time elaborating on the hard work involved, but equally label the
project a success.
‘The integration has gone I guess quite well. [...]. Yes, there have been is­
sues and there have been problems and there still are, [...], but nothing that 
we haven't been able to cope with, and I think that's the key thing. The busi­
ness ran all the way through, is still running, the customers did not notice a 
different significantly when we changed from one system to the other, so by 
those kinds of definitions I think it was a success. [...] I mean everyone 
really was trying to make this, everybody bought into it ultimately. You 
know, this is going to happen, let's make a really good job of it, we've got to 
get through a period of change, let's make it happen.” (John McGregor)
“Well, yes, I mean, I wouldn't say it was a smooth transition, you know, be­
cause we were left high and dry really and a lot more people were quite ap­
prehensive, because it was also a working office at the same time as a new 
computer system, so you still had your phone calls and your work to do, as 
well as trying to learn a new computer system.” (Jane Adams)
In hindsight, the change is also construed as an economic necessity, because it 
would save costs in the long run. A fulfillment of the change agenda would therefore 
ensure competitiveness within the particular industry segment. It should also be men­
tioned that in the evaluation of the focal time period, UK managers concede that the 
change did not come entirely unexpected, insofar as there was awareness about earlier 
projects in other subsidiaries. Given the massive warehouse facility in Germany and the 
advent of SAP at the continental organizational units, it was reasonable to expect the
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UK to be on the change agenda as well. Albeit, British managers were not expecting it 
to arrive so soon, but rather three to five years later due to the subsidiary’s autonomy 
and its geographic position.
There are also some critical remarks among evaluations, mainly about those con­
sequences of the change that relate to the earlier description of decreased independence. 
Here, the patent effect on local culture in combination with the autocratic decision­
making at headquarters has left an aftertaste with change recipients.
“I think it's definitely changed the whole culture of the place, it's definitely, I 
mean, it was very much warehouse orientated, the warehouse was probably 
very much the heart of the place, so I think with them going it was a tremen­
dous wrench.” (Rebecca Winterstein)
“The new culture is much more of a commercial organization. The size of 
R&P, it's becoming more centralized, and therefore the freedom is gone.”
(Hugh Prescott)
“I think they developed distrust for future decisions, and people like Paul and 
Robert and John must be sitting around thinking 'why didn't they tell me', 
what's coming next. And if they have that attitude, they've got to be remarka­
bly good people to not let it affect their day-by-day judgment, and there aren't 
many people who can do that. I can't. [...] Globally, R&P should trust its up­
per management to be good at its job” (Hugh Prescott)
Especially the latter two quotes illustrate some side effects of a project with a 
purely technical focus. The influence of participants’ experiences during the change on 
their expectations about the future of the company and their own work is elaborated in 
the next section.
Further layoffs?
On the basis of their recollections of the project and their resulting current situa­
tion, participants were asked to speculate about future developments. Managers in the 
UK reacted with a degree of caution to this question, generally providing unspecific an­
swers or denoting insufficient knowledge to make any prediction. Only Hugh Prescott, 
presumably without the constraints of an existing employment contract on his commen­
tary, explicitly anticipates further integration and centralization, which in turn would in 
his view stifle personal initiative and critical thinking. As a main consequence of such a 
trajectory of minimizing the UK subsidiary, he foresees further layoffs, with especially 
Robert Walsh’s and Paul Samuelson’s jobs becoming obsolete.
While not actively denying the scenario outlined above, German managers do not 
provide a clear indication, of specific future plans concerning the British subsidiary.
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There certainly does not seem to be a roadmap of immediate further alterations, and at­
tention at headquarters is shifted towards conveying the established transformation 
measures to other countries, namely the United States, Australia, and possibly Japan. A 
consensus seems to have been reached to leave the customer service operations in the 
UK, mainly due to culturally formed customer relationship management. However, the 
medium to long-term strategy clearly pursues a target of further integration and centrali­
zation across all units and subsidiaries of the company.
UK employees in contrast are more concrete in sharing the anticipation that the 
subsidiary will shrink further, and that they will be made redundant as a result. The dy­
namics of past developments are understood as an indicator of effects on their own posi­
tions. Especially the capabilities of the new computer system instill profound job inse­
curity.
“I think we're going to be even more computerized, with less staff, I think 
such changes are to come. We're all going to be more computerized.” (Susan 
Parker)
“I foresee that we won't be here in 18 months time, 2 years time. I don't think 
we will be here. They won't need us. They can do it from Germany, have a 
call center in Germany. [...], they have the internet where I think they will 
offer wholesale customers die option to order online and get a bigger dis­
count. So we're not needed. You need a moan center, you know, if someone 
wants to moan, have a complaint, you just need them, and that can be any­
where in the world. So I don't think we'll be here.” (Jane Adams)
This anxiety and uncertainty about the future as a result of the change was probed 
into deeper and will be emphasized in the later section on the awareness of resistance.
The following last thematic category on the nature of the change project stems 
from the analysis of project documentation. Again, the document content is not particu­
larly rich in non-technical information, which explains the brevity of this category.
Procedure according to plan
Four interview codes in relation to aspects of the project itself were retained for 
the document data. One additional code is exclusive to the document content (see Ap­
pendix J and K). The majority of quotations in the project cluster describe operational 
aspects of the change, while only a few contain non-technical information about ‘effi­
ciency’ and the ‘evaluation of the change’. As in the interview data, the efficiency gain 
of integrating a company-wide IT architecture with a centralized distribution was high­
lighted. All nine quotations on this code stem from the first presentation in May 2001.
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Hence, it appears that German management tried to win the support of the subsidiary by 
emphasizing the economic justification for the change project.
There were also a few evaluative statements in the documentation, exclusively 
about the successful completion of planning and preparation stages. This project man­
agement according to the set plan is reflected in the monitoring of progress and formal­
ized to make decisions traceable. It is interesting to note that at the last pre- 
implementation meeting on 29 January 2002 an evaluation meeting was planned for 27 
March 2002. The meeting apparently did not take place, which again indicates that ret­
rospective evaluation was not a priority during or after the project.
The IT department at the subsidiary is only mentioned insofar as its status quo be­
fore the change is described. Any foreseeable effects of the SAP implementation on the 
personnel or focus of activity of IT in the UK are not stated.
The second thematic category on the nature of the project in the documentation is 
‘operational project management’. This category, a central theme for much of the re­
mainder of the document content, was covered in section 4.1.2 as non-essential for the 
current research focus and will hence not receive specific mentioning here.
In order to further contextualize the findings relating to learning and resistance, 
results about the new SAP system that the British subsidiary had to adapt to are pre­
sented in the next section. Following the gradual closure o f the warehouse, the system 
implementation required an unprecedented learning effort and a potential for resistance 
by employees who remained at the subsidiary. However, an understanding of key as­
pects of the system is necessary to fully comprehend its effects on respondents. An ac­
count of respondents’ verbal and formalized remarks in this area will be provided in the 
next four thematic categories.
4.3.4 The new system
Progress
The upgrade to SAP R/3 established a more extensive, quicker, and more reliable 
computer system. The new software brought an improvement to operational efficiency 
and integrated various organizational units. A direct link with headquarters enabled
200
Results
faster throughput, that is, the journey of a product from the factory to the customer. But 
such capabilities also required the system to be increasingly complex to cover a myriad 
of processes within a large organization. While the introduction of SAP certainly had a 
normative function of redefining procedures, the interconnection of different elements 
of R&P’s value chain remained an unsolved problem for some aspects. Hence, the 
widely acknowledged efficiency gain was accomplished through a trade-off for in­
creased complexity.
“It's a monumentally complex system, it is not a particularly good interface, 
not user friendly in many ways, [...]. We'd been told it's a wonderful system, 
and I've no doubt it is, it does many, many, many things better than any sys­
tem that we've got before, [...]. But I was expecting something that is frankly 
easier to operate than it actually is.” (Robert Walsh)
“I have to say the biggest problem with SAP, and it's still the biggest problem 
that we have now is the fact that when we were first told about SAP we were 
told that one of the things it could do was it could tell you when product was 
available if it was out of stock at the time you wanted it. [...], that's a key 
thing, that's one thing the customer wants to know. [...] We were told that 
worked, and it was no problem, and it didn't work, and it still doesn't work 
today.” (Kevin Franks)
UK employees, who have more of a user perspective because of their job tasks, 
more strongly emphasize the improvement that SAP afforded their work. Even though 
there might be room for improvement, the overall reaction to the new system was very 
positive.
“It's much, to me it's a much better system than what we had before.” (Jane 
Adams)
“It's a lot easier. It's a lot, lot easier. [...] But, well, I feel myself there is a lot 
more what I would like SAP to do, for me.” (Dheepa Naidoo)
Using the new system appears to have been fairly challenging at first. Employees 
provide many tales of their initial problems with the functions of SAP, each relating to 
specific job tasks or procedures. However, there is also agreement on a learning curve 
effect relative to the time spent working with the new system. Thus in general the initial 
struggle was mitigated as the familiarity with the system increased.
“I think they [the other employees] saw it, it was something good that was 
happening, but in the back of their mind they thought 'Will I be able to do 
it?'.” (Dheepa Naidoo)
UK managers share this recollection of the first encounters with SAP and ascribe 
most o f the learning effect to on-the-job training.
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The setup of the system to cover all processes and contingencies for a global or­
ganization is illustrated by the fact that the rollout for the British subsidiary was explic­
itly modeled after prior implementations in other national units, namely Austria, Swit­
zerland, and France. As a result, the SAP package had to streamline regional differences 
in culture, language, and operating procedures, and introduce an organization-wide 
standard. It has been described before that participants at the British subsidiary reacted 
with skepticism to this aspect of the change, as the new system perceivably stood for a 
generic approach that did not specifically cater for local conditions. The complexity of 
the system can then partially be ascribed to the global needs it has to serve, while com­
prising a lot of redundancy or functions irrelevant to particular local environments.
The British subsidiary operated on a computer system that became increasingly 
outdated and cumbersome to use by the time the change measures were announced. 
More than ten years old and poorly supported by the original vendor company, the 
MACH system was recognized by managers and employees alike as in need of a sub­
stantial upgrade. For example, MACH could not be operated through a Windows-based 
user interface, requiring input as textual code. Moreover, there was no direct compati­
bility with standard Microsoft Office software such as Excel or Access. Consequently, 
from a user perspective people in the British subsidiary were actually looking forward 
to a proposed system with enhanced functionality, greater capabilities, and improved 
user friendliness.
“The old computer system wasn't very good, and quite cumbersome and 
slow, and, you know at month's end we had to close down for a day, and 
those sort of things which were always very inconvenient.” (Christine Peters)
“MACH was not perfect, it was an old system, it was installed here in 1990 I 
believe, maybe even 1989, probably 1990, so you know it was 11-12 years 
old. [...] it was basically a defunct system, being supported by a company 
that was no longer interested in supporting it. So I mean there were consider­
able concerns about MACH, and I think many people were pleased that we 
were going to be leaving those concerns behind, moving into something 
which hopefully would be a lot better supported.” (John McGregor)
Following the decision to implement SAP, MACH was gradually faded out in 
both the customer service and the accounting department. In the latter especially, a dual 
system was run for three months to ensure complete data migration and smooth process­
ing once MACH was switched off. In sum, users at the British subsidiary agree that de-
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spite the complexity of SAP, the new system was an improvement to the operations at 
R&P UK given the inadequacy and shortcomings of MACH.
Reflecting on the changes to everyday procedures due to the new system, UK em­
ployees also emphasize SAP’s greater functionality and processing speed first of all. At 
the same time, their work is still, of course, computer-based, revolving around the same 
tasks such as order input or the maintenance of customer accounts. Hence, it is more the 
procedural order of completing a task, and the system tools involved in this completion 
that account for the main divergence. Even though there are differing opinions on the 
degree of procedural changes that SAP brought about, largely as a function of individual 
job tasks, some consensus exists on the nature of the change to everyday procedures not 
being revolutionary but rather occurring within the same conceptual framework.
“Uh, the actual day-to-day way of working for most people has not changed 
nearly as dramatically as the view you just expressed SAP would suggest.
Uh, the customer service department does very similar things than the things 
they did before with MACH. After all what we're doing is selling plates basi­
cally, putting orders into the system, making certain peoples’ invoice. The ac­
tual process there is incredibly similar, the way it's done of course is different 
because you got different screens, you got different ways of clearing deliver­
ies through and this sort of thing.” (Robert Walsh)
The essence of the transition to SAP from a user perspective was then to learn 
how to both handle a new tool and the steps in a new routine. One German manager 
pointed out that SAP nevertheless requires many more steps to complete a process, due 
to its increased complexity. On the basis of the results presented so far it might be as­
sumed, however, that the new technology did not radically alter everyday work proce­
dures nor modify existing interactional patterns or organizational structures, as de­
scribed in examples by Billings et al. (1977), Barley (1986), or Burkhardt & Brass 
(1990). Albeit, the latter point deserves more deliberation, since the new system has 
been shown to act as a catalyst for integration and centralization tendencies. In combi­
nation with related findings on learning and resistance, the question of SAP as a modi­
fier of organizational structure will be elaborated in the discussion section.
‘Progress’ as a thematic category was also found in the documentation. However, 
the content in the ‘new system’ cluster in the documents is overwhelmingly technical 
with the exception of a minority of five quotations on the ‘quality’ of the new system 
and the inadequacy of the old ‘MACH’ system. This reiterates the findings in the inter-
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views, where MACH is described as technically outdated and SAP was generally 
judged a great improvement. All other quotations in this cluster cover technical aspects 
of the implementation and configuration of the new system.
Again, the category on ‘operational project management’ was already discussed in 
section 4.1.2.
One size fits all
Given the findings obtained on the complexity of SAP, the nature of the system 
integration and setup, and R&P’s targeted organization-wide IT architecture, it can be 
deducted that the new computer system was not implemented with the intention to ac­
count for local peculiarities. The IT strategy at headquarters was to build a unified sys­
tem that serves the needs of the organization globally and facilitates a centralized distri­
bution. Asked specifically about the flexibility of SAP to be adapted to local circum­
stances once it was implemented, respondents unanimously elaborated on the rigidity of 
the system. The degrees of freedom of the new technology at the local level appear to 
lie in a range from very few to none.
‘The program was going to be cast in stone, and any modification would be 
made in Germany, and it would be made for a global situation. [...] SAP was 
already in and functioning, they'd written it and it was working before we got 
to hear about it. We would unfortunately assume that when we came to SAP 
that we would have a great deal o f input and it would be modified to suit our 
way of working. The answer is no. [...] By the time they came to us, SAP was 
cast in stone.” (Hugh Prescott)
“The system is the basic system, uh, there's been no as far as I'm aware any 
special adaptations made for the UK, the only adaptation I suppose is basi­
cally the German version of it has been translated into English.” (Paul 
Samuelson)
UK managers complained that any suggestions for amendments could not be 
made locally, as illustrated before, but require authorization from headquarters. From an 
immediate user perspective, employees listed several examples where a minor adapta­
tion would significantly simplify a specific process. But when formally requested, such 
suggestions either stalled in a lengthy communication process or were flatly rejected by 
central IT. Although UK participants show an understanding of the limitations to flexi­
bility set by a global IT architecture, the inability to institute even minor adjustments is 
a cause of frustration.
The German participants in the project clearly argue from a position that embraces 
the company as a whole, and illustrate the shortcomings of the alternative scenario.
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“And you’ll need most importantly a structure that is uniform in all markets, 
which was exactly what R&P didn’t have. Everyone had an independent ac­
counting system, everyone tailored something for the customer service, for 
everything possible, and those were all solutions that were okay by them­
selves, but they were intended entirely for such small units, and here at head­
quarters you’d have the biggest difficulties to simply extract the pool of data 
in such a way that you can later transform it into a meaningful information at 
all. Therefore it’s good that we’re all subject to this unified SAP organiza­
tion, where the emphasis lies on ‘unified’ and not on ‘SAP’.” (Manfred 
Becker)
“This is actually more of a European solution, [...] that’s of course where a 
certain stiffness come from, and it has to be, otherwise we’ll smother again in 
ideal solutions, and that will show in less cost efficiency. In my opinion the 
harmonization process needs to be driven further, no question.” (Peter 
Schmitdbauer)
Hence, both sides provide valid arguments in this conflicting issue, but the final 
setup evidently favors the global solution. With the UK subsidiary being incapacitated 
to make amendments, and bottom-up feedback on the new system thereby substantially 
constrained, it must be expected that the way the system was set up had a sincere impact 
on the dynamics of learning and resistance in the project.
Following the presentation of findings related to the nature of the change project 
and the new system, the remainder of the results chapter will now focus on awareness of 
resistance and on learning in the change project at R&P UK.
4 .4  A w a r e n e ss
Awareness has been defined in section 2.4 as the mediator between resistance and 
learning. For resistance to change to function as a source of organizational learning, 
awareness about resistance was introduced as a necessary condition. The presentation of 
results so far indicated an emergence of moderate resistance by a single individual. As 
shown in Table 3.2 (p. 138), the analysis of awareness of the found resistance will con­
sider three factors, namely existence, intensity, and semantic elaboration. For each level 
of analysis, data will be presented on whether there was awareness, and if so, how 
strong it was, and how this awareness was represented in project participants’ percep­
tions. Due to the nature of the obtained data, results at the group level are informed by 
interview and documentation material, and concentrate on the semantic elaboration of 
resistance.
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4.4,1 Individual level awareness
Insecurity
British project participants unanimously described the announcement of the 
change as a shock. Although it is generally admitted that there was at least a subtle ex­
pectation, given the prior changes in other European subsidiaries, a similar change to 
UK operations was not perceived to be possible for another three to five years. The as­
surance of the distant geographic location of the UK market, the logistical problems of 
crossing the British Channel, and the traditional autonomy of the unit instilled the Brit­
ish groups with an impression of stable conditions for at least the short to medium term. 
Hence, realizing the magnitude of the change and its ramifications in combination with 
the fact that it was in essence non-negotiable left the British side stunned. One British 
manager vividly illustrates the breaking of the news.
“John phoned on his mobile, to tell me what had happened the day before.
And he said ‘We were totally shell-shocked’. He said ‘I had absolutely no 
idea it was coming’, he said ‘In the drive back from Gatwick, when I've 
picked them up from the airport, Olivier Berg27 threw a kind of throw away 
line, ‘And of course now with the warehouse closure” , and John’s answer to 
that was ‘It took all my self-control not to crash the car. I said could you re­
peat that?’, and Olivier Berg realized that he had said something totally un­
guarded. We were blissfully unaware that they weren't coming in to discuss 
future plans for the UK, whether it would be new shops, new centers, new 
strategies. We weren't aware of what they were coming for, they wouldn't tell 
us.” (Hugh Prescott)
The shock value of the announcement was the same among employees, especially 
once it became clear which consequences would emerge. Among those consequences 
the warehouse closure was naturally the gravest to UK employees, as many of their col­
leagues would be made redundant.
“With the warehouse closure, that was a real shock, a real shock. I used to 
deal with the warehouse an awful lot, got on with all the people that were 
working in the warehouse. It was very, very upsetting at the time.” (Susan 
Parker)
Given the unexpectedness of the change project and the autocratic way of how the 
decision to go ahead was reached, UK participants became increasingly uncertain about 
fundamental coordinates of their organization and work. The management in Germany 
had taken critical steps to reduce the headcount at the UK subsidiary by deciding to
27 Olivier Berg was a board member at the time who accompanied the German management team to the 
first meeting where the change was announced. He did not participate in the subsequent execution of the 
project, but joined on that occasion as a senior manager to provide additional legitimacy.
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close the local warehouse. Such a display of willingness to introduce radical change 
caused great uncertainty amongst the remaining staff about the future safety of their 
jobs, as further cuts might be expected. Consequently, employees in the customer ser­
vice and accounting departments began to speculate whether their own job tasks could 
be outsourced or rationalized. Again, due to the unexpectedness of the change and the 
intransparent decision process, various rumors circulated and mutual trust suffered.
“I think [it is important] to fully inform your staff. I think it was obvious that 
everyone, the atmosphere here, everyone was nervous, and nobody was reas­
sured, and I think that was, I don't know whether that was intentional, or 
whether it wasn't possible to, you still kind of think that maybe there is some­
thing we don't know, so therefore it's best not to say anything. I don't know, 
but it wasn't a very nice atmosphere to be working in at that time.” (Abigail 
Woolfe)
“I mean throughout the company there was this feeling of ‘God, who's going 
to be next?’.” (Susan Parker)
UK managers agree with their employees about this atmosphere of uncertainty 
immediately following the announcement of the project. They elaborate on the suspi­
cions held by employees about further downsizing of the subsidiary, as certain account­
ing and customer service functions could be performed independent of location. But 
British managers also held considerable uncertainty about the security of their own jobs, 
given the dismissal of Hugh Prescott and the shifting significance of, for example, the 
local IT department. It has been mentioned before that this structural change brought 
about by the project served as a cause of well-founded worries for Robert Walsh and 
Paul Samuelson.
Confronted with reports of uncertainty at the UK subsidiary, German managers 
eagerly stress their clear communication at the beginning of the project and their open­
ness and honesty about the strategy for British operations.
“We clearly told the important people right from the beginning where the 
journey would go. And especially in the IT area it was said perfectly clear 
what we were expecting there, yes, and who’d stay, and this insecurity we 
tried to take away from people.” (Heinz Berwanger)
Hence, there are contrasting remarks about the level of uncertainty or the justifica­
tion of its existence. This can presumably be related to the damage of trust in the rela­
tionship with headquarters as a result of the decision making process. The issues of trust 
and open communication will be revisited further down with the results on learning. The 
shock value of the change announcement and the ensuing uncertainty and lack of trust 
would hold the potential to profoundly influence learning dynamics and provide an im­
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petus for resistance. It was shown, however, that resistance only emerged on a very lim­
ited scale. Nevertheless, the situation did warrant a heightened sensitivity for critical 
responses.
Adding to the uncertainty about their jobs was an anxiety among British partici­
pants whether they would be able to handle the new system. Introduced as state-of-the- 
art business software to the UK subsidiary, SAP R/3 was received as a seminal mod­
ernization with impressive capabilities. However, such capabilities are based on a myr­
iad of functions and processes that would seemingly require insightful mastery. UK em­
ployees reacted to these anticipations with considerable anxiety, since they would have 
to spend the majority of their time working with the new system. Worries centered on 
the ability to manage working with SAP.
“I think some, the operation of the computer system was of concern to some 
because they didn't think they were very good at it, and they were worried 
about, you know, how to read the screen, and how to do things, I think one or 
two were quite worried about that.” (Christine Peters)
As illustrated by the above quote, anxiousness levels did not seem to be critical, 
but rather reflected a general unease about whether personal abilities would match the 
learning requirements of the new system. The UK staff was thoroughly familiar with 
operating computers, and the challenge lay solely in becoming proficient in the new 
software package. British managers, who themselves use SAP on a daily basis, empa­
thize with their staff about the initial concerns, but similarly do not overrate anxiousness 
levels. When speaking for themselves the managers report a somewhat proactive recep­
tion of the new technology. Finally, on the basis of their experiences with prior imple­
mentations, German managers appreciate users’ worries accompanying the introduction 
of the new system. At the same time they remark that adopting SAP as a user is not an 
insurmountable task, a mindset that they felt was largely shared by British participants.
Resistance is futile
Once the change was announced, people at the UK subsidiary developed diverg­
ing expectations about the future of their workplace. The managers in retrospect concur 
on the notion that their expectations were generally positive, and that they hoped for an 
immediate improvement to their operations.
“I believe that we were, many of us in particular, different groups in different 
environments, but we were generally looking to get a lot from the change.”
(Robert Walsh)
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A potential of the planned measures to fundamentally alter the way the subsidiary 
worked was recognized and, for the case of the software implementation, was perceived 
as an opportunity for progress.
The employees showed a less unanimous opinion in their accounts of initial ex­
pectations. On the positive end of the scale, the same kind of positive anticipation about 
a system that was going to make their jobs easier was reported. There were, however, 
also some negative expectations centering on the notion that computers might soon take 
over their work. Others simply anticipated increased stress levels since the change 
would be implemented without a halt to the running operations. Hence, employees’ ex­
pectations before the change project really started seemed to have been more negative 
on the whole than those of their managers.
Distinct from expectations, a general change attitude in relation to the project was 
also coded for. Answers in this realm are of course related to the change at the subsidi­
ary, which is why German managers elaborate less about themselves than about their 
British colleagues. First of all, a universal necessity to continuously change, even an 
inevitability, is recognized by the German side. It is how the world works, as is stated, 
and R&P has to adjust to its competitive environment. This ‘law of nature’ German 
managers believe was largely accepted by UK managers. Moreover, they reckon that the 
British team also acknowledged advantages the change would bring and therefore re­
frained from becoming emotional or acting irrationally.
“John McGregor, he’s also, he’s recognized that it also has advantages and he 
has, I would say, put aside emotional issues relatively quickly.” (Heinz Ber- 
wanger)
It should be noted that this type of attitude was postulated for the whole subsidiary 
with one exception, namely the head of the local IT department, Robert Walsh. Aware­
ness about Walsh’s resistance is confined to German and British managers, but is voiced 
most explicitly and unambiguously by the German side.
“In most areas [it] was basically unproblematic, where everything was seen 
very objectively and where the loss of certain liberties was simply balanced 
against the positive things that accompany the whole thing, there we actually 
had no problems, that needs to be said definitely. Uh, in the whole manage­
ment, there is one exception, which is the IT topic, where he has massively, 
massively worked against it and boycotted it in part.” (Heinz Berwanger)
As shown in the results section about the British IT department, the local IT man­
ager was assessed as a difficult figure in the change, one that had to be brought back in
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line on several occasions by headquarters. Walsh’s negative change attitude and re­
ported suboptimal cooperation is attributed entirely to his personality and the conse­
quences the SAP implementation had on his position. There is not a single consideration 
whether his critical stance might be based on founded concerns or be justified by inade­
quacies of the implementation process or of the new system itself. German managers 
utilize adjectives such as stubborn or peculiar to describe him and explain that he was 
an obstacle that needed to be overcome.
“I mean, you can tolerate [his behavior] for a while, but at some point you’ll 
say, well, up to here and no further. Yes? It’s either going to happen with you 
or without you. Yes? And we had to make this clear to Robert Walsh several 
times.” (Heinz Berwanger)
The analysis here shows that irrespective of whether Walsh’s reluctance was justi­
fied by anything else but self-interest, there seems to have been no attempt to look for 
possibly constructive reasons for his stance. His behavior was not probed for valid sub­
stance. All remarks about him from the German side highlight mainly his stubbornness. 
Hence, irrespective of whether Walsh was right or wrong, there seems to be a patholo- 
gization of his resistance. It is marked as unfounded, unjustified, and plain unnecessary. 
As a result, there was individual level and group level awareness about a single resisting 
individual, but this resistance was construed as dysfunctional.
The managers in the UK perceived the upcoming development as inevitable, 
based on a resignation about the decision-making authority at headquarters. The com­
ments in this realm seem not so much to reflect a wholehearted embrace of the underly­
ing motives for the change, but rather a rational assessment of the power structure 
within the organization. Such resignation by UK managers might be understood as a 
factor facilitating a lack of resistance to the measures imposed on the British subsidiary. 
Moreover, such resignation might also thwart awareness about their colleague’s resis­
tant behavior, or facilitate a construal thereof as individual stubbornness.
„However, we were also resigned to the fact that it was going to happen and 
we had to make the best job of it that we could, there was no point fighting 
against it because it was going to happen whatever we said or did.” (Kevin 
Franks)
“I think in a way everyone was initially resigned to the fact this is going to 
happen, we can't stand here and say we don't want it because we are part of 
R&P and R&P have agreed it's the worldwide system. So, there is no point 
trying to defeat something, which is undefeatable.” (John McGregor)
210
Results
Employees tend to emphasize arguments similar to those of the German manag­
ers, namely that change is a natural and frequent occurrence, and that they had to ‘go 
with the flow’. Their perceived role was to adhere to the project plan devised at head­
quarters.
“You can't sit down and say, well I don't want to change, or my job should 
not change, my client should not change. Well, they do. You know, your job 
will be redefined inevitably, it always will.” (Christine Peters)
“We didn't have a choice, you know? We didn't have a choice saying no we 
didn't want it, it just appeared, it was going to happen, and, uh, you'd have to 
deal with it. [...], but we had no option but to accept it. You know, no matter 
what you thought yourself.” (Jane Adams)
It was previously shown that, with the exception of a single individual, there was 
no explicit and noticeable emergence of resistance within the change project at R&P 
UK. Under the thematic code ‘resistance’ potential remarks about such emergences 
were coded for, most often following a direct question whether respondents had wit­
nessed or taken part in any resistance throughout the project. Hence, the reconstruction 
of this topic from the perspective of internal observers culminated in an immediate con­
frontation with the core issue.
German managers were quick to point out that, except for the one critical British 
IT manager, cooperation was satisfactory and no episodes of resistance arose. Accord­
ing to their responses resistance among British participants, if extant at all, only ex­
pressed itself in a somewhat emotional aversion.
“I think there was more of an emotional initial problem, but as I said before, 
the people are internationally oriented and overcome something like that 
quite quickly.” (Manfred Becker)
UK managers additionally deemphasize Robert Walsh’s behavior and agree with 
their German colleagues that there was no resistance in their own domain. One manager 
even expressed mild surprise over the fact that the workers in the warehouse took the 
news about the change and consequently about their dismissal extremely well.
“I think [people] may have at times been less cooperative than they could 
have been, and that's a lot different from being resistant. No one obstructed 
the process; no one tried in any way, shape or form to do derail it. [...] The 
UK went very well, there was no resistance in the UK. The individual staff in 
the UK did not resist.” (Hugh Prescott)
Similar responses about a general absence of resistance in the project are found 
among UK employees, who mostly dismiss the notion of resistance in favor of such al­
ternative descriptions as anxiety or uncertainty.
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“[There was] not really a resistance, more anxiousness. Anxious that you 
should be able to perform the new things, [...]. Not a resistance, not really, 
no. I wouldn't call it resistance. We were all a bit surprised when they said 
the warehouse was going to be closed down, but there wasn't the sort of thing 
that anybody got angry and said they mustn't do that.” (Christine Peters)
These responses give an impression of an understanding of resistance among pro­
ject participants as an ‘all or nothing’ phenomenon, as some severe set of actions that 
would have fundamentally endangered the project as a whole. Especially Hugh Pres­
cott’s quote reflects this perception, which does not consider resistance to be anywhere 
similar to critical assessment or constructive disapproval. The possibility that such a 
negative image of the concept of resistance might have biased respondents and led them 
to not recognize the full spectrum of the concept, including functional resistance, will be 
examined more closely in the analysis of the repertory grid results.
In sum, awareness of resistance at the individual (and group) level appears to have 
been largely confined to German managers, who construed the behavior of a single re­
sistant individual as dysfunctional. Managers and employees at the British subsidiary 
expressed little awareness of resistance. To them, resistance was futile or did not seem 
like a meaningful exercise for a number of reasons. First of all, despite some moderate 
anxiety about an increasing dominance of computers, expectations about the project 
once it was announced were generally rather positive. Change recipients recognized that 
the UK subsidiary’s operational procedures were outdated and that the company was 
moving towards higher efficiency through integration. Secondly, once the project was 
announced change recipients resigned to the apparent inevitability of the change. 
Thirdly, change recipients also acknowledged that SAP R/3 was by and large an im­
provement to their operations. These facts make a reasonable case against resistance of 
the destructive and dysfunctional type, but do not necessarily preclude an emergence of 
a constructive and functional type of resistance. As stated earlier, for example, critical 
assessment o f the new system seems to have been absent almost entirely. Additional 
factors that play a role in stifling any resistance can be found in the company’s hierar­
chy and top-down power relations. These contextual factors seemingly influence em­
ployees to not consider an impeding form of resistance as an option, while they also 
hold the potential to function as a disincentive to constructive resistance such as critical 
feedback.
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4.4.2 Group level awareness
As shown in Table 3.2 (p. 138), the obtained information about awareness of re­
sistance at the group level is largely centered on the semantic elaboration of resistance. 
From the interview data it can be assumed that awareness at the group level was seem­
ingly confined to German managers, who communicated with one another about Robert 
Walsh as the resistant individual. There is no evidence of group level awareness in the 
documentation. The interview findings suggest that informal communication at head­
quarters constituted the essence of group level awareness. Hence, awareness at this level 
of analysis existed, albeit with low intensity and only among a specific group. In the 
following, the semantic elaboration of resistance among project participants is explored.
Repertory grid results
The repertory grids for groups one, two, and three28 are shown in Figure 4.4, 
Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6 below. Elements (columns) represent different manifesta­
tions of resistance produced by the respondents, constructs (rows) stand for different 
dimensions generated in the triadic comparisons and used to cognitively organize the 
elements. The three groups generated a 8 x 9, a 9 x 9, and a 8 x 8 matrix, respectively. 
These were then filled out with ratings on a seven-point scale, where any rating on a 
construct could be given to more than one element. For example, group 1 rated the ele­
ment ‘discussion with managers’ as the most constructive element on the dimension 
‘destructive-constructive’, and the element ‘decreased performance level’ as the most 
pessimistic element on the dimension ‘pessimistic-optimistic’. The ratings are high­
lighted according to their magnitude with different background patterns.
28 The repertory grid for group 3 (German managers) was conducted in German and subsequently trans­
lated by the author.
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stogie 1 
no impact 2 
pessimistic 3 
low desperation 4 
irrationals 
destructive 6 
subtle 7
not directed at management 8 
not affecting output rates negatively 9
1 collective
2  Impact
3 optimisitc
4 high desperation
5 rational
6 constructive
7 overt
8 directed at management
9 affecting output rates negatively
Aggression 
Tears, frustration 
Decreased performance level 
Leaving the company 
Bad feelings 
Threats to leave 
Discussion with managers 
Discussions with colleagues
Figure 4.4: Repertory grid of group 1 (UK employees)
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individual 2 
negatively affecting output3 
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cost to the company 7 
covert 8 
constructive 9
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2 collective
3 not affecting output
4 passive
5 not directed at management
6 emotional
7 no costs to company
8 overt
9 destructive
Anger, frustration 
Leave the company 
Discussion with management 
Gossip 
Decreased performance 
Indifference 
Negative speculation 
High stress 
Becoming secretive
Figure 4.5: Repertory grid of group 2 (UK employees)
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passive 1 
not solution-oriented2  
not communicative 3  
damage to the company 4 
hidden 5  
atoned
repressing the change 7  
destm ctive 8 1 4 T  1
1 active
2  so/utton-oriented
3  communicative
4 no damage to the company
5  open
6 coiiective
7  openly tackling the change
8  constructive
Leaving the company 
Demotivation 
Calling in sick 
Discussion with management 
Threats to leave 
Undermining of daily business 
Discussions with colleagues 
Deliberate gossip
Figure 4.6: Repertory grid of group 3 (German managers)
The initial qualitative analysis focuses on the generated elements first. It can be
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In sum, the three groups largely converge on their ideas about how resistance to 
change is expressed in work situations. The conspicuous exception is the inability of 
German managers to recognize any emotional aspects of resistance. Except for discus­
sions, the remaining elements for the managers’ group exclusively portray resistance as 
a more or less rational act of supposedly bad intentions. For all three groups the only 
inherently constructive forms of resistance named by respondents are discussions with 
management and colleagues. All other manifestations have either a strongly emotive 
character, show little rational problem orientation, or are downright destructive. Hence, 
the majority of manifestations reflect a dysfunctionality of resistance.
The elicited constructs show a comparable degree of similarity across the groups. 
Several constructs can be found in all three groups, albeit with a slightly different word­
ing. Resistance may be expressed by individuals or the collective (also ‘single­
collective’, ‘alone-collective’), in a hidden or open fashion (‘subtle-overt’, ‘covert- 
overt’), or in a passive or active way (probably also ‘no impact-impact’). Respondents 
also share a structuring dimension relating to the quantifiable, observable damage resis­
tance might inflict on an organization (‘not affecting output-affecting output’, ‘cost to 
the company-no cost to the company’, ‘damage to the company-no damage to the com­
pany’). Further, a dimension about the functionality or future utility of resistance is 
shared (‘destructive-constructive’, ‘pessimistic-optimistic’, ‘repressing the change- 
openly tackling the change’). This latter dimension seems to hold a conceptual central­
ity given the prior discussion in the theory chapter on resistance. Particularly the con­
struct ‘destructive-constructive’ reflects the fundamental cognitive distinction between 
resistance as a functional indicator or as a dysfunctional nuisance. Three more sets of 
constructs are specific to certain groups. The two employee groups share emotional di­
mensions (‘low desperation-high desperation’, ‘irrational-rational’, ‘rational- 
emotional’), which are again absent among the managers. In addition, the employees 
have in common a hierarchical dimension (‘not directed at management-directed at 
management’), which managers are lacking. Group 2 and 3, UK employees and German 
managers, on the other hand share a communication dimension (‘verbal-action’, ‘not 
communicative-communicative’) that is not shown by group 1.
In sum, there is again a convergence between the groups in how they structure the 
resistance concept. All groups of respondents utilize the degree of collectivity (‘single­
collective’), activity (‘passive-active’), visibility (‘covert-overt’), and constructiveness 
(‘destructive-constructive’) as structuring tools, with the latter dimension occupying a
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central theoretical position. Again, the managers disregard the role of emotional influ­
ences. They also do not produce a hierarchical dimension, possibly because they per­
ceive resistance as always directed at management. This assumption would reflect an 
‘observing the other’ perspective on the phenomenon (see section 2.1.5, p. 91), but is 
hard to verify based on just the found absence. It is finally interesting to note that the 
shared dimensions on potential damage to the company do not have a truly positive 
pole. The most positive outcome of an episode of resistance would be that it does not 
affect output rates negatively, inflicts no cost to the company, or results in no damage to 
the company. The possibility that resistance might lead to increased output rates and 
profits to the company, as implied by the constructiveness pole, is not considered. Con­
sistent with the element findings above, the omitted genuinely positive construct poles 
on the outcome dimensions indicate a prevailing understanding of resistance as a deficit 
concept.
In the second step of the repertory grid analysis, descriptive indicators are calcu­
lated to illustrate the relationships between the elements and between the constructs, 
respectively. All computations in this section are done with the statistical software 
package SPSS (Norusis, 2004), and the output can be found in Appendix I. First of all, 
means, standard deviations, and skewness scores are calculated for the constructs to de­
tect rating tendencies and outliers. As for the latter, there are no means that diverge 
from the natural mean of four on the seven-point scale by more than one standard devia­
tion. The largest mean of 4.88 is found for group 2 on the construct ‘constructive- 
destructive’, indicating that this group leaned towards the destructive end of the scale 
when rating its manifestations of resistance. The skewness score shows how much the 
obtained distribution of ratings varies from the normal distribution. In general, a skew­
ness score greater than twice its standard error signifies an asymmetric distribution. 
None of the distributions for the present grid dimensions are seriously skewed. The 
most lopsided dimensions are ‘irrational-rational’ for group 1, ‘constructive-destructive’ 
for group 2, and ‘passive-active’ for group 3. The stronger emphasis in the first two 
cases is towards the negative construct pole, and in the third case towards the active 
pole. This means that on the whole, the named manifestations of resistance are seen as 
rather destructive, irrational, and involving activity.
Pearson product-moment correlations reveal the strength of the interrelations be­
tween elements and between constructs, respectively (see Appendix I). The correlations
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discussed in the following are significant at a = .01. Observing interrelationships be­
tween constructs first, group 1 associates individual (as opposed to collective) resistance 
and irrationality with high desperation, and rationality with constructiveness. Group 2 
perceives active (as opposed to passive) resistance as directed at management, and, 
logically, negative effects on output as related to costs to the company. For group 3 
communicative forms of resistance are seen as solution-oriented, while a lack of solu­
tion orientation is related to damage to the company. Apparently, the positive or gener­
ally constructive and solution-oriented type of resistance seems to be connected to ra­
tional and communicative behavior. The interrelations for the elements show significant 
coefficients that would mostly be logically expected. Group 1 hence perceives a similar­
ity between discussions with colleagues and managers, and between threats to leave and 
actually leaving the company. In addition, people who leave the company are seen as 
very unlikely to engage in discussions with managers and colleagues, and decreased 
performance levels are similarly unlikely to be a topic of discussion with superiors. 
Group 2 does not see high stress being discussed with management. Group 3 disassoci­
ates calling in sick with discussions with colleagues. Hence, the correlations among 
elements reveal obvious associations and no surprises.
In sum, there is limited information to be gained from the numerical indicators so 
far. No considerable differences between groups are found. There is a slight bias on the 
skewness and mean scores towards the negative and dysfunctional construct poles, reaf­
firming the perceived dysfunctionality of resistance found earlier. The correlations 
mostly reflect the obvious.
The occurrence of clusters of fairly high correlations in all four tables above leads 
to the assumption that a summary representation could give a clearer picture of group­
ings of constructs and elements. Therefore, the third step of the analysis focuses on spa­
tial representations of the obtained data and the underlying structure of the grids. Here, 
the grid data is factor analyzed using principal component analysis. This illuminates 
how elements and constructs are related to each other. Factor analysis requires the 
source data to be two-set similarity data, as explicated by Coombs (1964). The term 
‘two-set data’ in the context of the repertory grid corresponds to the relationships be­
tween constructs and elements, as opposed to one-set data as in the relationships among 
either elements or constructs. The term similarity pertains to the ratings in a grid indi­
cating the degree to which an element is close to a construct pole. Moreover, principal
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components analysis requires at least an ordinal level of measurement, with the data for 
the present grids being on an interval scale. Hence, the chosen factor analysis is appro­
priate to the grid data (Bell, 1988), while multidimensional scaling as an alternative 
would also be a feasible method of analysis. Although the regions or clusters generated 
in an MDS solution are not directly related to the factors in a PCA solution (Borg & 
Groenen, 1997), for the purpose of identifying simple relationships between elements 
and constructs in a grid the two methods essentially produce the same kind of results 
(Bell, 1988). Despite the fact that multivariate techniques such as factor analysis typi­
cally require large sample sizes for the purpose of generalization, the use of such meth­
ods for the discovery of underlying patterns within the data does not necessitate exten­
sive samples (Reger, 1990). Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, and Figure 4.9 below show the un­
rotated two-dimensional factor solutions on the covariance matrix for the constructs and 
elements in the three obtained grids. For the graphical output WEBGrid-III was used, an 
internet-based specialized tool for repertory grid analyses (Gaines & Shaw, 2001). Here, 
a point convention for elements and a vector convention for constructs is adopted. The 
construct directions are plotted as lines through the construct means with a length pro­
portional to the construct loadings. Essentially the constructs are considered in their 
normal and reversed form; that is, the initial construct vector is projected back through 
the original to an equal length. For example, for the construct loadings x and y that 
function as coordinates, a line would be plotted from (x,y) to (-x,-y). All numerical indi­
cators relating to the PCA solutions, such as eigenvalues and factor loadings, can be 
found in Appendix I29.
The PCA solution for the employee group 1 shows a somewhat even distribution 
of elements and constructs. First of all, none of the constructs lie particularly close to 
the origin, indicating that they are reasonably well defined by the two components. As 
for elements, the two generated principal components seem to define the elements ‘ag­
gression’ and ‘tears, frustration’ less well. The first two components explain 87% 
(62%+25%) of the total variance, which means that the original data are adequately rep­
resented by a two-factor solution.
29 Appendix I shows the SPSS replication of the WEBGrid-III calculations. WEBGrid-III was used for its 
graphical output functions, while all numerical indicators were replicated with SPSS.
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Figure 4.7: PCA solution for group 1 (UK employees)
The constructs mainly build a fan of lines around the first component, which 
makes it hard to educe a common component label. Tmpact-no impact’ is the only con­
struct relatively close to the second component. There are four sets of constructs that 
show close proximity. Overt actions are understood as directed at management, and re­
sistance expressed by an individual is associated with high desperation. These four di­
mensions lie closest to the first component. Moreover, constructive resistance is con­
strued as rational, and generally optimistic forms of discontent are believed to not affect 
output rates negatively. There are fewer element clusters. Respondents perceive ‘tears, 
frustration’ and ‘bad feelings’ as similar, although those two elements and ‘aggression’ 
are less well explained by the two-component solution. ‘Aggression’, ‘threats to leave’, 
and ‘leaving the company’ are also in relatively close proximity. These latter, rather 
drastic, expressions of resistance are understood as overt and directed at management. 
They mostly involve single, desperate individuals and are believed to make an impact. 
Emotional expressions of resistance on the other hand are not seen as having a lasting 
effect. At the constructive and rational region of the scale respondents locate ‘discus-
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lieved to have an impact, while at the same time being somewhat desperate, irrational, 
and solitary. The other one corresponds to a constructive, discussion-oriented type of 
resistance that holds optimistic and rational connotations and usually involves more 
than one individual.
high s t r e s s *
not directed at management
B ecom ing sec re tiv e  \ 
action*— .
no costs to companynegatively affecting outpui
\ * gossip
not affecting output
cast to the company *--------
d e c re a se d  p erfo rm ance ' la tive specu lation verba!
leave th e  co m p an y *
active1
^  constructive 
collectivedirected at management«
emotion
* d iscussion  w ith  m a n ag em e n t
Figure 4.8: PCA solution for group 2 (UK employees)
The graphical output for group 2 gives a similar first impression to the one for the 
first group, with an even distribution of elements and constructs, and no discernible 
concentration around either axis. The elements ‘anger, frustration’ and ‘negative specu­
lation’ appear less well defined by the two-component solution. The first two compo­
nents explain 80% (48%+32%) of the total variance.
Again, four sheaves of constructs can be recognized, and they are associated with 
different elements. The employees in group 2 see ‘indifference’ as passive, not directed 
at management, and, surprisingly, rational. ‘Becoming secretive’, ‘decreased perform­
ance’, and ‘leaving the company’ are perceived as involving activity, negatively affect­
ing output, and inducing cost to the company. The same three constructs are related to 
‘gossip’ on their alternative pole. In between the three named clusters lies the set of 
constructs in which constructive resistance is seen as collective and overt. The element 
‘discussions with management’ can be connected with these element poles, but it also
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loads very high on the second component. Another element that is equally well ex­
plained by the second component, albeit on the opposite end, is ‘high stress’.
In sum, the spatial representation in this case is again more informative than the 
component solution. However, one can discern a dimension of tangible, concrete, and 
mostly damaging action fanning out around the first component. The elements ‘high 
stress’ and ‘discussion with management’ are comparative outliers best explained by the 
second component.
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Figure 4.9: PCA solution for group 3 (German managers)
The data produced by the German managers in group 3 differs from the first two 
groups in that the PCA solution is more strongly dominated by the first extracted com­
ponent. With one exception, all constructs scatter around the x-axis. The elements 
‘threats to leave’ and possibly ‘deliberate gossip’ are less well explained by the factorial 
solution. The first two components explain 82% (64%+18%) of the total variance.
There are two clusters to be found at either end of the first component. The Ger­
man management sees ‘discussions with colleagues’ and ‘discussions with manage­
ment’ as constructive, solution-oriented, openly tackling the change, communicative, 
and inflicting no damage to the company. In contrast, ‘calling in sick’ and the ‘under­
mining of daily business’ are associated with the opposite poles of the said constructs. 
The construct ‘hidden-open’ is apparently extremely well defined by the second com­
ponent. Related to the two poles of this construct are two relatively isolated elements.
2 2 2
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‘Leaving the company’ is construed as an open act, in contrast to ‘demotivation’, which 
is rather hidden. The construct ‘active-passive’ does not seem to fit well into either 
component realm.
Hence, the first component describes a distinction between a generally construc­
tive and discussion-oriented form of resistance that German managers perceive as rather 
positive, and a destructive, secretive form of resistance. Interestingly, the positive type 
of resistance is believed to not damage the company. Solitary structuring dimensions are 
the degree of activity and openness. Isolated types of resistance are ‘leaving the com­
pany’ and ‘demotivation’.
In sum, all three groups exhibit a basic differentiation between two types of resis­
tance. One type centers on discussions and is characterized as constructive, open, ra­
tional, optimistic, and solution-oriented. This positively laden type of resistance is asso­
ciated with collective action. On the opposite is a resistance of a withdrawing and intro­
verted nature that is characterized as destructive, desperate, inflicting cost to the com­
pany, and non-communicative. While the German managers see the positive type of re­
sistance as proactive and useful, this relationship is not so clear for the employees. In 
fact, group 1 construes the negatively laden type of resistance as having more of an im­
pact. Moreover, the managers seem to have a somewhat more coherent representation of 
resistance. Lastly, the emotional manifestations that are exclusive to employees are not 
well captured by the PCA solutions, indicating a potential additional, emotive compo­
nent.
Overall, the findings from the repertory grid analyses show that resistance is an 
unclear and ambiguous concept for the project participants. On the one hand respon­
dents recognize a constructive, functional type of resistance. On the other hand a dys­
functional image of resistance is reflected by the fact that the majority of elicited ele­
ments is negative. In addition, most of the constructs do not express any genuine poten­
tial for improvement. Indicative of this are positive construct poles such as ‘not affect­
ing output rates negatively’ and ‘no cost to the company’. Moreover, resistance was 
never directly associated with learning. German managers, the only group explicitly 
showing awareness of resistance, do seem to recognize a useful type of resistance. The 
existence, intensity, and outlined semantic elaboration of their awareness of resistance 
in the project in principle have the potential to function as a source of learning. How­
ever, for the actual case of a resisting local IT manager, his behavior is pathologized. As
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a result, there does not seem to exist any swift reconciliation between the idea that resis­
tance might in principle be functional and the actual practical implication of improve­
ment and learning as a result of resistance in the project.
4.4.3 Organizational level awareness
The data source for awareness at the organizational level is the project documen­
tation. It was intended to use the thematic code ‘resistance’ to account for any content 
pertaining to formalized awareness about resistance. However, resistance was not men­
tioned in the documents. There are no quotations that can be assigned to this code, and 
the code frequency is zero (see Appendix J and L). As indicated earlier, the vast major­
ity of the content of the project documentation is of a somewhat technical nature, la­
beled here as operational project management (see section 3.4.7, p. 157). While the 
topic of learning still received some attention in the formalization process, the topic of 
resistance is absent in the documents. Therefore, awareness of resistance seemingly did 
not reach the organizational level.
4.5  Learning
Learning is the last component of the research focus in Figure 2.2 (p. 110), and 
the emphasis of the present study is on learning as a result of resistance and awareness 
thereof. The findings so far reveal moderate resistance at the individual level by a single 
British manager, awareness of this resistance at the individual and group level by Ger­
man managers, and a semantic elaboration that basically denounces this resistance as an 
individual dysfunction. In the following, data are presented to assess to what extent the 
detected awareness functioned as a source of organizational learning. Moreover, it is 
examined whether the learning in the change project reflects the processes described in 
the proposed procedural framework of organizational learning. Since organizational 
learning involves three levels of analysis, the presentation is split into three sections.
224
Results
4.5,1 Individual level learning
Selling SAP
In the previous sections it was shown that after the shock caused by the initial an­
nouncement of the change, a combination of uncertainty about job security and anx­
iousness regarding the ability to handle the new system caused insecurity among British 
participants. Such insecurity could be expected to provide a condition opportune for re­
sistance to occur (George & Jones, 2001). After all, during the time period immediately 
following the announcement of the change, when the downright negative consequences 
of many layoffs became known, British participants were not yet fully aware of any ad­
vantages of the new system. In addition, further negative aspects such as a decrease in 
independence and a more centralized organizational structure could be expected. Hence, 
an emergence of resistant attitudes or behavior would not have been a completely un­
founded reaction. However, it was shown that little resistance occurred.
Interestingly, regarding the cohesiveness among British participants, the findings 
reveal a distinct split of roles between managers and employees at the subsidiary, who 
could have in principle stood united against the German initiative. Here, UK managers 
did not function as intermediaries, but as a direct extension to the chain of command 
from headquarters. Instead of critically appraising the prescribed measures, they readily 
accepted and handed them down to their employees. The attribute that makes their be­
havior distinctive is the ‘sales approach’ with which they address the staff in the cus­
tomer service and accounting departments. When introducing SAP, UK managers em­
phasize their efforts to ‘sell the system’ to their staff, that is, they highlight the advan­
tages and neglect any critical comments.
“I think the good thing that we did from our point o f view was that we sold 
SAP, I think, particularly well to our people. [...] And I was able, with quite 
a good deal of confidence, I was able to sell the SAP system as a distinct ad­
vantage over the old MACH system that we had. [...] From memory, I think 
we were able to sell the SAP system pretty well to people. There was virtu­
ally no negativity about the SAP system.” (Kevin Franks)
“I think we'd sold them the advantages that, the fact that things changed, it 
didn't bother them, I think they saw the advantages for the advantages they 
were, they recognized them and they were happy for their work to change.”
(Kevin Franks)
The sales approach is a strong indicator for the lack of interest in any critical as­
sessment of the new system. End users were not expected or encouraged to profoundly
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probe for the advantages and disadvantages of SAP, but to embrace the technology 
without much reflection. The employees support this analysis by stating that the system 
was described to them as a stellar improvement that would soon become industry stan­
dard. The communicated nature of the system as state-of-the-art would therefore make 
any end user feedback unnecessary. UK managers seem to have felt that a seamless im­
plementation would be the key criterion for the evaluation of their project efforts as a 
success, and the positive feedback they received from headquarters about this, as was 
presented earlier, proved them right. The assigned objective was not to challenge, but to 
conform. The UK subsidiary was the fourth national unit to adopt SAP. Any local de­
viation from the predetermined way the system was going to be implemented would be 
limited by the unified system architecture and a determination to ‘harmonize’ across the 
entire organization.
It must be noted, however, that while UK managers laud their own selling efforts, 
the very same approach is resented when applied to them from headquarters.
“I would've just like to have known at the beginning, look this is coming 
rather than this is one of the advantages of the system. What they did is they 
used [a forecasting function] as a way of selling the system, whereas in fact it 
would have been better to tell the truth and say, look this doesn't work yet, 
but when it does work it's going to be great.” (Kevin Franks)
As can be seen, the German management appears to have employed the same 
strategy of emphasizing advantages to persuade local managers. The contradiction lies 
in the UK executives’ objection to the strategy when on the receiving end, but their con­
fident administering of the very same approach to their employees. This could be inter­
preted as reflecting the distinctively hierarchical culture of the organization, where the 
flow of information is filtered when passing the boundaries of hierarchical levels.
The sales approach conceivably decreases employees’ potential for critical as­
sessment of SAP R/3. Moreover, it decreases their capacity to recognize the beneficial 
effects of a critical assessment. This has strong implications for learning, as it must be 
suspected that a disinterest by management in bottom-up feedback would stifle learning 
behaviors such as active evaluation or the generation of improvement suggestions. Fur­
ther regarding the sales approach, it should be noted that people were not actively de­
terred from being critical, but rather that the company culture and expectations for ap­
propriate role behavior apparently did not encourage employees to do more than simply 
accept the change.
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“You now need far more people that go with the procedures brought down, 
have a minor input. Whatever comes down from Germany has already been 
settled into the path they're going through. And therefore people who do chal­
lenge, their return is not necessarily good. And that's not good for the com­
pany culture.” (Hugh Prescott)
To keep the analysis of the sales approach in perspective, the question at the sub­
sidiary was certainly not whether to accept the new system or not, as compliance with 
the implementation decision was unmistakably requested from headquarters. Also, SAP 
as a whole was an improvement in comparison to the older MACH system, as all Brit­
ish participants agree. But the question could have been one of making an already good 
tool even better, and of critically assessing a technology that fundamentally alters the 
way the unit works. It is assumed that such possibilities for learning were blocked by 
the sales approach.
In sum, it seems that by selling SAP to both UK managers and employees a po­
tential for resistance to emerge was evaded, which also led to a lack of awareness about 
the possibility for criticism or resistance, and in effect to a resulting absence of learn­
ing. Any adaptation of SAP to local circumstances was not put up for discussion with 
end users, whereby any possibly productive resistance was denied a forum. With resis­
tance annulled, critical end user assessment and hence a chance for bottom-up im­
provement was lost. The sales approach appears to have set the agenda for a slick im­
plementation, in which improvement and adaptation was not an option. Hugh Prescott’s 
earlier quote about the exclusion of individuality and the subsidiary’s development to­
wards becoming a copying machine rings true, as the centralization and standardization 
efforts seem to build a strong potential for stifling local initiative in favor of centralized 
planning. Any learning from resistance is precluded, if resistance is smothered or 
pathologized, and awareness obstructed. There was resistance at the individual level by 
a single manager, and there was awareness at the individual and group level, confined 
to the German participants and construed as dysfunctional. However, learning as a re­
sult was not reported.
Given the described semantic elaboration of resistance, the only learning that 
could plausibly be expected would be avoidance learning. This assumption will be 
elaborated in the discussion chapter (particularly in section 5.1.3). Individual level 
learning was identified as a necessary precondition for group and organizational level 
learning. Therefore, if learning by resistance did not occur on the individual level, it can
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be assumed not to have occurred at higher levels of aggregation either. As a result, the 
remainder of the learning section will focus on procedural aspects of organizational 
learning as described in the proposed learning framework, while the data are still 
probed for evidence of learning from resistance.
Insufficient training
The word count analysis showed the code ‘training’ to be the most dominant in 
terms of magnitude of respondents’ comments. The training as the first point of contact 
for employees with the new system proves to be a decisive factor in the learning effort 
and for the acceptance of the new software. From a learning perspective, the largest 
gains on individuals’ learning curves should be made during the initial training phase. 
The training itself was originally conducted in a lecture format by members of staff 
from headquarters, especially Sabine Fischer. After a first training session for the Brit­
ish management and two employees (declared key users) at the company’s main prem­
ises in Germany, the intention was to have these participants train their colleagues after 
their return to the subsidiary. Following requests from British users, the lecture style 
was quickly abandoned in favor of a more practical training on a mock system. This re­
vised training version was then repeated at the British location for end users there.
UK managers were very vocal in their expressions of dissatisfaction with the 
training in general and with the inadequacy of particular aspects in specific. The criti­
cism centered on the formal, theoretical training style favored by the staff responsible at 
headquarters. Instead of a deductive overview of the capabilities and scope of the new 
system, British managers preferred a practical demonstration of relevant tasks and pro­
cedures. The managers at the subsidiary also felt that the training documents were 
largely irrelevant, and they were astonished by a time frame for the entire exercise that 
was far too short in their view. The total training time varied for different users, but in 
general was not more than three to four occasions of a few hours each, which had to be 
completed in addition to the regular workload.
“The initial training was how systems and procedures were going to work, 
were very frustrating, ill-prepared for, [...] badly documented, and too many 
times questions asked would be brushed aside or 'we'll look into it and get 
back to you', and we'd have to fight for an answer.” (Hugh Prescott)
“We actually ended up having to rewrite the whole manual ourselves doing 
lots of screen dumps, going through sequences of this is how we believe we 
actually do it.” (Robert Walsh)
228
Results
The dissatisfaction with the training was, however, not fed back to the German 
side. Instead, the managers at the subsidiary independently expanded their own training 
time frame and adapted the training documents, thereby rendering improvement at 
headquarters impossible. This episode indicates a lack of bottom-up communication that 
will be elaborated in the thematic categories ‘responsiveness to feedback’ and ‘changing 
through communication’ further down. The frequency and length of respondents’ com­
ments on the training phase seems to almost entirely reflect the importance of the first 
encounters with the new system, and much less the friction with headquarters. Although 
UK managers occasionally expressed serious dissatisfaction with the initial training 
plan, it did not lead to a similar questioning of other aspects of the change.
Employees at the British subsidiary showed a similar degree of discontent with 
the early training efforts. They entirely agree with their superiors about the inadequacy 
of the original training content and the brevity of the entire exercise. For their day-to- 
day operations they had wanted to be given practical direct instructions on how to use 
the different screens that are relevant to their specific tasks, a type of hands-on instruc­
tion the German trainers were not prepared to provide. An on-the-job training with users 
experienced in the relevant tasks as trainers would have been much preferred.
“I personally don't feel we had adequate training on it, I think we were given 
about 4 hours in total over a period o f 2 to 3 days.” (Susan Parker)
“[The initial training in Germany] to me was a total waste of time because 
they told us such, the information that they gave us wasn't user friendly, it 
was very complicated, and they gave us all these big manuals, [...] it was im­
plemented without really much training I must say, you know, it was, we had 
like a room like this and we'd practice, but uh, the training that we were given 
and the information that we were given was so long winded, it was too de­
tailed, you didn't need to know it, [...], and it was a hit and miss I would say 
for the first six weeks.” (Jane Adams)
In contrast, German managers give a more positive account of the training efforts 
and by and large evaluate the training as successful. After all, users produced no major 
mishap once the system went live. Discontent among trainees is not particularly empha­
sized, although it is acknowledged that more training needed to be provided than was 
originally planned. One German manager also defends the train-the-trainer principle, 
according to which key users are taught selectively in order to then act as trainers them­
selves and pass on their knowledge to colleagues. However, it was also recognized by 
the German side that the training phase was a difficult period for participants and put 
them under increased pressure.
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“[The training] wasn’t entirely easy I would say, it wasn’t easy for me, be­
cause it was the first training of this kind for me [...] for those people it was 
also completely new and they had to carve the practice time out of their nor­
mal working time, or they had to stay longer at times, simply to be able to 
practice.” (Sabine Fischer)
The train-the-trainer principle required three British employees to participate 
along with their managers in the initial training session at headquarters. Alice Farns­
worth, Abigail Woolfe, and Jane Adams were supposed to become relative experts in 
the parts of the system that were relevant to the operations of British employees. Once 
returned to the subsidiary, they were thought to convey what they had learned to their 
fellow co-workers and act as experts within the organization. This expert principle was 
commented on rather negatively by UK employees and managers. The supposed experts 
themselves admitted to their minimal and often inadequate knowledge as a result of the 
training, while their colleagues both empathized with the experts’ confusion and ques­
tioned the feasibility of the training principle. Most often the experts would simply 
function as a transmitter of questions from the subsidiary to headquarters.
“We were meant to be the key users, we were the ones meant to have the an­
swers, and I think sometimes they'd get frustrated when we didn't. [...] But if 
we didn't know, as I said, we knew somebody to ask, and in the beginning it 
may have been a bit frustrating for them for wanting all these answers and we 
just didn't have them basically. We were taught the very basics and we had to 
build on that. They gave you enough to basically get you by and then you just 
learned as you went along.” (Alice Farnsworth)
“Jane [a key user] went to Germany in the October prior to this to learn it 
with another girl, and I think we expected Jane to give us a bit o f training on 
this, which she didn't really, because I think she was just as confused as eve­
rybody else.” (Susan Parker)
In sum, participants vividly memorized the training as both the direct entry point 
to the new system and a source of dissatisfaction and friction with headquarters. This 
friction, although leading to a positive outcome for British change recipients, was in ret­
rospect not construed as resistance and did apparently not lead to any further episodes of 
openly displayed discontent.
In the sequence of thematic categories on learning in the interview data, the cate­
gory ‘random formalization’ would follow next (see Appendix G). However, since that 
category describes a distinctly organizational level topic, it will be discussed further 
down in section 4.5.3 on learning at the organizational level.
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Responsiveness to feedback
In the earlier section on the quality of the new system, employees in the UK re­
ported that they would like to see several aspects o f the SAP system improved or 
adapted to their specific requirements. This would constitute a reason to provide user 
feedback to management in England and Germany. In contrast, it was shown in the sec­
tion on selling SAP that the sales approach and a related disinterest by management in 
bottom-up feedback was likely to decrease the potential for employees’ critical assess­
ment. As revealed above, top-down feedback in the form of evaluative reports on the 
project was apparently absent. The bottom-up transfer of learning through user feedback 
was coded for under the code ‘feedback’ and is presented in the following.
UK managers held a potential to forward feedback from their employees to Ger­
man headquarters, or provide it themselves. Regarding the new system, they emphasize 
that their hands were largely tied by the inflexibility o f the global SAP R/3 solution and 
the indication from headquarters that there was very little room for adaptation. While 
the harmonization strategy of implementing a uniform computer system across subsidi­
aries seemingly precluded local user feedback on the system functionality, UK manag­
ers apparently also did not generate any substantial feedback on the implementation 
process or on general intra-organizational relations. One British manager expresses con­
cern about the lack of provision of or attentiveness to feedback.
“I think that [the company] should be much more responsive to the people 
going through the change.” (Robert Walsh)
German managers allude to the hierarchical culture when they say that the few re­
quests, questions, or comments they receive usually originate from the management 
team at the British subsidiary and never from the employees there. However, they also 
point out the narrow scope for adaptations due to the uniform system solution, and the 
limitation of their attentiveness due to their generally busy schedules.
“Of course there are a lot of requests from bottom-up, which you have to I’d 
say reject, and that is then the inflexibility. Yes? We naturally then try to ar­
gue that it is very difficult to judge this from the perspective of an English 
clerical assistant or whatever without full understanding of such a whole 
European solution.” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
The most revealing answers on the topic of feedback stem from the employees at 
the British subsidiary. They provide an account of a situation in which there is little en­
couragement for voicing critical thinking. The employees do not seem to be expected to 
make suggestions for improvement or take the initiative in any bottom-up learning ef­
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fort. In case they do generate feedback, specifically on the system, it is channeled 
through local management to headquarters, and most often rejected there, as stated 
above.
Interviewer: “Suggestions like [modifications of SAP functions], can you 
make them to anyone?”
Abigail Woolfe: “We've not been encouraged to.”
“[It would be better if] they would take our comments across as well, how we 
feel, if we've got comments, our views as well, take our views as well before 
the change, because we might be able to implement something else, you 
know, because we work in that position, there might be information there.
Looking at it from the top end and seeing how the person is working, obvi­
ously you can see, but then taking a view from the person as well would be a 
help, wouldn't it.” (Dheepa Naidoo)
In sum, bottom-up feedback mechanisms throughout the change project appear to 
have been undeveloped and individual initiative stifled by a rigid technology and a dis­
tinct hierarchy. The latter two aspects also play a role in causing an inattentiveness or 
even disinterest at the management level in bottom-up feedback provision, especially in 
Germany. It must be suspected that these circumstances had a profoundly diminishing 
impact on learning in general, since feedback is a factor that links individuals, groups, 
and the organization in the collective learning process. Moreover, resistance as a feed­
back mechanism with a strong signal value was neglected, thereby adding to the neglect 
of this type of knowledge generation and provision.
Learning by doing
The code ‘individual learning’ naturally pertains mostly to employees at the Brit­
ish subsidiary, since they were the main target group that needed to learn the new sys­
tem. British managers use SAP as well, but it is by far not such an integral part of their 
daily routines. The main finding for the employees is their preference for practical 
learning. Instead of receiving lectures or handbooks, the employees found it much more 
useful to get a hands-on introduction that was tailored to their specific task structure. As 
indicated in the findings for the code ‘training’, practicing with SAP on a mock system 
and later as a form of on-the-job training was the main way of learning for individuals. 
Hence, this direct experiential learning reflects the model proposed in the theoretical 
chapter on organizational learning. New employees that joined the company after the 
change project also had an experiential learning phase.
“Any new person that starts, we just sit them with another person who's used 
it for a long time and they get to talk.” (Alice Farnsworth)
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Interviewer: “So how do you learn, how do you build on [the basics you 
were taught]?”
Alice Farnsworth: “Uh, if you have a problem, if there is something I can't 
do, if I ask somebody in the sales office and they don't know, fair enough, we 
then go to the factory and ask, there is a person at the factory, and nine times 
out o f ten it's Frank, and then he passes the information back.”
Interviewer: “So you wouldn't fiddle around yourself and try?”
Alice Farnsworth: “You could, but you would end up in an awful lot o f trou­
ble, I prefer to ask somebody, I think because SAP is quite powerful [...], 
and I could do a lot more damage.”
All in all, the findings on individual learning so far seem in accordance with the 
theoretical expectations. Experiential learning at the individual level, as will be shown 
mostly linked to and supported by group interaction, constitutes the majority of partici­
pants’ learning efforts. The accounts provided on learning concentrate on the new tech­
nology and on the lowest level in the hierarchy. Managers in Britain and Germany seem 
somewhat peripheral to the learning efforts within the project. Again, resistance neither 
plays a role for individual learning in the new system, nor functions as a source of learn­
ing for the improvement of the system or for project changes.
Results on the thematic code ‘group learning’ will be presented further below in 
section 4.5.2 on group level learning.
Honesty, cohesiveness, and lost learning
When people terminate their working relationship with the organization and leave, 
or when knowledge is not expressed in observable behavior, then learning is lost to the 
organization. At R&P UK there was one case of a customer service representative leav­
ing voluntarily prior to the change project30. Several members of staff in the UK re­
ported that the particular customer service employee left, because she apparently felt 
unwilling to meet the upcoming challenge of having to adapt to a new technology. As 
learning builds on prior knowledge, collective learning efforts are impeded if knowl­
edgeable individuals are no longer available. UK managers showed awareness of the 
detrimental effects of losing experienced staff in a period of change.
“People could possibly have left [because of the change]. If they left, their 
expertise went with them. They didn't have any expertise in SAP, but they 
sure as hell knew what they were doing at the moment, and could talk the 
customer tune. [...] If  you lost them, and had brought an outsider in, who had 
no loyalty to R&P, who was just there for the salary, we lost that. [...] We
30 The dismissed warehouse staff is not considered here, because they worked in a separated unit, which 
was closed down entirely. Although a lot of knowledge lost as a result, it was, however, mostly irrelevant 
to the subsidiary’s further operations.
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train people to be experienced, to know what our customers need. [...]
Change your staff every six months and you have no experience.” (Hugh 
Prescott)
“I think the biggest problem that faces R&P is that as they exercise more con­
trol they will stifle individuality and then they will lose the benefit of having 
the flair and the imagination that comes from grassroots.” (Hugh Prescott)
R&P UK was fortunate to have only one employee from its core unit leave as a 
consequence of the change. Experience-based collective learning therefore seemingly 
did not suffer dramatically. It is naturally harder to assess the extent of learning lost due 
to individuals’ failure to share their knowledge, that is the non-translation of individual 
knowledge into behavior observable by others. The results under the code ‘group learn­
ing’, presented in the next section, would indicate that this was minimal, as respondents 
reported a great sense of cooperation during the learning phase. However, the second 
quote above hints at the influence of a changing company culture that might function as 
a discouragement to open interaction with the purpose of collective learning. In addi­
tion, it has been shown that there was a certain inattentiveness or lack of interest for bot­
tom-up feedback. These two facts combined suggest that despite employees’ willing­
ness to cooperate with one another, the company itself might lose learning through a 
more control-oriented culture and a discouragement of personal initiative and construc­
tive criticism.
At the end of the individual interviews respondents were asked to tell about the 
lessons they learned as a result of the change project. This was an open question that did 
not refer specifically to any topic discussed during the interview, and respondents were 
prompted to think of recommendations for future change projects.
Honesty and fairness were the two suggestions UK managers highlighted. They 
stressed the importance of fair treatment in getting the support of the staff to follow 
along a change initiative. One manager named the warehouse closure as the prime ex­
ample for a positive outcome of fair treatment, as a result of which the warehouse op­
erations could be maintained until the end of the change period. More proper and early 
communication was also suggested.
“When there is change, be honest with people, be as honest as you can be 
with people. If  there is going to be a change that might affect people, let them 
know as soon as possible, and don't let the rumors start spreading, you know, 
give them the truth and ask for their support and I think you get it. I think 
that's one issue. The second issue is good communication as in all things is 
really the key.” (John McGregor)
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The German management team also focused on communication as an important 
success factor. It was recognized that communicative efforts could have been more ex­
tensive in the change project. What is meant is more particularly direct personal interac­
tion rather than telephone calls or emails. In addition, the German side also stresses the 
positive effects on the organization’s cohesiveness that such a project entails.
Wessons learned are certainly that such projects develop the cohesiveness of 
the organization [...] very, very strongly, [...]. That you simply get to know 
each other better. [...] It brings the organization together and thereby the un­
derstanding for the problems of the other side.” (Heinz Berwanger)
Especially for England I would have had the IT do more of the training part 
[...]. There were many misunderstandings, so communication, definitely 
more direct communication on site.” (Peter Schmitdbauer)
The recommendation for more communication is also brought forth by British 
employees. They mostly relate this to the aspect of honesty, namely informing the entire 
organization about upcoming changes as early and as comprehensively as possible. Re­
flecting on earlier results on anxiety and uncertainty, the employees again stress their 
uncomfortableness with the in their view inadequate information flow during the pro­
ject. In addition, more training is recommended, as indicated in the earlier result section 
on the insufficiency of the training program. One employee suggests additional training 
sessions a few months into the change and afterwards at regular intervals.
“Be as upfront as you can be and reassure people, that just because that's 
closing it doesn't mean that this is going to go. I mean that's all we wanted to 
know basically, and people were too frightened to ask.” (Abigail Woolfe)
Interviewer: “So more communication and training?”
Susan Parker: “I bet everybody said that, haven't they?”
In sum, the lessons learned by project participants center on recommendations 
about more and better training, a commitment to openness about the direction of the 
change, and more frequent and comprehensive communication between organizational 
units.
The findings for the basic code ‘communication’ pertain to learning at the group 
level, and will therefore be presented in the next section.
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4.5.2 Group level learning
Similar to the section on existence and intensity of group level awareness, infor­
mation about learning at the group level needs to be extracted from the interview results 
and the project documentation. Due to a scarcity of relevant data in the documents, find­
ings on group level learning stem mainly from the interviews, namely from the thematic 
code ‘group learning’ and from the thematic category ‘changing through communica­
tion’.
As indicated by the quotes in the ‘learning by doing’ section, individual and group 
learning seem to be closely linked in the project; especially in an environment were 
many employees work in the same room. This assumption is confirmed in respondents’ 
accounts of group learning. Again, the topic of group learning is mostly relevant to em­
ployees, since British managers do not work as a group and do not rely extensively on 
SAP in their daily routines. The few remarks by German managers in this realm entirely 
correspond with those by employees at the subsidiary, which are presented below.
UK employees generally highlight the group experience as the key driver of their 
learning the new system. Facilitated by an open door policy at the subsidiary and by an 
open-plan office floor for the majority of staff, employees’ learning involved to a great 
extent asking colleagues for help, sharing information with others, and working through 
problems together.
“P f people got stuck], they'd say I don't know what to do, does anybody un­
derstand how to do this, and if one of us did, because obviously we would 
pick up different points, some quicker, and you know, in one area and other 
people would pick up points in a different area, yes, you would just shout, 
what can I do, and we would all gather around somebody's computer and try 
to find out.” (Christine Peters)
“I feel that myself and the other girls, we sort of all taught one another, as we 
progressed with it, we all found out certain things, different things at different 
times and we'd pass that information on to each other, and I feel for me basi­
cally my learning of it came from there more than anything else.” (Susan 
Parker)
The two quotes above reflect the propositions about group learning and memory 
made in the process model in chapter 1.9. The employee groups learn by communicat­
ing through action or verbalization, and a transactive form of memory seems to be pre­
sent in which different individuals are knowledgeable about different aspects of the new 
system. Respondents also noticed that the speed and easy with which individuals learn 
the new technology appears to be to some extent a function of age, with older employ­
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ees being a bit slower and more nervous. But such problems seem to have been ab­
sorbed by an atmosphere of sharing, interaction, and dialogue, where everyone would 
make new knowledge available for their colleagues. In cases where employees could 
not find a solution to a problem locally, the particular issue would be passed on along 
the hierarchical structure to the managers at the subsidiary and then to headquarters. 
This trail of expertise back to the central IT department functioned well according to 
British employees, who found the experts in Germany to be generally responsive to 
their inquiries.
Changing through communication
The two codes on communication were not included as topics in the original in­
terview topic guide, but were later added in the analysis because of the frequency of re­
spondents’ comments in this realm. Communication within the UK and communication 
between the subsidiary and headquarters were coded for separately.
The results for communication within the subsidiary revealed some overlap with 
earlier findings on anxiety, uncertainty, and lessons learned. This code pertains exclu­
sively to the British participants, as German managers did not comment on the commu­
nication amongst their foreign colleagues. It has already been shown that communica­
tive efforts in term of group learning were judged positively by respondents. However, 
the communication about the change itself was often deemed suboptimal. Although UK 
managers generally judge their information policy to have been adequate, indicating for 
example the frequent staff meetings prior to the change, the fact that employees ex­
pressed great uncertainty throughout the project causes doubts about whether the inter­
nal communication was sufficient.
“We knew it at the end of May, beginning of June, we didn't tell the ware­
house until July. We took a month to process the management structure to 
make sure they were right, [...] we were all on board with this, [...] except 
the warehouse manager, he was kept in darkness, we felt that his allegiance to 
his staff was too strong. This had to be kept quiet until the right time. Uh, we 
were guilty of doing exactly what Germany had done to us, but we were on a 
damage limitation.” (Hugh Prescott)
Hence, it seems as if the same kind of scarcity of information from headquarters 
that UK managers complained about was passed on to the British employees. The Brit­
ish managers unanimously stress their eagerness to be open with their staff, but appar­
ently felt particularly at the beginning of the change project that the news should not be 
disclosed too early.
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UK employees largely reiterate earlier findings in their comments on communica­
tion within the subsidiary. They report about the information meetings at the beginning 
of the project, and about the well functioning communicative interaction at the group 
level. In addition, they also reflect on the uncertainty aspect once the full ramifications 
of the change project were announced.
The last code ‘communication with headquarters’ deals with the communication 
between the organizational units in Britain and Germany. The word count for this code 
is comparatively large (see Figure 4.1), because respondents provide many elaborate 
descriptions of meetings and conversations. Again, the results on this code show some 
overlap with results presented earlier, so the findings shown here will be rather brief.
UK managers evaluate the general quality of the communication stream between 
headquarters and subsidiary as rather mediocre. They recognize traditional weaknesses 
in this area, and again criticize the lack of participation in the decision making to go 
ahead with the change project. Regarding the latter point, British managers are dissatis­
fied and disappointed that they seemingly were not consulted or more directly involved 
in conceptual discussions about the project, and hence felt that important information 
was withheld from them. Such presumptions need not necessarily be fact based, but 
they reflect the perceptions of participants. At the same time, the trans-organizational 
communication on aspects of the functionality of SAP was thought to be rather good 
most of the time.
“We traditionally haven't been very good as a company in passing on infor­
mation.” (Robert Walsh)
It should be stressed that the recognition of a quality or frequency deficit in com­
munication between organizational units is backed by a common perception that good 
communication is crucial in large-scale change efforts.
This view is shared by the British employees, who felt similarly uninformed at 
times, as shown before. The employees cannot comment on the top-level communica­
tion on the project itself, but they do elaborate on task related exchanges concerning 
their daily routines. Such exchanges of queries about the functions of SAP are appar­
ently responded to quickly and comprehensively, which reflects on the integrative func­
tion of the new technology. SAP as a company-wide system links different units closely 
together and greatly enhances communication via email.
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In their accounts of communication across units German managers mostly reiter­
ate their lessons learned. They provide some descriptive episodes and conclude that 
communication should probably move up higher on the agenda for future projects.
In sum, it seems that all participants recognized the pivotal role of communication 
for the project, but at the same time recollected distinct deficits therein. The learning 
model proposed in the theory chapters employs communication within the feed forward 
and feedback processes as the underlying transmission mechanism. In a similar way 
communication seems to be the underlying brace holding together and enabling the 
change process. The change did function through communication, but as shown there 
was apparently too much peremptory top-down communication and too little innovative 
and constructive bottom-up communication.
4.5.3 Organizational level learning
Despite the indication in Table 3.2 (p. 138), in this section on organizational level 
learning, evidence from the documentation is enriched by relevant interview data. As a 
result, the information about learning at the organizational level consists of the thematic 
interview category ‘random formalization’ and the thematic document category ‘selling 
SAP’. This latter category label was also used for interview content relating to learning 
from resistance at the individual level. The same theme appears again briefly in the 
documentation and provides evidence for a lack of learning from resistance at the or­
ganizational level.
Random formalization
Formalization had been identified in the first theory chapter as learning at the or­
ganizational level, as mainly the consolidation of learning efforts undertaken among in­
dividuals and groups. The change project at R&P UK required learning in the interac­
tion with the new computer system, and because of the generally altered circumstances 
at the subsidiary. One aspect of formalization is the writing up of training contents, an 
important aspect of new knowledge, as it comprises most of the instructions on how to 
use the new system. Asked about their formalization or consolidation efforts, British 
managers mainly referred to the production of a training manual that was specific to UK 
operations. They do not explicitly specify any other kind of systematic written consoli­
dation of knowledge built up during the project. Albeit, moderate regret is voiced over
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the fact that there is apparently no organized scheme in any knowledge consolidation 
effort.
“Looking back, the biggest criticism of our general performance was the fact 
that we couldn't really put together, at the stage we were doing the initial 
training manuals that we were happy with for the UK users, put together 
really comprehensive sets of instructions because there were lots of things we 
were learning during the process ourselves.” (Robert Walsh)
Most formalization related to the change within the subsidiary seems to be under­
taken at an ad hoc basis, without an officially allocated production time or storage loca­
tion. British employees describe this more directly in comparison to their superiors. Ac­
cording to them, the retention of knowledge about the system was spread across differ­
ent media, but always in a rather improvised and unsystematic manner. Employees 
would send emails to one another about new findings, write insights on a notice board in 
the back of the customer service room, save text files on the local intranet, keep per­
sonal notes in desk drawers, or refer to the local SAP manual, which was evaluated by 
most employees as unsatisfactory. The content of such formalization would mostly be 
about procedures in the SAP system. However, this content was dispersed among many 
employees and locations, which would make retrieval of a specific piece of information 
very difficult.
Interviewer: “Has there been somebody creating an official binder of ‘SAP 
uncovered’, or ‘tips and tricks’?
Christine Peters: “No, I don't think so, no. [...] Somebody came over from 
Germany again and tried to sort any problems, she produced a huge bunch of 
notes that Rebecca put into a folder. [...] Nobody actually produced some­
thing to begin with, and said this is the manual, here you are, certainly not 
from Germany. We sort of did this on our own I think, more sort of loose 
sleeve system than a formalized thing.”
“pf] somebody has a problem, we'd all reach for our notes and see if anybody 
had actually made any notes on their folder.” (Rose Browning)
“Nobody's been nominated for [the formalization of knowledge]. It would 
have been a good idea at the time, [...]. I mean, I haven't, I keep notes for 
myself. Sometimes when I have to do something I can't remember how to do 
it, but I have kept it in an email and I can find it that way and I'll go into that 
if I can't remember how to do it. But no, nobody's amalgamated all this in­
formation.” (Jane Adams)
While German managers cannot comment on the formalization efforts of their 
British colleagues, they provide a somewhat similar impression as illustrated above 
when asked about their documentation of the project. The written material for the transi­
tion at R&P UK was largely adapted from documents on the earlier change projects in
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other national subsidiaries. This includes mostly training materials, planning documen­
tation, and technical specifications. Interestingly the German management did not pro­
duce any final analysis or retrospective evaluation of the project, something that was 
missing in British managers’ recollections as well.
Heinz Berwanger: “Normally we don’t produce [a final report], that is not 
customary here, we do a continuous improvement process throughout the 
project, we have open points, which are tackled, but a proper final report, we 
don’t do that.”
Interviewer: “Why?”
Heinz Berwanger: “If things work out you don’t have to do it.”
The reason given in the quote above for not writing a final project report reflects 
on earlier theorizing about resistance to change. Had there been more resistance in the 
project, or had the existing resistance not been denounced as dysfunctional, it must be 
suspected that this particular manager would have found a retrospective analysis more 
worthwhile. Hence, while important learning from experience is precluded by a lack of 
interest for this relatively smooth transition, resistance and a functional understanding 
thereof might have prompted managers to consider learning from experience more seri­
ously. In that respect, resistance might not only have the potential to function as a 
source, but also as a stimulus for learning.
Overall, the formalization efforts related to the focal change project seem to be 
random and unsystematic. There is no centralized database or established directory 
where new knowledge is retained. The consolidation relies on individual initiative, is 
hardly cumulative for the entire organization, and thereby impedes easy retrieval. As for 
a retrospective analysis and evaluation of the project, a potentially strong means of ex­
periential learning, this was apparently neglected completely by both the British and the 
German management. This conclusion is confirmed by the earlier examination of the 
production frequency of project documentation (see section 4.1.2, p. 172), in which it 
was found that the formalization effort practically ended shortly after the system im­
plementation.
Selling SAP
‘Learning from resistance’, is the sole code retained in the document analysis 
from the interview learning cluster, and the sole indicator of learning in the project 
documentation. It combines only three quotations; all coming from the single employee 
newsletter that mentions the change project. The author, Kevin Franks, informs his em­
ployees about the upcoming change.
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“As you may be aware we in the UK will be integrated into this exciting new 
system from the 1st of February next year. With the introduction of this sys­
tem we can look forward to many immediate improvements to our current 
systems, along with ongoing improvements as future developments are made 
to the new system.” (Kevin Franks in an employee newsletter)
The wording of this text passage and two others in the document corresponds ex­
actly to Kevin Franks’ interview remarks about selling the new system to the employees 
at the subsidiary. SAP is described as exciting and an immediate improvement, while 
the detrimental effects of the system on the warehouse operations or any acceptance is­
sues are omitted.
There are no other comments on learning or indicators of learning from resistance 
in the document content. All other assumptions about learning concerning the project 
documentation are based on production frequency and observations about content char­
acteristics, and were mainly presented in section 4.1.2.
4 .6  Su m m a r y
Concentrating on the research focus, the findings indicate moderate resistance by 
a single individual, low awareness construed as dysfunctional and exclusive to German 
managers at the individual and group level, and no observable use of resistance as a 
source of learning at any level of analysis. In the following, these presented results on 
the variables resistance, awareness, and learning as well as on the influence of contex­
tual factors are integrated to conclude on the question of learning by resistance in the 
change project at Rousseau & Paul UK.
The transformation at R&P UK resulted in decreased independence for a formerly 
rather autonomous subsidiary. Integrated in a uniform, company-wide IT architecture 
and a joint distribution system, the British operations became significantly more trans­
parent within the centralized structure of the whole organization. This centralized struc­
ture is reflected in the decision-making process about the change that took place in a 
non-participative style exclusively at headquarters. The fait accompli criticized by Brit­
ish respondents emerges in the first document presented by German managers, which 
already contains a project management organigram and a detailed time plan. Resulting 
from a lack of participation in a decision that entailed many redundancies and sincere 
changes, UK participants reported increasing suspicion and anxiety. However, such
242
Results
negative emotions and anticipations were apparently not strong enough to trigger wide­
spread resistance.
The minimal resistance that did surface was confined to a single individual, the IT 
manager at the British subsidiary, and was expressed by him through reluctant coopera­
tion and open criticism of the change measures. No other change recipients followed 
this course of action. There are two immediate, contextual reasons for the detected lim­
ited degree of resistance.
First, the new system was presented as an overwhelming technical fix. Any criti­
cal assessment of the new system is essentially ruled out by its monolithic structure, in­
flexibility to local changes, and the centralized system architecture. R&P UK was the 
fourth in a succession of SAP implementations in national subsidiaries and was required 
to adapt to preconfigured standards. The project was therefore subject to a success im­
perative that rejected local criticism and amendment. Second, SAP seems to be a genu­
ine improvement over the previous technically inadequate system. It enables the distri­
bution from a centralized warehouse facility in Germany and has a modem user inter­
face that allows for quicker processing and transactions. Resisting SAP as a whole 
would not have made sense from a usability perspective.
One more reason for the low level of resistance is central to the research focus of 
the present study, and relates to the role of awareness. More specifically, it reflects on 
the interaction between awareness of resistance and resistance itself. Only German 
managers, at the individual and group level, showed explicit awareness about resistance. 
This awareness was communicated as not necessitating significant consequences for 
action, and the resistance observed by them was perceived as dysfunctional. The seman­
tic elaboration of resistance in the project by German managers is partially reflected in 
the general repertory grid results. While a majority of the elicited elements and con­
structs show a rather dysfunctional and destructive image of resistance, the multivariate 
solutions illustrate that all groups recognize the potential for resistance to be construc­
tive and functional. However, the concept was never directly associated with improve­
ment or learning. An apparent disinclination to recognize functional qualities of resis­
tance was demonstrated, for example, by two British managers’ unwillingness to evalu­
ate resistance in the repertory grid exercise, because they felt upset by a suspected asso­
ciation of their subsidiary with this controversial concept. The little resistance that did 
surface at the individual level in the project was pathologized by dismissing it as a per­
sonality issue. As a result, over the time span of the project, the reciprocal effects of the
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described type of awareness seemingly contributed to the confinement of resistance to 
the reluctance of a single individual.
In sum, within the context of a hierarchical structure that impedes bottom-up input 
and an identified success imperative, the potential for resistance was largely smothered. 
Project success for the realm of the human factor, that is the change recipients, was sub- 
liminally defined as acquiescent acceptance, which is reflected in the idea purported by 
UK managers of selling SAP to their employees. Resistance in this context acquired an 
‘all or nothing’ connotation for the change recipients, thereby excluding moderate forms 
of informed criticism and user feedback. The reciprocal effects of low awareness and 
negative construal further precluded any consequential emergence of resistance or con­
structive attentiveness to criticism.
The possibility of resistance functioning as a source of organizational learning 
was minimized by the described low degree of resistance, the confined awareness, and 
the negative construal. In fact, no learning from resistance at the individual and group 
level was reported, and there is no relevant evidence in the project documentation. It 
seems that awareness, as the necessary mediator, was not sufficiently prevalent and in­
tense to trigger learning. Resistance and awareness of resistance were neither recog­
nized nor utilized as sources of learning.
There was, however, learning from other sources, such as the training on and in­
teraction with the new system. The involved learning processes were assessed, and con­
sonance with several aspects of the proposed integrated framework of organizational 
learning was found. Getting practical experience on the new system was the preferred 
type of learning at the individual level, while learning through interaction and dialogue 
at the group level was also extensively reported. Factual or perceived experts served as 
key elements of a transactive memory system. British managers verified the assumption 
that individual learning may be lost because of decreased motivation or employees leav­
ing the company. Task execution and experience gathering seems to have temporally 
preceded formalization in general. However, there were also several impediments to 
learning in the project.
First, there was generally little interest by change agents in bottom-up feedback 
from change recipients. As implied above, informed user comment was not encouraged. 
While there were certainly constraints set by a uniform company-wide IT solution, the 
functionality of the system leaves room for improvement. This was not explored despite
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a potential usefulness for subsequent implementations in other national subsidiaries. 
System uniformity took priority over system usability. Disinterest by management in 
employee opinion hindered the flow of learning across levels of analysis, and might 
likely decrease employees’ motivation for bottom-up feedback provision in the future. 
This is especially problematic given that the importance of good communication be­
tween the different units of the organization was emphasized unanimously by respon­
dents. Second, the formalization resulting from individual and group learning on the 
new system followed a mostly random fashion. There was no systematic gathering of 
generated knowledge. Instead, employees collected their own notes ad hoc and circu­
lated them around the work floor. The formalization represented by the official project 
documentation was dominated by technical information. Such documentation makes 
decisions and responsibilities traceable, but disregards many learning purposes. Pro­
duced exclusively by staff at German headquarters and handed down to the subsidiary, a 
change recipient perspective was absent. Third, and closely related to the characteristics 
of the general formalization is the lack of retrospective project evaluation, which also 
diminished potential learning. The documentation contains no evaluative report, again 
despite the fact that at least two similar projects were to follow at other national subsidi­
aries.
In conclusion, the factors that stifled resistance and awareness not only precluded 
resistance as a source of learning, but also largely shaped any other learning during the 
change. Learning was not a priority in the project, vividly demonstrated by the disinter­
est in bottom-up feedback. An opportunity for more organization-wide learning was 
lost, and it must be suspected that not heeding resistance might have detrimental effects 
in the long run. Such assumptions will be part of the following discussion chapter.
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5 DISCUSSION
The objective of this thesis was to assess the potential of resistance to change as a 
source of organizational learning. In the theoretical sections, resistance was depicted as 
an independent variable with effects on organizational processes. A shift of attention 
from the causes to the effects of resistance illuminated the diagnostic and informative 
qualities of the concept, which were examined for their capability to initiate learning in 
an empirical case study of an organizational change project. More specifically, the de­
pendent variables of interest were organizational awareness about resistance, as sug­
gested by an analogy to acute pain, and resulting organizational learning. For both vari­
ables, an influence of contextual factors was recognized and three levels of analysis 
were distinguished. Learning processes were identified as cognition on the individual 
level, communication on the group level, and formalization on the organizational level, 
and were integrated into a framework of learning and memory. The results of the study 
revealed several contextual and procedural factors that limited the emergence of resis­
tance and awareness, and subsequently hindered learning in general and precluded 
learning from resistance in particular.
In the following last chapter, a reflection on both the reviewed and proposed the­
ory as well as on the analyzed results will be provided. First of all, the research focus is 
discussed, including contextual influences, focal variables, and the employed analogy to 
acute pain. As the findings indicate a lost opportunity for learning and limited aware­
ness of resistance, some opportunity costs of not heeding resistance are considered. Fol­
lowing an evaluation of the proposed process model of organizational learning, the 
chapter then concludes with reflections on the research process, on the limitations of the 
findings, and on implications for further research.
5.1 O r g a n iz a t io n a l  l e a r n in g  f r o m  r e s is t a n c e
In the first part of the discussion chapter, I will return to both the research ques­
tion and the research focus, and evaluate the main conceptual issues from the onset of 
the study in the light of the obtained empirical results.
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5.1,1 Revisiting the results
“How can an organization learn from resistance to change?” This research ques­
tion was asked on the basis of theoretical discussions about the processes of collective 
learning and the potential for resistance to act as a functional source thereof. The short, 
practical answer arising from the results of the conducted empirical study is twofold, 
and distressingly banal: An organization can learn from resistance to change, if it allows  ^
resistance in its midst, and is interested in learning.
Little resistance was found in the change project at R&P UK. The new computer 
system was sold as an overwhelming technical fix, and its smooth implementation was 
an imperative set by headquarters. While in principle recognizing potential benefits of 
resistance to change initiatives and change contents, respondents neither considered re­
sistance an option nor associated it with possible improvement or learning in the cir­
cumstances of the project. On the contrary, the little resistance that did surface was dis­
missed as a personality issue. This type of ‘negative’ awareness is suspected to have had 
reciprocal effects on the existing resistance, reducing its intensity and the likelihood of 
further emergences, which in turn would then reduce awareness. As a result of such dy­
namics, the low level of awareness did not suffice to trigger learning. In addition, the 
intra-organizational communication that was examined did not easily facilitate learning 
initiated by end users of the new system. Upward communication was generally ham­
pered by the distinct organizational hierarchy. A low priority of linking learning and 
improvement was reflected in the disregard by management of bottom-up user feed­
back. An observed unsystematic formalization and a lack of retrospective project 
evaluation support the impression that learning was not a main concern in the change at 
R&P UK. In sum, the combined results converge on a discouragement of resistance and 
a disinterest in learning.
In a conversation with Heinz Berwanger after the presentation of results to the 
German management, he agreed with these conclusions. As the leader of the German 
management team, he commented that the implementation projects in national subsidi­
aries so far were too preoccupied with technical and operational aspects of the changes. 
Consequently, the ‘human side of the change’, as he called it, would often be left largely 
unattended.
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Given the presented results, allowing or encouraging resistance in the context of 
an organizational change would apparently first of all require a functional understand­
ing. Although respondents acknowledged a potentially informative signal value of resis­
tance in principle, they did not apply this theoretical awareness to the practical circum­
stances of the change project. A perceived inherent negativity, in combination with con­
textual influences, led to a situation in which resistance was generally not considered as 
a viable option. The negative representations of resistance among project participants 
concur with Bauer’s (1993) results in his semantic differential study of the concept, in 
which he found a prevalence of similarly negative connotations and a strong association 
with deficit concepts. Hence, the dysfunctionality of resistance in the eye of the internal 
observer seems to not be particular to the examined circumstances, but appears to be a 
common phenomenon in organizational settings. Resistance is an emotive term and is 
likely to be intuitively bad news in many organizational circumstances.
In order to increase the learning potential of resistance, one conclusion from these  ^
findings would be to promote a functional understanding. Relating to the semantic/ 
elaboration aspect of the awareness variable, such a functional understanding would 
likely not have a dampening reciprocal effect on resistance, because it conveys an inter­
est in extracting information from the behavior of the resistant individual. Therefore, a 
functional understanding would lead to stronger awareness, or would at least not de­
crease awareness. It then becomes a practical task of change management to educate /  
change participants about the diagnostic and informative aspects of resistance. Another / 
method of facilitating a less aversive reaction to resistance might also be to simply 
change the label. When presented with the findings of the research study, the British 
management, for example, advised me to not use the term resistance in future field re­
search, because of the term’s negative and emotive connotations. While a different ter­
minology might yield some benefits regarding access and cooperation in applied re­
search, the usefulness of a new label for the changing organization is not so clear. A la­
bel less salient than resistance might not raise a sufficient degree of awareness to func­
tion as a learning input, for example.
Following the rationale outlined above, more awareness and in turn more learning 
would be facilitated if resistance were assessed by change participants for its diagnostic 
and informative content. This assumption, however, begs two questions. First, can only 
a functional understanding of resistance raise awareness? As explained above, under­
standing resistance functionally would increase the intensity of awareness because of
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the information seeking due to the interest in the diagnostic qualities of resistance. 
However, a dysfunctional understanding might also increase awareness simply because 
of the bad news value of resistance. Hence, in one scenario, awareness is raised as a 
function of interest, while in the other scenario awareness is raised as a function of 
alarm. The second, related question is whether only awareness in the form of a func­
tional understanding can lead to learning? Awareness has been established as a neces­
sary precondition for learning, and the empirical results in the present study showed that 
a dysfunctional construal of resistance, in combination with other factors, precluded 
learning. It must be suspected, however, that a dysfunctional understanding can also 
serve as a learning input, although leading to a different type of learning. If resistance is 
seen as a nuisance that needs to be overcome, the organization might learn to avoid it in 
the future. This question of types of learning will be discussed in more detail further be­
low in section 5.1.3.
Apart from allowing resistance, a basic interest in learning seems to be the second 
general requirement for organizational learning from resistance to occur. In this study it 
was shown that strong contextual influences diminished especially upper management’s 
interest in learning. The two key diminishing factors seemed to be the nature of the pro­
ject itself and the centralization of the organization in combination with a somewhat 
more pronounced hierarchy.
Identified as a monolithic technical fix, the computer system that was imple­
mented at R&P UK offered no degrees of freedom to be adapted the to the needs of the 
local organization. Moreover, despite the novelty and centralized architecture of the sys­
tem, SAP did not require a deep alteration of employees’ work routines. Employees at 
the subsidiary had worked on computers before the change already, and they recognized 
the immediate benefits of the new technology to their everyday tasks. Hence, the nature 
of the change appears to at least partially determine whether learning is at the periphery 
or at the core of an organization’s attention. It must be expected that more fundamental 
changes, for which standardized solutions are neither available nor applicable, or for 
which the focal organization has no prior experience, generate a greater necessity to pay 
attention to learning. Such changes may not only create urgency for learning, but might 
also cause greater resistance in the first place. In this respect it would have been inter­
esting to look at the first SAP implementation at R&P in Germany and compare that 
initial change with the subsequent change at the British subsidiary. One might also
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speculate about the external influence of the somewhat static environment of the ceram­
ics industry in which R&P operates. Learning is likely to move to the top of the agenda 
for organizations that are subject to constantly changing environments (Eisenhardt, 
1989b; von Rosenstiel & Koch, 2001).
A second factor that diminished learning in the observed project seems to be the 
constraining influence of organizational hierarchy. The change caused R&P UK, a for­
merly rather independent subsidiary, to become integrated in a centralized organiza­
tional structure. The geographical distance, the different languages, and several layers of / 
hierarchy seem to be impediments to a flow of learning. User feedback needs to travel 
further in the centralized organization to reach people with the authority to make sig­
nificant decisions. In addition, bottom-up feedback seems to have been generally un­
common, and was not encouraged by management.
Along with the centralization, the new system also brought about greater transpar­
ency. Essentially, this meant greater top-down control, as the administrative rights to the 
system’s monitoring functions all lay at headquarters. As a result, greater transparency 
changed the power relations by increasing the means of control of the German man­
agement. Similar effects of new technology on intra-organizational power relations, al­
beit not necessarily with the same implications, have been illustrated by other authors; 
for example for the case of CT scanners in hospital radiology departments (Barley, 
1986), or for the case of a computerized information system in a government agency 
(Burkhardt & Brass, 1990). It could also be assumed that the lack of interest in bottom- 
up feedback might have been caused by a confidence in the monitoring capabilities of 
the new system. Finally, the centralization and thereby the integration of the subsidiary 
into the greater organization require an increase of attention to internal communication, 
simply because communication will now often need to travel further or to more recipi­
ents. As this might not have been realized yet at R&P, the found disinterest in learning 
could also be a result of a temporal inability to learn within the new organizational 
structure. Hence, bottom-up feedback would require new patterns of communication 
following the change. In addition, internal feedback and learning need not only be inte­
grated into a more centralized structure, but potential providers also need to feel moti­
vated to contribute. Especially large organizations often institutionalize feedback and 
learning by setting up research and development units, thereby potentially signaling to 
the rest of the employees that there is no specific need for their input. At R&P, for ex­
ample, the generation as well as the execution of amendments and improvements to the
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new system were centralized at the German corporate IT department. On the other hand, 
large organizations also have the resources to devote significant attention to local learn­
ing during and after a change, for example through project evaluations. This was not 
done for the examined project at R&P UK.
In sum, the limitation of resistance and the disinterest in learning constitute a lost 
opportunity for learning in the project. While the disinterest in learning relates to the 
contextual influences, the limited resistance pertains to the dynamics between resistance 
and awareness. In the following section, some procedural implications for the sequence 
of resistance, awareness, and learning are discussed.
5,1.2 Focal variables and levels o f analysis
In Figure 2.2 on page 110, the research focus was illustrated as a sequence of re­
sistance, awareness, and learning. In the empirical study, especially the variables aware­
ness and learning, in combination with contextual factors, were of concern in order to 
assess how an organization can learn from resistance to change. Combining the vari­
ables of the research focus, Table 2.2 on page 111 described potential outcomes of the 
tripartite sequence. The results of the present study showed some resistance, some/ 
awareness, and no learning from these sources in the change project. It becomes clear 
that Table 2.2 cannot capture the revealed nuances, as the findings would have to fit 
somewhere in between the cells. The outcomes in the table were logically derived, and 
the present real case indicates that this structuring of potential outcomes requires some 
refinement. Such refinement needs to account for change participants at various levels 
of aggregation.
Following the conceptualization of organizational learning in the first chapter, 
three levels of analysis were introduced to distinguish between different entities in­
volved. This categorization was then applied to the variables resistance and awareness 
as well. Including levels of analysis in the presentation of results, it was shown that /  
there was resistance at the individual level, awareness at the individual and group level, 
and learning at no level. Going back to Table 2.2, these findings would fit in between 
the two lower cells on the left hand side, since there was awareness, but not at all levels. 
Consequently, a refinement of Table 2.2 needs to integrate levels of analysis. Table 5.1
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below shows the combinations of potential outcomes for the focal variables and the 
three levels of analysis.
Table 5.1: Combinations of focal variables and levels o f analysis
Resistance Awareness Learning
Organization Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Group Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Individual Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
The results for the present study are underlined.
In principle there are 64 potential outcomes. Some of those are theoretically im­
possible. For example, it was established that learning from resistance requires prior 
awareness, which rules out all combinations with any ‘Yes’ in the learning column and 
no awareness at any level at the same time. Other combinations are theoretically possi­
ble, but would need empirical verification to reveal their feasibility. For example, the 
pain analogy suggests that awareness without prior resistance is possible, but it remains 
to be determined to which organizational reality this scenario would relate. The example 
by Prasad & Prasad (2000) illustrated in section 2.1.4 provides some indication of oc­
currences of this type of ‘phantom resistance’ or ‘phantom awareness’. Generally, one 
would expect a left-to-right sequence for the variables, and a bottom-up sequence for 
levels. Hence, learning from resistance requires prior resistance and awareness, and ac­
tivity at the organizational level is enabled by prior activity at lower levels. By this ra­
tionale, it seems unlikely, for example, that awareness restricted to the individual level 
could result in full-spectrum learning. In this respect, the question would be what kind / 
of awareness is required to trigger learning?
This question points to a closer look at the results. There was awareness about re­
sistance at the individual and group level in the change project, but this awareness was 
confined to a subgroup of change participants, namely the German management. The 
majority of individuals and groups at the British subsidiary did not exhibit any aware­
ness of resistance. This indicates a further layer of complexity. At the individual and 
group level there might be partial or full resistance, awareness, or learning, respectively.
At the organizational level, the scaling of extent would only apply to the learning vari­
able, as formalization might be only partially disseminated. Resistance and awareness at
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the organizational level, both not procedurally defined, would necessarily pertain to the 
entire organization. As a result of this added complexity, which derives from the em­
pirical findings, future studies on the research focus need to consider the three focal 
variables, the three levels of analysis, and the degree of participation within each level 
of analysis. Table 5.1 would therefore have to be expanded in the first column on the 
left to account for the degree of resistance, awareness, and learning within each level. 
This is not done graphically here, however, because the issue of between- and within- 
level participation raises a further conceptual point.
Throughout the discussion so far conclusions have been made about the intensity 
of different concepts and processes. It was assumed that the change at R&P UK was not 
dramatic enough to cause widespread resistance, that the observed resistance was not 
strong enough to lead to pervasive awareness, that the analyzed awareness was not in­
tense enough to trigger learning. Moreover, in the paragraphs above it was elaborated 
that the found occurrences were restricted to certain levels of analysis, and to a certain 
degree of participation within those levels. In this light, organizational learning by resis­
tance seems to be a question of transfer and of crossing thresholds: Thresholds between 
variables, thresholds between levels of analysis, and thresholds within levels of analysis.
For organizational learning, the threshold question has been adequately defined, at 
least between levels of analysis. According to the formula described in section 1.6, 
genuine organizational learning is constituted by learning at the individual level and 
learning at the supra-individual level (OL = ILL (GLL+OLL)). Moreover, the processes 
involved in organizational learning have also been outlined. For resistance and aware­
ness the threshold question is not so clear, as these two variables have not been theoreti­
cally dissected against the background of different organizational constituents. An 
analysis of the procedures involved in resistance and awareness at different levels, simi­
lar to that for organizational learning in section 1.7, could provide some clarification on 
the dynamics between levels for those variables.
However, at the core of the threshold discussion seems to be the participation 
within levels of analysis, as this is the smallest distinguished unit and the building block 
for further explanations. Generally, thresholds for within-level participation appear hard r  
to define, and would need to be tackled individually in further research. For example, 
what degree of participation is necessary for partial awareness at the group level, that is, 
how many groups need to be aware of resistance, in order to cause awareness at the or-
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ganizational level? The empirical results showed a partial awareness at the group level, 
as only German managers reported that they had observed and discussed resistance. 
Their awareness did apparently not disseminate to other groups or to all project partici­
pants, indicating a participation below the necessary threshold.
In an ideal or maximized scenario, an emergence of resistance would lead to full 
awareness at all three levels of analysis, and this full organization-wide awareness 
would lead to genuine organizational learning involving all individuals, groups, and the 
organization as a whole. Obstacles to such a scenario are contextual influences, as found 
in the results, and the extent and degree of intensity of the procedural transfer, as pre­
sumed in the threshold discussion. On the procedural side, the maximized scenario 
could in principle be attained by either lowering thresholds or increasing the transfer 
intensity. A functional understanding of resistance, for example, could be expected to 
lower the threshold between resistance and awareness. Increasing the transfer intensity 
between variables could mean to involve all three levels of analysis within each vari­
able. However, these assumptions are somewhat speculative, given the limited empirical 
evidence. Further research needs to determine what processes are involved in resistance 
and awareness at different levels of analysis, and how the procedural transfer is facili­
tated. Internal communication might be expected to play a key role here.
5,1,3 Extending the pain analogy
Two observations that have so far been mentioned in the discussion lead to a reas­
sessment of the pain analogy in the light of the obtained results. In section 5.1.1 it was 
considered whether resistance requires a functional understanding to result in learning. 
The question ensuing from this consideration was whether different perceptions of resis­
tance lead to different types of learning. In section 5.1.2 assumptions were elaborated 
about the empirical observation that the little awareness of resistance in the change pro­
ject at R&P UK was not enough to trigger learning. Even though there was resistance, 
awareness was confined to a subgroup of project participants. The pain analogy would 
lead to the assumption that the project did not feel the pain.
The classical learning literature suggests that learning by acute pain is essentially /  
a form of avoidance learning (Anderson, 1995). If pain is a consequence of action, it 
may be escaped by a particular behavior. However, unlike escape learning, avoidance
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learning is not dependent on reward; it is sustained without further consequences, nei­
ther positive nor negative. Avoidance learning leads to the development of a condi-'  
tioned avoidance reflex, which signals pain inducing situations that need to be avoided 
in the future. As a reflex that is sustained without reinforcement, avoidance learning / 
does not involve deeper processing or a more fundamental assessment of the situation.
If extrapolated to the organizational level, an equivalent of the individual level concept '  
of avoidance learning would be single-loop learning, as introduced in section 1.3.2 on 
types of learning. Single-loop learning is restricted to detecting and correcting errors '  
within a given system of rules. The main issue is performance enhancement within a 
given target. This stands in contrast to double-loop learning, which is defined by the re- ^ 
assessment of underlying assumptions, values, and targets of an activity in the light of a 
new situation. Here, the idea is not so much an efficiency gain, but rather a paradigm 
shift (Argyris & Schon, 1978).
Following the argumentation above, the pain analogy would suggest that organ- ^ 
izational learning by resistance basically leads to avoidance learning. In this perspec- /  
tive, resistance is an unpleasant, painful consequence of organizational action, that is 
change, and hence the essence of learning will be to avoid change in the future. The in­
sight from this kind of learning is minimal. Behavior is suppressed and imagination and 
thinking are not involved. On the basis of the obtained results and the thought process 
so far, two arguments are made against these implications of the pain analogy. The ar­
guments are somewhat intertwined and question the applicability of the analogy in the 
form that was outlined in the second chapter.
Firstly, it is proposed that organizational learning by resistance may resemble , 
double-loop learning if resistance to change is understood functionally. A functional /  
understanding of resistance is constituted by a recognition of the diagnostic and infor­
mative qualities of resistance to change. A pragmatic interest in the signal value of re- ✓ 
sistance necessarily entails an assessment of the change in the light of resistant behav­
ior. This will involve an assessment of antecedents and consequences, objects and moti­
vations for resistance, and the content of the change itself. As a result, deeper cognitive 
processing must be involved than what would be suggested by the avoidance learning 
paradigm. If directed at underlying assumptions and theories-in-use, such deep process­
ing holds the potential for double-loop learning. In short, a functional understanding /  
demands intelligent evaluation, while a dysfunctional understanding encourages over­
coming the nuisance of resistance and avoiding it in the future.
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A second argument against the supposition that organizational learning by resis­
tance always results in avoidance learning is facilitated by a closer look at the processes 
involved in organizational learning. These have been identified as cognition at the indi-/ 
vidual level, communication at the group level, and formalization at the organizational 
level. At higher levels of aggregation, especially at the group level, learning implies in-/ 
teraction, dialogue, sharing, and mutual assessment. Since organizational learning has / 
been described as involving feed-forward across levels, by the time a learning issue has 
reached the organizational level, it will likely have been processed by multiple indi­
viduals. For these reasons, Jost & Bauer (2003) expect a shift towards higher propor- x 
tions of double-loop learning at the group and organizational levels. The single-loop , 
learning pattern inherent in avoidance learning appears too limited in an organizational 
context. Consequently, if learning stalls at the individual level and does not reach the /  
group or the organization, the probability of remaining in the avoidance paradigm 
would be expected to be greater. Referring to probability or likelihood indicates that the 
outlined assumption is not postulated as an invariable mechanism. In principle, avoid­
ance learning might even become formalized and engrained in organizational memory. 
However, the nature of the described group and organizational level processes denotes 
much potential for double-loop learning at higher levels of aggregation.
Overall, the type of organizational learning from resistance seems to depend on 
the kind of understanding of resistance and on the extent of learning at higher levels of 
aggregation. The analogy to acute pain suggests that any organizational learning by re­
sistance results in single-loop learning. In contrast, learning at higher levels and a func­
tional understanding of resistance are presumed to facilitate double-loop learning. In 
conclusion, the pain analogy needs to be extended in this respect.
5.1.4 Opportunity costs o f not heeding resistance
At the end of section 5.1.1 it was concluded that the found limitation of resistance 
and the disinterest in learning amount to a lost opportunity for learning in the change 
project. Such lost opportunities might have detrimental effects in the long run. In the 
following paragraphs some speculations will be discussed about the opportunity costs of 
not heeding resistance.
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The Oxford Reference Online dictionary (1997) defines opportunity cost as “the / 
income or benefit foregone as the result of carrying out a particular decision, when re­
sources are limited or when mutually exclusive projects are involved”. The conscious or 
unconscious decision to inconsiderately overcome resistance instead of paying attention 
to its informative potential can be expected to result in some ‘income or benefits for­
gone’. While a short term crisis situation might only be resolved by suppressing resis- /  
tance and ignoring employee criticism, such a strategy is expected to have negative ef­
fects in the long run. In the present case, resistance was not heeded because of several 
contextual influences and the diminishing dynamics between resistance and awareness. 
In particular, the results emphasized the discouragement of and inattentiveness to bot­
tom-up feedback, the promoted uncritical acceptance of technological change, the sub­
liminal dissociation of resistance from learning and improvement, and the analyzed dys­
functional understanding.
One broad topic area relating to the discussion of opportunity costs is organiza­
tional culture, specifically the focus on implicit, unquestioned assumptions and values 
that people have regarding the way that things should be (Schein, 1990). The culture of 
an organization is continually shaped by events and actions taken, and change is one of 
the most decisive influences (Heracleous, 2001). The way change is handled and man­
aged in an organization will significantly shape the organizational culture, which is in 
turn an important determinant of employee behavior. If resistance to change is smoth­
ered, this affects organizational culture as it conveys a message to employees that the 
organization is either not interested in their opinion or not allowing criticism. The likely 
reaction by affected employees is then to either stop caring to resist and learn, or to stop 
daring to resist and learn.
Caring to resist and learn pertains to a general responsiveness to and interest in 
changes to the organization. In this respect, not heeding resistance might lead to a cul­
ture of indifference, in which employees work to rule, but show little initiative to care 
for anything they are not immediately required to do. Indifference precludes any moti­
vation for inquiry or improvement of operations and circumstances.
Daring to resist and learn pertains to openness, trust, and safety to experiment and 
criticize. In this context, not heeding resistance might lead to a culture of suppression 
and fear, which in turn could lead to resignation and indifference. Such a culture will 
deter individuals from engaging in explorative behavior, and is equally likely to lead to 
a perpetuation of the status quo rather than to a development of improvement and pro­
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gress. As indicated, suppression might precede indifference, and seems to capture the 
essence of the overcoming paradigm. In the following, the discussion will therefore 
concentrate more on aspects of not daring to resist and learn.
A culture of feedback and learning, as propagated most evidently in the literature / 
on the learning organization (Senge, 1990a), is unlikely to be developed or sustained if 
resistance is continually overcome by management. Feedback and learning require a '  
supportive environment. Edmondson (1999; Edmondson & Moingeon, 1999), for ex­
ample, has shown the beneficial effects of psychological safety and trust for team and 
organizational learning. If organizational members hold a shared belief that their envi­
ronment is safe for interpersonal risk taking, they are more likely to engage in learning 
behaviors. An absence of trust and safety is likely to lead to constraints or even com­
plete elimination of any critical assessment of changes.
In general, trust and also leeway to explore and experiment imply the possibility /  
of making mistakes. Learning from mistakes and errors is a key aspect of experiential 
learning (Kolb, 1984). Research on error management and the productive use of errors 
has revealed some beneficial effects of analyzing the informative characteristics of error 
making. During training, for example, the possibility to make and utilize errors signifi- / 
cantly affects the speed and comprehensiveness of learning (Frese, 1995). Individuals/ 
and groups that are encouraged to make errors perform better on a subsequent test than 
those that are discouraged (Heimbeck, Frese, Sonnentag, & Keith, 2003). In his work on 
error management, Frese (1995) initially focuses on the individual level, using errors as 
the independent variable, in order to then speculate about the organizational level. He 
uses the term ‘reflective withdrawal’ as a constructive reaction induced by error mak­
ing. This conceptualization corresponds to the awareness variable of the present re­
search focus. Reflective withdrawal in the context of making errors appears to fulfill a 
role similar to that of functional awareness in the context of resistance. As shown em­
pirically, the sequence of error, reflective withdrawal, and learning led to improved re­
sults. However, these positive effects of error making were only attained when errors 
were not punished or even actively encouraged.
Linking the error literature with the topic of organizational learning, Lipshitz et al. 
(2002) particularly emphasizes the aspect of culture. They state that “tolerance for error 
is management’s principal contribution to psychological safety” (p. 89), and elaborate 
on the productive use of errors. The suggestion that errors in the service of learning
258
Discussion
should not be punished but valued as opportunities for learning is captured in the fol­
lowing tale:
“At the heart of [learning] ... is a m indset... that enables companies to rec­
ognize the value of productive failure as opposed to unproductive success ....
A young manager, after losing $ 10 million in a risky venture was called into 
[IBM’s legendary founder] Thomas Watson’s office. The young man, thor­
oughly intimidated, began by saying, “I guess you want my resignation.”
Watson replied “You can’t be serious. We just spent $ 10 million educating 
you.” (Garvin, 1993, p. 85-86, as cited in Lipshitz et al., 2002)
While these authors focus on learning from errors, their assumptions might be eas­
ily adaptable to the discussion on learning from resistance. This becomes apparent in 
Lipshitz et al.’s (2002) further exploration of the implications of productive error use for 
organizational learning. For example, it is proposed that learning from errors is more 
easily facilitated if errors are critical or costly to the organizational operations. If the 
cost of errors is hard to quantify or will only show in the long run, learning might not be 
triggered immediately and effectively. In contrast, learning from error is of utmost imy 
portance in environments in which people routinely face potentially catastrophic errors, / 
such as nuclear power plants (Carrol, 1995) or fighter flight units (Popper & Lipshitz/' 
1998). Related to the present study, resistance against the SAP implementation would 
not have critically endangered the operations of the organization. Being the fourth im­
plementation at a national subsidiary that generates only a fraction of the company’s 
revenues and profits, the possibility of something going wrong during the change would 
hardly have been assessed as life threatening by management at headquarters. Hence, 
the detected disinterest in learning might well be an effect of the little criticality of the 
change at R&P UK. This observation then implies a relationship between the criticality 
of a change to organizational operations and the impact of resistance on learning. Ac­
cordingly, organizational learning from resistance to change will to some extent be a 
function of the criticality of the change.
The idea of change criticality as a determinant of learning by resistance is sup­
ported by the pain analogy. If acute pain indicates a threat to survival, rather than a mere 
nuisance to the current activity, it will lead to heightened arousal and awareness, and 
will require immediate action and learning. In the same way, resistance during a critical 
change might instill a crisis mentality in the organization, thereby making it more con­
ducive to learning. However, such a crisis mentality might also result in the exact oppo­
site effect of restricted information processing and constricted control, as described in
259
Discussion
the thread-rigidity hypothesis of organizational behavior (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 
1981).
Related to the context of using errors productively and learning from resistance is 
the literature on conflict management. While errors mostly relate to concrete tasks, con­
flict usually revolves around broader sets of issues or behaviors. However, the concept 
of conflict is still narrower in focus than resistance, and concentrates on individuals and 
groups that are negatively affected by other individuals and groups (Thomas, 1992). 
While resistance pertains to all three levels of analysis, errors and conflict are generally r 
researched at the individual and group level, although the organizational level is in­
creasingly becoming a focus of interest. Conflict, like resistance, has a history of being 
treated as a pathological state, and only recently has there been a shift of attention to­
ward the productive use of conflict (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997). Growing evidence 1 
shows that conflict may be beneficial to performance in groups and organizations, and 
that avoiding and suppressing conflict reduces individual creativity, decision quality in 
teams, product development, and communication between work groups (De Dreu, 
1997). For the present purposes, the main finding that is extracted from conflict research/ 
is that the key to understanding productive conflict seems to be a distinction between 
cognitive and affective issues. Conflict over task-related issues, such as scarce resourcesx 
or procedures, appears to enhance group performance, while conflict over social- 
emotional issues, such as values and identity, reduces performance and satisfaction 
(Jehn, 1995; Simons & Peterson, 2000). More generally, group interaction and dialogue, 
that is group learning, seem to benefit from cognitive but not from affective disagree­
ment and dispute.
As emergences of resistance to change usually involve conflict, the treatment of 
resistance might influence the type of ensuing conflict. First of all, if a culture of sup­
pression and fear is the result of overcoming resistance, it can be assumed that any con­
flict still surfacing will reflect the emotional essence of such a culture. There can also 
be, of course, emotional resistance, that is, a resistance not grounded in rational opposi­
tion but in affective antagonism. In such cases, resistance will probably involve emo­
tional conflict irrespective of how it is handled. However, in cases where resistance is 
founded in rationality, inconsiderately overcoming it must be expected to lead to rather 
emotional responses. On the basis of the discussion so far it is therefore speculated that 
not heeding resistance is more likely to lead to affective than to cognitive conflict. In 
this respect, the promotion of a functional understanding of resistance might not only
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prevent a suppressive reaction by management, but might also facilitate the prevalence 
of the cognitive type of conflict.
In sum, if a conscious or unconscious decision is made to not heed resistance, the 
opportunity cost of this decision might be the furtherance of an organizational culture 
that is not conducive to learning. The discussion above illustrated that a lack of heed for 
resistance might not only be associated with stifling learning in general, but conse­
quently also with negatively affecting employee morale and motivation, decreasing psy­
chological safety and trust, diminishing communication, and lower productivity and re­
duced output. Finally, it was shown that the literatures on error and conflict manage­
ment hold a distinct potential to stimulate research on learning by resistance.
5.2 T h e  in t e g r a t e d  f r a m e w o r k  o f  l e a r n in g  a n d  m e m o r y
In this section, the proposed integrated framework of learning and memory across 
levels of analysis (Figure 7.5, p. 80) will be discussed in the light of the empirical re­
sults. The framework was developed as a result of the described fragmentation of organ­
izational learning theory, and in order to illustrate and summarize the theoretical under­
standing of organizational learning in this thesis. Three levels of analysis are distin­
guished, and information processing at each level is defined. At the individual level, 
learning was described as cognition, at the group level as communication through action 
or verbalization, and at the organizational level as formalization. Memory components 
were depicted as individual memory, transactive group memory, and organizational 
memory, respectively. The process model illustrates an integrated feed forward se­
quence that also includes feedback loops. Influential individuals might circumvent the 
group level, and learning is lost when individual learning is not translated into observ­
able behavior and when especially experienced members leave the organization.
The framework was developed as a structuring device that may systematize theory 
building in the realm of organizational learning. Although the present empirical study 
was by no means a proper test of the process model, the results provide some idea about 
the feasibility of the framework as a descriptive representation, and of the applicability 
of its components.
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At the individual level, the learning and memorizing that was reported related 
mainly to the training in the SAP system. It was naturally difficult for respondents to 
retrospectively describe and appraise their own cognition during the interviews. Hence, 
a future assessment might have to utilize methods that provide a closer analysis of the 
given tasks. Individual learning to use a computer system could, for example, be ob­
served in situ while subjects verbalize their experience, and then evaluated afterwards 
with a performance test (Heimbeck et al., 2003). However, the experiential learning cy­
cle in the model seems to well represent the individual learning process in the project, as 
respondents frequently illustrated their ‘leaming-by-doing’ practices. In addition, lost 
learning as a component at this level was reported through references to employees 
leaving the company.
Group level learning as proposed in the model was also found in the project. Shar­
ing, interaction, and dialogue were reported as the essence of learning in the group. The 
portrayal of perceived experts on different components of the new computer software 
indicates the existence of a transactive memory system. Customer service representa­
tives at R&P UK learned in the group by talking to and observing one another. The in­
teraction at the group level fed back and informed individual experiences with the com­
puter system.
While there is adequate replication of the framework at the individual and group 
level, the results for learning at the organizational level might indicate a necessary re­
finement of the proposed conceptualization. Learning on the new system was partially 
consolidated in formal documentation, although this formalization was undertaken in a 
very unsystematic way. The assumption that learning at the organizational level is rather 
a matter of consolidation than creation of knowledge was confirmed insofar as there 
was no content in the documents that indicated learning over and above the issues al­
ready mentioned in the interviews. The prevalence of technical information in the pro­
ject documentation demonstrated, however, that the examination of documentation in 
order to determine learning at the organizational level might be problematic. Not every­
thing that is formalized is automatically an indicator of learning. A necessary distinction 
between content that is specific to learning and irrelevant content will have to be made 
depending on the specific setting. Ideally, this distinction would be made on the basis of 
a longitudinal study, in which the feed forward of learning across levels is examined, 
and in which formalized content could be compared to issues that have come to the fore 
at the individual and group level. Furthermore, not all documentation is the same, as
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there are varying degrees of formality and ‘officialness’. One might therefore speculate 
whether more learning has gone into a document that is very official, such as a share­
holder report as opposed to an internal memo. On the other hand, official documents 
might be extremely streamlined or even censored, such as press statements in some cir­
cumstances. Comparatively more prior learning might also precede documentation that 
is rated as confidential, or documentation that is applicable to the entire organization 
rather than to just a specific unit. Answers to these speculations will have to be empiri­
cal, involving the exact specification of given settings, and the tracking of paper trails. 
Therefore, it is concluded here that there are few universally applicable rules concerning 
the identification of consolidated learning in formalized documentation. Instead, the 
particular analysis will depend on the setting of the given enquiry. However, a longitu­
dinal assessment that is able to follow a learning issue across levels of analysis is ex­
pected to generate more robust results in this context.
One observation that should receive specific attention is the fact that there was no 
official evaluation of the change project at R&P UK. Such an activity could be expected 
to significantly increase the learning content in the documentation. Lipshitz et al. (2002) 
describe post project reviews as important mechanisms of organizational learning, since 
they combine preceding learning at lower levels with a final consolidation, dissemina­
tion, and official status. Post project reviews might also illustrate a link between sharing 
at the group level and formalization at the organizational level, as they are usually pro­
duced by a team of evaluators. In contrast, the managers in the present study spent 
seven times more words in their retrospective accounts on the topic of planning than on 
their evaluation of the project, as was revealed by the word counts of the interview data.
The findings also raised awareness about some influences on the flow of learning 
across levels of analysis, namely organizational hierarchy and possibly internal politics. 
The detrimental effect of a distinct hierarchy on upward communication and feedback 
was already discussed in section 5.1.1. The proposed framework illustrates organiza­
tional learning as requiring not only interaction (at the group level), but also interrela­
tion between levels of analysis. Communicative feed forward and feedback processes 
link the levels, and genuine organizational learning includes learning at a minimum of 
two levels of aggregation. In contrast, a hierarchical system seems to unlink the levels 
of analysis, place formal barriers between them (Glauser, 1984; Salaman, 2001), or in­
crease the distance the communication has to travel to reach its intended recipients (de
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Cock, de Witte, & van Nieuwkerke, 1998). On the other hand, hierarchies seem to have 
some positive effects on memory functions within organizations, as they have been as­
sociated with the storage of group learning (Romme, 1997) and the buffering of the ef­
fect of high turnover rates on organizational knowledge (Carley, 1992). As a result of 
such varying suggestions, the influence of hierarchy on the learning model warrants fur­
ther attention in subsequent studies.
Another potentially decisive influence on the intra-organizational flow of learning 
is internal politics (Coopey & Burgoyne, 2000; Vince, 2001). The process model de­
scribes the aspect of sharing and integration across units and levels of analysis as cru­
cial. However, different interest groups within the organization might show varying de­
grees of willingness to contribute to the exchange and processing of information. Con­
sequently, internal politics are expected to mostly affect the integrative aspect of organ­
izational learning, that is the feed forward and feedback of learning and knowledge. In­
ternal politics were not found to be an influential factor in the present study, especially 
not for group learning in the customer service department. The centralization of deci­
sion authority at headquarters was more of an explicit consolidation of power than a re­
flection of political motivation. Similarly, issues such as the relationship between head­
quarters and subsidiary, or the dismissal of the subsidiary’s general manager, were fre­
quently mentioned but not described as involving political deliberation.
Finally, the value of the framework for theory building about organizational learn­
ing should be briefly assessed. It has been said that the framework integrates suggested 
components of organizational learning into a coherent whole. The inherent descriptions 
of processes include explanations of how one event gives rise to the next, temporally 
subsequent, event. Such descriptions constitute a process theory, as opposed to a vari­
ance theory, in which an increase in an independent variable is theorized to cause an 
increase in some dependent variable (Mohr, 1982). The proposed essential processes of 
learning and memory were found in the empirical data. As a structuring device, the 
framework eases the identification and location of facilitators and inhibitors of the flow 
of learning across level of analysis. Individual motivation, psychological safety, unhin­
dered communication, and a culture of indifference or fear were some of the issues 
mentioned in this respect. Further research will expand this list.
A possible specification was suggested in section 5.1.2 regarding the degree of 
‘penetration’ of learning at the individual and group level. This threshold question could
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be formally integrated, but it is argued here not to over-specify the model in order to not 
constrain further exploration. As many more empirical observations are required to as­
sess the made propositions, it is essential to keep the model flexible enough so that it 
can be adapted to varying circumstances.
5.3 C o n c l u d in g  r e f l e c t io n s
This thesis contributes to the literatures on resistance to change and organizational 
learning. In particular, it links two concepts that have not been associated in a analytical 
study before. This link was facilitated by a new conceptualization of organizational 
learning processes and by an elaboration of the understanding of the signal function of 
resistance in organizational change processes. Other constructs such as errors or general 
conflict have been considered as potential sources of learning. The novel value of this 
thesis is constituted by the independent critical power that has been applied to a system­
atic assessment of the input function of resistance to change for learning beyond the in­
dividual level.
In the following section concluding reflections are made about the limitations of 
the research process and the obtained results. Finally considerations about further re­
search are elaborated and new hypotheses are proposed.
5.3.1 Limitations
The present study is a first step in establishing learning by resistance as a com­
bined phenomenon in the literatures on organizational learning and resistance to change. 
Additional conceptual and empirical work is needed to refine and extend the described 
ideas before more solid conclusions may be drawn. In order for this to be adequately 
contextualized, it is important to illustrate the limits of the obtained empirical findings 
and theoretical propositions. These limits will be elaborated from the general to the 
more specific in the following.
First of all, the nature of the present study in terms of theory building needs to be 
discussed. Weick (1979, p. 36) describes methodological trade-offs in theory building 
by illustrating the commensurate complexity of the research process through the face of
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a clock. The adjectives ‘general’, ‘simple’, and ‘accurate’ are inscribed at twelve, four, 
and eight o’clock respectively. This is to demonstrate that any research in the social sci­
ences, or the theory underlying it, cannot combine generality, accuracy, and simplicity 
at the same time (Thomgate, 1976). For example, experimental laboratory studies, 
placed at six o’clock, are simple and accurate, but have questionable generalizability. 
Multiple qualitative field studies are located at two o’clock, combining generalizability 
and accuracy, but lacking in simplicity. The present single case study would be placed 
at four o’clock; it is accurate, but complex and specific. In the light of this illustration, 
Cialdini (1980) proposes that theory building should start by multiple, real-world obser­
vations (i.e. general and accurate data), proceed to testing hypotheses in the laboratory 
(i.e. simple and accurate data), and finally move towards multiple quantitative field ob­
servations (i.e. simple and general data). Hence, the present study is at the very begin­
ning of the full cycle with a focus on exploration and accurate description. Further 
mainly qualitative field observations should follow that substantiate the inductive theory 
initiated here. Once a number of hypotheses are firmly established (some of which are 
suggested in the next section), anticipated relationships between variables can be iso­
lated and tested. In the long run, cycling between induction and deduction, and in effect 
integrating qualitative and quantitative data, will not only increase the validity of indi­
vidual findings, but also build theory that is not limited by the trade-offs o f single meth­
odologies (Fine & Elsbach, 2000).
Apart from resistance and awareness, the research focus included the variable of 
organizational learning, which was structured procedurally by means of an integrated 
framework. The components of this framework were explored selectively in this study, 
for example group learning or organizational memory. As the topic of organizational 
learning is multifaceted, the relevant literature reveals a specialization into levels of 
analysis and sub-processes. In further studies, a narrowing-down of the initial broad fo­
cus is advisable, in order to develop sound conclusions about the nature of and the rela­
tionships between individual components of the framework. Such as strategy also seems 
sensible because empirical research on organizational learning as an organization-wide 
phenomenon faces the difficulty of requiring a scope for the entire organization. Since 
access and decision control for researchers in professional organizations is mostly lim­
ited, there is rarely a possibility to bring an entire organization to a halt in order to study 
its learning processes. Overall, the main contribution of the present study in regards to
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organizational learning is to set a research agenda and provide broad directions and im­
plications for further research to drill down on specific aspects. The integrated frame­
work does this by breaking the general phenomenon into components and relationships 
that may be analyzed separately. However, the illustrative value of the framework is 
largely conceptual and requires further theoretical and empirical corroboration.
Another aspect of the more general limitations and areas of improvement of the 
study concerns the examination of resistance. It was found that the term resistance has 
largely negative connotations. Accordingly, managers in the UK suggested at the final 
results presentation that this is too emotive a term to be used routinely in such a research 
project. Instead, it was discussed to defuse ‘resistance’ in future research attempts by 
using a different terminology (e.g. attitudes to change), or by at least not labeling the 
entire project with the concept. Considering the research process, in the present case 
resistance was observed in retrospect as opposed to an in situ analysis. Due to the man­
ageable time span between the end of the change and the beginning of the data collec­
tion, memories were still relatively fresh among project participants and documentation 
was still available. But there is certainly a temporal threshold after which an organiza­
tional change becomes too distant to invoke detailed memories or find comprehensive 
archival information. Analyzing resistance in situ, however, might be more complicated 
because of the problem of getting access and because of respondents* situational and 
emotional reactions to an investigation about an ongoing change. On the other hand, in 
the present case only the documentation allowed for an analysis of events over time that 
was not confounded by respondents’ memory capabilities or their selective retrieval. 
Hence, direct data collection with respondents over the course of a project would have 
added a more genuine longitudinal aspect.
A clear limitation of the study regarding the specific aspect of obtainable data is 
the lack of both independent data on the resistance variable and true group level data for 
the existence and intensity of awareness and for learning, as shown in Table 3.2 (p. 
138). These issues have been elaborated several times in previous sections (i.e. in sec­
tions 3.1, 3.4.1, and 4.2), and measures to alleviate them were provided. While espe­
cially the data coverage of resistance was suboptimal, this did not critically influence 
the findings on the rest of the research focus, since actual resistance in the project was 
examined as a mere stimulant to the variable sequence. Moreover, the discovered mini­
mal degree of resistance in the project revealed interesting aspects about the constrain­
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ing influence of contextual factors. Nevertheless, in future studies it should be attempted 
to obtain direct data for all variables of interest.
The three methods used for the data collection differed in regards to their feasibil­
ity of application and adequacy for the variables of interest. Interviews and the collec­
tion of documentation proved to be appropriate for the setting and comparatively easy to 
conduct or collect. Repertory grids on the other hand were more problematic, because 
the method is unknown to most people, potentially threatening due to its ‘psychological’ 
imagery, and cumbersome to conduct. Especially for controversial topics like resistance, 
the method can lead respondents to suspect that they are being made to reveal informa­
tion that they would be able to control otherwise. This was illustrated by the UK man­
ager who refused to cooperate in the repertory grid exercise (see section 3.3.5, p. 133, 
and section 3.4.4, p. 150). Moreover, the different manifestations of resistance that were 
used as elements had unclear boundaries in some cases. As a result, intangible, abstract, 
and possibly overlapping constructs such as manifestations of resistance seem less ap­
propriate for the repertory grid method than tangible entities. For example, grids are of­
ten used in market research to evaluate different products. In comparison, respondents 
will clearly find it easier to generate evaluative dimensions for effortlessly distinguish­
able automobiles than for expressions of resistance to change. Despite the difficult ap­
plicability of the method to the present research context, it generated important insights 
on the resistance variable. However, for future studies the issue of how abstract a set of 
constructs might seem to respondents should be considered further in advance.
5.3.2 Considerations for further research
The discussion in this fifth chapter exhibited several areas where future studies 
could advance conceptual clarity and attempt empirical substantiation. In the final sec­
tion I will explore some considerations for further research, which derive from the find­
ings of the present study.
The initial research focus consisted of a sequence of resistance, awareness, and 
learning, in which all three variables were presumed to be influenced by contextual fac­
tors. On the basis of the obtained results, the structure of this sequence can now be 
amended. Three variables or effects in particular emerged that are suggested for further 
investigation, namely organizational culture, hierarchy, and double-loop learning. 
Figure 5.1 below shows the extended research focus.
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Figure 5.1: Hypothetical influences and effects
Culture and hierarchy are included as moderating effects on the original sequence, 
while a potential for double-loop learning is depicted as a result of learning at higher 
levels of analysis. Double-loop learning as an evaluation of underlying values and prin­
ciples is expected to not only have an effect on organizational conditions, but also to 
influence culture and hierarchy. As the single- versus double-loop assumptions were 
discussed before in section 5.1.3, this will not receive repeated elaboration here. The 
suggested influence of culture and hierarchy, however, needs more explanation.
In section 5.1.4 on the opportunity costs of not heeding resistance, organizational 
culture was presented as a crucial influence on whether employees care or dare to resist 
and subsequently learn. The finding that resistance was not perceived as a viable option 
in the analyzed project sheds light on the influence of organizational culture on the 
treatment of resistance, both in terms of its emergence and effects. It is hypothesized 
that organizational culture has the potential to influence two relationships: The relation­
ship between organizational conditions and resistance, that is whether resistance 
emerges or not, and the relationship between resistance and awareness, that is whether 
resistance is recognized once it has emerged. It might be presumed that people in an ex­
plorative, feedback-oriented culture are more likely to engage in resistance behavior 
than people exposed to a control-oriented or indifferent culture. On the other hand, an 
organizational culture that is too suppressive might leave its members no other choice 
but to resist. Hence, the influence of culture on resistance could be expected to follow
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an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, a feedback-oriented, open culture might 
similarly lead to greater awareness about emergences of resistance.
Pertaining to a suspected moderating influence of organizational culture, one pos­
sible question opening up another stream of research would be ‘Do innovative compa­
nies have more of a resistance culture?’. Particularly the literature on productive conflict 
would suggest this (De Dreu & Van de Vliert, 1997). A potential research design would 
be a comparative questionnaire study using an organizational culture instrument (e.g. 
van der Post & de Coning, 1997) complemented by items relating to findings from 
qualitative work on resistance, such as the present study. The sample of organizations 
should then include ‘innovators’, such as product design companies (see for example 
Hargadon & Sutton, 1997), and ‘administrators’, such as bureaucratic monopolists. 
While the organization in the present study is located more on the ‘administrator’ end of 
the spectrum, it would be interesting to conduct a case study on an ‘innovator’ with the 
specific focus on detecting a ‘resistance culture’. One aspect to look at would be 
whether in an ‘innovator’ organization people are more likely to associate resistance 
with potential learning and improvement, a cognitive link that was missing in the pre­
sent study.
The influence of hierarchy on organizational learning was discussed in the previ­
ous section 5.2, especially the presumed detrimental effect of a distinct hierarchy on the 
flow of internal communication. The hierarchy variable shown in Figure 5.1 is hypothe­
sized to influence culture, the relationship between awareness and organizational learn­
ing, and organizational learning itself. A specific hypothesis stemming from the find­
ings is that a stronger hierarchy hinders organizational learning, as it potentially unlinks 
the levels of analysis or places formal barriers between them. Comparative studies in 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations could make it possible to isolate the 
variable, and provide insight into how the levels in the integrated framework correspond 
to the levels of a given organizational hierarchy. Varying the hierarchical influence in 
subsequent case studies would provide more clarity on this.
Further research on the integrated framework would greatly benefit from longitu­
dinal research designs. As mentioned before, in the present study only the documenta­
tion provided a direct reflection of the development of the project over time. Observing 
a change project from beginning to end would provide genuine proximity to issues that 
unfold over time, such as the transfer of group learning to the formalization stage or the
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feedback function of formalized knowledge for group and individual learning. Popper & 
Lipshitz (1998) also suggest to examine so-called organizational learning mechanisms 
(e.g. post-action reviews or the work of quality control units) over time, which might be 
an interesting way of systematically analyzing specific aspects of the framework. In ad­
dition, a longitudinal design could more closely reveal the different phases and influ­
ence of resistance over the course of a change project (Bauer, 1993).
Finally, some further conditions that might be beneficial for learning from resis­
tance to occur will be discussed. The influences of organizational culture and hierarchy 
have already been mentioned in this respect. Three more aspects emerging from the 
findings are change criticality, task structure and flexibility, and tight or loose coupling 
of organizational components and processes.
In section 5.1.4 on opportunity costs of not heeding resistance it was presumed 
that the criticality of a change for an organization’s functioning might determine the ex­
tent and intensity of learning from emergences of resistance. Consistent with this as­
sumption, Lipshitz et al. (2002) state that illustrative research on organizational learning 
often comes from environments that are either dangerous or in which mistakes have se­
vere consequences. Accordingly, learning by resistance might be more intense and read­
ily observable for cases in which changes are critical or the environment is hazardous. 
In such cases where resistance is costly, awareness will increase and learning may be 
crucial for organizational survival. Examples of studies on nuclear power plants, hospi­
tal surgery wards, and fighter flight units were listed by the authors above (Lipshitz et 
al., 2002). Such examples suggest similar ‘high criticality’ settings for future inquiries 
on the present research focus. However, such a strategy might easily become infeasible 
due to high barriers to access.
Another influence on learning and resistance is task structure. Edmondson (1999, 
p. 378) assumes that team learning might greatly benefit from flexibility in task struc­
ture and completion. Under conditions of highly constrained tasks with tightly specified 
criteria for success, learning will not control much variance in performance. There is 
little room for information seeking, feedback is built into the task, and therefore sharing, 
interaction, and dialogue will become unnecessary after an initial brief learning phase. 
For example, a team working on an assembly line will not benefit from learning behav­
ior or constructive resistance as much as an independent team with few inherent task 
constraints and uncertain criteria for success. This is true for the employees at R&P UK,
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whose jobs essentially consist of taking orders from customers or maintaining the ac­
counting operations of the company. The confined nature of their tasks seems to be a 
constraint on learning. Without the situational and task-related constraints, resistance 
might emerge more easily and individuals might more readily perceive this as a source 
of learning. Future research should therefore consider the utility of learning behavior 
across different task categories. Contrast could be achieved by choosing a setting that 
has not as much constraining structure. Particularly interesting might be design teams or 
research and development departments, as such units are more flexible and more cru­
cially depend on learning. As mentioned above, such units and the environments they 
operate in might also permit or even require more of a ‘resistance culture’, that is a con­
vention of task-related conflict and debate.
A final consideration in the discussion about conditions conducive to learning 
from resistance somewhat combines the hypothesized influences of task structure and 
hierarchy. The questions under which conditions resistance triggers learning and under 
which conditions learning travels quickly or slowly across levels of analysis might be 
directly related to the degree of interconnection of organizational elements and proc­
esses. Interconnection as tight or loose coupling in organizations has been related to ac­
cidents and catastrophes. For example, an organization combining tight coupling with 
high complexity is assumed to have a larger potential for catastrophic failure (Perrow, 
1984). In the present case the proposed process framework and the empirical evidence 
suggest that both ends of the spectrum are required. Tight coupling is needed for com­
munication to flow effectively and to facilitate feed forward and feed back processes 
between levels of analysis. Loose coupling is needed to ensure room for exploration, 
errors and mistakes, emergences of resistance, and constructive reflection. As a result, 
there should be tight coupling between levels of analysis, and loose coupling within. 
The strategy of contrasting different organizational settings in further case studies men­
tioned above could provide insight on this issue.
In sum, further research needs to substantiate the conclusions drawn in this study 
about organizational learning from resistance to change. Organizational culture, hierar­
chy, change criticality, task flexibility, and system coupling have been suggested as ad­
ditional points of entry to the focal sequence. The effects of potential double-loop learn­
ing were also reflected and a recommendation was made for longitudinal designs. These 
considerations may guide my future research.
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APPENDIX
A p p e n d ix  A : D e s c r ip t io n  o f  p a r t ic ip a n t s  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  d a t a  c o l l e c ­
t io n
Respon­
dent
Position* Area Level in 
hierarchy
Length of 
tenure
(m = 14.6)
Age
(»  = 
47)
Gender
John
McGregor
Managing director General
management
UK management 15 53 Male
Robert Walsh IT development manager IT UK management 11 53 Male
Kevin Franks Operations manager (dep­
uty manager before 
change project)
Operations 
manage­
ment/custom 
er service
UK management 21 45 Male
Paul
Samuelson
Financial controller Accounting UK management 29 56 Male
Hugh Prescott General manager, now Operations UK management 18 57 Male
retired (made redundant management
during change project)
Christine Pe­
ters
Sales administrator Customer
service
UK employee 7 57 Female
Alice Farns­
worth
Retail administrator (IT 
supervisor during the 
change)
Retail (IT 
during the 
change)
UK employee 17 35 Female
Jane
Adams
Wholesale sales adminis­
trator
Customer
service
UK employee 5 49 Female
Dheepa Nai- 
doo
Sales administrator (credit 
administrator before 
change)
Customer
service
UK employee 6 33 Female
Abigail
Woolfe
Credit controller Accounting UK employee 9 36 Female
Susan Parker Hotel ware administrator Customer
service
UK employee 14 55 Female
Rose Brown­
ing
Payroll and general ledger 
administrator
Accounting UK employee 15 36 Female
Parvati Gupta Sales administrator Customer
service
UK employee 4 59 Female
Rebecca
Winter-stein
Assistant to operations 
manager
Customer
service
UK employee 10 36 Female
Heinz
Berwanger
Managing director logis­
tics
Logistics German
management
17 42 Male
Peter
Schmidt-
bauer
Managing director central 
IT, trading systems
IT German man­
agement
33 49 Male
Manfred
Becker
Customer service man­
ager
Market ser­
vice
German man­
agement
16 53 Male
Sabine
Fischer
Regional manager cus­
tomer service export
Market ser­
vice
German man­
agement
15 42 Female
* The change implementation took place roughly one year prior to the data collection. Some respondents 
took on different job roles or changed areas in the mean time.
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* John McGregor I *Managing Director'
I
H O TEL
I
C O R PO R A TE
Sue Bradford
[Carl Nulling 
, National Sales 'Manager
R ETAIL
. . . . I . . . .
 1---------
F IN A N C IA L
; Sean McFiersley J_ 
i Sales & Marketing Director i
Joanne Peterman
j Charles Snell < J Janet Price '\ National Sales | i National Sales |
' Manager i | Manager i
j Wholesale j i Own Retail J
* Paul Samuelson • 
» Financial Controller •
C U ST O M E R  SE R V IC E  
&  O P E R A T IO N S
.Hugh Prescott •
» General Manager J
J (made redundant during change, .
, not part of the organization any more}
’ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • A
« • • • •  •  • ! • • • • • •
J Kevin Franks •
.  Operations Manage*
IN F O R M A T IO N
T E C H N O L O G Y
i . . . . . .
•Robert Walsh •
•  IT Department Manager •
Gordon Powell 
Frank Backley Senior Account Managers 
Kevin Johnson 
Tony Abraham Account Managers
j Barbara O Dwyer |
A ssistant
Rebecca WmtersteuJ 
Jane Adams
Rose Browning
•Abigail Woolfe .  -----Z Accounts Department.  .Susan Parker 
Dheepa Naidoo
Stuart Lee 
John Stockworth Stock t t  Returns
* Alice Farnsworth*
Concession Shops 
Flagship Stores 
Outlet Stores
• Christine Peters .z Parvati Gupta .
.  Customer Service •
• A Product CostingsZ
Pauline Cox.............
Caroline Fernandez 
(both Joined after 
the change)
Frances Pillings Receptionist 
Rose Twingsley
Michael Carr Janitor
• . ;  Involved in data collection (interviews/repertory grids) 
■  Working with SAP on a daily basis 
[ . . ' A t  Sullsgate offices less than once per week
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A p p e n d ix  C : In t r o d u c t o r y  l e t t e r  t o  p a r t ic ip a n t s
M. Gregor Jost
London School of Economics
Department of Social Psychology
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Phone: 020 7955 6215
Fax: 020 7955 7565
E-mail: g.jost@lse.ac.uk
London, 2 May 2003
Dear Rousseau & Paul employee,
As part of my doctoral dissertation at the London School of Economics, I am conduct­
ing a study on organizational learning and attitudes to change. The focus of the study is 
the past implementation of SAP R/3 at Rousseau & Paul in England.
With the help of the people that were actively involved or subsequently affected, I am 
trying to understand aspects of the implementation project. Of particular interest will be 
how the project unfolded, the effects of the new IT infrastructure on people’s daily ac­
tivities, and the lessons learned.
I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to interview you and discuss the implementa­
tion project. The interview should last approximately 60 minutes. It will be entirely con­
fidential, and, with your consent, I will tape record it, as this makes my analysis much 
easier.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. I am looking forward to 
speaking to you soon.
Yours sincerely,
Gregor Jost
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A p p e n d ix  D: C o n s e n t  fo rm
CONSENT FORM
Project Organizational Learning and Attitudes to Change 
(conducted by Gregor Jost)
The following interview is conducted under a strict code of ethics. Therefore the in­
formed consent of participants is needed.
Please confirm that you were informed about the following issues:
1. The aims of the study have been explained to you, and you are willing to participate.
2. Any information you provide will be completely confidential. The tape recording 
will be typed out by Gregor Jost and then no one will have access to the interview 
transcript apart from Gregor Jost and his research colleague at the London School of 
Economics.
3. In the final research report the information you give us will be presented in such a 
way that no one can identify you - your participation in the study is anonymous.
4. If at any stage of the interview you decide you don’t want to participate any more, 
you are free to say so.
5. You need to agree that you are happy for the interview to be tape-recorded.
If all goes according to plan the interview should take about one hour.
Are there any questions you want to ask about the study before signing the consent
form?
DATE and NAME:_________________________________________
SIGNED:
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A p p e n d ix  E : Inter v iew  topic  guide
1. Background questions
Name, age 
Position
Length of tenure with company
2. Job description
What kind of job do you do here? Where do you work? Alone or with others (group)? 
What are the daily activities of your job?
3. Describing the project (narrative)
Time scale of the project (start, end), milestones
How was the project communicated after the decision in Germany?
How did you experience the project?
How did you experience the changes to daily activities?
How did you experience changes to the entire organization due to the new IT infrastruc­
ture, or due to the warehouse closure? (e.g., relation to mother company, etc.)
How did this change and its implementation compare to other major changes (if there 
are any comparable ones)?
4. Aspects of Resistance to Change and Organizational Learning
Were there any obstacles to the implementation, i.e. technical difficulties, individuals 
not feeling comfortable with it, group consensus that the new system is inadequate, am­
biguous messages from management, etc.?
Was there any resistance to the change? If so, at what level (e.g. mainly single individu­
als?), and how was that expressed, how was it communicated or dispersed within the 
organization?
What was the reaction to that resistance (who reacted, how, with what consequences)?
How was information about the changes communicated (group meetings, training ses­
sions, tutoring, manuals, etc.)? How was the training conducted?
Was there a great deal of sharing of information or individual experience about the new 
system? How did that evolve? How was the learning passed on (e.g. from experts to 
non-experts)?
Was the new knowledge formalized or documented?
What would you say are the lessons learned from this project (e.g., about the function­
ing of the organization, organizational structure, customer relations, work processes 
etc.)? Any formal or systematic analysis?
5. Future
What is your future outlook on the development of the IT system?
What is going to happen to R&P UK in the future?
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A p p e n d ix  F : T o p -d o w n  in t e r v ie w  c o d in g  f r a m e
TOPIC AREAS BASIC CODES THEMATIC CODES (n = 37)
Personal informa­ Demographics Job description: Job roles and responsibilities
tion and job descrip­ Demographics: Age, length of tenure, job title
Information on pers. 
background, job 
characteristics, and 
motivation
tion Commitment: Interest and commitment to the job
Description of the 
change
Information about
Organizational
relations
System integration: Interconnectivity and integration of the 
subsidiary into the company system
Germany vs. UK: The relationship with headquarters
the change imple­
mentation, the new
Decision making: How decisions about the change projects 
were made
computer system, The project Concerns: Prior concerns about the change
and internal organ­
izational dynamics
Prior implementations: Earlier implementations within other 
national companies of the organization
Planning: Descriptions of the planning of the change
Efficiency: Linking the two parts of the change (SAP imple­
mentation and warehouse closure)
Managing the transition: Descriptions of how the transition 
was undertaken
Redundancies: Layoffs resulting from the change
IT in the UK: Effects of the change on the IT dept, in the UK
Evaluation of change: Evaluative statements in retrospect
Outlook: Outlook on future developments
The new system Quality: Evaluative statements about (features of) the new 
system
Using the new system: Managing the new system as a user
MACH: Evaluative statements about the old MACH system 
(system used in the UK before SAP)
Everyday procedures: Changes to day-to-day procedures 
dues to the new system
Flexibility: Responsiveness of the new system to desired sys­
tem changes
Resistance and Resistance Shock: Strong emotional reactions to the change
learning
Characteristics of
Uncertainty: Uncertainty and lack of knowledge about as­
pects of the change
resistance during the 
change, and learning 
at different levels of
Anxiousness: Pear and worry about the change
Expectations: Anticipations about the change once it was 
announced
analysis Change attitude: Resigned attitude about upcoming change
Resistance: Emergences of resistance to change
Learning Learning from resistance: Using resistance or critical reac­
tions as a source of learning
Training: Comments on the execution and the quality of the 
training in the new system
Experts: Development of experts (key users) and expertise in 
the new system
Formalization of knowledge: Documentation and formaliza­
tion of generated knowledge for work-related purposes
Feedback: Feedback on the usability of the new system and 
improvement suggestions
Individual learning: Accounts of learning at the indiv. level
Group learning: Accounts of learning at the group level
Learning lost: Individual level learning that was not fed for­
ward into the organization
Lessons learned: Lessons learned from the project
Communication
Description of intra- 
organizational com­
munication
Communication Communication within UK: Descriptions of comm, within 
the subsidiary
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A p p e n d i x  G :  C o m p l e t e  i n t e r v i e w  c o d i n g  f r a m e
BASIC
CODES
THEMATIC 
CODES (n=37)
MAH' 
UK managers
i COMMON THI 
UK employees
;m e s
GER managers
D e m o ­
g r a p h ic s
AND JOB DE­
SCRIPTION
Job description
Demographics
Commitment ■ W e’re doing a good  job  at R&P in the 
UK
U K  is d o in g  fin e
O r g a n iz a ­
t io n a l  RE­
LATIONS
System
integration
Germany vs. 
UK
Decision mak­
ing
■ This dim inishes 
w hat w e’ve had 
independently in the 
UK
■ W e do things 
differently in the 
UK
» D ecisions are made 
in Germany, there is 
no discussion with 
us
■ W e’ve  got som e­
body to fall back on  
now
■ D ecisions are made 
in Germany, there is 
no discussion with  
us
• England has lost 
independence and 
their performance 
became more trans­
parent
■ Personal exchange is 
important because 
the U K  has a more 
hierarchical business 
culture
■ The decision to go  
ahead with the pro­
ject was largely 
made here
D ecreased  in d e­
pen d en ce
C entralized  or­
gan ization
T h e  p r o ­
j e c t
Concerns 
Prior imple­
mentations 
Planning
Efficiency 
Managing the 
transition 
Redundancies 
IT  in the UK
Evaluation of 
the change
• Has this change been 
catered to our needs 
at all?
■ There were prob­
lem s with prior 
implementations in 
other countries
• The warehouse 
closure is a direct 
consequence o f  the 
SAP implementation
■ Having to manage 
the warehouse clo­
sure and the SAP  
implementation at 
the same tim e was a 
very big effort
■ W e realized that a 
lot o f  people w ould  
be made redundant
■ W e tried to make the 
redundancies as 
comfortable as pos­
sible
■ The IT department 
in the UK has 
shrunk dramatically
■ W e all did a very 
g ood job
■ Germany was 
satisfied
■ The change project 
was an econom ic
• W e though it w asn’t 
going to work.
■ The transition meant 
a lot o f  extra work  
for us
• The redundancies 
had a big impact on 
morale and people  
becam e very inse­
cure
■ The IT department 
in the UK has 
shrunk dramatically
■ It was a struggle, but 
in the end it w ent 
w ell
• The structure o f  the 
England project was 
based on experi­
ences with earlier 
implementations
■ Planning w as based  
on earlier im ple­
mentations in other 
subsidiaries
■ W e could have done 
this project in a 
shorter tim e period
• SAP and a central­
ized distribution is 
an integral part o f  
our strategy
• The change made 
the IT department as 
it w as obsolete
■ A ll numbers indicate 
it w as a success, and 
it gave us confi­
dence for further 
projects
A ch an ge pre­
scribed  from  
headquarters
A  d ifficu lt project
S u c c e ss  im pera­
tiv e
Appendix
BASIC
CODES
THEMATIC
....■
MAIP
I T 1 /  ___ _ „  __ __ _U Iv ma n agcrs
i  COMMON THI 
UK employees
5MES THEMATIC
Outlook ■ They w ill need less  
and less people in 
the future
■ Our long-term  
strategy is to im­
plement SAP in all 
national subsidiaries
Further layoffs?
T h e  n e w
SY ST E M
Quality 
Using the new 
system 
MACH 
Everyday pro­
cedures
Flexibility
■ The new  system  is 
an improvement, but 
it is monumental 
and com plex
■ There are things the 
new system  doesn’t 
do that w e w ere told  
it would
■ Our old MACH  
system  was cumber­
som e and becam e 
outdated
■ Everyday procedures 
have not changed  
dramatically with  
the new  system
■ W e can’t make even  
minor changes to the 
system , only Ger­
many can do that
• SAP made my job  a 
lot more efficient
■ The new  system  was 
very d ifficult at first, 
but after a w hile w e  
were okay with it
■Our old  M ACH  
system  was cumber­
som e and became 
outdated
■ Everyday procedures 
are much quicker 
now
■ W e can’t make even  
minor changes to the 
system , only Ger­
many can do that
■ The system  is 
intended as a stan­
dardized worldwide 
solution, there is no 
room for special 
treatment
P rogress  
O ne s iz e  fits all
RESIS­
TANCE
Shock
Uncertainty
Anxiousness
Expectations
Change
attitude
Resistance
■ When the news 
broke about the 
changes, that was a 
shock to everyone
■ At the beginning our 
em ployees became 
very uncertain about 
their job  safety
■ W ill I be able to 
manage and perform  
the new  things?
■ W e were generally 
looking to get a lot 
from the change
■ W e were resigned to 
the fact that it was 
going to happen and 
w e had to make the 
best o f  it
■ People reacted w ell 
to the change and 
remained coopera­
tive
» I think it was more 
anxiousness than 
resistance
■ Especially the 
w arehouse closure 
was a real shock
1 It was frustrating to 
not know  what was 
going to happen and 
people started w on­
dering w ho was next 
to go
■ W e w ere nervous 
and worried whether 
w e w ould manage to 
work wit the new  
system
■ The computers are 
going to take over
■ Changes happen, 
you have to go with 
the flow
■ W e were probably 
more anxious than 
resistant
■ W e clearly com m u­
nicated to the UK  
management what 
was going to happen
■ They agreed that the 
change was a neces­
sity and generally  
acted rationally
■ They had rather 
em otional problems 
initially, but that 
passed quickly
Insecurity
R esistan ce  is 
futile
L e a r n in g Learning from 
resistance
Training
Experts
■ W e sold SAP 
particularly w ell to 
our people
■ The first training in 
Germany was very 
bad and irrelevant to
■ It was described to 
us as the b ig new  
computer system  
that all b ig  com pa­
nies have now
■ There w as not 
enough training, and 
w hat w e had was
■ W e used the ‘train 
the trainer’ princi­
ple, w hich w e al-
S e llin g  SA P
In su fficien t train­
in g
2 9 9
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THEMATIC 
CODES (n=37) is=>
...
' COMMON THEMES
Formalization 
of knowledge
Feedback
Individual 
learning 
Group learning
Learning lost
Lessons
learned
what w e do here
■ There was generally  
too little training
■ Som e people were 
meant to be key 
users
■ W e had to write our 
ow n sim ple training 
manual
■ There is no organ­
ized documentation  
for everyone
■ I think the company  
should be much 
more responsive to 
the people going  
through the change
■ Y ou learn by using 
the program
■ W hen people leave, 
their know ledge is 
lost
■ B eing honest with  
people about the 
change is very im­
portant
inadequate
■ N ew  people get 
informal on-the-job  
training
■ Som e people were 
meant to be key 
users, but they 
didn’t have all the 
answers
■ Y ou made your ow n  
notes, bits o f  paper 
in peop le’s drawers 
basically
■ W e’ve not been  
encouraged to g ive  
feedback
■ You really learn not 
from the manuals 
but by using the 
system
• It is better to ask 
som ebody than to 
fiddle around with it 
yourself
■ The younger people 
cope much better 
and they’re less 
nervous
■ W e’d just shout and 
all help each other. 
W e talk a lot
■ One lady left be­
cause o f  the change
■ In future projects, 
they should com ­
municate more and 
fully inform staff. 
Much more training 
is also needed
ways found success­
ful
■ There is no final 
project report
■ W e used prior 
training manuals 
and adapted them to 
the U K  project
■ They seem ed to help  
one another a lot 
with the new  pro­
gram
■ Face-to-face interac­
tion is crucial on  
such projects and 
strengthens the co­
hesiveness o f  the 
organization
R andom  form al­
ization
R esp o n siv en ess  
to  feedback
L earning by do­
ing
H on esty , co h e ­
siv e n e ss , and lost  
learning
C o m m u n i ­
c a t io n
Communica­
tion within UK 
Communica­
tion with head­
quarters
■ W e tried to be open  
with people and kept 
our sta ff informed
■ W e traditionally 
haven’t been very 
good as a company 
in passing on infor­
mation
■ G ood com m unica­
tion is crucial in any 
change
• The German man­
agem ent didn’t g ive  
us all the informa­
tion w e needed  
during the project
■ W e com m unicate a 
lot in sales and ac­
counting
• UK management 
told us in a m eeting  
that the change was 
going to happen
■ W e em ail specific 
questions to Ger­
many or phone them  
and usually get 
responses
■ The communication  
with the UK man­
agem ent was often  
difficult, and w e  
probably should  
have had more
C hanging  
through co m m u ­
nication
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A p p e n d ix  H : F r e q u e n c ie s  o f  t h e m a t ic  c o d e s  a c r o s s  in t e r v ie w s
Interviews
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Totals
Thematic codes ---- — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ------------
Anxiousness 0 2 2 11 5 6 1 0 4 0 4 1 1 11 7 0 3 1 59
Change attitude 1 1 2 5 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 4 5 3 2 3 5 45
Commitment 4 2 4 0 0 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 24 1 0 0 0 41
Communication with h 15 8 10 5 8 2 8 0 1 4 1 1 0 10 8 10 7 11 109
Communication within 0 4 3 4 6 4 1 0 4 2 1 3 0 11 3 1 2 0 49
Concerns about imple 4 1 6 3 2 2 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 4 5 4 0 2 39
Decision making 6 3 4 1 2 2 0 2 0 1 3 0 1 16 2 9 1 3 56
Demographics 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 5 2 2 4 3 3 36
Efficiency 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 22
Evaluation of the ch 2 6 5 4 5 1 1 5 4 3 3 1 5 8 9 6 6 1 75
Everyday procedures 2 2 0 1 1 9 3 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 7 1 5 2 40
Expectations 1 3 3 7 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 16 2 0 0 0 40
Experts within the o 2 2 0 6 2 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 2 0 26
Feedback 4 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 3 5 1 0 23
Flexibility 2 2 4 1 2 1 4 1 1 3 0 0 3 5 1 4 1 0 35
Formalization of kno 7 6 0 5 7 6 5 3 11 6 5 4 1 0 7 4 3 2 82
Germany vs. UK 12 9 2 2 3 1 2 7 0 0 0 0 6 8 0 14 4 5 75
Group learning 0 2 0 6 4 7 4 0 5 2 3 8 0 0 9 0 1 3 54
Inadequacy of the ol 2 3 1 5 1 6 2 0 2 0 4 1 0 0 4 0 4 2 37
Individual learning 3 0 0 4 7 2 2 0 5 1 2 1 0 0 2 0 3 1 33
IT in the UK 4 1 1 1 5 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 2 5 0 2 0 0 28
Job description 1 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 3 5 5 5 4 4 7 4 3 7 61
Learning from resist 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 6 1 0 1 0 19
Learning lost 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 1 0 0 0 14
Lessons learned 0 3 1 2 2 4 3 2 1 2 3 0 2 8 3 4 6 0 46
Managing the transit 1 3 2 5 3 6 1 2 0 4 4 0 2 6 4 1 2 4 50
Outlook 0 1 2 6 2 1 4 1 6 5 9 3 3 5 3 1 2 0 54
Planning the impleme 4 1 4 0 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 0 5 8 0 7 6 4 48
Prior implementation 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 4 7 0 4 1 5 32
Quality of the new s 7 8 0 8 2 8 7 0 3 1 6 6 2 1 9 1 6 1 76
Redundancies 3 7 3 7 4 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 11 3 2 1 2 48
Resistance 0 2 0 2 1 3 3 3 0 1 2 1 3 9 2 4 1 4 41
Shock 0 3 0 5 0 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 22
System integration w 10 4 6 4 4 4 8 4 2 5 1 1 6 8 2 2 6 2 79
Training 7 14 2 3 10 10 9 5 11 4 9 5 2 6 21 8 10 19 155
Uncertainty 2 3 1 0 4 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 12 2 1 2 2 37
Using the new system 1 1 0 6 1 4 1 0 6 3 4 3 0 0 4 0 5 5 44
Totals 116 120 76 124 101 102 88 71 81 64 90 48 67 235 141 108 102 96 1830
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A p p e n d ix  I: Statistical  a nalyses  fo r  the  reperto ry  grids
Group 1: UK employees (Farnsworth, Woolfe, Browning) 
Group 2: UK employees (Naidoo, Winterstein)
Group 3: German managers (Berwanger, Becker)
Descriptive statistics of constructs
Group 1
N Mean Std. Skewness
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
single-collective 8 3.88 1.959 .230 .752
no impact-impact 8 3.63 2.200 .421 .752
pessimistic-optimistic 8 3.87 2.031 .224 .752
low desperation-high 
desperation 8 4.38 1.996 -.690 .752
irrational-rational 8 3.38 2.134 .877 .752
destructive-constructive 8 3.63 2.066 .541 .752
subtle-overt 8 4.13 2.031 -.224 .752
not directed at
management-directed 8 4.00 2.000 .000 .752
at management
not affecting output 
rate-affecting output rate 8 3.75 2.315
.035 .752
Valid N (listwise) 8
Group 2
N Mean Std. Skewness
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
verbal-action 9 4.0000 1.87083 .000 .717
individual-collective 9 3.3333 2.12132 .651 .717
negatively affecting 
output-not affecting output e 4.2222 1.98606
-.269 .717
active-passive 9 3.6667 2.00000 .469 .717
directed at
management-not directed 9 3.7778 1.98606 .269 .717
at management
emotional-rational 9 3.7778 2.10819 -.038 .717
cost to the company-no 
cost to the company 9 3.7778 2.04803
.720 .717
covert-overt 9 4.2222 1.92209 -.403 .717
constructive-destructive 9 4.8889 1.90029 -.922 .717
Valid N (listwise) 9
Group 3
N Mean Std. Skewness
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
passive - active 8 4.38 2.066 -.541 .752
not solution-oriented - 
solution-oriented 8 3.63 2.264
.226 .752
not communicative - 
communicative 8 3.88 2.232 .207
.752
damage to the company 
- no damage to the 8 4.00 1.927 -.160 .752
company
hidden - open 8 4.00 2.000 .000 .752
alone - collective 8 3.75 1.982 .459 .752
repressing the change - 
openly tackling the 8 4.13 1.885 -.067 .752
change
destructive - constructive 8 3.75 2.188 .096 .752
Valid N (listwise) 8
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Correlation tables for constructs
Group 1
single-col
lective
no
impact-impact
pessimistic
-optimistic
low
desperation-
high
desperation
irrational-
rational
destructive-
constructive subtle-overt
not directed at 
management- 
directed at 
management
not affecting 
output 
rate-affecting 
output rate
single-collective Pearson Correlation 1 -.543 426 -.936*' .833* 798* -713* - 7 6 6 - -.543
Sig. (2-tailed) .165 .292 .001 .010 .017 .047 .027 .164
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
no impact-impact Pearson Correlation -.543 t" ' .340 .557 -.209 -.193 .651 .779* -.021
Sig. (2-tailed) .165 .410 .151 .619 .648 .080 .023 .961
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
pessimistic-optimistic Pearson Correlation .426 .340 1 -.515 .738* .736* -.100 -.106 -.798*
Sig. (2-taHed) .292 .410 .191 .037 .037 .815 .804 .018
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
low desperation-high Pearson Correlation -.936- .557 -.515 1 -.876* -.827* .762* .680 .673
desperation Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .151 .191 .004 .011 .028 .063 .068
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
irrational-rational Pearson Correlation .833* -.209 .738* -.876* 1 .911* -.639 -.536 -.701
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .619 .037 .004 .002 .088 .171 .053
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
destructive-constructive Pearson Correlation .798* -.193 .736* -.827* .911* 1 -.396 -.588 -.829*
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .648 .037 .011 .002 .332 .125 .011
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
subtle-overt Pearson Correlation -.713* .651 -.100 .762* -.639 -.396 1 .528 .251
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .080 .815 .028 .088 .332 .179 .549
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
not directed at Pearson Correlation -.766* .779* -.106 .680 -.536 -.588 .528 1 .247
management-directed Sig. (2-taHed) .027 .023 .804 .063 .171 .125 .179 .556
at m anagement N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
not affecting output Pearson Correlation -.543 -.021 -.798* .673 -.701 -.829* .251 .247 1
rate-affecting output rate Sig. (2-tailed) .164 .961 .018 .068 .053 .011 .549 .556
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
**- Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0 05 level (2-tailed)
Group 2
verbal-action
individual
-collective
negatively
affecting
output-not
affecting
output active-passive
directed at 
management- 
not directed at 
management
emotional
-rational
cost to the 
company-no 
cost to the 
company covert-overt
constructive
-destructive
*3 4 7
.892“ -.583 -.175
.001 .099 .022 .978 .652
9 9 9 9 9
1 -.670* .601 -.182 .158
.048 .087 .639 684
9 9 9 9 9
-670* 1 -.244 .291 -.350
.048 .526 .447 .356
9 9 9 9 9
.601 -.244 1 .141 -.553
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N
.138
9
940
9
.745*
.021
9
1
9
directed at Pearson Correlation -2 6 9 -.188 489 .892**
management-not directed Sig. (2-tailed) .484 628 .181 .001
at management N 9 9 9 9
emotional-rational Pearson Correlation .317 .186 -.166 -.583
Sig. (2-tailed) .406 .631 .670 .099
N 9 9 9 9
cost to the company-no 
cost to the comDanv
Pearson Correlation
Ain O-taiUril
-.685*
H H
422 .905**
nm
.743*
025
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Group 3
passive - 
active
not 
solution-o 
riented - 
solution-o 
riented
not 
communi 
cative - 
communi 
cative
damage to the 
company-no 
damage to the 
company hidden - open
alone- 
collective
repressing 
the change - 
openly 
tackling the 
change
destructive - 
constructive
passive - active Pearson Correlation 1 .279 .352 .359 .277 .515 .793* .751*
Sig. (2-tailed) .504 .392 .383 .507 .192 .019 .032
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
not solution-oriented - Pearson Correlation .279 1 .866" .884" -.316 .708* .749* .671
solution-oriented Sig. (2-tailed) .504 .005 .004 .446 .049 .032 .069
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
not communicaive - Pearson Correlation .352 .866" 1 .830* -.096 .735* .751* .607
communicative Sig. (2-tailed) .392 .005 .011 .821 .038 .032 .110
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
damage to the company Pearson Correlation .359 .884** .830* 1 .037 .673 .668 .779*
- no damage to the Sig. (2-tailed) .383 .004 .011 .931 .067 .070 .023
company N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
hidden - open Pearson Correlation .277 -.316 -.096 .037 1 .000 -.076 .229
Sig. (2-tailed) .507 .446 .821 .931 1.000 .858 .586
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
alone - collective Pearson Correlation .515 .708* .735* .673 .000 1 .698 .577
Sig. (2-tailed) .192 .049 .038 .067 1.000 .054 .135
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
repressing the change - Pearson Correlation .793* .749* .751* .668 -.076 .698 1 .771*
openly tackling the Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .032 .032 .070 .858 .054 .025
change N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
destructive - constructive Pearson Correlation .751* .671 .607 .779* .229 .577 .771* 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .069 .110 .023 .586 .135 .025
N 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
'  Correlation is significant at the  0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**• Correlation is significant a t th e  0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlation tables for elements
Group 1
D iscussions
with
co lleagues
D iscussions
with
m an aq ers
T h rea ts  to  
leave Bad feelinqs
Leaving th e  
com pany
D ecrease
perform ance
level
Tears,
frustration A ggression
D iscussions with P ea rso n  Correlation 1 .901“ -.679* -.035 -.9 2 5 " -.674* -.079 - 442
co lleagues Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .044 .929 .000 .047 .839 .233
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
D iscussions with P ea rso n  Correlation .901" 1 -.492 -.248 -.8 1 7 " -.8 5 5 " -.299 -.354
m an ag e rs Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .179 .519 .007 .003 .435 .350
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
T h rea ts  to  leave P ea rso n  Correlation -.679* -4 9 2 1 -.378 .8 6 5 " .155 -.314 .647
Sig. (2-tailed) .044 .179 .315 .003 .691 .411 .060
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Bad feelings P ea rso n  Correlation -.035 -.248 -.378 1 -.210 .481 .060 -.520
Sig. (2-tailed) .929 .519 .315 .587 .190 .878 .151
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Leaving th e  com pany P ea rso n  Correlation - .9 2 5 " -.8 1 7 " 8 6 5 " -.210 1 .478 -.065 .585
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007 .003 .587 .194 .867 .098
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
D ec rease P ea rso n  Correlation -.674* - .8 5 5 " .155 .481 .478 1 .453 .104
perform ance level Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .003 .691 .190 .194 .220 .790
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
T ears , frustration P ea rso n  Correlation -.079 -.299 -.314 .060 -.065 .453 1 .007
Sig. (2-tailed) .839 .435 .411 .878 .867 .220 .986
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
A ggression P ea rso n  Correlation -.442 -.354 .647 -.520 .585 .104 .007 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .233 .350 .060 .151 .098 .790 .986
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
**• Correlation is significant at th e  0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the  0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Group 2
Hiding parts
of work,
becoming
secretive ._ . . . High stress
Negative
speculation Indifference
Decreased
performance Gossip
Discussion
with
m anagement
Leave the 
company
Anger,
frustration
Hiding parts of work, Pearson Correlation ' 310 '  - r s " 1 -.108 ■ -  -  — -.691* -.482 .608 -136
becoming secretive Sig. (2-tailed) .417 .755 .783 .027 .039 .189 .082 .727
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
High s tress Pearson Correlation .310 1 -280 .494 .016 -.066 -.822*' -.007 .685*
Sig. (2-tailed) .417 466 .177 .967 .866 .007 .986 .042
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Negative speculation Pearson Correlation -.122 -.280 1 -.122 -.189 .135 496 .177 .243
Sig. (2-tailed) .755 .466 .755 626 .730 .175 .648 .529
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Indifference Pearson Correlation -.108 .494 -122 1 -.639 .266 -2 9 6 -.616 .183
Sig. (2-tailed) .783 .177 .755 .064 .489 .440 . o n .637
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
D ecreased performance Pearson Correlation .726* .016 -189 -.639 1 -.636 -.300 .727* -2 6 9
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .967 .626 .064 .066 .432 .026 .485
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Gossip Pearson Correlation -.691* -.066 .135 .266 -.636 1 .204 -.775* .327
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .866 730 .489 .066 .598 .014 .390
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Discussion with Pearson Correlation -.482 -.822* .496 -.296 -.300 .204 1 -.068 -.350
m anagem ent Sig. (2-tailed) .189 .007 .175 .440 .432 .598 .863 .356
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Leave the company Pearson Correlation .608 -.007 .177 -.616 rrr -.775* -.068 1 -.012
Sig. (2-taHed) .082 .986 .648 .077 .026 .014 .863 .975
N 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Anger, frustration Pearson Correlation -.136 .685* 243 .183 -.269 327 -.350 -.012 1
Sin 17.tailertl 777 h i? 570 637 465 390 356 9 75
Appendix
Factor analysis results
Syntax (generic syntax excluding specific variables for the respective groups) 
FACTOR
A/ARIABLES {all variables} /MISSING LISTWISE /ANALYSIS {all variables} 
/PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION 
/PLOT ROTATION 
/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
/EXTRACTION PC 
/ROTATION NOROTATE 
/METHOD=COVARIANCE .
Group 1 by constructs
Communalities
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
single-collective 3.839 3.466 ' 1.000 .903
no impact-impact 4.839 4.498 1.000 .930
pessimistic-optimistic 4.125 3.797 1.000 .921
low desperation-high 
desperation 3.982 3.808 1.000 .956
irrational-rational 4.554 4.148 1.000 .911
destructive-constructive 4.268 3.927 1.000 .920
subtle-overt 4.125 2.888 1.000 .700
not directed at
management-directed 
at management
4.000 3.081 1.000 .770
not affecting output 
rate-affecting output rate 5.357 4.479 1.000 .836
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues3 Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 24.282 62.119 62.119 24.282 62.119 62.119
2 9.810 25.096 87.215 9.810 25.096 87.215
3 2.295 5.872 93.086
4 1.483 3.793 96.879
5 .536 1.372 98.251
6 .419 1.071 99.322
7 .265 .678 100.000
8 -6.71 E-17 -1.716E-16 100.000
9 -9.73E-16 -2.490E-15 100.000
Rescaled 1 24.282 62.119 62.119 5.670 62.999 62.999
2 9.810 25.096 87.215 2.177 24.184 87.183
3 2.295 5.872 93.086
4 1.483 3.793 96.879
5 .536 1.372 98.251
6 .419 1.071 99.322
7 .265 .678 100.000
8 -6.71 E-17 -1.716E-16 100.000
9 -9.73E-16 -2.490E-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a- When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
306
Appendix
Component Matrix
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
single-collective -1.820 -.390 -.929 -.199
no impact-impact 1.002 1.869 .455 .850
pessimistic-optimistic -1.268 1.480 -.624 .729
low desperation-high 
desperation 1.936 .247 .970 .124
irrational-rational -1.997 .402 -.936 .188
destructive-constructive -1.898 .571 -.919 .276
subtle-overt 1.407 .953 .693 .469
not directed at
management-directed 
at management
1.423 1.027 .712 .514
not affecting output 
rate-affecting output rate 1.737 -1.209 .750 -.522
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a- 2 components extracted.
Group 1 by elements
Communallties
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
Discussions with 
colleagues 6.028 5.702 1.000 .946
Discussions with 6.000 5.877 1.000 .979managers 
Threats to leave 3.361 3.061 1.000 .911
Bad feelings 1.694 .971 1.000 .573
Leaving the company 6.444 6.367 1.000 .988
Decrease 
performance level 4.444 4.165 1.000 .937
Tears, frustration 2.028 .775 1.000 .382
Aggression 1.944 1.005 1.000 .517
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues9 Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 21.492 ' 67.280 67.280 21.492 67.280 67.280
2 6.431 20.132 87.412 6.431 20.132 87.412
3 2.107 6.597 94.009
4 .831 2.602 96.611
5 .472 1.478 98.089
6 .349 1.091 99.180
7 .262 .820 100.000
8 1.990E-06 6.229E-06 100.000
Rescaled 1 21.492 67.280 67.280 4.067 50.832 50.832
2 6.431 20.132 87.412 2.167 27.088 77.920
3 2.107 6.597 94.009
4 .831 2.602 96.611
5 .472 1.478 98.089
6 .349 1.091 99.180
7 .262 .820 100.000
8 1.990E-06 6.229E-06 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a- When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
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Component Matrix
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
Discussions with 
colleagues -2.388 .023 -.973 .009
Discussions with 
managers -2.318 -.711 -.946 -.290
Threats to leave 1.325 -1.142 .723 -.623
Bad feelings .030 .985 .023 .757
Leaving the company 2.406 -.761 .948 -.300
Decrease 
performance level 1.525 1.356 .724 .643
Tears, frustration .180 .862 .127 .605
Aggression .717 -.700 .515 -.502
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a- 2 components extracted.
Group 2 by constructs
Communalities
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
verbal-action 3.500 2.918 1.000 .834
individual-collective 4.500 3.418 1.000 .760
negatively affecting 
output-not affecting output 3.944 3.566 1.000 .904
active-passive 4.000 3.686 1.000 .922
directed at
management-not directed 3.944 3.522 1.000 .893
at management
emotional-rational 4.444 3.006 1.000 .676
cost to the company-no 
cost to the company 4.194 3.544 1.000 .845
covert-overt 3.694 1.926 1.000 .521
constructive-destructive 3.611 3.215 1.000 .690
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues * Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 17.443 48.678 48.678 17.443 48.678 48.678
2 11.357 31.693 80.372 11.357 31.693 80.372
3 3.067 8.558 88.930
4 2.214 6.178 95.108
5 1.107 3.090 98.197
6 .458 1.278 99.475
7 .168 .468 99.943
8 .020 .057 100.000
9 1.250E-16 3.489E-16 100.000
Rescaled 1 17.443 48.678 48.678 4.440 49.332 49.332
2 11.357 31.693 80.372 2.804 31.161 80.493
3 3.067 8.558 88.930
4 2.214 6.178 95.108
5 1.107 3.090 98.197
6 .458 1.278 99.475
7 .168 .468 99.943
8 .020 .057 100.000
9 1.250E-16 3.489E-16 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a. When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
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Component Matrix
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
verbal-action -1.662 .395 -.888 .211
individual-collective 1.180 -1.423 .556 -.671
negatively affecting 
output-not affecting output 1.887 -.074 .950 -.037
active-passive 1.553 1.128 .777 .564
directed at
management-not directed 1.118 1.508 .563 .759
at management
emotional-rational -.671 -1.599 -.318 -.758
cost to the company-no 
cost to the company 1.870 .213 .913 .104
covert-overt .684 -1.207 .356 -.628
constructive-destructive -1.284 1.252 -.676 .659
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a- 2 components extracted.
Group 2 by elements
Communalities
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
Hiding parts of work, 
becoming secretive 3.611 2.657 1.000 .736
High stress 4.611 4.157 1.000 .902
Negative speculation .361 .056 1.000 .155
Indifference 3.611 2.427 1.000 .672
Decreased performance 2.528 1.921 1.000 .760
Gossip 4.250 3.174 1.000 .747
Discussion with 
management 6.111 5.507 1.000 .901
Leave the company 7.500 6.612 1.000 .908
Anger, frustration 1.528 .440 1.000 .288
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues * Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 15.624 45.803 45.803 ' 15.624 45.803 45.803
2 11.528 33.795 79.598 11.528 33.795 79.598
3 2.918 8.554 88.153
4 2.271 6.657 94.810
5 1.039 3.046 97.855
6 .391 1.147 99.002
7 .196 .576 99.578
8 .144 .422 100.000
9 2.968E-15 8.701 E-15 100.000
Rescaled 1 15.624 45.803 45.803 3.423 38.034 38.034
2 11.528 33.795 79.598 2.646 29.401 67.435
3 2.918 8.554 88.153
4 2.271 6.657 94.810
5 1.039 3.046 97.855
6 .391 1.147 99.002
7 .196 .576 99.578
8 .144 .422 100.000
9 2.968E-15 8.701 E-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a- When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
309
Appendix
Com ponent Matrb?
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
Hiding parts of work, 
becoming secretive 1.557 .483 .819 .254
High stress .388 2.002 .181 .932
Negative speculation -.047 -.232 -.078 -.386
Indifference -.933 1.248 -.491 .657
Decreased performance 1.376 -.165 .865 -.104
Gossip -1.776 .144 -.861 .070
Discussion with 
management -.890 -2.171 -.360 -.878
Leave the company 2.515 -.697 .918 -.255
Anger, frustration -.111 .654 -.090 .529
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a- 2 components extracted.
Group 3 by constructs
Communalities
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
passive - active 4.268 3.443 1.000 .807
not solution-oriented - 
solution-oriented 5.125 4.943 1.000 .964
not communicative - 
communicative 4.982 4.235 1.000 .850
damage to the company
- no damage to the 3.714 3.023 1.000 .814
company
hidden - open 4.000 2.731 1.000 .683
alone - collective 3.929 2.660 1.000 .677
repressing the change - 
openly tackling the 
change
3.554 2.953 1.000 .831
destructive - constructive 4.786 4.134 1.000 .864
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues * Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 21.886 63.701 63.701 21.886 63.701 63.701
2 6.237 18.153 81.853 6.237 18.153 81.853
3 2.955 8.602 90.455
4 1.802 5.245 95.701
5 .961 2.797 98.497
6 .291 .847 99.344
7 .225 .656 100.000
8 -1.03E-15 -3.003E-15 100.000
Rescaled 1 21.886 63.701 63.701 5.040 62.996 62.996
2 6.237 18.153 81.853 1.450 18.128 81.124
3 2.955 8.602 90.455
4 1.802 5.245 95.701
5 .961 2.797 98.497
6 .291 .847 99.344
7 .225 .656 100.000
8 -1.03E-15 -3.003E-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a- When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
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Component Matrix*
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
passive - active 1.327 1.297 .643 .628
not solution-oriented - 
solution-oriented 2.028 -.912 .896 -.403
not communicative - 
communicative 1.980 -.560 .887 -.251
damage to the company 
- no damage to the 1.723 -.231 .894 -.120
company 
hidden - open -.033 1.652 -.016 .826
alone - collective 1.630 -.060 .822 -.030
repressing the change - 
openly tackling the 1.706 .206 .905 .109
change
destructive - constructive 1.885 .762 .862 .348
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a- 2 components extracted.
Group 3 by elements
Communallties
Raw Rescaled
Initial Extraction Initial Extraction
Deliberate gossip .982 .041 1.000 .042
Discussions with 
colleagues .786 .507 1.000 .646
Undermining of daily 
business 1.554 .984 1.000 .634
Threats to leave .286 .019 1.000 .067
Discussion with 
management 1.839 .863 1.000 .469
Calling in sick 2.982 2.808 1.000 .942
Demotivation 1.411 .983 1.000 .697
Leaving the company 5.554 5.395 1.000 .971
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eiaenvalues a Extraction Sums of Sauared Loadings
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
Raw 1 8.116 52.724 52.724 8.116 52.724 52.724
2 3.485 22.639 75.363 3.485 22.639 75.363
3 1.908 12.395 87.758
4 1.059 6.882 94.640
5 .461 2.994 97.634
6 .346 2.250 99.884
7 .018 .116 100.000
8 -4.12E-16 -2.675E-15 100.000
Rescaled 1 8.116 52.724 52.724 2.710 33.870 33.870
2 3.485 22.639 75.363 1.757 21.961 55.831
3 1.908 12.395 87.758
4 1.059 6.882 94.640
5 .461 2.994 97.634
6 .346 2.250 99.884
7 .018 .116 100.000
8 -4.12E-16 -2.675E-15 100.000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a- When analyzing a covariance matrix, the initial eigenvalues are the same across the raw and rescaled solution.
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Component Matrix
Raw Rescaled
Component Component
1 2 1 2
Deliberate gossip .025 -.200 .025 -.202
Discussions with 
colleagues .541 .463 .611 .522
Undermining of daily 
business .039 .991 .032 .795
Threats to leave .042 .131 .079 .246
Discussion with 
management .832 .413 .613 .305
Calling in sick -1.220 -1.149 -.706 -.665
Demotivation .910 -.393 .766 -.331
Leaving the company -2.193 .765 -.931 .325
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis, 
a- 2 components extracted.
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A p p e n d i x  J : T o p - d o w n  d o c u m e n t  c o d i n g  f r a m e
T o pic  A r e a s B a sic  C o d e s T h em a t ic  C o d e s  (n =  30)
Description of 
the change
Organizational
relations
System integration: Interconnectivity and integration o f the 
subsidiary into the company system
Germany vs. UK: The relationship between the subsidiary and 
headquarters
Decision making: Decision making about and within the pro­
ject
The project Planning: Descriptions o f  the planning o f the change
Efficiency: Linking the two parts o f  the change (SAP imple­
mentation and warehouse closure), general efficiency gains
IT in the UK: Effects o f  the change on the IT department in 
the UK
Evaluation of change: Evaluative statements in retrospect
Warehouse closure: Issues related to the warehouse closure
The new system Quality: Evaluative statements about (features of) the new sys­
tem
MACH: Evaluative statements about the old MACH system 
(system used in the UK before SAP)
SAP specifications: Specifications and configurations of SAP
Learning from resistance: Using resistance as a source o f
learning______________________________________________
Training: Comments on the user training in the new system 
Formalization of knowledge: Formalization/documentation o f
knowledge in the project____________________________________
Communication with headquarters: Communication between 
the UK subsidiary and German headquarters (both directions)
Title/Purpose: Title and/or purpose o f document_____________
Date of production: Date on which the document was created 
Date of delivery: Date until which a given task should be com-
pleted________________________________________________
Sender: Sender or producer o f  document_____________________
Recipient: Recipient o f  document___________________________
Task responsibility: Person to whom given task is assigned
(includes to-do lists) ______________________ ___
Product issues: Issues related to specific products or product
ranges_______________________________________________
Product returns: Product returns from customers_____________
Pricing issues: I s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  p r i c i n g  o f  p r o d u c t s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Accounting issues: Issues related to accounting ____________
Shipment and delivery: Shipment and delivery planning and
procedures_________________________________________ _______
Hotel customers: Specifications related to hotel customers 
Concession shop/WhoIesale customers: Specifications related
to concession shop/wholesale customers _
Household customers: Specifications related to household 
customers
Resistance and 
learning
Resistance
Learning
Communication Communication
Document
specification
Products
Customers
Appendix
A p p e n d i x  K :  C o m p l e t e  d o c u m e n t  c o d i n g  f r a m e
BASIC CODES THEMATIC CODES ■  MAIN COMMON THEMES 11 THEMATIC
O r g a n iz a ­
t io n a l  RELA­
TIONS
System integration 
Germany vs. UK 
Decision making
■ Conceptual aspects o f  em bedding the opera­
tions o f  the UK subsidiary in the com pany- 
w ide system  architecture
■ Provision o f  support from Germany for SAP  
implementation
■ Recom mendation o f  SA P implementation  
and centralized distribution
The normative 
power o f  the factual
T h e  p r o j e c t Planning 
Efficiency 
IT in the UK 
Evaluation of change 
Warehouse closure
■ Organization o f  planning logistics (m eetings 
when, where, to-do lists etc.)
■ The centralized distribution and unified IT- 
architecture w ill greatly improve efficiency
■ Status quo o f  the IT system  in the U K
■ The implementation steps were com pleted  
satisfactorily
■ Logistical aspects o f  closing the UK ware­
house
Procedure according 
to plan
Operational project 
management
T h e  n e w  s y s t e m Quality
MACH
SA P implementation
■ The new  system  w ill bring many immediate 
improvements
■ M ACH is technically inadequate
■ Technical aspects o f  the SAP imnlementa-
Progress
Operational project
■ Configurations for the SAP system  (user 
interface, entry codes, standard procedures 
etc.)
R e s is t a n c e
L e a r n in g Learning from resis­
tance 
Training 
Formalization of  
knowledge
■ SAP is an exciting new  system  that w ill lead 
to immediate improvements
■ Planning and logistical aspects o f  training 
execution
■ Paper trail and documentation o f  project 
steps and decisions taken
Selling SAP
Operational project 
management
C o m m u n ic a t io n Communication with 
headquarters
■ The com pany units w ill have to com m uni­
cate about certain issues
Operational project 
management
D o c u m e n t
S P E C IF IC A T IO N
Title/Purpose 
Date of production 
Date o f delivery 
Sender 
Recipient
Task responsibility
■ Title and purpose o f  documents (m eeting  
minutes, status report etc.)
■ Date o f  production
■ Date o f  delivery o f  a given identified task
■ Sender o f  the document
» Recipient o f  the document
■ Person responsible for a given identified  
task
Operational project 
management
P r o d u c t s Product issues 
Product returns 
Pricing issues 
Accounting issues 
Shipment and delivery
■ Specifications about certain products or 
product ranges
■ Logistical aspects o f  returning unwanted  
products from customers back to the ware­
house
■ A spects o f  pricing for products and services  
in the new  system
■ A spects o f  accounting procedures in the new  
system
■ Logistics and specifications about the ship­
ment and delivery o f  products from the cen­
tral w arehouse to customers
Operational project 
management
C u s t o m e r s Hotel customers 
Concession  
shop/wholesale cus­
tomers
Household customers
■ Specific requirements o f  hotel customers
■ Specific requirements o f  concession  shops 
and w holesale customers
■ Specific requirements o f  household custom ­
ers
Operational project 
management
Documents
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Thematic codes — — — — —  - — — --- — — — — —
Accounting issues 0 10 11 6 4 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 0 0 1
Communication with h 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Concession shop /whol 1 8 3 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
Date of delivery 0 15 11 8 6 12 6 2 0 1 4 32 4 0 20
Date of production 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
Decision making 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Evaluation of the ch 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Formalization of kno 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Germany vs. UK 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hotel customers 0 5 3 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Household customers 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MACH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IT in the UK 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Learning from resist 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Planning the impleme 0 3 19 0 2 1 2 2 7 0 3 0 0 0 0
Pricing issues 0 4 4 6 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Product issues 0 5 9 2 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 0
Product returns 1 8 7 3 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Quality of the news 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Recipient 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAP implementation p 0 6 3 12 2 12 0 2 3 6 5 4 2 0 0
SAP specifications 0 4 4 7 5 7 5 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2
Sender 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 1
Shipment and deliver 9 10 8 3 6 1 2 2 1 0 0 5 0 0 2
System integration w 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Task responsibility 0 26 39 25 11 22 9 18 14 21 5 22 2 0 11
Title/purpose 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Training 0 2 3 1 3 3 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 2
Warehouse closure 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Totals 15 118 137 80 51 76 38 43 36 34 21 77 12 3 50
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
0 1 0 4 1 6 3 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 3 0 0 0 6
0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2
0 1 0 0 0 7 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 14 0 0 0 42 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 0 3 0 4 0 3
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
0 0 0 0 4 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 7 1 4
0 0 14 5 0 4 42 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 2 2 10 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
1 1 0 1 1 1 5 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 9 28 20 8 43 105 38
24 25 26 27 28 Totals
2 0 0 0 0 60
0 0 0 0 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 32
0 0 4 0 0 131
1 1 2 0 0 34
0 0 4 0 0 4
0 0 9 0 0 9
0 0 0 1 0 6
0 2 0 0 0 66
0 0 0 1 0 2
1 1 0 0 0 19
1 1 0 0 0 9
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 2 0 0 4
0 0 0 0 3 3
0 0 0 3 0 47
0 1 0 0 0 33
0 1 0 0 0 29
0 1 0 0 0 36
0 0 2 0 2 4
0 0 0 0 0 8
4 3 2 2 0 84
0 0 3 0 0 105
0 0 0 0 0 19
2 0 5 0 1 77
0 0 7 0 1 9
0 4 0 0 0 234
1 1 4 1 1 34
0 2 0 0 0 28
0 0 5 0 1 14
13 19 50 8 9 1143
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